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ABSTRACT 
The .finaneial and competitive positions of most industries 
in N ig er ia(pr iva te and pub 1ic) have deter iorated s tead ily 
over the last ten years. This decline has been attributed 
to several factors (such as economie and politicai issues) 
but the single factor most frequently blamed for this is the 
'detective1 system of wage détermination in the country 
which has been accused of being responsible for widespread 
dissatisiaction and unprecedented levéis of industriai unrest 
among workers in the country. 
This study attempts to examine the various forms or 
mechan isms of wage détermination in the country such as (1) 
the Collective Bargaining Process, (2) Arbitration by way of 
wage commissions, (3) the National Minimum Wage, 
(4) Attempts at Pr ices and Incomes Policy. A spec ial exam-
ination and évaluation of the role of trade unions in wage 
détermination is also being carried out. Further, the 
impact of wage policy in economie development is being 
discussed. 
The general hypothesis which has been'developed for this 
study is that "In Nigeria, Industries or Companies using 
the Collective Bargaining Process for the déterminât ion of 
their workers rémunération have a lower str ike ine idence, 
lower labour turnover, lower absenteeism rate, and enjoy 
high productivity". This hypothesis is used to generate 
other sub-hypotheses such as (a) workers under collective 
bargaining indus tries derive more job satisfaction from 
their jobs; (b) Labour-management relationships. are more 
cordial in industries'or compan ies under collée t i ve bar-
gaining arrangements ; (c) Un ion density and worker 
participation in deeision-making are higher in industries 
under collective bargaining; and (d) middle managers in 
companies or .industries under the collective bargaining 
arrangements have a greater sense of belonging-, 
achievement and self-actualisation. 
The hypothèses were tested using a sample of 1,000 workers 
of comparable occupa tions drawn from two compan ies s i tua ted 
in Apapa and Ikeja, the highly industrial areas of Lagos, 
the capital of Nigeria. One was Nigeria Airways Ltd., a 
state-owned org an isation where wage détermination is by 
the Centralised or arbitration wage system. ' The other was 
Lever Brothers(Nig.)Ltd., a private multi-national company 
using the Collective Bargaining process to'determine its 
workers levéis of rémunération. In order to obtain as 
reliable data as possible the fieldwork which was carried 
out in Nigeria was done in two phases. In Phase One, ali 
the proposed techn iques to be used for obtaining da ta such 
as questionnaire structuring, interviewing - structured and 
unstructured - were pretested to minimise any possible 
anoma lies. The questionnaire was structured in two parts. 
The first, Part 'A' con ta ined factual questions(age, 
mar i tal status, académie qua 1if icat ions, work career and 
social background). While in Part 'B', general opinion 
and attitude questions were included. Phase Two of the 
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f ield wor k involved the ma in da ta collée t ion task. 
Also, dur ing th i s per iod, selec ted manager s f: rom bo th 
companies wer e interviewed, together with some Nigeria 
Employer s Consultative Association and Central Trade 
Union officiais, using the unstructured interviewing 
technique. 
The data was processed through the SPSS computer programme. 
A battery of S t a t i s t i c a l tests such as factor and item 
analysis, the Gutman and Likert techniques were used for 
a 11i tude scale measurerneuts. Cor re lation coefficient and 
the ordinary least squares équations were also applied to 
establish évidence of association. 
The fieldwork revealed that, firstly, wage settlernent 
through arbitration is very defective in nature and opération 
in the workers 1 eyes. Secondly, it revealed that workers 
in the firm using the collective bargaining process for the 
de termina t ion of their wag es were mor e sátisf i ed wi th the ir 
jobs. The Collective Bargaining firm had a lower str ike • 
record, lower labour turnover, lower absenteeism rate and 
enjoyed higher productivity rates and good labour-management 
relationship. It had a higher un ion dens i ty and mor e 
articúlate trade union officiais. Finally, it was 
d iscernable from the study tha t manager s in Lever Brother s 
were more satisfied with their pay, -jobs and conditions of 
service and more interested in their workers. What's more, 
the managers have .more sensé of achievement, belonging and 
feelings of self-fulfilment.- This was quite unlike the 
managers in the company under the centralised wage system, 
who were found to be anomic, have feelings of estrangement, 
aliénation and find their work meaningless. 
Furthermore, -the study will evalúate the role of the sound 
wage policy in the process of economie development, 
particularly in agricultural dominated economy such as 
Nigeria. 
Finally, because of the government's apparent deep-seated 
interest in wage détermination issues, coupled with the 
relatively 'fragile nature' of the Nigérian economy, a' 
•tr ipar ti te mode 1 of the collec tive bargaining process 
(embracing government, employers, and workers représentatives) 
is suggested to illuminate thèse relations in a developing 
society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The interest shown by governrnents , emplo/ers and 
employees in wage determination has been growing in developed 
and developing countries in recent decades. This surge 
of interest is due not only to the importance of the 
wage determination system as a device for distributing 
income and rewarding work, but also to the significance 
of wages to the three "Social Partners". Governments, 
employers and employees have their divergent interests to 
further and view wage determination with their own set 
of valúes. 
The employee generally depends entirely or substan-
tially on his wage income to satisfy both his basic needs 
and his wider aspirations as a consumer both for himself 
and his family. Consequently, securing and maintaining 
an income which is sufficient to fulfil these needs and 
aspirations is a matter of top priority for him. To the 
employer, on the other hand, wages are costs, in many 
cases a significant proportion of his total costs. The 
survival and growth of the company implies controlling 
costs, including wages. Government interest stems from 
soc ial and economic cons iderat ions. Wages, even in rela-
tively underdevelopéd'economies, constitute a significant 
proportion of national income, Governments will therefore 
be deeply concerned with wages as they develop policies 
on macro-economic matters such as employment, growth-, 
prices, investment, productivity and the management of 
foreign exchange. 
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A further considération for governments in dealing 
with wage matters, especially in developing countries, is 
that they themselves are often the largest employers. 
Governments therefore feel the need to conduct themselves 
as "model" employers, setting an example for private 
employers. To a considérable extent such governments can 
be seen to be acting as "barometers" guiding private 
employers in determining wage rates. '* 
Ail of thèse interests of employées, employers and 
governments will influence the choice of a country 1 s wage 
détermination system. As governments themselves play key 
rôles in establishing mechanisms for wage détermination in 
developing countries, their situation is a complex one. 
This thesis analyses the position in Nigeria as that 
country attempts to establish a wage déterminât ion 
system which encompasses the wider range of aspirations 
of employées and employers while permitting government to 
pursue its responsibility for economic growth in a stable 
economic and politicai environment. 
Nigeria, like other developing countries, has two 
main methods of wage détermination to choose from. One 
alternative is basically a centralised-, govemnent regulated 
system relying on statutory orders, administrative decree 
and compulsory arbitration. The other alternative is 
collective bargaining with minimal or limited state and 
legal intervention, as practised in Western Europe and 
North America.^ Centralised wage détermination, pioneered 
in Australia and New Zealand has been adopted in most 
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developing countries. These countries have felt that 
the degree of governmental control promised by centralised 
wage détermination is necessary given the vulnerable 
nature of their économies-.- Arguments put forward are that 
collective bargaining gives rise to inflation because 
trade unions are able to negotiate wage increases which 
are "too-high"; and this in turn resultsin the loss of 
compêtitiveness on international markets. Another criticism 
of collective bargaining which has influenced the choice 
of wage détermination system relates to equity. Collective 
bargaining lacks the capacity to achieve an "équitable" 
income distribution because in a developing society it 
will tend to create "excessive" income disparities. 
Another count against collective bargaining is that it 
permits open industriai conflict which results in a loss 
of-out-put which developing countries cannot afford,. 
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and discourages much needed foreign investment. 
Leaving aside the merits of thèse arguments, the net 
effect of thèse beliefs has been both to limit strictly 
the rôle of collective bargaining in developing countries, 
and to tightly constrict the rôle and influence of trade 
unions. This limited rôle of the trade unions in the 
wage détermination process has affected their structure 
and organisational capability. At a fundamental level 
this situation is in line with the hypothesis put forward 
by H.A. Clegg in Trade Unionism under collective 
Bargaining.' Clegg hypothesized that 
"the theory of union behaviour 
under collective bargaining 
maintains that variations in 
k 
union behaviour can~be explained 
by différences in collective 
bargaining". -
He qualifies this statement by poìnting out that' ìt is a 
limited hypothe5Ìs which only applies where collective 
bargaining exists, and not a general theory of trade 
unionismi Clegg also concèdes later that his theory 
dpes not establish "prédictive causal laws", and that he 
was simply postulating that collective bargaining was the 
"main or principal" influence on union behaviour. Despite 
thèse qualifications, Clegg's hypothesis remains a signi-
ficant one from'the point of view of understanding the 
growth and development of industriai relations institutions. 
If the basic relationship postulated by Clegg 
is correct, then the establishment ofstable collective 
bargaining arrangements is a necessary condition for a 
mature trade union movement : and should lead to greater 
maturity in trade unions. If the theory is correct, and 
can be applied to developing countries, then it provides 
at least part of the answer to the contention that collec-
tive bargaining must inevitably lead to immature unions 
defining their members' interests narrowly and becoming 
O 
obstacles to economie growth. This, then, gives rise to 
the question central to this thesis: can Clegg's hypothesis 
be applied to developing countries? This is a question 
of great economic and politicai importance. If developing 
countries can generate "mature" union movements, taking 
• into(account longer term and national interests and 
resolving disputes peacefully, an alternative exists to 
centralised wage determination. This, in its turn, would 
provide a democratic pluralist alternative to a poten­
tially authoritarian solution. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
applicability of Clegg's hypothesis to a developing 
country - a project in which Clegg himself expressed an 
interest - not to test the basic validity of the concept. 
Clegg originated his hypothesis in the context of six 
western industrialised societies and his arguments in 
trade unionism under collective bargaining are sufficiently 
sound to serve as the starting; point for this thesis. 
Indeed, the period in which Clegg produced this work can 
be said to be one which supports his general theory in 
a strong but negative way. Interference by many western 
governments with collective bargaining in pursuit of 
crude incomes policies based on limited agreement has 
de-stabilised bargaining arrangements and produced strident 
and more militant trade unionism. A more oppositional 
approach by trade unions and increased industrial conflict 
has marked these countries' industrial relations in the 
last decade and half. A blunt and les^ sophisticated 
approach by government to collective bargaining has led 
to less "mature" behaviour by western trade unions. 
Recent developments in more industrialised societies 
and the difficulties these countries have experienced 
with industrial relations and wage determination raises 
the question what- can be expected of government, employers 
and trade unions in a developing society like Nigeria? 
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That something can be expected is basic to this thesis. 
No académie work connected with social and politicai 
matters can expect to be value free, and this is no 
exception. Underlying this thesis is a belief that the 
search for an effective wage system in Nigeria which 
started in the colonial period is a worthwhile one. 
It is reasonable for the "Social Partners" in Nigeria to 
seek for a system of wage détermination which achieves 
socially désirable goals as well as satisfying to a 
significant degree the aspirations of individuals and 
organisations. The value of such a system is the basic 
value against which the sophistication of government and 
the "maturity" of the union movement may be assessed. 
"Mature" or constructive behaviour by trade unions is 
behaviour which leads to the establishment and maintenance 
of such a wage payment system. 
A central question to this thesis is therefore 
whether there is évidence to suggest in the Nigérian 
expérience that Nigérian trade unions are capable of res-
ponding in a constructive manner to initiatives by government 
and by employers to develop collective bargaining. 
Criticai to this question is what government in Nigeria 
wants from that country's industriai relations arrangements. 
Nigérian government policy in this area has been influenced 
by a number of considérations. 
The policy of Nigérian governments towards wages -
and, by implication, towards industriai relations 
generally - has reflected its concerns in the course of 
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ec onomic and s oc ial development. Government has wanted 
a wage structure which can be used as a mechanism to 
allocate labour from low to high productivity sectors, 
a major aim has been to move labour from the agricultura 
te the industriai sectors. Another objective has been 
the redistribution of income to bridge the .earnings 
gap between high and low paid workers, which is a 
serious problem in ail developing countries. Despite 
thèse spécifie objectives, and the general desire for 
economie stability, Nigérian governments have always 
maintained a commitment to the principle of collective 
bargaining. In a speech in 1955 , the first Prime 
Minister of Nigeria, Sir Tafawa Abubakar Balewa, 
rea'ff irmed the government 1 s confidence in the effectivene 
of voluntary negotiations and collective bargaining for 
the détermination of wages.^ 
This commitment to the principle of collective bargainin 
was further reaffirmed by the Federai Government in 
1969, in the following government statement: 
"The Eiinistry encourages employers and workers 
to try to settle questions of wages and conditions 
of employaient by collective bargaining and only 
intervenes in the last resort, in the public 
interest, as an impartial arbiter. It fully 
supports the principles and practice of free 
voluntary negotiation, collective bargaining 
and joint consultation. The policy is based 
on belief that those directly concerned in the 
production process are best placed to find the 
answer to their problems". 
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However, inspite of this overwhçl ming support and 
commitment, in practice, the government has been reluctant 
to act on this commitment and has instead been relying on 
statutory wage détermination - through appointed wage 
commissions. As the Udoji wages and salaries review 
commission observed in 1974/75: 
"We do not consider it necessary. 
for us to justify a policy of 
consultation with staff associations 
or unions in the public service; 
such a relationship is practised 
virtually world-wide, and time 
and again this government has 
formally stated its acceptance of 
the principle. Yet implementation 
of the policy has been half-
hearted on the part of both government 
and its employers".? 
The préférence for "centralised" wage détermination 
was expressed in 1970/71, by the Adebo Wages and Salaries 
Review Commission. This commission put the argument in 
the following statement: 
"The use of collective bargaining 
would not alone keep wages in 
proper national balance both as 
regards comparison between the 
sectors, and in relation to available 
real resources. More generally ... 
is such a system likely to assure, 
simultaneously , distributive equity , 
economie growth, full employment and 
monetary stability". 
Given that Nigeria needs industrial and political harmony 
so as to be able to accomplish its social and économie 
development programmes, government has been uncertain 
about what method of wage détermination can croate the 
industrial peace. 
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This study examines 'methods' of wage determination 
in Nigeria and the structure and organisation of tr ade 
unions to discover the effect on the general conduct of 
industrial relations, particularly on issues such as 
industrial confliet and-thpt- union bargaining role. " Fashoyin 
in his recent study has argued that the collective bar­
gaining process is a suitable 'mechanism1 of wage deter­
mination for N iger ia. He no ted: 
"The present study suggests that for Nigeria, 
there is hardly any doubt in the industr ial 
communi ty espec ially among thethreeparties 
in industr ialisat ion - labour management and 
government - that collective bargaining as 
the core of industrial relations is suitable 
for the country", g 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 
one examines the Niger ia economic and social background, 
as well as the wage structure essential for the under­
standing of the analysis. Here, also, the hypothesis 
and significance of the study are treated. Chapter 
two treats the Nigerian trade union movement - develop­
ment and organisation, as well as the legal framework 
of the Niger ian industr ial relations. Chapter three 
looks at the main methods of wage determination in 
Nigeria, and concludes that the system of determining 
wages- by the government appointed wage commission has 
serious disadvantages, though some improvement is possible. 
In this chapter also, the Nigerian exper ience of collec tive 
bargaining and the reasons why its growth has been 
limited is considered. 
10 
Chapter four considers the expérience of the other 
wage fixing techniques, the national minimum wage and 
pr ices and incomes policy ';• "
 :: ; and argues 
that neither can be central to a general system of wage 
détermination in the country. 
The rôle of the Nigérian trade un ion movernen t in 
pay détermination, as well as its structure and major 
organisational problems are covered in chapter f ive. 
In chapter six, the research methods used in the investi-
gation, and the case studies of the twò organisatitions^ 
where the survey was carried out are discussed". Chapter 
seven considers the 1results 1 of the research; and the 
hypothèses put forward for the study are tested. The 
role of wage policy in economie development is discussed 
in chapter eight. While the last chapter of the thesis 
{Chapter 9) looks at the future, of^the wage détermination 
system in Niger ia with special focus on the collective 
bargaining mechanism, and suggests a new approach 
to the system. 
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CHAPTER ONE BACKGROUND SURVEY 
The wage/salary détermination process of a country cannot be 
fully understood and appreciated except against its economie 
and politicai background. Howe-ver, since there existé a sub-
stantial body of literature"^ on the latter, only the 
former (economie setting) would be discussed. Hence the 
purpose of this chapter. 
1.1 -VTHE ECONOMY AND THE LABOUR FORCE STRUCTURE 
Nigeria's modem economie growth started at the end of the 
•Second World War ( 1939-4-5 ) ; and in the 1950s the (GDP) 
Gross Domestic Product increased at an annual rate of 4 
2 
per cent. This accelerated to about 5 per cent in tho first 
half of 1960s immediately following politicai independence. 
However, the politicai instability which erupted after 1965 
and later culminated in the civil war between the Federai 
government and the secessionists Biafra 1967-70 led to the 
disruption in the economy, so that by 1970 the economie 
gains of the early 1960s had been seriously reduced. 
Nonetheless, the 1970s witnessed a remarkable recovery in 
economie growth and development. The Second National Plan 
for Development and Reconstruction 1970-74-» and the Third 
National Plan 1975-80, generated a considérable growth and 
restructuring of the economy. In fact, the GDP during 
this period 1970-74- increased by 8.2 per cent per annum and 
about 8.5 per cent per annum in period to 1978-79- - With the 
virtual doubling of oil priées in 1978-80 and the maintenance 
of high levels of production, through the production was later 
cut back from 2 million barrels per day to 1.6 million 
12a 
(barrels per day), the GDP target of 9-5 per cent was 
achieved. This means that the GDP more than doubled 
during the 1970-80 period wìth an annual rate of growth 
of about 9 per cent per annum. 
13' 
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In 1979/80, the income per capita was $600 dollars 
approximately N355.8 Naira. With the decline in the 
revenues from oil since the second part of 1981 it is likely 
the Income.per capita would be below the 1979/80 level 
by the end of 1980/81 fiscal year. 'However, what•is 
interesting about the income per capita as at 1979/80, is 
that it has shown a tremendous upward trend during 20 year 
pèriod (1960/80). It has risen from a mere N43.5 Naira 
per c ami t a in 1960, N187-85 Naira in 1975 to N355.8 Naira 
in 1979/80. This apparentquadruppling of the per capita 
income has been largely due to the increased prosperi'ty from 
petroleum in addition to progress in value-added accruing 
from industries. In other words, the economy as measured 
i 
by the size of its Gross Domestic Product - about 
£28 billion in 1980 - was the largest in Africa, surpassing 
South Africa, and among the top ten countries in the third 
world. Table T. shows the Gross Domestic Product (at 
current factor cost) for 1979-80 financial year. It 
can be seen from the table that the GDP was N29,664 
(approximately N30 billion, while the total Gross National 
Product stood at N30,109.9 million Naira. 
Thèse records of outstanding "economie performance 
notwithstanding, Nigeria is stili primarily an agricultural 
economy where agriculture stili accounts for a substantial 
proportion of the GDP; though in recent years its contri-
bution to the GDP is fast declining. At the time of 
independence in 1960 , agriculture including forestry, 1ive 
stock and fishery was the mainstay of the economy. It 
accounted for over 60 percent of the GDP. As can be seen 
H 
Table 1: Gross Domestic Product (At Current Factor Cost) 
For 1979-80: Distribution; in N Million and 
Percentage 
Sector N Million Percentage 
1.Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 5,457.3 18.4 
2.Mining and Quarrying 1 1 ,008 . 0 37. 1 
3.Manufacturing & Crafts 2,375.0 8.0 
4.ELectricity & Water Supply 158.6 0.5 
5. Building and COnstruction 3,357.2 11 .3 
6.Distribution 2,419.1 8.2 
7.Transport & Communication 1 ,019.0 3.4 
8.General Government 2,060.9 6.9 
9.Education 1 ,008 .5 3.4 
10.Health 328 .3 1.2 
11.Other Services 472.8 1.6 
Total 29,664.8 100.0 
Spuree: Federal Republic of Nigeria: Third National 
Development Plan 1975-80, Volume 1, Table 5.4, 
p.SO. 
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from Table 2, in 1958/59, the country's Gross Domestic 
Product valued at 1962/63 factor cost amounted to N2,084.2 
million Naira. Of this figure agriculture accounted for 
N1,342 million Naira or 64.39 percent; while Distribution 
the second largest sector contributed N260.6 million Naira 
or 12.5 percent. None of the other major sectors of 
the economy accounted for as much as 5\. percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product. The share of manufacturing, 
building/construction, mining and quarrying sectors which 
have now dominated the economywas 4.6,' 4.2 and 1.1 percent 
respectively. Thus, at the ève of Nigeria's independence 
in 1960, the economy was predominantly agricultural. Even 
in the post-independence years, for example, between 1960-
65 as reflected in table 2 , agricultural contribution 
averaged 61.8 percent of the GDP. However, as noted 
earlier in.the récent years its contribution to the Gross 
Domestic Product has beenonthe decline. As can be'seen 
from table 4, from 64 .39 percent contribution in "1958/59 
to 34.74 percent in 1973/74. And the trend has not changed 
s inee then as the statistics in table 3 re inforces. It 
can be seen from the table that among ali the sectors, 
agricultural sector recorded the least average annual 
growth rates of the GDP for the years 1975-80. 
Ironically, inspite of this relative decline the 
government has been embarking on extensive agricultural 
development programmes. The main reason being the govern-
ment 1 s commitment to an Export-led economie growth and the 
achievement of self-sufficiency in food production. During 
the Third National Pian period 1975-80 the national 
capital expenditure for the agricultural sector was 
Table g. . Sectoral Distribution of Nigeria's GDF Gross Domestic Product 1 958-1 975, Percentages 
Sector 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 
1. Agricolture^ 64.39 
2 . Forestiy & Fishing 64.39 63.13 64.08 62 .19 61 .82 61 .50 58 .67 55.37 
2. Mining 1 .12 1 .20 1 .20 1 .74 2 .09 2.08 2.7tj 4.76 
3. Manufacturing 4.65 4.82 4 .80 5.22 5.64 6.02 6.13 7.02 
4. Electric i t y 0 .24 0.29 0 .32 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.58 . 
5. Building & Const 4.22 •E45S3 4.01 4.23 4.34 4.19 4.34 5.55 
_6- Distribution 12.50 12.50 12.74 12.35 12.05 12.80'' 13 .50 13.30 
7. Transport & 
Communication 4.79 4.79 
A _ " •' 
4.56 
4 . " -'• 
4.14 4.83 4.64 5 .07 4.64 
8. General Govt. 3.01 . 3.47 3.20 3.10 2.99 2 .76 3.04 3.08 
9 . Educat ion 2.52 2 .74 2.56 2.81 2.99 2.93 3.17 3.08 
10. Health 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.64 0.63 0.69 0.72 
11 . Others Services 2.09 2.03 2.03 2.26 2.17 • 1 .98 2.17 2.30 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
CContinued next page) 
Sector 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 
1. Agriculture 
---
2. Forestry & Fishery 51 .88 52.69 52.54 47.45 44.56 42 .00 36.99 34.74 
3. Mining 6.90 6.36 3.34 8.10 11 .99 15.07 16.79 17.77 
Manufactur ing 7.36 7.35 7.88 8.17 7.49 6.52 7.56 8.90 
Electricity 0.66 0.58 0.69 0.64 0.58 0.62 0.70 0.83 
Building & Const. 5.22 5.27 4 .60 5. 20 6.27 7.51 8.51 8 .09 
Distribution 12.79 12.92 13.06 12.76 12.15 11.7-5 10.73 10.84 
Transport & 
Communication 4.65 4.40 4.94 3.95 3.26 3.15 3.64 4.26 
General Govt. 3.35 3.57 5.46 8.00 7.40 6.95 8.24 7.84 
T 
Education 3.62 3.47 3.61 2.24 2.69 2.83 2.90 3.02 
Health 0.82 0.72 0.79 0.72 0.87 0.78 8.94 1.15 
Others services 2.72 2.67 3.08 2.77 .2.74 2.78 3.00 2.23 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Notes : 1. At 1962-63 Factor 2. Former EasternRegion not included in the estimation. 
Source : Federai office of Statistics, National Accounts df Nigeria Lagos 1976. See also Olaloku, F.A. et al., 
"Structure of the Nigérian Economy: Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1979, p.6, Table 1.2. 
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Table 3 -. . Annual Sector.al Growth Rates of the Gross 
Domestic Product at Current Factor Cost 
1975-80 
Sector 1975-76 
( 
1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
1975-80 
1 .Agriculture, 
!• Forestry & 
Fishing 9.7 10.8 10.2 10.0 9.9 10.1 
2.Mining & 
Qiiarrying 10.4 10.3 10.9 11 .2 11.9 11.0 
3.Manufacturing 
& Crafts 21 .6 26.3 29.4 30 .8 33.7 28.3 
4.Electricity & 
Water supply 17.9 17.9 24.3 24 .7 25.5 22 .1 
5.Building & 
Construction 28.2 31 .6 32.5 35.3 35.1 32.5 
ó.Distribution 16.6 18.0 20.5 22.2 23.0 20.1. 
7.Transport & 
Communication 19.2 22.9 25.7 29.6 31.4 25.8 
8.General Govt. 15.0 15.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 18.0 
9.Education 19.0 21.0 22.0 23 .0 24.0 21.8 
10.Health 18.0 19.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 20 .0 
11.0ther Services 13.8 15.5 17.3 19.0 19.7 17.1 
12.Aggregate 
Annual G. Rate 13.0 14.2 15.6 16.8 18.0 15.5 
Source: Federai Republic of Nigeria Third National Development Pian 1975-80, 
Volume 1, Table 5.6 p.51. 
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N2.201 billion, ( T a b l e s ) . In April 1 9 8 0 , the government 
launched the 'Green Revolution Programme' as a testimony 
to its commitment to extensive agricultural expansion. The 
primary objective of the programme was to modernise the 
agr icu ltural sector of the economy and espec ially to achiev.e 
self-sufficiency in food production. At.'the launching cere-
•mony the Federai Government made-available the suin of 183 million 
Naàra for the resuscitation of the sector's ailing crops, livestock, 
fqrestry and fishery Units which had hitherto been neglected. 
Under this arrangement various projects such as land clear-
ing schemes, farm mèchanization centres, agro-service 
centres, river basin development schemes, national accle-
rated food production programmes and tractor hire service 
l 
received increased development funds. In addition, fol-
lowing the green révolution programme, supply of fertilizers 
and other material inputs were increased together with 
3 
'crédit1 under the crédit guarantee scheme. 
To implement the green révolution programme, two 
bodies were set up: 
a. The National council on the green révolution, headed 
by the président, and 21 other members drawn from 
ministries whose responsibilities have bearing on 
agricultural production, processing and research. 
The main functions of the council include: the co-
ordination of ail the activities of the ministries 
associated with the programme and the issuing of 
directives on the exécution of the programme. 
20 
Table ..4-. National Capital Expenditure for the Agriculture 
Sector During the 1975-80 Plan Period 
N (million) As a percentage 
of the 1979-80 GDP 
of approx. N30 
Billion 
i. Crops N1 .646 billion 5.5 
ii. Livestock N344.064 1 .1 
iii.Forestry N109.727 0.4 
iv. Fishery N101 .554 0.4 
Total 2.201 billion 7.3 
Source : Third National Development Plan 19 75-8 0, 
Volume One, p.72. 
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b. The other body is the commodity boards. The main 
function of the commodity boards is to purchase sche-
duled crops (cocoa,seed cotton and" ground nuts). 
As part of, ••' the green revolution programme, within the 
first six months of 1980 the Central Bank guaranteed a total 
of 318 agricultural loans to various sectors and state 
governments. The overall aim of these massive agricultural 
development programmes and direct cash investiments has 
been to increase agricultural contribution to the gross 
domestic product. 
However, this aim (increase in agricultural contri-
bution) is rarely being met, commenting on the poor agri-
cultural performances with respect to ìts contribution to 
the GDP (Tableï ) in his budget speech in Aprii 1979, 
the former head of state Lt. General Obasonjo declared: 
\ "Changes are inévitable in process 
of economie growth and development, 
in our particular case, the pro-
portionate decline in agricultural 
production has been too rapid".4-
Undoubtedly agriculture has performed poorly since late 
1960s due to: ravages of the civil war, urban based -
development strategy, fluctuation in world market prices 
for agricultural produets and the Sahelian drought of the 
early 70s; have ali combined to reduce the annual route of 
growth of per capita agricultural output. As already 
shown in Table i, in 1979-80 agricultural sector contribu-
tion to GDP was 18.4 percent compared with 34 percent in 
22 
1973-74 almost a 50 percent décline in real contribution. 
In effect, agriculture bas declined in significance, it is 
as Diejomaoh noted recently "the weakest sector in the 
5 
economy". 
Even in the einployment field which it dominated in 
the early 50s and 60s trends in modem sector employment 
are showing a constant décline in agricultural employment 
as Table 5 shows. As can be seen in the table, services 
industry now tops with almost 36 percent employment, 
closely followed by manufacturing industry, and construc­
tion with 21.4 and 13.7 percent respectively. 
Nonetheless, the economy has found 'consolation' 
in the other contributors to the Gross Domestic Product. 
Particularly from the mining sector. dominated by oil pro­
duction. The index of minerai production for the first 
half of 1980 stood at 118.3 (1972=100), compared with 
120.5 and 131 in the corresponding periods of 1979. The 
indices of production of gas, cassiterite columbite, coal 
and lime stone rose by 24.0,.45.6, 45.3, 4.2 and 3.0 
percent respectively compared with the levels in the second 
half of 1979. 
Petroleum now contributes 90 percent of the total 
export and 80 percent of the tax revenue and about 25 
percent of the GDP. Oil production has in other words 
emerged as the mainstay of the economy now. However, 
with the current oil glut , in the world market both 
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Table 5 . Recent Trends in Modem Sector Employaient, 
1973-75 
, . • ; \j 
EMPLOYMENT Additional 
Employment 
Sept. 1973 
to Aprii 
1975 
Sept. 1973 Aprii 1975 
0 0 
Share 
No 
(000) 
0 
0 
Share 
No 
(000) 
1 * 
Agriculture 7.3 101.5 7.0 105.0 
3,500 
Mining & Quarrying 6.4 89.0 6.0 90.0 1,000 
Manufacturing & 
Processing 
y M 
Construction & 
Building 
21.4 297.4 21.6 324.0 26,600 
13.7 190.4 14.0 210.0 19,600 
Electricity, Gas & 
Water 2.1 29.2 2;0 30.0 800 
Distribution 7.0 97.3 6.6 99.0 1,700 
Transport & 
Communication 6.4 89.0 6.1 91.5 2,500 
Services 35.7 496.2 36.7 550.5 54,300 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 1,500.0 110,000 
Source : Third National Development Plan 1975-80 , Volume I, 
Table 32.3, p. 371 . 
Explanation: 
1. Traditional Agriculture which still employs 
the bulk of population is not included here. 
2k 
production and exports have been moderated, as table 6 
has shown. It can be seen from the table that both 
production and exports fell in 1975 after an ail time 
record in 1974. After *pi.cking1 up in 1976 and 1 977 , res-
pectively, production and export experienced a decline in 
1978. Similarly, réductions on both production and export 
levels were experienced in 1980. When compared with the 
1979 production level of 841,055 (barrels) it is 10.4 
percent below. 
Some critics of the economy have argued however, that 
total reliance on revenues from oil production which is 
beset by world price fluctuation in the oil market was 
not to the Nation's advantage. Many fear that certain 
projected economie development plans might be delayed or 
completely abandoned if the oil industry starts experienc-
ing massive decline in revenues. This fear was 
expressed by the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
0. Ola Vincent when he said: 
"People should also express concern 
about the réduction in the volume 
of the country 1s traditional and 
other non-oil exports". 6 
The Governor's statement implies that the economy was 
'leaning' so much on the oil export and thereby neglecting 
other non-oil exports such as cocoa, ground nuts and bean 
seed. The fluctuation in production and price have always 
been reflected in changing politics by the Government. 
It has a number of ways of reacting to such events. The 
most effective weapon in its armoury being a constant 
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Table 6 . Crude Oil Production and Export Statistics 
1970-1980 
CRUDE OIL IN BARRELS 
Year Production Exports 
1970 395,935,689 383,455,353 
1971 558,678,882 542,545,131 
1972 643,206,685 650,640,779 
1973 750,593,415 725,117,624 
1974 823,317,838 795,710,044 
1975 651 ,506,761 627,638,983 
1976 758,058,380 736,822,998 
1977 765,937,709 757,942,105 
1978 692,269,121 667,387,067 
1979 841,634,055 818,726,943 
1980 
l 
754,620,497 380,140,8211 
Source : Annua1 Abstract of Statistics 1981 édition : 
Federai Office of Statistics Lagos Nigeria: 
Table 6.14, p. 83. 
Notes: 
1. The figure of 380,140,821 (barreis) is only 
for Ist half of 1980 Jan-June. The second-
half was not available. 
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re-adjustment and reviewing of its policies. For example, 
as production and prices rose in the first half of the 
1970s, the then military government adopted libéral import 
policies and awarded large wages and salary increases 
7 • 
such as the Adebo and the Udoji awards. 
However, as production fell below expectations in 
1975 and 1978 (see tableô ) , the government swiftly reacted 
by adjusting its demand management policies. Import 
controls were increased, so also was the responsibilities 
of the Comprehensive Import Supervision Scheme (CISS) 
8 
set up to oversee import controls during the period. 
The government on its part made sure that development 
spending did not fall below expectation. To fulfill this 
obligation the government entered the Euro-Dollar market 
to raise 51.7 billion dollars to finance development 
9 
projects. 
\ 
The construction industry has also continued to make 
substantial contribution to the Gross Domestic Product. 
In 1970, it accounted for 4 percent of the GDP. While in 
1975-76, 76-77, 77-78 and 79-80 it accounted for 6.1, 
6.7, 7.3 and 9.0 percent respectively of the gross domestic 
product. The building boom of the 1970swas aimed at 
breakîng the constraints caused by inadéquate roads, ports 
and airport facilities, housing and office shortages. 
Récent years have seen the completion of major new high-
ways and bridges, modem ports, airports and office build­
ings and several housing projects. The problem now, 
however, is that a lull has gripped the industry because 
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raost major projects hâve either been completed or nearing 
completion. Emphasis has now shifted to maintenance of new 
facilities, building of residential accommodation and the 
new fédéral capital at Abuja. With this shift, a much 
lower level of activity is now ranging in the industry 
compared with the boom years of the 1970's. 
Manufacturing also experienced a significant growth in 
1970-78 period. Output increased at annual rate of 10 percent 
in the first half of the 1970's, and later reached about 14 
percent during the second half of the 1970's. Its share of 
the gross domestic product has been very encouraging as well. 
For example, in 1976-77, 1977-78, 1978-79 and 1979-80 it 
accounted for 5.2, 5.7, 6.2 and 6.9 percent respectively. 
However, it needs to be emphasised, that manufacturing pro­
duction is still largely dominated by consumer goods indus­
tries although the last few years have witnessed a major 
shift towards intermediate and capital goods industries. 
Some of the projects include two oil refineries cited at 
Kaduna and Warri respectively. Two car assemply plants -
a Volkswagen plant at Badagri and Peugeot plant at Kaduna; 
three commercial vehicle assembly plants, a large phos­
phate fertilizer plant, two big steel projects and a liqui-
fied natural gas project. 
There has also been growth in the power, water and 
télécommunication industries. Although intermittent power 
failures or cuts are still rampant in différent parts of the 
country, supply has increased significantly with the com­
pletion of new thermal plants and expansion of existing 
capacities. For example, in 1980, installed electr icity 
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generating capacity increased by 5.4 percent to 1,822.7 
mégawatts. The major power stations are the Kainji (Hydro 
760 m w ) . Delta (GT 312 m w ) , Afam (GT 252 m w ) , Ijora (GT 
96.7 mw) Ijora II (ST 85 mw) and Sapele (ST 240 mw) accounted 
for 95.8 percent of the total generating capacity. The net 
effect of thèse improvements has been the shortening of 
•power cuts duration time' in the period 1981/82, and incre-
ased electricity consumption in ail sectors - industrial 
commercial and residential. Similarly, the water shortage 
remains, but the situation is imprôving more public- taps 
ar/e now running in the day-time, compared with the situa-
with the completion of several automatic téléphone exchanges, 
although, admittedly, the services are still generally poor. 
For example, first class letters still take three to five 
days before getting to their destination. And only about 
20 percent of the population are téléphone subscribers. 
Since Gross Domestic Product performance is not the only 
yardstick for a country*s economic viab'ility, an examination 
of another 'economic indicator* such as inflation before 
concluding the discussion would be in place. Inflation: 
In the 1970's the average rate of inflation was 14.35 percent."" 
The main causes of inflation during the period were a combina-
tion of factors. On the supply side the main éléments were: 
i. inadéquate supply of locally produced and imported 
commodities. 
ii. the high priées of imported goods occasioned by 
increases in foreign prices, international foreign 
tion a few years ago. Télécommunications hâve also improved 
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exchange instability, higher freight charges and 
surchages arising from port congestion; 
iii.high costs of domestic manufactures arising from 
higher wage costs, accompanied by low productivity in 
some cases; 
iv. monopolistic practices by some Nigérian and foreign 
enterprenuers with respect to production, importation 
and distribution of certain commodities. 
While on the demand side, were: 
i. the rapid rate of government récurrent and capital 
spending during the period; 
ii. the phenominal increases in wage s and salaries, in 
particular the awards made by the Udoji wages and 
salaries commission; 
.iii.the rapid increases in thé quantity of money supply. 
for example, in December 1975, the money supply was 
N2 ,044.1 (million Naira, by 1979 it had increased to 
N6,146.6 million Naira; showing that within a space 
of four years (1975-79), the quantity of money supply 
il r 
has quadruppled; and 
iv. increases in demand generated by an environment cha-
racterised by expectations of inflation; particularly 
within those few months preceding the officiai publi­
cation of the Udoji awards. Ali the above éléments 
on both the demand and supply side combined to 
accelerate the rate of inflation during the seventies. 
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Hovever, since 1980 there has been a réduction in the 
overall inflation rate. By the second half of 1980 the rate 
of inflation stood at 2 0 per cent. With the présent dee line 
in revenue and foreign exchange reserves, rapid increases in 
government expenditure and imports would be severely reduced. 
It is therefore likely that the Government would achieve its 
objective of reducing the rate of inflation to below 10 per 
cent during the Fourth National Development Plan 1981-85-
In sum, the growth of the econoray has been substantial 
twenty years after independenee and it is likely to c ontinue 
into the 1980s with the launch of the Fourth National 
Development Plan 1981-85. It was estimated in 1980 by some 
Nigérian Ec onomists such as Diej eomah (Profes s or of 
Economics at the University of Lagos) that the rate of 
growth during the 1981-85 period would be higher at about 
8.5 per cent per annum. During this pian period 1981-85* 
priòrity will be given to agriculture (an average growth 
rate of 5 per cent.per annum has been set for the sector) 
housìng, éducation, health and manufacturing. Also efforts 
will be directed to reducing the dependence of the 
economy on oil as a source of government revenue and 
foreign exchange earnings. In addition attention will be 
focused on the developraent of technology, increased productivity/ 
réduction in the level of under-empioyment, réduction in rural-
urban migration and the promotion of a new national orientation 
conducive to greater discipline, better attitude to work and 
cleaner environment. The overall pian will cost the Federai 
12 
government about £32 billion pounds. 
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Albeit the above mentioned statistics may sound very 
ene ouraging and plausible both t o s orne Niger ians and 
foreign investors,; the question is what impact will it 
have on the standard of living of the people of Nigeria? 
Where over 75 per cent of the population can be considered 
to be living in poverty, many (25 per cent) far below the 
13 
poverty line. Perhaps, an examination of the workforce 
would help us to provide an answer to the question. 
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A study of wage-salary détermination may appear to be 
unnecessary for an agricultural economy such as Nigeria, 
in which the proportion of the wage-earners is a very smali 
fraction of the labour force (see Table 7 ) . In 1973 and 1975 
agricultural shares of the modem sector employment were 7.3 
and 7.0 percent respeetively. In effect, agriculture stili 
provides employaient for over 70 percent of the working 
population. However, one question which needs to be answered 
before proceeding with the examination of the labour force 
is - why is wage-employment such a small fraction of the 
population? 
Undoubtedly, this sort of question will attract a variety 
of answers or explanations; but the hard fact is that up 
till the first half of this century, most Nigérians had 
différent perceptions of and attitudes towards wage-
employment. Many saw the concept of wage-employment as 
being contrary to or in direct conflict with their"customary 
norms and values which binds them together as a primary 
society. To the titled villager (chief or Mazi) or an 
ordinary citizen, wage-earning employment was too mean a 
thing ; ancT acceptirug one meant degrading one ' s independent, 
self-sufficient status to that of an ubiquitous hired-
labourer. In fact, working for another, unless when 
governed by customs and tradition,amoimted to slavery. 
This attitude according to Elliot Berg, was 'the feature 
of ali traditional pre-industrial societies. 
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Table The Labour Market 1975-80 
1975 
r f 
1980 Change 1975-80 
No 
[millions) 
0 
0 
Share 
No 
(millions) 
% 
Share 
(millions) 
1.Labour Force 29.22 - 32.74 - 3.52 
2.Unemployment Gap 1.31 4.5 0.98 3.0 0.33 
3.GAINFUL OCCUPATION 29.91 - 31 .76 - 3.85 
a.Agrie Sector 17.86 64 .0 19.21 60.5 1.15 
b.Non-Agrie " 8.05 36.0 12.55 39.5 2.70 
i.Large & Médium • 
size establishments 1 .40 14.2 1 .86 14.8 0.46 
ii.Small-scale 
ènterprises 8.45 85.8 10.69 85.2 .2.24 
4a.WAGE EMPLOYMENT 
SECTOR 
2.18 7.8 2.76 8.7 0.58 
a. Agr icul tur al -
sector 0.21 9.5 0.25 8.9 0.04 
i.Large and médium 
.size establishments 0.10 47.6 0.12 48.0 0.02 
ii.Small-scale 
ènterprises 0.11 52.4 0.13 52.0 0.02 
b.Non-agrie sector 
i.Large and médium 
size establishments 
1 .97 
1 .40 
90 .5 
71.1 
2.51 
1 .86 
91 .1 
74.1 
0.54 
0 .46 
ii.Small-scale 
ènterprises 0.57 28.9 0.65 25.9 0.08 
4b.WAGE EMPLOYMENT 
BY SIZE OF FIRM 
a.Large & Médium 
size establishments 2.18 _ 2.76 _ 0.58 
i.Agrie-sector 0.10 6.7 0.12 6.1 0.02 
ii.Non-agrie sector 1 .40 93.3 1 .86 93.9 0 .46 
(contihued on next page) 
34 
1 
1975 Change 
1975-80 
(millions) No 
(millions) 
% 
Share 
No 
(millions) 
% 
Share 
b.Small scale (firms) 0.68 31 .2 0 . 78 28.3 0.10 
i. Agriculture 0.11 16.2 0.13 16.7 0.02 
ii.Non-agriculture 0.57 83.8 0.65 83.3 0.08 
5.SELFA/C (UNPAID 
HOUSEHOLD WOMEN ETC. 25.73 92.3 29 .00 91.3 3.27 
a.Agric-sector 17.83 69.3 19.26 66.4 1 .43 
b.Non-agric sector 7.90 30.7 9.74 33 .6 1 .84 
Source : Fédéral Republic of Nigeria!, Third National Development 
Plan, 1975-80, Volume I, Table 32.7, p.374. 
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Furthermore, to most o£ thèse traditionalists wage-
employment was purely instrumental, in other words a 
means to achieve a set goal or objective, which in most 
cases was to accumulate enough money with which to pay 
the dowry for a wife. The moment such budgeted cash was 
amassed, the worker retirai to his village. A number of 
alternatives were usually open to him. He may decide 
to remain in the village and carry on with full-time 
subsistence agriculture; or he may choose to practise 
village craft or be engaged in some local cottage industry 
like weaving or pottery. On the other hand, particularly 
in big villages, he may decide to enter modem occupations 
such as hair-dressing and photography. For those with 
little cash, petty retail trading which afford them the 
opportunity of visiting the townships or cities occasional-
ly is an attractive occupation. 
However, the two world wars had this negative 
attitude among the traditional people towards wage-
employment quashed. For soon after the outbreak of the Second 
world war the government had over 40,000 Nigérians 
recruited into the armed forces to be trained in dif-
férent •skilled jobs; such as mechanics, electriciàns, 
telephonists, motor drivers and store keepers. At the 
end of the war, the Labour Department was faced with the 
daunting task of re-settling over 120,000 demobilised 
soldiers and other servicemen, two-thirds of whom regis-
15 
tered for wage-employment. ,* 
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Various reasons have been advanced for this change 
of attitude among thèse traditional people. Firstly, it 
was discovered that many of the discharged soldiers had 
decided to seek wage-employment because of lack of 
sufficient personal 'capital 1 with which to start private 
businesses.In effect, many thought that they would be 
able to fulfil this aspiration after a period of such • 
wage-employment. Secondly, some of the semi-educated 
ones among the soldiers expressed the view that farming 
(as practised in the villages) was a m'ean occupation. 
Finally, many soldiers feit that wage-employment was 
by définition the most reliable and regulär source of 
cash with which to acquire the paraphernalia of modem 
living such as bicycles, gramaph'ones, radios, nylons and 
other clothes for their wives and relatives. Consequently, 
since the 1940s the labour force as a percentage of the 
population has been'. increasing though wage-earners 
still remain a small fraction of the labour force as Table 
"7 ' has shown.
 r-
It is worthy of note, however,that during the 1970's 
the labour force has been increasing in absolute terms 
by about 630,000 per annum. As can be seen from table $ 
almost- half of the population was in the labour force 
between 1965 and 1980. The labour force participation 
rate is estimated to be 78 percent (based on the 1967 
labour force sample survey). Another significant feature 
of the Nigérian labour force is the prédominance of 
semi-skilled or unskilled labour with little or no work 
expérience. The labour force sample survey of 1966/67 
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Table 8 . Organisée! Labour and the Labour Force, 
1965-80. 
Year 
(A) 
Population 
'• (000) 
(B) 
Labour 
force 
(000) 
Labour 
force as 
% of po­
pulation 
0 0 
ccy 
Organised 
Labour l 
Organised 
labour as 
% of La-
labour 
force 
1965 48676 23810 49 544016 2.3 
1970 55073 26080 47 700416 2.7 
1975 62925 29220 46 864249 3.0 
1980 72596 32740 45 N. A. N.A. 
Source : 
(a) United Nations Report on Monitoring of Population 
Trends, Population Commission, Nineteenth Session 
10-21 , January 1977 . 
(b) Third National Development Plan 1975-80, Volume I 
Table 32.1, p. 369, Fédéral Ministry of 
Economie Development, Lagos. 
(c) Fédéral Ministry of Labour & Productivity Various 
Reports. 
xplanatcrV Note: 
Organised labour force here means wage/salary earners 
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the only comprehensive survey to date showed that the 
labour force is generally young, with about 70 percent 
clustering around 15-40 years of age . ^  In addition, 
the 1966-1967 survey also revealed that the labour force 
participation rate is higher among males than females 
approximately 94.8 percent in the former and about 64.8 
percent in the latter. 
The 1966-1967 survey further revealed that wage-
employment in agricultural sector was an infinitésimal 
fraction of the total wage-employment, it stoòd at .6 
percent in urban areas and 0.8 percent in rural areas. 
This contrasts with the share of 21 percent recorded by the 
non-agricultural sector during the same period. In 1970, 
wage-employment represented 5.8 percent of the total 
gainful employment and by 1975 and 1980 it had gone up to 
7.8 and 8.7 percent respectively (Table 7.). 
With regards to sectoral employments, in 1973 employ-.. 
ment in the various sectors totalled 1.39 million and by 
Aprii 1975 it had increased to 1.5 million an increase of 
about 8 percent(Table 9.). The public sector tops the 
list with 75.2 percent(See Table 10.). However, from 
the above statistics it has become very vivid that the 
wage earning population is very small when compared to, 
firstly, the size of gainful employment; and secondly 
the labour force as a whole. Indeed, both the 1975 
and-the latest(1980) figures of 2.3 and 2.7 percent 
respecitvely of wage-earners in Nigeria as a percentage of 
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the population bore further testimony to the problem of wage 
employment in the country. 
Looking at table 9 one can notice the relatively large 
size of employment in the service, industry. It can be seen 
from the table that in each of the years (1965-75) under 
considération, employment in the industry accounted for 
more than a third of the wage-earning population, and remains 
the largest source of wage-employment in the country. This 
pattern of distribution actually reflects the nature of the 
modem sector employment in Nigeria as primarily commercial 
rather than industriai, albeit the drive now is for massive 
industrialisation. Also from the same table it can be seen 
that both the manufacturing and the construction sectors 
recorded big increases in employment. The apparent increases 
(in employment) in these sectors particularly in the 
manufacturing and the construction sectors reinforces 
the federai government 1 s total commitment towards 
industriai growth. 
Furthermore, employment in agriculture in the four 
years as shown in table 9 below declined from 13-5 to 7 percent 
of the wage-earning employment. For instance, in 1965» 
employment in the industry numbered around 59-280 
workers, in 1966, barely one year it had gone up to 163,900 
workers, an increase of about 176 percent. However, in 
1973 (table 9) it dropped sharply to 101 ^ ^'(work-ers) > 
but rose again in 1975 to 105 / 00'0> (workers.) an increase 
of about 3.4 percent. Undoubtedly this 
¿0 
Table 9 Sectoral Distribution of EMployment in Nigeria 1 965-75 
Tndustry 
Group: 
E M P L O Y M E N T 
1965 
Nuniber Share 
1966 
Number ' Share Number 
1973 
Share 
1975 
Number Share 
Agriculture 
Mining & Quarrying 
Manufacturing • - •. -
Processing 
Constructional 
Building 
Electricity, Gas 
and Water 
Distribution 
Transport & 
Communication 
Services 
Others 
59280 
34900 
64980 
87780 
13680 
41660 
53580 
1209.180 
NA 
10.5 
6.2 
11.5 
15.5 
2.4 
7.4 
9.5 
37.0 
163,900 
NA 
110,000 
51500 
NA 
58500 
119000 
672000 
37400 
13.5 
9.1 
4.2 
4.8 
9.8 
55.4 
3.1 
101500 
89000 
297400 
190400 
29200 
97300 
89000 
496200 
7.3 
6.4 
21.4 
13.7 
2.1 
7.0 
6.4 
35.7 
105000 
90000 
324000 
210000 
30000 
99000 
91500 
550000 
7.0 
6.0 
21.6 
14.0 
2.0 
6.6 
6.1 
36.7 
Total 565000 100.01,212,30C 100.0 1,390000 100.0 1 ,50000c100.0 
Source : Computed from the Second National Development Plan 
1970-74, Table 5, p. 328; and the Third National 
Development Plan 1975-80, Federai Ministry of 
Economie Development, Lagos, Vol. I, Table 32.2, 
p. 371 . 
sudden fall in agricultural employment since 1973 may be 
due to the significant growth in recent years in other 
sectors, such as the building and construction sectors. 
In addition, the fall " in agricultural sector employment 
may be due to the fact that a significant proportion of 
Nigérian workers now demand good wages, and Jobs that 
offer better conditions of service and prospects for 
advancement; which agricultural Jobs hardly offer, 
Moreover, most workers are now inclined to become semi­
prof essionals (in the building änd construction industry) 
such as architectSjplumbers and building contractons, so 
as to maximize their earnings, and hence enjoy better 
living standards. 
Clearly, the above récent developments have left 
agricultural .industry in a rather dlfficult position. 
As a conséquence food importation has been on the increase 
since 1978. The government spends about $1 billion 
dollars a year,,around 8 percent of its oil revenue,, 
importing food. The consolation, however, is that the 
federai government has acknowledged this problem; and in 
the présent national development plan, the:"4th national 
Development Plan 1981-85, top priority is being given to 
the industry through the 'Green Revolution Programme'. 
According to this pain, agriculture is to receive 13 
percent of the planned investment, twice the figures for 
the Third National Development Plan. Nonetheless, some 
critics are of the view that the figure still fall below 
the 21 percent allocated to other industries (a much 
smaller section in the economy). Nor is the figure greater 
than what many African countries have already- allocated to 
their agricultural sector. 
^ Employment i'n„mining and quarrylng (table-9) has .-.grown • at. 
a tremendous pace in sectoral employment distribution. 
For example, in 1965 a total of 34,900 people were engaged 
in the sector, by 1975 the figure had increased to 90,000 
(people)' an astonishing 158 percent increase in just 
ten years. This rapid rise in employment in the sector 
is largely attributed to the upsurge in oil production 
with its attendant investment programmes. 
-j' 
Our discussion of wage-employment and the labour 
force would seem rather incomplete without special spot-
light on the public sector employment in the country. 
Perhaps, another significant feature of the Nigérian 
labour force is the prédominance of wage-earhing employ­
ment in public sector. Table 10 reflects the estimated 
public sector employment for 1973 and 1975. It can be 
seen from the table that in September 1973 a total of 
901,828 (people was employed in the public sector, which 
accounted for 65 percent (64.86%) of the m o d e m sector 
employment in that year. In Aprii 1975 the public sector 
accounted for over 67 percent of the m o d e m sector employ­
ment, „a percentage increase of 11.95 percent between 
September 1973 to Aprii 1975. 
Table 10 further shows that Governments (Federai, 
State and local) alone accounted for 38 percent of the 
public sector employment in 1973,- and 40 percent in 1975 . 
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Table 10., Pubiic Sector Employment in Nigeria, 19 73 and 197 5 
E M P L 0 Y M E N T 
September 1973 April 
1975 
% increases 
Sept 1973-75 
Number % Number 
1. Federal Civil 
Services 121,953 13.52 144,500 18.49 
2. State Civil 
Services 136,530 15.14 167,600 22.76 
3. Local Govern­
ment 80,500 8.93 92,500 14.91 
4. Corporations 
(incl. Univer­
sities & Govt. 
Companies 148,845 16.50 160,000 7.49 
5. Teaching 
Service 164,000 18.19 195,000 18.90 
6. Others 250,000 ' 27.72 250,000 -
Total 901,828 100.00 1 ,009,600 11.95 
Source : Federal Republic of Nigeria Third National 
. Development Plan 1975-80. Volume 1, Table 32.4, 
p.371. 
u 
Moreover, the combined public sector employment (government, 
Institutions and corporations) constituted 67 percent 
o£ the entire estimated wage-earning employment in 1975 
(table 7 ) . What is instructive, however, from our dis-
cussion on the public sector employment is that, the 
sector is having an overall influence in the working of 
the industriai relations system, particularly in wage/ 
salary policy issues. In that, as the largest single 
employer of industriai labour, it dictâtes the pace of 
wage/salary movements in the ".country. 
Another aspect of the country's 'work force 1 which 
is worthy of emphasis is the unemployment situation. 
This is of particular importance because 'unemployment' 
is now one of the most difficult economie problems 
facing the country. Although statistical évidence on 
the extent of unemployment is fragmentary there is no 
doubt that both unemployment and underemployment are wide 
spread in the country particularly in the urban centres. 
The high concentration of unemployment in the urban cen-
tres is a conséquence of rural-urban migration. For 
example, a recent study carried out in Lagos shows that 
in 1972, 49.2 percent of the unemployed people carne from 
the former Western state; while 12.9 percent came from 
l o ' 
the former East - Central State. Underemployment is 
mainly a rural area problem and the people prone to it 
are those described as the 'working poor' - that is those 
who work hard but earn too little to maintain a decent 
19 
1iving standard. 
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Table 10 J . Urban Unemployment -
Distribution in Nigeria 
Urban Centres 
Unemployment Rates (%) 
November 
1974 1976 
Lagos (Metro) 7.2 . 6.2 
Ibadan 5.7 4.1 
Benin 13.1 4.1 
Enugu 11.5 9.0 
Korin 1 .5 1 .6 
Kano 2.2 3.3 
Maduguri 5.0 6.1 
Sokoto 2.0 2.8 
Kaduna 6.1 n. a 
Jos 6.2 5.6 
Port Harcourt 13.3 8.6 
Calabar 22.3 13.5 
Source : National Manpower Board, 1977 as quoted in ). . [ 
Diejomabh,' V.P., The Structure and Nature of 
Nigeria's Manpower Resources' Management in 
Nigeria, xiii, 5 June 6 July 1977, p. 28 
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Table 10.1 depicts the unemployment rates in the différent 
urban centres in the country for the years 1974 and 1976. 
As can be seen from the table, Calabar in the South-Eastern 
state has in both years the highest rates of unemployment. 
Following Calabar is Anambra State which recorded 11.5 
percent in 1974 and 9.0 percent in 1976. The position 
in both centres contrasts sharply with the position in 
centres like Illorin which had an average unemployment 
rate of 1.55 pereent and Sokoto with 2.4 percent average. 
What the présent level of urban unemployment implies is for 
future public policy to be directed towards the industrialisât 
of the rural areas so as to reduce the pressure on thèse 
centres. 
The brief conclusion to be drawn from this discussion 
is that both the economy (measured in terms of GDP), and 
the labour force have shown a significant growth rate in 
the last ten years. For ecample, the economy has grown 
from a GDP of about ^ b i llion Naira in 1965 to H 30 billion 
in 1980. Similarly, the labour force has increased from 
a total labour force of 23.8 million in 1965 to 32.74 
million in 1980; even though as a percentage of the 
population it remains very small. 
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1.2 WAGE/SALARY STRUCTURE IN NIGERIA 
In the preceding section, we attempted to examine the 
economie and labour force structure cf Nigeria. It is the 
intention of this section to examine the wage/salary 
structure with a view to finding out whether the structure 
is !rational' enough to perform the distributive., w ' 
;
 the productive and _the allocative functions necessary for 
rapid economie; development. " ~" " 
'• In contrast to a 'wage' which is defined as the 
price paid to labour as a factor 1 input' in the process 
of production in an economie system; a wage structure 
refers to the set of inter-relations among a collection 
of wages. It is the pattern of relative wages disclosed 
when the labour market is looked at in divisions based 
20 
on its broad characteristics. It, therefore, shows the 
différences in income due to différences in skills, 
21 
industries, sectors and in geographical location. Like 
the labour market in general, the wage structure is-
regarded as one of the crucial issues in an employment 
22 
oriented development strategy. As noted above it is 
central not only to development strategy per se, but also 
as a vehicle for raising living standard and production 
through increased supply of skilled and high level man-
power, and enhancement of équitable income distribution. 
As indicated earlier in the discussion, a rational 
wage structure performs certain functions in an economie system. 
Thèse include: firstly, to ensure an équitable income distribution 
among the work force in particular the low paid, to enable them 
• AB • 
to maintain a minimum living standard. This function can 
be achieved through a number of ways. Kirstly, by granting 
large wage increases to this group of (low paìd) v/orkers, 
who are composed mainly of semi-skilled and unskilled where 
différentiels are wide. Secondlyrthis.may bç.done through a basic 
allov/ance or income guarantee, which is the amount paid to 
23 
a family whose ihcome for the year is zero. 
Secondly, it can be used as an incentive device to 
raise productivity. In this regardawage structure is 
adapted in such a way that it can provide useful incentives 
for workers to acquire needed skill-vital for high degree 
of responsibility and productivity. As the ILO noted 
during one of its proceedings in 19&7, 
"Wage differentials based on skill are a 
; major incentive to learn new skills and 
move up the occupational ladder" . 
\ 
. Thirdly, a well structured pay system can help in 
the re-allocation of labour to those sectors of the 
economy where labour is in short supply but in great 
demand, as well as to move labour away from those areas 
where unemployment and underemployment are concentrâted. 
In addition, it can be used as--a vehicle to move labour 
from low ,pr oductivity to higher productivity sectors , for "exanple 
from the agricultural sector to. manufacturing industries. 
There is no doubt that for a wage structure to fulfil 
the above functions .or objectives it has to be well 
designed. However, measurement'of relative wage differentials 
• * 
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is not an easy task particularly in the developing countries; 
in the next few paragraphs we shall be examining some of these 
problems. 
Broadly, a major problem with the meàsurement of relative 
wage differentials is the lack of objective criteria for 
measuring and comparing différences in degree of 'skill 1 
in any given occupation. To beg-in with, job définitions 
and contents differ between countries and sometimes within 
countries over time. Ey lack of objective criteria we mean 
that there are no set of rules or guidelines which can be 
universally applied when différences in skill are being 
measured or compared. For example, what level of skill 
should be takenas a yardstick? How should it be measured? 
These are some of the daunting questions associated with 
skill differentials meàsurement. 
Secondly, there is the problem of data availability. 
Particularly prone to this problem are the developing 
countries, where it is diffìcuìt to obtain earnings and 
related data in the first place. If such data 
is available it would either be very incomplete or in a 
format which would render it unsuitable for empirical 
studies. Berge underscores this.- point when he noted, 
"Aside from the inhérent methodological problems, 
practically nothing is known or available about wages or 
50 
wage trends in the underdeveloped countries. Such information 
as is a vailable is unsystematic^uncertain, and often 
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contradictory". Récent ^ expérience by the researcher during the 
field work in Nigeria reinforces Berg's assertion. For example, 
in one of the companies selected for the survey, it was 
found that the research officers were unable to produce 
a comprehensive list and the total number of ail the 
employées in the company, Requests for statistical 
information covering a number of issues such as on earnings, 
absenteeism rate could not be met. It was not because the 
managers were not prepared to assist but because the 
information requested of them was in a very 'poor format'. 
The third problem is that of comparing rural (agri-
cultural) and urban average incomes. This problem stems 
from the fact that farmers dérive their income from other 
sources outside the 'return' from sales. Thèse other 
sources include income from petty trading, transfers from 
friends and relatives in the cities . When c omparing 
rural-urban incomes it bec ornes very difficult to account 
for thèse extra sources, in terms of deciding whether 
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to include or drop them in the process. In addition, 
agricultural incomes consist partly of 'subsistence' 
output of-which a significant proportion is locally consumed 
by the farmer and his household, and it is difficult to 
put a value on them as part of income. 
Furthermore, in most developing countries, for example 
in Nigeria, fringe benefits (overtime and bonus payments) 
are rarely taken into account by personnel managers 
when computing items making up an employée's pay 
packet to establish the range of earnings for 
various skill catégories. With the result that 
most investigators are often left with représentative 
wages even where formai classification scheme existed. 
Bearing thèse limitations in mind, we can now proceed 
with the examination of the Nigérian wage differentials, 
and comparing them with deVeloped countries. 
A striking feature of the wage/salary structure 
of most developing countries is the existence of 
large 'differentials' between the various catégories 
of workers. Thus, there exists rural-urban incomes 
disparities, _occupational differentials, and 
inter-industry wage differentials. The net effect 
of thèse continuing large wage differentials, 
particularly between the rural and urban workers, is 
the increase in recent years in the rural-urban 
'drift* among the farmers and young men and women 
in search of higher income Jobs. This in turn, gives 
rise to urban unemployment,shortage of housing 
accommodation, insufficient santiry conditions 
and related social problems. 
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However, in recent years, the drive to bridge this earnings 
gap has been intensified, through góvernment mínimum wages, 
social legislation and industrial relation policies. 
It is quite understandable _that wage differentials are 
usually a problem in the early stages of development because 
of scarcity of skilled labour which has to be compensated in 
order to stimulate the supply of skilled labour. But it is 
not enough reason to explain the current large wage difieren 1 
tialso in the developing countries. Anyway, it can be 
argued that the current large 'differentials' in the develop­
ing countries are to some degree due to their neglect, and the 
relegation to a subsidiary role of collective bargaining 
in the wage determination process. One of the beliefs which 
stimulated interest in this área of research was that collective 
bargaining isicthe only mechanism capable of creating a basis 
for a more acceptab le level of wage differentials. Unlike 
the other mechanisms such as wage commissions or arbitration 
which has no basis for comparing Jobs to establish their 
relativities, the collective bargaining employs sophisticated 
management techniques(such as 'job evaluation') which has 
the potential to créate equity in an organisation' s wage 
structure. The experiences of the deve loped countries such as 
the United Kingdom and the United States where the collective 
bargaining mechanisms is extensively used in the determination 
of employees remuneration rates lend- support to the assertion. 
In these countries(UK and USA) 'differentials'are hardly 
noticed, as the succeeding paragraphs would highlight. 
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S i m i l a r l y , in the United S t a t e s , the p i c t u r e i s the 
same, as t a b l e 1 1 . 1 d e p i c t s . I t might be argued t h a t 
d i f f é r e n c e s e x i s t between the UK and the USA t a b l e s i n 
terms of o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n c a t é g o r i e s and perhaps 
the years s e l e c t é d for the a n a l y s i s , and hence might a f f e c t 
the comparisons . Such d i f f é r e n c e s might not- matter so 
much s ince the two t a b l e s are i l l u m i n a t i n g enough.-' Again 
lack of more s u i t a b l e data l e f t the re searcher with no 
a l t e r n a t i v e cho ice hence . The' t a b l e shows f o r example 
that in 1.975 a s k i l l e d worker's (craftsmart) weekly 
average earning was $223 d o l l a r s , while tha t of u n s k i l l e d 
( o p e r a t i v e ) labourer was $164 d o l l a r s a cash d i f f é r e n c e of 
$59 d o l l a r s , "or a r a t i o of 1 - 4 : 1 . The gap in subséquent 
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years has remained the same. 
Take the i s s u e of ' s k i l l d i f f é r e n c i a i s 1 f o r example, in 
the United Kingdom, the earnings gap between a s k i l l e d and 
u n s k i l l e d hourly r a t e d manual workers i s not much. This i s 
i l l u s t r a t e d on t a b l e 11 which d e p i c t s the average earnings f o r 
the t u o c l a s s e s of workers in 1978 and 1979- The t a b l e 
shows t h a t , f o r example in 1978 tha t the cash d i f f é r e n c e 
between the average earnings of a s k i l l e d male worker and 
the u n s k i l l e d male worker was £ 9 6 4 - 0 0 pounds 
,a r a t i o of 1 . 3 : 1 , whi le in 1 9 7 9 , i t was a ..^ 
cash d i f f é r e n c e of £ 1 1 6 2 . 0 0 pounds but with the same r a t i o 
\ 
of 1 . 3 ¡ 1 . In a d d i t i o n , the o v e r a l l percentage change^for 
both c l a s s of workers for the two years was a similar one. 
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Table 1 1 . Occupâtional Class Earning Averages in UK 
1 9 7 8 and 1 9 7 9 
Sex : r 1 9 7 8 £ 
1 9 7 9 
£ 
% of 1 9 7 8 
IA. .Higher .'Professions 
I B . Lower Professions 
2 B . Managers etc 
3 . Clerks 
4 . Foremen/women etc 
MANUAL WORKERS 
M 
F 
M. 
F 
M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
F 
5 9 4 8 
( 4 8 3 0 ) 
5 1 7 0 
3 7 3 6 
5 9 9 6 
3 7 6 8 
3 7 0 1 
2 7 3 0 
4 6 8 5 
3 2 1 4 
6 6 5 8 
( 5 5 4 8 ) 
5 6 3 7 
4 1 1 9 
6 7 9 6 
4 3 0 9 
4 2 2 9 
3 0 7 2 
5 5 2 6 
3 5 9 0 
1 1 2 
( 1 1 5 ) 
1 0 9 
1 1 0 
1 1 3 
1 1 4 
1 1 4 
1 1 5 
1 1 8 
1 1 2 
5. Skilied 
6 . Semi-skilled 
7 . Unskilled 
All 
M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
4 3 5 4 
2 2 4 6 
3 8 2 7 
2 3 5 6 
3 3 9 0 
( 2 2 7 5 ) 
4 6 3 3 
5 1 9 7 
2 6 1 9 
4 5 2 0 
2 6 9 9 
4 0 3 5 
( 2 5 0 7 ) 
5 2 7 3 
1 1 9 
1 1 7 
1 1 8 
1 1 5 
1 1 9 
1 1 0 
1 1 4 
~ F "1 """ 2 8 8 1 • " 3 2 7 6 - ' U 4 - " 
Source : 
(Gray Routh's Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 
1 9 6 6 - 1 9 7 9 Table 2 . 3 1 ) . 
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Table 11.1 Weekly Earnings of Full-time Wage And Salary 
Workers in the USA, 1970-1975 
Occupation 1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 
All Workers S 130 $144 S159 S169 S185 
Professionals & Tech­
nical s 181 192 212 228 246 
Managers,Administ. 190 214 238 250 274 
Sales workers 133 151 163 172 189 
Clérical workers 109 121 130 140 150 
Craft & Foremen 157 172 195 211 223 
Operative (Unskilled) 115 126 140 150 164 
Operative (Except;train) NA' 119 132 141 157 
Transport Equip Operatoi NA 152 169 180 198 
Non-Farm Labourers .110 123 138 149 154 
Private hiousehold 
workers 38 40 59 50 . 54 
Other service workers 87 104 111 117 
Farm workers 71 80 96 107 111 
Source: US Bureau of Labour Statistics Special Labour Force 
Report No 143, Usual Weekly Earnings of American 
Workers, 1971. 
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On the other hand, table 11.2 illustrâtes the much 
discussed issue of abnormal skill differentials that exist 
in the developing countries particularly in Africa. The 
choice of Swaziland for illustration is arguable, but can be 
justified on the following grounds. Firstly, the extrême 
nature of its skill differentials make it suitable for 
académie analysis - for it offers basis for sharp comparisons 
and contrasts . Secondly, Swaziland was chosen because 
it is a developing c ountry, s inee over c oncentrâtion on 
1
 data 1 fr om Nigeria would raise s orne que stion on the inter -
— 
national repr3 sentativenés s of the data. 
However, • it might be argued that the sma11 
size of its workforce renders it unsuitable for this scale 
of research which représentativeness of a sample counts 
much. Secondly, it may be argued that since the country 
is having skilied manpower problems at this stage of its 
economie development that the présent income différences 
might be a de liberate g overnment strategy to attract and 
retain skillèd manpower hence its unsuitability as empirical 
data. The foregoing arguments aside, Swaziland was chosen 
because of the extrême nature of its skill differentials 
which offer good facts for académie discussion. 
The table shows that in 1974 for example, that a 
2 8 
skilled maie worker was receiving 4-10 Enalamagen per 
month, while the unskilled maie worker was on 41 Emalangeni 
per month, a différence of 369 Emelangenis or a ratic~ of 
10:1 or 10 times more than the unskilled worker. Almost 
in line with the situation in Nigeria. Although some 
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Table 11.2 Wages in Manufacturing (Ali Industries) in 
Swaziland Africa 1970-80 
Year 
Payment Monthly 
Skilled Worker Unskilled Worker 
1970 ? NA NA 
1971 NA NA 
1972 240 34 
1973 205 34 
1974 410 41 
1975 383 43 
1976 370 67 
1977 477 68 
1978 521 90 
1979 NA NA 
1980 
i 
NA NA 
Explanatory Notes 
1. Emalangenì - is the officiai currency 
in Swaziland just as pound sterling is in the UK 
and Naira and Kobo in Nigeria. 
2. N.A. - here means Not Available. 
3. Workers here referred to are male workers only. 
4 1 . 7 1 0 5 , Emalangeni = £ 1 (one pd. steriing). 
Source : The International Labour Organisation Year Book 
of Labour Statistics 1980 , pp. 442-451. 
ss; 
changes seem to have taken place since 1978 with the ratio 
narrowing from 10:1 to 6:1 or 6 tirnes, but the difference 
remains much when compared with the positions in the UK and 
US where ratios are 1.3:1 and 1.4:1 respectively. 
With regards to the public sector pay differentìals, 
particularly the incomes gap between the highest and 
lowest manpower, in the developed countries the differences 
are generally not very wide. In the UK for example, the 
ratio between a post office executive (general clerical) 
and a manual worker (manipulative grade) average gross 
weekly earnings is 1.1:1.. Similarly, in the United 
States in 1975» the average earnings of those in the 
professional and technical occupations were no more than 
approximately two times the average earnings of operatives . 
In the Soviet Union these differentìals are even more 
compressed. as is suggested by the fact that in 1964-
average industriai earnings exceeded average earnings of 
medicai Doctors by almost a third, and average teacher 
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wages by even more. 
Wage dif.ferentialsv in" Nigeria include 
large öccupational . <skilled and unskilled) , 
urbana and rural, as well as public sector (lowest and 
highest paid government employée) differentials. In 
this discussion, however, attention will be focused on a 
limited number of issues that are either most discussed 
in the literature or are particularly important from the 
V * 
! • • 
Urban policy point of view. These include rural-urban income 
differentials, skilled and unskilled manual workers (in the 
•private sector) differentials, and in the public sector -
the highest and lowest manpower differentials. The main 
reason for the omissions being simply that it will not be 
possible to have- a meaningful discussion on all thèse -élément 
of wage structure within the confines of the study. The orde 
which thèse issues have been arranged for discussion here has 
nothing to do with the degree of importance of each" of the 
issues being discussed. . 
As emphasised above, the sise of the rural-urban ihcome 
differential is a basic problem in attempting to develop an 
équitable wage/salary structure in Nigeria. The long-term-
effect of this disparity in incomes accounts for the rural-
urban drift of workers particularly the young farmers in 
search of higher income - earning jobs. For the purpose 
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of this discussion rural income is defined as income 
of those in subsistence agriculture {peasant farmers) and 
related employment. 
The statistics in table 11.3 shows that, the average 
income from rural areas at both rural and urban prices 
are far too low compared with those of urban areas. 
Average income per head is 892 Naira at rural prices 
and 8128 Naira at urban prices in the rural area. 
While in the urban sector average income per head is 
8559 Naira at both urban and rural prices. 
61 
Table 11.3 Estimâtes of Rural and Urban Incoine ÇAt 
Rural and Urban Prices' 1977-78. 
Rural Prices Urban Prices 
TOTAL INCOME PER SECTOR 
(IN MILLION OF NAIRA) 
Non-Agricultural (Urban) 14,689 14,689 
Agricultural (Rural) 5,389 7,497 
Represent: Cash 1,617 1,213 . 
Subs istence 3,772 6,284 
AVERAGE INCOME PER HEAD 
IN EACH SECTOR 
(IN MILLIONS NAIRA) 
(P.A.) 
Urban 559 559 
Rural 92 128 
Ratio 6.1 (4 .4) 
Explanatory Notes : 
1 . Food prices in urban area are assumed to be 
1.66 times as high as in rural areas, but that 
prices of consumer good were 1.33 times as high 
in rural as in towns (urban). 
Source: I.L.O (JASPA) Jobs and Skills Programme for 
Africa (meeting the basic needs of the people of 
Nigeria) Table 41, Addis Ababa 1981. 
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Also reinforcing this income gap concept between 
the two areas (urban-rural) is the data in table 11.4. 
The table shows that back in 1973-74 and 1978-79, the 
per capita income of urban workers was N225.00 Naira and 
N585 .00 Naira per annum respectively on average. Whereas 
the rural (agricultural) farmers per capita income was 
M59.00 Naira and H96.00 Naira per annum. The table further 
reveals that by 1978-79 farmers income had increased by 
two-thirds while non-farmers income had doubled, so that 
between 1978-79 the rural-urban income gap had widened 
from 1 : 4 . 7 to 1:6.1. 
The Nigérian urban economy consists of three major 
groups: the wage earners, informai sector operators 
and formai sector entrepreneurs. Among the wage/salary 
earning class are - the skilled, clérical officers, un-
skilled, semi-skilled and top government officiais. On 
the other hand, the .informai sector operators include 
Street vendors, tailors, petty traders and carpenters. 
The' formai sector entrepreneurs include indàgênous_: _ 
businessmen and middle managers in multi-national companies. 
One thing in common with thèse groups is the huge dis-
pari ties in income levels existing between them. The 
eamings gap between the two traditional competitors 
6
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Table 11.4 Agricultura! and Non-Agrie (Urban) Incomes 
1973-74 and 1978-79. 
_ \ , 
1975-74 1978-79 
CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES: 8,848 21,924 
Agriculture (Rural) 3,352 5,657 
Subsistence 2,346 3,960 
Cash Balance 1,006 1,697 
Non-Agriculture (Urban) 5,496 16,267 
Population (Mil1 ions) " 77 87 
Rural :Urban 74:26 68:32 
PER CAPITA INCOME 
(NAIRA P.A.) 115 252 
Total 
Agriculture (Rural) 59 96 
Non-Agriculture 275 585 
Ratio:Agriculture 
None-ogriculture 1:4.7 • 1:6.1 
Explanatory Notes: 
1. The data used in this table is 'a raw data' (by 
the ILO JASPA summary) which means that there was 
no allowance made for price changes. However, 
the différences such adjustment could have made 
on the évolution of the rural-urban income gap 
remains to be seen. 
Source : Ibid., page 220 , table 47. 
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(skilled and unskilled) in the wage-salary earning class 
being the worst affected, as shown in table 11.5. 
Table 11.5 illustrâtes the financial position of 
the unskilled workers in an estimated income distribu­
tion in Nigeria in 1973. The table indicates that when 
the aggregate income of the unskilled worker was N125.00 
Naira per annum, that of his skilled worker counterpart 
was N705.00 Naira per annum a ratio of 1:5.6. The same 
table further reveals that the skilled worker earns\ 
N1500 Naira per annum and his five times better off than 
the unskilled worker with an .average income óf H320.00 
per annum. 
Nor is there incomes parity between the unskilled 
worker and the semi-skilled worker, as càn be seen from 
the same table. While the unskilled worker's average 
income was N320.oo Naira per annum, the semi-skilled 
worker doing the same number of hours a week like the 
"unskilled worker was receiving N700.00 Naira per annum. 
Moreover, the position of the unskilled worker is relatively 
the same when compared with the other urban "income 
huniers" - such as the Street, vendors, tailors, mechanics, 
S 
carpenters and small shopkeepers as the income league 
table Jias shown. 
Furthermore, from the same table we can see the gap 
between the unskilled worker's average income and that 
of a Nigeria professional. At an average income of 
N4500.00 Naira per annum, an average Nigérian professional 
earns 14.1 times as much as an average unskilled worker 
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Table 11.5 An •Estimateci Distribution of Income in Urban 
Nigeria, 1975. 
(000) 
Number 
(000) 
Aggregate 
Income 
Millions 
of Naira 
Average 
Income 
Naira P.A. 
Numbers Income 
(Per capita) 
Unskilled 
Workers 390 125 320 10.9 2.2 
Informal Sec-
tor I (Street 
vendors) 700 262 374 19.6 4.7 
Informai 
Sector II 
(tailors, 
mechanics 
Carpenters) 1000 538 538 27.9 9.7 
Semi-skilled 337 236 • 700 9.4 . 4.2 
Skilled/Clerical 470 705 1500 ~13.1 12.7 
Informal 
Sector III 
(Small shop-
keepers, taxi 
ówners) 300 654 2181 8.4 11.8 
Professional, 
Nigérians 55 248 4500 1.5. 4.5 
Formal 
Sector enter-
preneurs 300 2493 8310 8.4 44.9 
Professional, 
Non-Nigerian 27 297 110Û0 0.8 5.3 
TotaJ 3580 5585 1553 100.0 100.0 
Source : Report to the government of Nigeria by the ILO 
(JASPA) Basic Needs Mission - Jobs and Skills 
Programme for ofrica Addis Ababa. 
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(a ratio of 14:1). While the formai sector entrepreneur' 
business executives, and managers earn ' *twenty six 
times as much as the unskilled workers. 
Not surprisingly, this table further shows that, 
even though the unskilled, the semi-skilled and other 
informai sector wage earners formed 80 percent of the 
urban population their share of urban income is only 21 
percent. Whereas, the skilled workers who constitute 
only 13.1 percent of the urban population earned 12.7 
percent" of the urban income*; the remaining 55 percent is 
shared by a small minority grpup of workers Centrepreneurs) 
who formed only 10 percent of the urban population. But 
what is the position like in the public sector where there 
are more trained and educated manpower than .in the private 
sector? To answer this question we need to examine the 
public sector wage structure more closely. 
\ 
In Nigeria, the government is by far the largest 
single employer of labour as was shown in table 10.2. 
Additionally, the government is the largest employer 
of highly trained and educated manpower. In fact, it is 
reckoned that three out of four university graduâtes work 
for the government though in récent years the position is 
32 
gradually changing.. The main reason for this shift is 
that young graduâtes now prefer taking dp employment in the 
private sector where it is believed that they can maximise 
67' 
the ir net rate of returns in a very short-ter m ; rather 
than joining the civil service to 'mark-time1 and wait for 
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pension and gratuity.' 
To be examined as already emphasized is the wage/salary 
dis par ity be tv/e en the permanent secretary ( Highes t level 
manpower) and the -watchman or the lift attendant and those in 
related j obs (lowest level) in the civil service as at 
présent, In the public sector, employées wage/salary 
structure is graded, the range being from level one to 
level seventeen L Ol - 17 as shown in table 11.6. There 
are seven steps in this revised salary structure though 
the 1step increase 1 is not applicable to all grades. It 
only applies to those on level 10 downwards; those on level 
11 upwards are not included. The old structure had eight . 
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step increases. 
Making up levels one to two are the watchmen, lift 
attendants, guards and related unskilled workers. The 
typists, téléphone attendants with little or no job 
expérience constitute the group that make up level three 
(L 03)• Level 04 is made up of craftsmen, drivers/ 
mechanics and assistant clérical offieers (officers with 
government class iv or attempted school certificate). 
The school certificate/GCE I 0 I level holders (clérical 
officers) and craftsmen with several years of job 
expérience constitute levels o5 and 06.. Graduâtes 
(university/polytechnics) after a year Ts national youth service 
are started on level 08. The same grade lével in which 
confidential secretaries with few years of expérience are 
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Table 11.6 Revised Salary Scales in the Civil Service 1975 
Grade 
Level 1 2 Steps ^  4 5 6 
Incre-
- mental 
7+ 
Rates 
01 
N 
846 
M 
870 
N 
894 
N 
918 
N 
912 
N 
966 
N + 
996 + 24/30 
02 942 972 1002 1032 1062 1092 1122 + 30 
03 1044 1080 1116 1 1 58 1200 1242 1 284 + 36/42 
04 1320 136.2 1404 1446 1488 1530 1 572 + • 42 
05 1626 1698 1770 1842 1914 1 986 2058 + 772 
06 2142 2238; 2334 2430 2526 2522 2718 96 
0? 2832 2 95 2" 3072 3192 331 2 3432 3552 120 
08 3564 3714 3864 4014 4164 4314 4962 1 50 
09 4668 4830 4992 5154 5316 5478 5640 162 
ro 5760 5922 6084 6246 6408 6570 6732 . 162 
n 6744 6924 7104 7284 180 
12 7404 7620 7836 8052 216 
13 8064 8384 8704 9024 320 
14 9168 9488 9808 10128 320 
15 10296 1081 2 11326 516 
16 11568 12144 12720 576 
17 1 2996 1 3632 14268 636 
Source : Main Report; Public Service Review Panel 
(headed by Akintola Williams) Ministry of 
Information Lagos, June 1975, p. 147. 
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grouped. New ejitrants with post-graduate qualifications -
DMS, M.A; MSc) together with executive officers with 
several years of service are grouped on level 09. 
Levéis 10-12 are occupied by sénior executive 
officers, principal secretarles, archi tects , accountants, 
and civil engineers with some years of experience in the 
government service. While levéis 13-16 are made up of 
sénior and principal executives officers with fifteen to 
twenty years of service in the ministry. In addition, 
assistant directors and sénior managers in para-statal 
organisations are in this group. The highest grade level 
as shown in table 11.6 is level 17. This grade level is 
mainly occupied by permanent secretarles, sénior directors 
and managing directors of state owned compañies such as 
the Nigeria Airways Ltd., Nigerian Railways and the 
National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). One striking 
thing about grade levéis eleven to seventeen (L 11 - 17) 
is that they are drawn with comparable sénior-management 
posts in well-established and effectively managed private 
firms whose. annual turnover is over and above N 2 million 
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Naira. With the overall aim of firstly, attracting new 
high level manpower; and secondly to prevent mass exodus 
of high level manpower from the civil service to the 
private sector. 
Another set of relative wages/salaries grade levéis 
which need to be mention in passing are those of special 
public officers namely: chief justice of the federation 
including judges, inspector-general of pólice and vice-
chancellors of universities . (Table 1 i. 7) . A knowledge of these grade 
70-
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levels would help tàiûghlight'.'/tne extent o£ wage differen-
tials in the developing countries which we discussed 
earlier. In any case, since it was not intended to be 
discussed here we have to proceed with the main discussion 
- examination of wage differentials between the per-
manent secretary (highest) and the watchman or lift 
attendant (least) paid government employée.. 
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Table 11.7. Public Officers Qu Special Salary Scale and Related 
Wage Differential 
Post WAges in N aira Ratio to Scale 01 
Chief Justice of the 
Fédération 16,200 19.1:1 
Secretary to the 
Federai Government 15,120 17.9:1 
Inspector-General of 
Pol ice 15,120 17.9:1 
Supreme Court Judges 
(C.APP) 14,400 16.6:1 
Secretaries to State 
Govts. 14,040 16.8:1 
Chief Justices (States) 14,220 16.8:1 
Grand Khali 14,220 16.8:1 
Vice Chancellors 1 14,040 16.6:1 
Sou'rce: The Public Service of Nigeria - Government Views on 
the Report of the Public Service Review Commission, 
Lagos, 1974, p. 70. 
Notes: 1. Vice Chancellors are no longer on the présent 
grade level system 01 to 17. They are now on a new 
University System Scale (USS) 01 to 15. Government 
views on the report of the Presidential Commis s ion 
on Salary and Conditions of Service of University 
Staff. National Assembly Press, Lagos, 1981, 
pp.4-12. 
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Table 11.6 reinforces the assertion that wage differentials 
in Nigeria at ail levels are large. The table shows that 
the incomes disparity between the permanent secretary 
(highest level) and the watchraan or lift attendant (least 
paid) workers is wide. While the permanent secretary on 
step one earns N12,996 Naira per annum, a watchman or 
lift attendant earns N846 Naira per annum. In other words, 
the permanent secretary earns fifteen times as much as 
the watchman in the civil service. A ratio of 15.4:1» 
it can be argued that the gap now is being bridged in the 
1970s and 80s. Nor is the incomes differential between 
the graduâtes on grade level 08 and 09, the executive 
officers on levels.L12 to' L16 'and'the watchman/lift-
attendant proportionate. A post-graduate government employée 
on grade level (L09) earns five times as much the watchman 
or lift attendant; a ratio of 5.5:1. Quite in sharn 
contrast wìth the position in the developed ,,'countr ies as noted 
the preceding sections. 
However, a fundamental question which has yet to receive 
a satisfactory answer is why should developing countries 
have such large wage/salary differentials? Earlier 
in the discussion we argued^that to some degree such 
large 'dixferentials1 were as a conséquence of the' 
'neglect r • - of collective bargaining which créâtes 
basis for a more acceptable wage differential in g society 
by the developing c ountr ies in the wage determination 
process. On the other hand, most of the explanatioh for 
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the large differentials in the developing countries by 
economie commentators centres around the 'market forces' 
- that is economie forces of supply and demand. It is 
generally held that the supply of unskilled labour is relatively 
abundant while the supply of skilied labour is 
relatively scarce and in great demand. An explanation 
which has some conotation with the "natural history of 
wage structure hypothesis" - that differentials are 
vide in early stages of development because the supply 
of unskilled labour is relatively abundant, the supply of 
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skilled labour relatively scarce. Since basic economie 
theory has it that in a perfectly competitive labour 
market, the co-existence of surplus unskilled làbour 
with a shortage of skilled labour would in the short-run 
mean a large" premium for 'skill' henee the diff erentials . 
Secondly, it. is held that wage structure operated by 
most ex-colonial administrât ors in the developing 
c ountries c ontr ibuted to the pre sent large wage 
differentials. In that, wages of trained and educated 
people were structured to be high enough not only to permit 
recruitment from abroad but also to permit a level of 
living considered 'appropriate' to expatriâtes in a 
colonial society. Stressing on this point with respect to 
Nigeria, Nwabueze asserts that: 
"This degree of wage disparity existed 
because the colonial government operated 
a high wage policy for the top échelon of ~-
the public service who were mostly Europeans"; 
In any case, as noted earlier, in récent years the case 
for closing the wage 'differential gap 1 in most developing 
countries is now receiving more attention. For instance, 
in Nigeria and Ghana there have been very few wage increases 
for those in the upper grade levels in the civil service 
wage structure ; while the.wage rates of the unskilled 
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and semi-skilled workers have risen markedly. Thus, by 
1975» the ratio between university graduâtes starting 
rates and the rates for unskilled labour in government 
service had fallen to about 4-75:1 in most of the 
c o n t i n e n t T h e reason may be due to the increased 
supply of university graduâtes to the labour market 
relative to unskilled labour in récent years.. For exaraple , 
in Nigeria, the output of graduâtes front Nigérian universities 
meant for the labour "market for the year 1978-79 was over 
twenty-two thousand ' 
What brpad .c onclus ion can we draw then from the 
foregoing discussions of Nigérian wage structure? An 
examination of the various wage differentials in the'country 
suggest that large income differentials still exist 
in spite of government efforts in récent years. Secondly, 
it is argued that c oliéet ive bargaining pr ocess is the only 
mechanism of wage détermination capable of creating more 
acceptable wage differential levéis in Nigeria. This is 
because it is the only mechanism of wage détermination which 
employs sophisticated management techniques such as Tjob 
évaluât ion' which créâtes equity in an organisâtion 1s wage 
structure. Furthermore, on the basis of the available 
data presented in our discussion, it is argued that, part of 
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naturai history of wage structure hypothesis which postulâtes 
that ; differentials are wide in early stages of development 
and that as development procoeds with the supply of skills, 
relative auards to skilled and unskilled labour would be 
compressed, does not seem to hold a firra ground in Nigeria. 
Our argument being that even though the pace of industrialisation 
has increased in the last decade, with relative increase 
in the supply of skilled manpower (because of massive 
educational and training facilities) there stili exist large 
differentials between the incomes of the skilled and 
unskilled manpower as shown in table 11.5. In any case, 
naturai hist ory hypothes is might have s orne relevanee when 
discussing the Nigérian wage differentials (skill differentials) 
in the year two thousandbut at .-présent-there is no strong 
évidence to suggest that it can be offered as a suitable 
explanation for the large wage differentials in Nigeria 
today. Henee our argument that colleetive bargaining is 
the necessary mechanism of wage détermination capable of 
providing a more acceptable leve 1 of wage differentials 
in Nigeria and indeed in the developing countries. 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE QF T H E S T U D Y 
The literature relevant to this área of investigation 
is scarce in respect of Nigeria. The few major published 
studies that háve been carried out concentrated on the 
Nigerian Trade Union movement's structure, historical 
development, politics and ideology, and henee treated the 
issue of wage determination superficially. These studies, 
four in number include those carried out by:' 
Y-ESUFU, An introduction to Industrial Relations 
in Nigeria: 
KILBY, Industrilization in an Open Economy; 
COHÉN, Labour and Politics in Nigeria; 1947-1974; and 
FASHOYIN, Industrial Relations in Nigeria -
Development and Practice. 
The first study is concerned with the'industrial 
relations system in Nigeria. Yesufu beliéves that by 
creating a strong social relationship between workers, 
management and the government, the pace of economic 
development would be accelerated. The second study 
discussed the economic progress of Nigeria in the light of 
her drive for rapid industrializaron. The study attempts 
also to examine the various" methods of wage setting in 
Nigeria and the underlying forces. It notes that the 
Anglo-Saxon model of wage setting(voluntary collective 
bargaining along the British model)is not suited to Nigeria, 
that an alternative system which would embrace the 
government, employers and unions is what is needed. 
These studies fail to cover the issue • 
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of wage détermination in depth. Cohen's study is concerned with 
the labour and politicai issues in Nigeria. The trade union 
movement - development, structure and activities before and after 
the civil war,the only chapter on wage settlement looks rnainly 
at collective bargaining. Fashoyin, like the other writers concen­
trâtes on the Nigeria industriai relations system - unions and employers 
and government. The only section on wage détermination deals 
more on collective bargaining, discussions on other mechanisms such 
as wage tribunal/commission are highly theoretical. 
This study is one of the first of its kind to identify 
the issue of wage détermination in Nigeria as a 'Central 
issue' that require something more than a peripheral treatment. 
Not only did the study examine the traditional wage setting 
mechanisms in Nigeria - the wage tribunals and the collective 
bargaining process in detail, but goes further to discuss other 
l 
forms or mechanisms'such as wage détermination through the 
National minimum wage, and an attempt at the priées and incarnes 
policies which previous studies have never considered. In 
addition, this study is more empirically based than the theoretical 
abstractions which characterised the few previous studies. 
More importantly, given the scarcity of literature in 
this area of study, this study is an attempt to make a modest 
contribution towards filling the 'gap'. The study, it is hoped 
would also stimulate further studies particularly in respect of 
union behaviour and wage détermination process. 
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In summary, the relevance of the study lies in the belief 
that 'industriai harmony' is crucial to a country's social and 
economic progress, more so, to a developing country like Nigeri 
purusing a number of economic development programmes. 
1 
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1.4 THE HYPOTHESES 
The gênerai hypothesis which has been developed for 
this study is that 'In Nigeria industries or companies 
using the collective bargaining process for the détermin-
ation of their workers- rémunération have a lower strike 
incidence, lower labour turnover, lower absenteeism rate 
and enjoy higher productivity'. This hypothesis is used 
to generate other sub-hypotheses such as that: 
a. Workers under collective bargaining industries 
dérive more job satisfaction from their jobs 
b. Labour-management relationships are more cordial 
in industries or companies under collective bar-
gaining arrangements. 
c. Union density and worker participation in ;decision-
making are higher in industries under collective 
bargaining. 
d. Middle managers in the companies or industries under 
collective bargaining arrangements have a greater 
sensé of belonging, achievement and self-actualisation 
In gênerai terms, a worker expresses satisfaction in 
his job when he knows that he is being rewarded according 
to his effort - that is, in terms, of pay, opportunities 
for promotion and other fringe benefits that accompany 
such a job. 
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In an industry where labour and management develop 
mutual understanding, appreciate each others position, 
apply lots o£ restraint and adopt the principie of 'give 
and take' when taking decisions on issues in the contract 
of employment, the relationship that exist is usually a 
cordial one. 
Workers would always like to join organisations that 
represent and fight £or their interest in an industry. In 
such industries workers are usually given the chance to take 
part in the decisions that affect their working lives. 
Where middle managers are given challenging responsibili-
ties, make decisions on their own in some situations, 
adequately rewarded according tp their efforts they would 
have sense of self-fulfillment. Moreover, where the prin­
cipie of "management by objectives" is practised - which 
considers the problem of individual managers as well as the 
overall company objectives, a feeling of achievement and 
self-actualisation would prevail among the managers. 
Undoubtedly, the foregoing factors are necessary for 
evolving industrial peace which is crucial to achieving 
set company objectives and even for a nation's development 
goals. For a country like Nigeria engaged in a number of 
economic and social development programmes, the maintenance 
of such an industrial harmony becomes even more crucial. 
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Collective bargaining, therefore, is the mechanism of wage 
determination that can provide those factors which create a 
basis for industrial peace. For example, a worker who accepts 
that he is receiving "a fair day's pay for a fair day*s work' 
would have no cause to foment trouble. And it is only 
collective bargaining process which applied sophisticated 
techniques such as 'Job evaluation' to determine the 
worth of relative Jobs before rewarding them, that can 
provide 'a fair day's pay for a fair day's Job', hence the 
hypotheses. 
\ 
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CHÄPTER TWO 
THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT OF NIGERIA 
2.5 THE.DEVELOPMENT/GENERALtHISTORICAL BACKGROUND -
This chapter is mainly concernée, with the historical 
dévelopment of the Nigérian trade union movement. Although 
it has been argued that modem trade unionism in Nigeria 
preceded the passing of the trade union ordinance in 1938 1 
by over 20 years, trade unionism in a real sense with union 
objectives did not emerge until the enaetment of the 1938 
'ordinance 1. Trade unions before 1938 were little more 
tr/an pétition writing bodies, clubs or professional associa­
tions, with less clear trade union objectives. Moreover, 
the history of the early unions was dominated by the history 
of the civil service union,the Nigérian Union of Teachers 
and the Railway Workers Union. Knowledge of the trade union 
historical setting is essential because, if collective 
bargaining is to be seriously considered in Nigeria as a 
major method of wage détermination, it needs to be shown ' 
that there is already a tradition of collective bargaining 
and trade union organisation among workers in Nigeria. 
In this chapter we intend to look at this historical 
dévelopment aspect more closely, particularly trade unionism 
before the 1938 trade unions 'ordinanceand its impact 
on trade union activities thereafter. 
Although the organisation of modem trade unionism . 
•began-very l a t e in Nigeria, the organisation of people 
Jintcr-viable- craft and -other related primary trades 
w^s not of récent origin. Organisation of Black-
smiths,Carver:s',Hunters and îveavers'have been in existence 
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for long though they lacked that organisational capacity and 
were closely guided by the forces of culture and traditions. 
Dominated by thèse cultural and traditional values their 
main functions were, first to organise and draw out contin-
gency plans to counter possible 'unforseen' circumstances 
that might befall their members. A second function was to 
regulate trade practices among the members. 
The apprentices were composed mainly of the relatives 
of the instructors, including cousins, sons, sons-in-law 
and other blood relations. This 'family background' made 
it impossible for money wage demands and calls for improved 
working conditions to be made. As a conséquence, there were 
no formal contracts of employment entered into. An example 
of such early Organization was the Mechanics"' Mutual Aid 
Provident and Mutual Improvement Association formed in 
July 1883.Summing up his study of thèse type of associations 
in Yoruba Towns, Peter Lloyd concluded that their function 
'was, and still is , to settle disputes, to regulate the 
relationship between producers, to fix prices, and to 
organise the payment of tribute to the king. The structure 
of the organisation was the lineage structure, the lineage 
meeting was the craft meeting; the craft head was the compound 
head, the oldest man in the lineage. The labour group was 
TP 
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small, consisting of father and son". This suggests that 
trade unionism as thought of today did not emerge until 
the establishment of permanent body of wage earners in 
Nigeria. 
The first trade union to be formed in Nigeria with 
some of the features of a modem trade union. was the 
'Southern Nigérian Civil Service Union' inaugurateci on 
Monday August 19th 1912, and was later renamed the 'Nigérian 
Civil Service Union', after the amalgamation of the Northern 
and Southern Protectoratesof Nigeria in 1914. Credit for th 
initiation and the subséquent formation of this maiden union 
goes to a Sierra. Leone civil servant called Henry Libert, 
who was transferred from the Sierra Leone civil service to 
the Nigérian civil service apparently for the purpose of 
establishing a 'league*of civil service officiais between 
the two British colonies. It is noteworthy that this 
Ir 
early union was not formed by a group of workers who wëre •• -
dÌ5satisfied with their pay and other conditions of employ-
ment, as would be the motive behind trade union actions 
today. The union was formed rather by aristocratie civil 
servants with less enthusiasm for trade union activities. 
Cpmmenting on this point Yesufu notes 
• "It is of importance to note 
that thè union was thus not formed . 
by group of disaffected workers 
who wanted a platform for which 
to fight for amélioration of 
grievances or for the improvement 
of specific conditions of employ-
ment". 3 
What's more, some documentary évidence suggests 
that the "minutes" of meeting kept by this union indicates 
that the union members including their chief organiser > 
Henry Liber.t, had no clear idea of what trade unionism 
4 
was all about. What was clear to them however, was that 
it was necessary to maintain such a union in Nigeria 
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since such a union was already existing elsewhere in the 
colonies, for example in the Sierra Leone. This 'rôle 
ambiguity'among the members of this union continued 
until the 15th of November 1912, when after their 5th 
meeting they emerged with a 'piecemeal' objective, which 
they stated as T,To promote the welfare and interests of 
native members of the civil service".^ 
Furthermore, membership of the 'union' was exclusive 
to those African civil servants in the 'upper segment' of 
the civil service hierarchy (first class clerks) which 
only a small proportion of Africans were able to attain. 
This sort of 'exclusive unionism 1 meant that the union had 
few members. For instance, it was recorded that the union 
had its highest attendance of 96 personsT for~ the first 
time in 12 months on 26th August 1912 when the railway 
staff représentatives attended the meeting. Thereafter, 
attendancies fluctuated between 20 and 30 members. 
Moréover,the unions abhorance of strikes.and related union weanöns, 
-ijnd its-over-tel-ian.ee on:publie--"lectures and-addresses 1-as 
a means of achieving its objectives,,further reinforces 
the lack of under standing of-aim and purposes of trade 
unionism by the civil service union. 
However, the year 1931 saw the development of more 
trade unions with clearer union aims. Most notable 
amóng them were the Railway Workers Union and the Nigérian 
Union of Teachers. Prior to 1931, the Railway Workers 
were catered for by the Nigérian civil service union 
discussed abQve; however, " • ducing the economie dépression 
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of the 1930s they broke away to form the Railway Workers 
Union*. The workers claiming that they (the civil service 
unión) could no longer serve their interests. The new 
Railway Workers Union was headed by Michael Imoudu. 
The Nigerian Union of Teachers similarly emerged 
as . a result of dissatisfaction with the services provided 
by the parent unión which apparently was diminishing 
rapidly compared with the early years of the century. 
The unión (NUT) was formed by the amalgamation of the 
local associations which had existed since 1920. 
Outlining the main reasoñs for the formation of the NUT 
in July 1931, the General Secretary Mr. E.C. Esua pointed 
out that the reasons were: 
a. The unsatisfactory conditions of service of . 
the teachers. 
b. No pensions and gratuities át" the time. 
c. Insecurity of teachers tenure. 
d. Teachers wanted to have an effective say in the 
planning of éducation and of the school curricula 
in Nigeria. 
e. t'ó see that the teaching profession in Nigeria 
regained its dignity and pTestig;e; and 
f. to raise the educational and professional 
standards of the teachers ih Nigeria".^ 
pefn'¿ guided by the same- type of intellectualism and 
aristocratic principies which dominated the Nigerian 
civil service unión, the NUT abhorred the use of the strike 
weapon; and henee could not see any need to register under 
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the trade union ordinance of 1938 which conferred unions 
with the right to negotiate with their employers. 
The.trade union ordinance of 1938 provided the righe 
botti to organise unions, and fo enter into collective 
bargaining with the employers providing the 'unions were 
registered. Unions that failed to register under the 
ordinance (s^ ée Chapter 2.7) -.were deemed inéligible to 
enter into collective bargaining with their employe'rs. 
Since the NUT was being organised along the same principles 
which guided the Nigeria civil service it did not register 
until December 24th 1941. While the Nigérian civil 
service registered on March 7th 1949, after the Tudor 
Davis Commission had speit out the conséquences for failing 
to registerthree years earlier. The commission pointed 
out: 
I
 \ 
I I , 
"Its failure to register was an 
anomally and a disregard of the 
ordinance by the trade union and 
by the registrar". 7 
Unliké the NUT and the Civil Service Unions, the Railway 
Workers Union was the first trade union to be registered 
under the union ordinance on January 17th 1940. In 
addition, the Railway Workers Union was more 'purposeful 1 
in terms of 'union activities' than both the NUT and 
Civil Service Union, for it was able to organise effective 
protests against its employers during the period. 
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The year 1938, -witne.ss.ed the. .Development of - - _ 
m o d e m trade unionism in Nigeria' following the trade 
union ordinance enacted by the British Colonial Government. 
The passing of the 'ordinance-' which came into effec.t in 
April 1939, was aCcompanied by an unprecedented level of 
organisâtional activity among the workers throughout 
Nigeria. Workers who were hitherto not interested in 
union activities started to form into trade unions for 
collective bargaining purposes. 
However, apart from the contribution made by the 
1
 ordinance ', there were' other major inducements for the rapid 
development of trade unions in Nigeria. First, there was 
economic dépression- occasioned by the Second World War 
(1939-1945) which among other things forced the'price of 
goods to rise /particularly in the urban centres., creating 
greater 'awareness' among the small proportion of workers 
in wage employment^ _ The wave of 
industrial unrest which ' énsuecL' culminated in 'a gênerai 
strike ~'in 1945 . The successful exécution of the strike 
which lasted 44 days (in Lagos) led to the rapid spread 
of trade union activity and militancy. Thereafter, 
workers, particularly railway workers, started agitating 
from time to time for increases in 'Cost of Living Allowance 
8 
known then as 'the war bonus 1 to offset price increases. 
92 
The second factor for the expansion of trade unionism, was 
the repressive nature of the "government order - the general defence 
9 
régulation of 1942 - which prohibited strikes and lockouts during 
the period and was seen by the workers as a premediated attempt by 
the colonial government to undermine the very existence of their newly 
.found organisation. Henee, the unions presented stiff opposition 
to the provisions of the order. This resistence coupled with the 
timely assistance by the nationalist movements led to the formation 
of the first central labour organisation, - the Trade Union Congress 
of Nigeria(TUCN) . The congress demanded a number of things from 
the government; an increase in employment through intensified 
industrialisation; nationalisation of all public utilities; and 
secondly, the establishment of a Labour Party." 1 0 Also the 
activities of the nationalist leaders during the period who were 
bent on getting rid of what they(the nationalists)'described as 
.'colonial tutelar leadership1 in the colony, aided the rise in 
i 
unionism enormously. 
\ 
The foregoing major inducements nothwithstanding, the 'bulk 
of the credit' goes to the 1938 ordinance for legalizing trade 
union activities which hithertqwere'potentially unlawful. 
As Yesufu pointed out: ^ • 
"In the absence of such a law 
Nigeria trade unions would have had .to 
contend with ali the complications of 
• the English common law; one cannot 
escape the conclusion therefore, that 
without the trade union's ordinance the 
development of workers organisations could 
have been delayed until at least after the 
war*. 1 1 
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À further conséquence of the '1938 Ordinance' 
was the sudden upsurge in the growth of union numbers 
and membership during the period. 
The changes that occurred in the trade union numbers 
and membership immediately after the implementation of the 
ordinance are reflected in Table. 16 (see Chapter 5.) . 
By the end of December 1940, 14 trade unions representing 
4629 workers had been registered. And by December 1941, 
the number of registered unions had increased to 41 with 
a total membership of 17,521 workers. 
It can be concluded thattrade unions in the actual sensé of 
trade unionism - that is with clear trade union objectives 
started in Nigeria after the trade union ordinance of 
1938 had been passed. 
2.6 THE CENTRAL LABOUR ORGANISATION(194 2-75) 
In the preceding sub-section we ^examined the early 
» .deVelopment of the Nigerian trade Union movement. 
•'Modern trade unionism in Nigeria started in 
earnest after the enactment of the trade union ordinance 
in 1938, which conferred to the unions the right to 
organise and bargain collectively. It was found also that 
prior to the 'ordinance that the early trade unions were 
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little more than pétition writing bodies, or clubs, with less 
defined trade union objectives. ' This sectioii examines 
the historical development of the Central Labour Organisation. 
This includes the' various attempts made at establishing a single 
central organisation, problems encountered and the présent state of 
affairs. The examination (of the central labour organisation) is 
essential because, a central labour organisation ëven if not one 
which was to prove permanent is an indication of growing "maturity" 
of Nigérian trade union movement. 
/ 
/ The COIA(Cost of Living Allowance) agitation of 1941 taught 
the trade union leaders two important lessons. Firstly, it amply 
dpmcnstrated to them the importance of 'organised labour*, as opposed 
to unorganised or amorphous labour. Secondly, and perhaps more 
important, it underscored the need for a 'central labour organisation* 
for the unification of ail sections of the labour force in the country. 
For although the ACTWS, the Civil Service Union and the Nigérian 
Union of Railwaymen represented a good proportion of workers; their 
rôle was limited by the fact that only the federai service employées 
were catered for. 1 3 The bulk of.the local government and state-
owned employées were not represented. Hence, the need to form a 
central labour organisation that would 'represent' ali the sections 
of organised labour motivated a meeting in Lagos in November 1942 
of trade union représentatives. This maiden meeting saw the inaug­
uration of the Federated Trades Union of Nigeria(FTU) with. the Over­
all objective of forming a Trade Union Congress (TUC) . 
In April 1943, as part of the TUC formation campaign, the FTU 
published the first issue of its officiai magazine 
called the 'Nigérian Worker' with a very captivating 
95 
editorial captioned 'we must unite". After months of 
intense negotiations, on July 1943 through a conference 
organised by the organisation a resolution changing the 
name of the FTU to TUCN (Trade Union Congress of Nigeria) 
was adopted.Without hesitation the congress outlined its 
aim and objectives in its constitution, part of which was 
a. "To unite all trade unions into one organised body 
b. to further by all reasonable means the aims and 
object of its member unions 
c. to secure the improvement of the general working 
conditions, and to promote the material, social 
and educational welfare of its workers.by such 
lawful means as the general council may from time 
to time deem expident 
d. to foster cooperation among its. member unions and 
the spirit of mutual regard among the individual 
workers. ' ' 
e. to assist in the proper organisation of all trade 
unions 
f. to protect the legal status and rights of trade 
union organisations 
g. to press for the nationalization of mining and 
^timber industries, township transport and other 
important public services" 
h. to establish a Nigerian Labour College 
i. to provide scholarships for trade union officials 
14 
to study abroad". 
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The conference adopted other resolutions one of which called 
for October 6 to 1 2 1943, to be declared a workers Mays of 
action. The idea being that the days set aside would allow 
union leaders to undertake house to house collection of 
funds with which to build workers secretariat. The confer­
ence elected the following officers to serve the new 
congress: T.A. Bankole, President, Chief A. Sayemi Coker 
Vice-president, M.A. Tokunboh, Secretary-general; I.S.M.0. 
Shonekan, Kofi Austin and F.O. Ogunbajo as Under-secretaries 
P.S. Taiwo, treasurer,and Obafemi Awolowo, Secretary/ 
editor of their magazine 'The Nigerian Worker.'' 
The relationship that followed between the congress 
and the government was very cordial. The government, in 
addition to according the TUCN its official recognition, 
organised the department of labour in such a way that 
enabled the congress to work with the department very 
harmoniously. Indeed,in its annual report for 1943 the 
Department of Labour noted: 
"The TUCN has rendered considerable 
assistance to the Department of 
Labour in settlement of disputes 
and the general application of 
labour standards" .15 
The congress was such an ambitious organisation, to the 
extent that at-its first session as a trade union 
movement it decided to undertake a total re-organisation 
of the labour movement on an 'industerial basis', and to 
encourage the amalgamation of smaller unions. To this 
end, it set up a committee in the same year to oversee 
the plan. 
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Barely six years after its formation, the Trade 
Union Congress of Nigeria(TUCN), split in 1949 because 
of bitter rivalry amongst trade union leaders, coupled 
with their divergent views over the handling of the 1945 
general strike. It was gathered, that during the general 
strike some union leaders were totally opposed to it, 
viewing it as an unnecessary and illegai venture because 
of the government's war time emergency régulations which 
prohibited such industriai actions. While on the other 
hand, some union leaders gave their unequivocal support 
for the strike action, hence the différences, in their 
views and the subséquent split. As a result of the split 
a new organisation emerged the Nigérian National Fédération 
of Labour (NNFL) in March 1949. Because of the confused 
situation, the TUCN lost greater proportion of the 
affiliated union members to the new faction NNFL; while 
other members elected to remain neutral. Throughout 1949 
frantic efforts were made by various union leaders to 
reconcile the TUCN and the NNFL but to no avail. 
It was not until 1950, when fresh attempts were 
being made to form a new coal miners' union following the 
Enugu Mining Crisis of the previous year, that the two 
factions, now joined by another union - the Fédération 
of Government and Municipal Non-clerical'workers union 
combined to form a new body called the Nigeria Labour 
Congress (NLC). However, in 1951 a year after its 
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inauguration the NLC feil into disrepute, and lost . 
prestige and influence, ^ -.and was consequently dissolved. 
Once more the search for a united central labour organisa­
tion resumed. Several.efforts were made between 1951-
1952, either to resuscitate earlier fédérations or to 
form an all-embracing national fédération of unions, but 
without success. 
In 1953, however, after those abortive efforts to 
salvage the ruins of TUC, a conférence of 29 trade unions 
meeting in Lagos passed a motion for a new organisation to 
be formed - the All Nigérian Trade Union Fédération (ANTUF). 
Ironically, the objectives and policies of- the new Labour 
Organisation were quite similar to those of the defunct 
trade union congress; the only major différence being that 
the ANTUF had aimed to establish its own politicai party 
labour (party) with a view to create a 'socialist govern-
ment'. Inspite of the general instability within the 
labour movement during the period, the ANTUF 
remained the undisputed central labour organisation until 
1956. Infact by 1955, as many as 39 trade unions with a 
membership of 95,000 had affiliated with it. 
However, such an overwhelming support was to be 
shortlived, for after a few years later the ANTUF 
disintegrated into various factions. This time, it was 
not as a resuit of "local politics" though it was partly 
to be blâmed; but the case of dee iding which internat ional 
organisations to affiliate with. The choice being between the Inter­
national Confédération of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and 
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the World Confédération of Trade unions (WCTU). Certain 
trade union leaders resented the federation's décision' 
not to affiliate with the western backed ICFTU; and 
accused the "fédération of having commun ist tendencies and 
1 8 
other leaders of being communist inspired". Communism 
has had no populär support in Nigeria, and was generally 
understood by the ordinary man in the Street as a godless 
ideology, designed to subvert and destroy Nigérian way of 
life, hence the stiff opposition by the other fédération 
leaders. Because of this strong disagreement some militant 
leaders decided to form a new body on " Aprili7th 1957 
to compete with the ANTUF, the new organisation was 
called 'the National Council of Trade Unions of Nigeria 
(NCTUN)'. 
The rivalry between the ANTUF and the NCTUN continued 
tili late 1958 when a group of union leaders founded the 
'National Labour Peace Committee' chargedwith the overall 
responsibility of uniting the labour movement. After 
months of protracted closed door délibérations; and 
following meetings held at both Ibadan and Lagos respec-
tively, òn January 21st 1959 a joint statement was issued 
confirming that a merger had been agreed. The statement 
weht on -
"That following this agreement, a 
joint merger conférence of the two 
organisations ANTUF and the NCTUN 
should be held at Enugu on March 7 
and 8 1959; Section IV of the 
"unity document" as it was known then 
pointed out: 1. that while recognising. 
the right of individuals to believe 
in any brand of politicai ideology, ; 
cognisance was nevertheless taken of 
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the events which had led to disunity 
in the past, and it was therefore 
agreed that in the interest of 
permanent -unity, communism, fascism, 
and national politicai partisanship 
should not bc projected in the 
Nigérian labour movement".' 
16 
The net resuit of the merger conférence which was 
held at the Day Spring Hotel Enugu on March 7th 1959 was 
the inauguration of a new organisation - Trade Union 
Congress of Nigeria (TUCN) for the second time. 
H.P. Adebola, a vertan trade union leader was appointed 
it s-près ident. 
The instability in the central labour organisation 
continued even after politicai independence in 1960. 
For no sooner had the 'Enugu Peace Pack' which brought the 
merger between the ANTUF and the NCTUN lasted one year 
than it split into two factions. One faction (led by Adebola, 
a renowned trade union leader) retained the originai 
poi icies of the defunct, TUCN, while the other faction formed 
a new movement called (NTUC)^with the most militant trade 
union leader ever.' known as its leader - Michael Imodu. 
With this further split within the centrai organisation 
compétition among the various union leaders became more 
intense, probably in an effort to win government support 
which was very vital for the survival of any organisation 
during the period. 
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However, it is worthy to note that all along 
government's approach to trade union matters particularly 
the Central Labour Organisation had generally been one of 
'a bstension, * . An y government involvement was mainly advi-
sory. While the occasionai encroaçhments were mainly 
designed to inspire the unions into forming a single, 
viable central labour union. But as it was becoming 
increasingly clear that the 'unions' left on their own 
could not achieve, this desired objective - unity within 
the central labour organisation - the government started 
to shift from itsabstentionist -approach to an Inter-
ventionist '"' policy in labour matters. And hence it vowed 
tooensure that a sensible, virile centrai labour organi-
sation had to be found.1. To reinforce this commitment the 
government arrangea a National Conference in 1961 with the 
thème "The role of Nigeria in African Affairs". 2 0 
Düring the conférence it was made clear by the 
Ministry of Labour officiais that the Nigérian Labour 
Movement could play a vital role in African Labour Affairs 
provided it solved its organisational problems. Following 
this conférence, a tiigh-powered1 peace committee was set 
up with by now the much familier terms of référence - 'to 
reconcile TUCN and the NTUC with a view to merging the 
two factions 'into a single labour organisation.' 
The committee was chaired by the speaker of the 
Federai House of Représentative then'Alhaji Jale Wasiri. 
Once more, after intense negotiations both bodies (TUCN 
and NTUC) accepted the peace formula and agreed that 
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"there should be only one central 
labour organisation for the 
Nigérian trade unions to be called 
the United Labour Congress (ULC) 
21 
The events that followed soon afterwards between the 
warring factions that forged the 'merger' adequatcly 
demonstrated that the fragile Tpeace packageVas a mere--
cosmetic exercise. For no sooner had the United Labour 
Congress been inaugurated on 3rd May 1962, than the factions 
started regrouping into their former blocks, under diff-
érent new names. Adebola's TUCN became the United Labour 
Congress of Nigeria (ULCN); while Michael Imodu's NTUC 
was renamed the 'Independent United Labour Congress of 
Nigeria (IULC). In the same year, following a conférence 
organised by the (PAWC) Pan-African Workers Congress to 
show its solidarity to the ICFTU African Zone, another 
labour union emerged called the Nigérian Workers Council 
(NWC). 
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In 1963, a meeting organised by the Nigérian Union 
of Teachers and Civil Service Union - the best organised 
Unions in the country - produced a 'peace committee' which 
was later to become yet another labour fédération - the 
Labour Unity Front (LUF) , brìnging the total number of 
Centrat Labour Organisations to four. After ten years :.in 
(1973), another effort was made to bring the warring fac-
tions together again into one centrai labour organisation. 
Hence, the NTUC, LUF, NWC and a faction of the ULC com-
bined to form the Nigérian Trade Union Fédération (NTUF) , 
( 1 0 3 
an organisation which according to Tayo Fashoyin never got 
22 ~" " 
off the ground in practice". The government refused to 
recognise the (NTUF) because of its past expériences 
with the Central Labour Organisations which was now charac-
terized by "merger today, poliferation tomorrow'. 
. \. In 1974 , during the burial of one of the 
Veteran trade union leaders in the country J.O. Oduleye, 
at Apena cementary, the leaders of the four main central 
organisations - LUF, ULC, NTUC and NWC-jointly declared 
the Apena Unity déclaration - in an emotional speech, which 
signalled another merger. The leaders pledged to bury their 
différences to form one central labour organisation. The 
merger culminated in the formation of the NLC (Nigérian 
Labour Congress) a year later on 19th December 1975. 
Table 12 summarises the pre-independence central labour 
organisations. The table does show that between 1942 
and 1960 attempts at the formation of one single central 
labour union resulted instead at the formation o f -
seven central labour organisations by the Nigérian Trade 
Union leaders. While table 13 .portrays the post-
independence expériences. 
The above chronological developments do show indeed 
that the various attempts by trade union leaders to bring 
about labour unity' tended to be sporadic and adhoc ; most 
of the ad hoc committees being conséquences of an indus-
-rial or politicai development such as wages and salary 
issues. For example, the establishment of the (JAÇ) Joint 
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Table 12., Central Labour Organisation 194 2-1960 
Pre-independence 
Name 
Period 
Operated 
1, Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUCN) 1942-1949 
2. Nigerian National Fedeartion of 
Labour (NNFL) 
3. Nigeria Labour Congress CNLC 1950-51 
4. All Nigerian Trade Union Federation (ANTUF) 1953-56 
5. National Council of Trade Union of Nigeria 
(NCTUN) 1957 
6a .Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUCN/ 1959 
6b . (Later United Labour Congress of Nigeria 
(ULCN) 1959-60 
Souces: 1 . Fédéral Ministry of Labour, annual reports 
^ various years. Published by the Ministry of 
Information Primary Division Lagos. 
2. Tayo Fashoyim - Industrial Relations in 
Nigeria (Development and Practice) Table 
3.2. Longman London, 1980. 
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Action. Committees) o£ the Nigeria tradé unions to be the 
'mouth piece' for the labour movement during the Morgan 
1963-64, Adebo 1970-71, and to Udoji 1974-75 wages and 
salaries review commissions respectively bear a clear 
testimony to the.ad hoc nature of thèse joint' committees. 
Fashoyin underscores this point: 
"In thèse circumstances, they (the 
unions) quickly realised that going 
to the highly informed wage commis-
sions without well-organised 
and sensible elaims for wage in-
creases could be fatai, hence they 
resorted to combining^ into a single, 
entity, however deceptive or temporary 
thèse may have been".^ 
As far as the Federai Military Government was con-
cerned the formation of the NLC (Nigérian Labour Congress) 
was nothing more than a 'calculated exercise' by trade 
union leaders to woo.the government into believing that 
the unions were also committed to finding a single, united 
centrai labour organisation. After ali,, successive govern-
menl£have witnessed séries of such mergers, amalgamations 
and take overs, for the past twenty years without a posi-
tive outcome . Kr^fteir-view-the government. was neither impressed 
nor convinced with the new organisation Ts Statements on 
its pol-icy objectives or goals within the framework of 
industriai relations. The following statement by the then 
federai commissioner for labour Major-General Henry Adefope 
on 18th December 1975 summarizéd why the government was so 
sceptical: 
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Table 13/ • Major (Post-Independence) Central Labour 
Organisations, 1960-1975 
Name of Union . Period 
operated 
1a. Nigeria Trade Union Congress (NTUC) 1960-1973 
b. Later Independent United Labour , (IULC) 1962 
c. Subsequently reverted to NTUC) 1963-1975 
2 . United Labour Congress (ULC) 1962-1975 
3. Nigerian Workers Council (NWC) 1962-1975 
4 . Labour Unity Front (LUF) 1063-1975 
5. Nigerian Trade Union Federation+ 
(NTUF) formed by the NTUC, LUF & NWC) 1973 
6 . Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC)* i '1975 
Sources : 
1. Ministry of Labour Annual report various yearsl 
Explanatory Notes 
+Not recognised by the Government 
*Initially not recognised by the Fédéral Military 
Government but later was reprived. 
"Like i t s predecessors the 
congress f a i l e d to meet the 
e x p e c t a t i o n s and a s p i r a t i o n s of 
the Niger ian workers as ev iden-
ced by the many p o r t e s t s denoun-
c ing both i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n and 
the undemocràtic process by 
which i t s numerous o f f i c e r s 
were appointed" 
As a further m a n i f e s t a t i o n of i t s d i s a p p r o v a l of the new 
o r g a n i s a t i o n , the government re fused to accord o f f i c i a i 
r é c o g n i t i o n to the NLC. Successfully, today , the NLC i s 
the only c e n t r a l labour org-anisation in the country r e p -
r e s e n t i n g f o r t y - t w o i n d u s t r i a l un ions . 
Furthermore, government's uncompromising a t t i t u d e 
towards the trade unions and t h e i r l e a d e r s f o r t h e i r i n -
c a p a c i t y to form one v i a b l e , u n i t e d c e n t r a l labour o r g a n i -
s a t i o n a f t e r over 30 years r e a c h e d . i t s c l imax in 1 9 7 6 . 
In that y e a r , the Fédéral M i l i t a r y Government abol'ished 
\ 
! 
a l l the four c e n t r a l labour o r g a n i s a t i o n s in the country 
thus the NTUC, ULC, LUF and the NWC which formed the 
NLC; and appointed an a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t r a d e unions -
Mr A d e b i y i . The a d m i n i s t r a t o r was charged with the f o l -
lowing r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s : 
a. For performing on beha l f of trade unions the same 
dut i e s as are normally performed by a c e n t r a l 
labeur o r g a n i s a t i o n inc luding -
i . r epresent ing the gênerai i n t e r e s t s of t rade 
unions on any advisory body se t up by the 
Fédéral M i l i t a r y Government; 
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The administrator was also charged with the responsibility 
of finding a means of forming a centrai labour organi­
sation, in the following words ofJsection 3(b} for taxing ali 
steps necessary to effect the formation of a single 
central labour organisation to which shall be affliated 
25 
all trade unions in Nigeria'. The Decree which saw 
both the démise and the appointment of a trade union admins-
trator in Nigeria and other necessary détails is reflected 
on appendix c. 
After the streamlining of the union structure in 1978, 
as requested by the Federai government, the number of 
trade unions was reduced to 42 industriai unions and the 
NLC emerged as the only central labour organisation to 
date. The NLC has been fully recognised and- even sponsored 
by the Federai government. An example of such sponsor-
ship was in 1979/80, when the sum of 2.5 million Niara 
was granted to the Nigeria Labour Congress by the Federai 
government for the building of its secrétariat complex in 
Surulere, Lagos. It is worthy of note, that since 1980 
the NLC Cthe équivalent of the TUC in the UK) with its 
moderate and at times very militant leader Alhaji Sumonu 
is turning out to be the 'ideal-type' central labour orga­
nisation which the Nigérian workeTS has been longing for. 
The achievements of the NLC since it received its 
final seal of approvai from the Federai government i n 1978, 
have been remarkable. For example, the NLC has been able 
to influence the Federai government to increase workers 
'minimum wage' from N60.00 Naira a month to an 
all time increase of N125.00 Naira per month. Even so, 
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up tili last year 1980, Sumonu the President, and his officiais were 
pressing for a minimum wage of N300.00 (three hundred Naira) for 
workers ali over the country. Seccndly, it has been able to 
induce the government to restore car basic allowances for workers 
on certain grades which was hitherto abolished. 
These remarkable achievements recorded by the Nigérian Labour 
Congress do not suggest that all is well with the Central Labour 
Organisation in terms of total unity and organisation. There 
are stili pockets of divisions within the organisation's hierarchy. 
Last year 1981, the NIC's deciared day of action on April 13 th 
was nearly ruined by leadership squabbling. However, it is too early 
to speculate what the next f ive to ten years hold in stock for the 
only surviving Central Labour Organisation since 1942. But at this 
very moment it is reckoned that with a bit of courage and honest 
within the leadership and goodwill from its million supporters it might 
go down in the annals of the labour movement as the longest surviving 
Central Labour Organisation in Nigeria. 
In sum, it is argued that although the trade union concept was 
a foreign import in Nigeria and had to be encouraged by law, there has 
been a significant trade union présence since the 1930's, i.e. for half 
a Century. The history of attempts to form a central labour 
Organisation helps to explain why Nigérian trade unions have over the 
years been 'distracted' by organisational and politicai problems 
from developing collective bargaining prccess. Add itionally , 
the : chronicle of the Nigérian labour movement helps to• 
demonstrate that collective bargaining ' is ' an essential 
foundation for a trade union movement; and is more likely to be 
•encouraged by developrnents in government attitudes. 
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2.7 The legal framework of the Nigérian Industrial 
Relations. 
Introduction 
^ - t. Unionism every where opérâtes in environment of 
legai, economie and politicai constraints and Nigeria 
would not be an exception. Henee, this section attempts 
to examine some of the legal enactments or ordinances 
in Nigeria, which have shaped the Nigérian trade union 
movement and indeed the entire industriai relations 
system. Knowledge of. the legai framework is an essential 
basis for understanding the methods of pay détermination 
practised in Nigeria. 
The Nigérian labour relations ordinances are all 
modelled(with the exception of military decrees) upon 
similar laws in Great Britain. Indeed,. before the late 
1930's when major ordinances were being formulated for 
l 
meeting the special social and economie problems of the . 
colonies", British Labour Laws particularly ( those pertaining 
to master and servant doctrine were enforced in Nigeria. 
Because of,thèse colonial arrangements, the 'doctrine' 
of 1voluntarism! became the basis of the Nigérian officiai 
labour policy in industriai relations matters as in Great 
Britain. However, in recent years, the Government moved 
from this abstention to an Interventionist approach,(a 
move.from non-legai intervention in industrial relations 
matters to greater reliance on its principies); mainly 
because the prevailing social and economie condì tions 
no longer warranted in' its-view" the -'principie of 
abstentionism'. 
Ili I 
The need to introduce législation to govern the 
Organization of persons engaged in industry for the 
purpose of collective relations was first made by Lord 
Passfield - the then Secretary of State for the colonies -
in his dispatch of 17th September 1930 to ali colonial 
governors. In that despatch, he expressed the view that 
social and industriai progress; in the colonial territories 
had got to the stage where the trade unions should be 
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perceived as a "natural and legitimate development". 
Hence, he suggested the passing of a simple trade union 
législation which would provide the basis of such deve-
lopment along the lines of the United Kingdom Trade Union 
Act of 1871 . 
The request generated a lot of inter-departmental 
and inter-governmental débate as to the suitab ility or 
otherwise of modem trade union législation in Nigeria. 
Most government officiais and some European employers who 
were consulted in respect of the new proposai opposed 
it. "' Arguing that the wage-earning 
population was too small; and secondly that the tribal 
system of mutuai assistance provided ali the necessary 
protection which the locai workers needed. Thìrdly, that 
the country was not politically, economically and socially 
viable for that type of législation which the 'civilized 
world' had evolved only after a considérable period of 
years. However, as the colonial office was determined to 
see the proposai through, it insisted and in 1938 the first 
comprehensive labour législation was enacted - the Tade 
1 
Union Ordinance"which commenced on April 1 1939. 
The new ordinance was based to a large extent upon 
similar législation in the United Kingdom (as requested 
by Lord Passfield) although there were some modifications 
to reflect the country's level of social and economie 
development. It prescribed a minimum code of conduct in 
respect of the administration of trade unions, and 
stipulated the rights and obligations of the trade unions 
including the officiais to their respective members and 
to the public. The ordinance defined a trade union (sec. 
23 and 39 & 40, Vict. C22, S16) as 
"any combination whether temporary 
or permanent, the principal 
purposes of which are the régu­
lation of the relations between 
workers and masters or between 
workmen and workmen, or between 
masters and masters whether such 
combination would or would not 
been enacted, have been deemed 
to have been an unlawful combi­
nation by reason of some one or 
more of its purposes, being in 
restraint of trade". 
Included in the définition are employers associations, 
as well as organizations of workmen. Exceptions (S28 of 
1939-)' from the définition 'are' members of the police 
force, the prisons and^a11 other services that 5ear arms". 
The ordinance further stipulated that trade unions 
had to be registered before performing any of the tra-
ditional trade union functions. This provision contrasts 
sharply with the practice in the United Kingdom during 
the same period where a trade union was left to register or 
112 i- • 
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not as it pleased, although registration with the registrar 
of friendly societies provided certain benefits which 
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were not enjoyed by unregistered organizations. The 
ordinance further stipulated that application for 
registration must be subscribed to by at least five [5) 
persons, and that such application should be submitted 
within three months after the formation of such a union. 
Whereby the Registrar refuses to register such a union 
or decided to cancel registration already effected for 
certain reasons, such an Organization - subject to right 
of appeal to the High Court - should be dissolved within 
three months of such refusai or cancellation. In addition, 
that ail applications for registration must first be 
notified in the officiai gazette, and that any objections 
for such registration should be filed within six months. 
Furthermore, the ordinance specified that only 
persons above the age of sixteen were eligible to be 
members of a trade union, although a trade union has the 
right to exclude persons below the age of twenty-one from 
its membership (S13). It also specified that a 'minor' 
should not hold office or be appointed a treasurer or 
be appointed to serve as a member of the management 
committee of a union; but that once admitted to general 
membership such a person or persons were entitled to 
enjoy ali the rights and privilèges provided by the 
union under its rules. Additionally, the ordinance 
stipulated that neither a trade union nor its officiais 
can be sued in respect of tort allegedly arising of any 
trade union activities persued in 'furtherance of a 
- * 
trade dispute 1 (sec.4. S2) . In other words, the ordòi-
nance granted 1 immunity 1 to trade• unions similar tò"£hé -Trade 
disputes Act of 1906 in the United Kingdom - the 'golden formula-1. 
•The Ordinance. macie, provision for peaceful picketing and. prévention-of 
Intimidation(S6.35 of 1939). 
Finally, the ordinance stipulated that 'agreements 
between members relating ta conditions of work ? or trade . 
practices, the application of union funds, or payment of 
fines imposed on any persoh by a court of law, and 
agreement between registered trade unions cannot be 
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enforced by legai process." 
The next labour législation came after three years 
in 1941. It was called the Trade Disputes (Arbitration an< 
enquiry) Ordinance No.3 of 1941, designed mainly to 
handle disputes which were bound to arise from time to 
time in.the labour-management relations. The full title 
of the ordinance read: ~ 
"Ah" ordinance to provide for the 
establishment of an Artitration 
Tribunal and Board of inquiry 
in connection with Trade Disputes, 
and to make provision for the 
settlement of such disputes, and 
for the purpose of inquiry into ^ 
economie and industriai conditions 
in Nigeria". 29 
Under the provisions of the ordinance, the •Minister 
of Labour fmay' cause an inquiry to be made in the 
çircumstances of a dispute, appoint an independent chair-
man to assist both parties to reach an agreement, or on 
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the application of either employers or the workers appoint 
a conciliator". Also the minister 'may' with the consent 
of the parties to the dispute 'appoint an arbitration 
tribunal 1, but if no previous effort had been made to 
résolve the dispute through conciliation he 'can order that 
the procedure be followed". However, before consenting 
to intervene in any dispute the ordinance provided that 
the minister "must satisfy hìmself that ali the voluntarily 
agreed negotiation machinery had bcen.exhaustively used." 
The provision 'was compulsory, and was "en forcé... until 1960. 
Since a department of government had to be responsibl 
for the enforcement and promotion of thèse labour laws 
as well as advising both sides of industry on the conduct 
of collective relations the Department of Labour was 
created on October Ist 1942. Initially, the" department 
had four staff - the commissioner and three labour 
officers, but by the end of 1943, it had had 20 staff; 
made up of the commissioner of labour, his deputy, eight 
labour officers, two African assistant officers, and eight 
assistant labour officers - in training. 
After the création of Labour Department other 
'Labour Ordinances' followed immediately. First and perhap 
the most important in the séries was the Labour Code 
Ordinance of 1945 (Cap. 91, Laws of the Fédération of 
Nigeria and Lagos 1958). The Ordinance was aimed at 
providing protection for workers against serious abuses. 
For example, it stipulated that certain contracts should 
be in writing and that such contracts should be terminated 
in a special manner. It prohibited forced labour, 
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made the granting of maternity leave to female workers 
compulsory in certain cases. It regulated the recruit-
ment of labour, the employment of young persons and women, 
apprenticeship and the manner of payment of wages. 
Following the 1945 ordinance was the 'Factories Ordi­
nance 1 enacted in 1955, aimed at ensuring safe conditions 
of work. The ordinance stipulated that machines be ade-
quately guarded, that workshops should be kept clean and 
well lighted. It also specified that workers should be 
provided with protective clothing and equipment, that 'firs 
aid' boxes be maintained in factories and finally that ail 
industrial accidents should be reported to the Government 
Factory Inspectors. 
The workmen's Compensation Ordinance 1941{Cap.222) 
provided for the payment of monetary compensation to injure 
workmen for injuries sustained at work where such injuries 
result in permanent or temporary incapacity. If such injuries resuit 
the death of the injured workmen such payments should be made to his 
dependents. 
The next important légal steps taken by the government 
to improve the labour-management relations was the "wages 
ordinance' in 1957. The ordinance according to Yesufu was 
1intended to be something of a stop-gap in the process of 
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development of trade unions and collective bargaining.' 
The ordinance empowered the government to prescribe condi­
tions of employment(wages, hours of work, holidays and 
related issues) where wages were 'unreasonably low and 
trade union organisation poor. 
In the middle of 1968 due to mounting industriai 
unrests occasioned by the civil war, the government 
promulgated a Decree - the Trade Disputes (Emergency 
Provision) Decree No. 21 which severely restricted the 
right to strike and lockout. 3 1 The then' commiss.ioner of 
labour,Major-General Adefope ;claimed that the purpose of 
the Decree was to "mobilize ali resources in order to 
crush Ojukwu's rébellion". The Decree stipulated that 
within 7 days of an outbreak of 'an industriai action' 
such trade dispute must be officially registered with the 
commissioner of labour. The xommissioner of labour was 
obliged within 14 days to appoint a conciliator or have 
the dispute referred to either.a board of enquiry or an 
arbitration tribunal. Düring the period of arbitration the 
parties to the dispute were forbidden from engaging 
in further strikes and lockouts, When a settlement 
was finally reached, the ordinance specified that copies 
.of the agreement -should he" made. available to the cómmissioner 
who .'ìs empòwe'red* to make't'he settlement birìtìing on -both -
oarties to the' dispute. The Decree was en^orce until 1976, 
when it was repealed by the Trade Dispute(Emergency Provisions) 
of 1976, - ~ 
However, inspite of the restriction placed on the 
right*to strike and lockout, industriai unrest remained 
widespread; and in order to get the situation under 
control another Decree with more stringent and stricter 
measures was promulgated on 12th December 1969 - the Trade 
Disputes (Emergency Provisions) Amendment Decree No. 53. 
The Decree màde strikes and lockouts illegal. 
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Publishing of 'material' that could incite any form of 
industriai action was punishable by five years imprisonment 
The Decree stipulated that either an employer or a trade 
union should report to the Inspector-Genenal of Police any 
disputes ar ising . from.. the ir. place of work.wi.thin 24 hours 
failure of which would result in either.the employer or the 
trade union leader being-sent to jail. Although the then 
commissioner o.f labour defended both (1968 and 1 969) 
Decrees as temporary measures to cr.ush 'OJukwu Ts rébellion, 
they remained inforce years.after the civil war.For-example 
in 1 9 7 5 , when following.the;Udoji Wages and Salaries Review 
Commi s s ion awards ( see Chapter 3 .8.) wor ker s wer e erabar k ing 
on a séries of industriai actions, particularly the 
'Bank employées', the Inspector-General of Police remindèd 
32 
the public that the 1969 Decree had not been revoked. 
What's more, four days later, the then Head of State 
33 
General Yakubu Gowon delivered a similar warning. 
The effect of the 1968/1969 Decrees was to weaken the 
trade unions even more during-the'.çeriod. Because with 
the restrictions placed on the organisation and "exécution 
of *strike action 1 the unions were in no position to force 
their employers to concede wage or other improvements in 
their conditions of service. 
The other législation that followed after the 1969 
Decree was the Trade Union Decree 1973 No. 31 (now 
amended - the Trade Union (Amendment) Decree 1978). The 
1973 Decree dealt with trade union registration and ré-
cognition. The 1978 (Amendment) Decree stipulated that 
application for the registration of a trade union should 
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be made to the registrar of trade union in the prescribed 
form and should be signed: 
a. 'in the case of trade union of workers by at least 
50 members; and 
b. in the case of trade union of employers by at least 
two members'. 
With respect to trade union récognition (S.22) the decree 
stipulated that on registration a trade union was entitled 
to récognition by the employer. That if an employer 
deliberately refuses to accord récognition to registered 
trade union such an employer would be guilty of an offence 
and be liable on summary conviction "in the courts. 
In 1974, the Federai government promulgated another 
Decree - the Labour Decree 1974 No. 21 (now amended -
Labour (Amendment) Decree 1978). The 1974 Decree treated 
the issue' of check-off system. Under the decree, employers 
and workers were not obliged to make déductions from the 
wages of workers eligible to be members of a union for 
the purposes of paying contributions to the trade union 
so recognised. The Labour (Amendment) Decree 1978 intro-
duced automatic check-off systemwhich empowered the . 
employer to make déductions from the wages of ali employées 
who are eligible to be members of the union except those 
who contract out of the system in writing. 'That such 
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déductions should be paid to the union. 
The pièces of législation that foìlowed wece (i) The 
Trade Disputes Decree which commenced on 1st January 1976 
(nov amended and cited as the Trade Disputes (Amendments) 
Decree (1977), and; 
(il) The Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Decree 1976 
(now amended and cited as the Trade Disputes (Essential 
Services) Amendment) Decree 1977. 
The Trade Disputes (Amendment) Decree 1977 amended 
some sections of the 1976 decree. For example, 'Appréhension 
of trade disputes by the commissioner of labour' (S3A) 
and 'tenure of office of members of the panel' (S7A) 
were amended. 
The Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Decree 1976 
empowered the Federai government to proscribe trade unions 
or associations empleyed in any essential service that 
has been engaged in acts calculated to disrupt the economy 
or the smooth running of any essential service. Or has, 
where applicable, wilfully failed to comply with the 
.procedure specified in the Trade Disputes Decree 1976 
in relation to the reporting and settlement of trade 
disputes. 3^ The Trade Disputes (Essential Services) 
(Amendment) Decree 1977 amends the Trade Disputes 
(Essential Services) Decree 1976, and amongst other 
things provided for the punishment of employers, officiais 
of any association of employers, officiais of .trade 
unions and certain individuals whose acts are calculated 
to disrupt the economy or the smooth running of any 
essential service. 
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Section 1(2) of the Decree states: 
"Any person found guilty o£ an 
offence under subsection (1) 
of this section shall on 
convinction -
a. where such person Is an 
employer or officiai thereof 
or an officiai of any asso-, 
ciation of employers be liab'le 
to a fine of N10,000 Naira; 
b. where such a person is an 
officiai of a trade union or, 
not being an officiai of a 
trade union, is a person who 
is any way performs or assumes 
a leadership rôle in any such 
trade union or faction there-
of, be liable to a fine of 
N200 or to imprisonment for 
six months or both such fine 
and imprisonment". 37 
In. summary, what is instructive in the discussion 
is the 'restrictive nature' of the Nigérian Labour 
Législations, which distinguishes it from the United 
Kingdom Labour Laws. For although most récent British 
Labour Législations such as the Employment Acts;of 1980 
and 1982 contain some éléments
 t 
of restriction mainly to curb trade union powers and 
immunities granted to them by the Act of 1906, non has 
been designed to outlaw strikes and lockouts te the extent-
Decreesdiscussed above hav'e done . Trade Disputes (Essential 
services) 1976 and Trade Disputes (Essential services) 
(Amendment) 1977, As noted elsewhere in the discussion, 
the net effect of thèse Decrees has been to weaken fur-
ther the already limited bargaining rôle of the trade 
unions. Because with the restrictions and threat of 
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1imprisonment for organising' 'strike action ' (which 
is the trade union's greatest 1weapon') the unions are 
in no position to force intransigent employers to concede 
wage increases as well as improvement in other related 
negotiable items. The encouragement of collective 
bargaining as a mechanism for wage détermination 
requires some relaxation of restrictive législation. 
We shall return to this issue later in the thesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
WAGE DETERMINATION PROCESS IN NIGERIA: 1 MAIN MECHANISMS' 
3.8 Wage Tribunals or Independent. Wage Commissions 
The preceding chapter examined the trade union 
movement's development and the central labour organisation 
It is the intention of this chapter to examine the various 
mechanisms or methods of wage determination which have 
in the last few years aroused both political and economic 
debate because of the Nigerian Labour Congress's demand 
for a N300.00 Naira per month minimum wage for workers 
in the country.^ Their advantages and disadvantages, • 
impact and performances will'be examined. Since wage, 
determination through government appointed wage tribunals 
or commissions havedominated the wage setting 'scene' 
for the last four decades (at least in the public sector) 
it would be in place to examine the process first; in order 
bo •find out what it is or they are, how it or they 
Operate(s) and what its recommendations usually look like. 
A wage commission or tribunal '^Is-atn*-. * 
independent body appointed by the government at about ever 
four to five years to review the wages and salaries of 
employees particularly those in the public sector with 
a view to recommending a rational wage structure. The 
body is usually made up of about six or seven members 
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(one chairman and five or six members) drawn from government 
ministries. or departments, industríes and academic ins-
titutions. A major feature of these bodies are they are 
.'ad-hoc1 in nature. * Of such wage Commission 
• set- up¿immediatel-y'.af ter • the - Civil - War • :-in .1970 1
i 
was. the 'AdeboWages and Salaries CommÉssrdn7 
On the 20th of April 1970, after the formal budget 
speech by the then head of state of the Federal Military 
Government-General Yakubu Gowon, a wage and salaries 
review commission was commissioned, to be chaired by 
Chief Adebo. The commission had the following composition: 
Chairman: Chief S.O. Adebo 
Members: 1. M.O. /*biodun(Private industry) 
2. A.E. Ekukinan (Government Dept.) 
3. Okon E, (Union leader) 
4. Dr. Bola (Academic) 
5. Mallam Mahmmed (Academic) 
The commission 1s terms of reference were: 
In the light of (a) the cost of living and remunera-
tion in posts with comparable responsibilities in 
the private sector, (b) the requirements for the 
rapid development of the national economy, and 
(c) the adequate development and deployment of 
efficient manpower in the public service and other 
factors; 
128 
1. Eto review the existing wages and salaries at ail 
levels in the public services, and in the statut-
ory public corporations and state-owned companies; 
2. to examine areas in which rationalisations and 
harmonisation of wages, salaries and other 
rémunération and conditions of employment are 
désirable and feasible as between the public 
and private sectors of the national economy; 
3. to consider the need to establish a System for 
ensuring that rémunération in the public services, 
the statutory corporations and state owned 
companies is periodically reviewed and kept in 
proper national balance; and 
4. to make recommendations to the Fédéral Military 
Government, including if necessary, the needs 
for any appropriate intérim measures pending 
2 
final recommendations. 
Some of the recommendations made by the Adebo Commission 
included: 
1. "That ail sections of the Nigérian community should 
be made aware of the close connection between 
issues of wages and prices and the gênerai prob-
lems of économie development and social justice. 
2. That subject to the réservations indicated in 
paras 40 and 44, Nigeria should adopt the 
principle of fair comparison with the private 
sector for determining pay in the public sector 
(para. 39). 
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3. That considération should be given to 'national-
ising and harmonising "the various pension and 
other superannuation schemes by the introduction 
of a national contributory superannuation scheme 
applicable to the différent organisations in 
the public as well as the private sectors (para. 
53) . 
4. That three levels of enforceable minimum wage 
should be established by zones as detailed 
in Appendix v to this report (para. 78). 
Exception from this rule would be permissible 
under the circumstances described in paras. 
79 and 81 of this report. 
5. Government should make it its declared policy to 
• abolish the differential treatment met'ed to 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour so that this 
^ class of workers can be paid the same rates 
throughout the country without any geographìcal 
differentiation. This policy should be effected 
in two or three phases
 t and 
6. That the daily paid. or unestablished staff should 
be considered for established posts after three 
years service, in accordance with the criteria 
laid down in this report (para. 88 to 90)".^ 
Êltogether there were . sixty-two recommandations ma<de by the 
Adebo Wages and Salaries Review Commission. 
Historically, thèse wage tribunals or commissions 
which now dominate the wage détermination system in the 
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country can be traced back to the days of the colonial 
administration in the country (Table 14). The colonial 
administrators were' reported to have started this 'method' 
of wage setting because of the imperfect -
nature of the Nigeria Labour Market which made it difficult 
for the establishment of a national wage structure, through 
(- 4 
the formalised "Anglo-sa.xon model". . ma jor ,purpose_behind the 
establishment of the wage.commission.or tribunals was to 
•reduce the differentials-between.urban and' rural incomes. 
This was because before' the Miller- Gommittee of .19.47, the 
^colonial government-was finding it >èxtrëme_ly difficult to 
\harmonize-the wages-paid-:tp .its • labourers with those of 
country peasants (non-wage earning f armers)L. 5 * 
_^ r^ he.. cost of - 1-i-ving . incr-ea~sed du ring- the war / workers 
started ag itating-f or a cost? of livihg -. allowancë (COLA) , to meet 
their basic needs; and each demand or agitation sees the 
establishment of a wage tribunal or commission for that 
particular pur-pose. The Bridges Committee terms of référ-
ence in 1942 reinforcea the above argument. Thèse included 
among other things Mto look into the possibility of 
increasing cost of living allowancë due to increases in 
" 6 
price brought about by war inflation 1939-45 'r Table 
14 reflects the • various wage tribunals or commissions that 
have tackled wage and salary issues in the country. The 
table is divided into two sections. Section One lists 
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the pre-independence wage commissions, while Section Two 
deals with the post-independence wage and salary commissions 
The table further reveals that from 1942 to 1981 the country 
had had thirteen wage commissions. 
Although wage tribunals or commissions.as a mechanism 
for wage setting remain popular^within the government ; 
circles,. it is not universally accepted by the majority 
of employers and employées in the country who would prefer 
collective bargaining. For example, responding to a 
question on the issue, a manager in one of the multi-
national companies described ± wage commissions in this 
manner: 
"The wage Commission is not only irrelevant 
it is very obstinate. Wage Commission has 
resulted in a major upheaval. Its objective 
is hypothetical. It has no statistical 
department that produces accurate data. Wage 
commissions start from assumptions". 7 
At times, even the authorities do acknowledge the hollowness 
and arbitrary nature of the wage commissions and their 
subséquent incapacity to deal with wage and salary issues 
satisfactorily. For instance, in its report the Morgan 
Commission acknowledged that wage détermination 'because of 
its complex nature falls within the sphère of collective 
bargaining'. The Commission notes: 
"As we have already emphasised, wages 
and salaries constitute the central 
core of the work contract and 
relationship, and there is no better 
index of the state of industrial relations 
machinery than its success in settling 
wages and salary disputes'' 
13 2 
4 
Year Commission Terms of Reference 
1942 Bridges 
(Committee) 
To look into the possibility of in-
increasing cost-of-living allowances 
due to increased price brought about 
by war inflation 1939-45. 
1946 Tudor 
Davies 
To determine the causes of the 1945 
general strike and to made necessary 
recommendations as to the possibili­
ty of reviewing wages, 
1946 Harragin To review.Wages/Salaries of the-estab­
lished government staff in the 
federation. 
, 1947 " Miller 
(Committee) 
To report on the necessity for 
consolidation of wages and cost-of-
living allowances of unestablished and 
daily-paid government employees. 
1949 Fitzgerald Inquiry'ifitoother causes o.£ Eriugu 
Coal- Mine Shooting. . 
1954 Gorsuch Review of wages/salaries of estab­
lished staff of all the governments 
of the Federation 
Table 14. Wage Tribunals or Commissions 1942/81 
.Pre- and Post-Independence 
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POST-INDEPENDENCE COMMISSIONS 
Year Commission Terms of Reference 
1963/ 
64 
Morgan To investigate the existing wage 
structure remuneration and conditions 
of service in wage earning employ­
ment in the country and to make re­
commendation concerning a suitable 
new structure, as well as adequate 
machinery for a review on a contin­
uing basis: with these guide lines, 
the commission was to provide recom­
mendation on : 
\ 
1. A general upward revision of 
salaries and wages of junior 
employees in both government 
and private establishments; 
2. the abolition of the daily wage 
system; 
3. the introduction of a national 
minimum wage. 
1959 Handbury Review and arbitrate for Federal 
government daily-paid worker's wages 
- 1959 Mbanefo Appointed by the Federal, Eastern and 
Northern regional governments to 
review wages of government workers 
and of all those employed in the 
private sector on the basis of 
increased cost-of-living. 
- * 
POST-INDEPENDENCE COMMISSIONS 
Year Commission Purpose or Terms of Référence 
1966 Elwood Rationalisation of posts created by 
the Gorsuch Commission in the civil 
service. 
1970/ 
71 
Adebo To review the existing wages and sal- -
aries at ail levels in the public 
services, and the statutory Public 
Corporations and state-owned 
companies 
1974/ 
75 
\ 
\ 
Udoji To review the wages of workers in 
the public service within the. 
framework of a comprehènsive but mana-
geable compensation scheme; and to 
create a machinery for making con-
tinuous wage adjustments possible in 
the future without recourse to ad-hoc 
wage commissions. 
1980 'Onòscde- To look into the wage structure of 
ail state-owned corporations with a 
view to recommending a différent 
salary structure for them. 
1. Complied from Annual Reports of the Fed. Ministry of 
Labour. 
Source : Daily T imes, January 10, 1975, Page 7, (Article 
"Infield Analytical Xray of the Public Service 
Commission Report". By Adeyeme M.A. and Mambudiri. 
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However, in the light of the mounting criticisms 
agaìnst this method of wage setting, one might ask why 
has this apparently
 (unpopular mechanism remained the 
T country's,main method ofwagè détermination. Clearly"-? " \ 
to give a tairly balanced and unbiased answer, one perhaps 
needs to examine very exhaus.tively its advantages and 
i 
disadvantages. This is because, both its advocates and 
protagonists must have some reasons underlying their 
respective actions or perceptions. To this end, we would 
start first by looking at its advantages. 
i 
Firstly, the government perceives the 'Mechanism' 
as the vehicle or avenue capable of ensuring adequate 
protection for vulnérable employées particularly those 
•engaged in the private sector. The argument here is that 
there are private employers in the country who regard 
their employées as mere appendages, and hence exploit them 
to their own advantage. 
Most of the levant ine~employers(the Lebanese and 
the Indians) it is argued are only interested in the 
services offered by their Nigérian employées without 
v • • • 
bothering whether such workers were equitably rewarded 
or not. Nor are the employers concerned about the 
general welfare, conditions of work and other related 
issues in the contract- of employment. Vulnérable 
workers it is argued are those employed in the 
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unprotected areas 1 (that is areas where trade union 
activities are either non-existent or very weak to organise 
the workers into différent collective bargaining units, 
for good wages). 
This 1Protectionist 1 view was explicitly taken by 
the Morgan wages and salaries review commission in 1964, 
and was later enshrined in the wages boards and industrial 
councils decree No. 1, 1973. Under Section 1(i) of the 
Decree it was stated that 'government has the responsi-
bility to protect workers in industries or firms where 
wages are unreasonably low or (where) no adéquate machinery 
\ q 
exists for the effective régulation of those workers.' 
Lately, the new National Labour Policy of 1975 reaffirmed 
the government's détermination to curb the exploitative 
tendencies of some unscrupulous employers. It stated 
thus: 
"The Fédéral Military Government will 
henceforth enforce rigorously the 
provisions of existing labour légis­
lation prescribing minimum conditions 
of employment. In this connection, 
the provisions of the Labour Decree 
No. 21 of 1974 relating to the 
protection of wages, contracts of 
employment, and terms and conditions 
of employment will be rigorously 
enforced in order to ensure that 
workers are not exploited by unscrup­
ulous employers of labour". . 
10 
Secondly, it is argued that since the public sector 
accounts for over 40 percent of ail wage employment'''' 
in the country, some form of cohérent manpower utilisation 
and allocation policy was désirable in order to increase 
efficiency within the public service. Infact this was 
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i 
one of the requirements made o£ Udoji Commission when it 
was thought that the Third National Development Plan 
1 2 ' 
(1975-1980) would be in serious trouble because of poor 
civil service and public agency performance. Undoubtedly, 
for this type of policy goal to be attained some harmoni-
zation of the wage structure would be necessary. 
The third argument in favour of the wage commissi.oners 
is related to the second point made above; it is argued that 
national intégration of public pay and organisation Structure 
was désirable in order to reduce excessive labour turnover 
and to tackl'e absenteeism and recruitment difficulties which 
characterised the public service. The point being argued 
here is that private employers pay excessive wages and henee 
attract the best middle and high level manpower away from 
the public service. For this reason, it is the duty of the 
wage tribunals or commissions to reduce the marked wage 
disparities by making the public sector wage structure 
more compétitive ; with a view to reducing middle and high 
1 3 
level man-power migration to the private sector. 
Indeed, this concept óf keeping the'national 
balance' was one of the terms of référence of the Adebo 
Commission in 1970. Subsection two of the white paper 
and final report states: 
"In the light of the cost of living 
and rémunération in Posts with 
comparable responsibilities in the 
private sector; to examine áreas in 
which rationalisation and harmonisa-
tion of wages, salaries and other 
rémunération and conditions of 
employment are désirable and feasible 
as between the public and private 
sectors of the National economy".- ; 
14 
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On the other hand, however, the opponents cargue 
that its disadvantages out weigh the advantages discussed 
in the preceeding paragraphs. Firstly, they^-argue that 
wage commissions or tribunals are not properly equipped 
to deal with complex issues such as wage determination. 
"Either the commissions lacked the capacity to 
evaluate intricate wage issues,or "." - they are severely 
handicapped by non-availability of comprehensive, reliable 
and up to date data, vital for wage negotiations. For 
example, data on cost of living trends, wages paid in 
comparable industries, and profit m a r g i n s w e r e not adequately 
taken into account by the Commission. ^ ^.-. -
It is argued that essential wage determination tools 
such as the "Job evaluation" technique which is described 
as a systematic method of appraising the value of each 
j o b ^ in relation to others in an enterprise, is either 
not adequately utilized or in very many cases neglected. 
With the result that the commissioners very "of fen . 
wor-k-with-- '-^Kece-meai and highly 
fragmented information to cover the broad spectrum of 
subjects included in the wage revision; such as social 
welfare for the workers, transport, housing and educational 
institutions. Consequently, most of the commission's wage 
increment recommendations have been based on such emotional 
arguments as rsocial justice and needs'. 1 6 
Furthermore, given the often very elaborate nature of 
the terms of reference of the 'commission1 and the time 
allocated for the completion and submission of its report 
to the government, it is argued that the wage commission 
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hardly carry out an indepth appraisal of the subjects it 
was set out to examine, but merely give a passing attention 
to issues because of time 'pressure'. The Adebo Wages and 
Salaries Review Commission set up immediately after the 
Civil War in 1970 reinforces this argument of 'lack of time". 
After the budget speech on the 20th April, 1970, which 
disclosed the approval by the Supreme. Military Council of 
the setting up of the Wage and Salary Review Commission, 
the appointment of the commission's members never took 
place until 3 months later(that was on July 14th 1970). 
The first report by the commission which recommended an 
'interim award' was submitted to the Federal Military 
Government in 1970. 
The above chain of events imply that in reality the 
'commission' had only two months to perform the assignment. 
Even three months wouldn't even be enough for the commission 
to embark on a nationwide survey (which involves sampling 
a cross-section of employees, in different parts of the 
country, interviewing them using the structured and 
unstructured interviewing technique, obtaining secondary 
material and finally, analysing the raw data from the 
survey) in order to genérate the necessary facts and 
figures vital to this type of complex task. Given this short 
space of time it is argued that it will be quite impract­
icable for the commission to make a realistic assessment 
and indeed a vigorous evaluation of the issues set out on 
its terms of reference. As a consequence, the comm-
í'ssion will at best -produce an interim or incomplete 
-' 140 
report and at worst a haphazard, and inconsistent report. 
Indeed, the government at times acknowledges this 'time 
pressure' issue, which each appointed wage commission had 
to face and its effect on the report itself. While receiv-
ing the Adebo Commission's report in December 1970, it 
declared: 
"The government accepts that the task 
of the commission was a most difficult 
one, and is not surprised that it could 
not be accomplished in a short time 
given to the commission". 
17 
Thirdly, it is argued that the composition of the 
wage tribunals or commissions is usually unrepresentative 
in scope. Those concerned with employment contracts, the 
employées and the employées a r e not generâlly appointed'to 
p^laces on the commission boards. Before 1959, wage commissions 
had ail along been chaired by an indépendant chairman 
appointed by the government, without either union or 
18 
employers associations représentatives.on the commission. 
Although recently the membership representational problem 
is gradually changing, nonetheless it is suggested that 
the 'social partners* (employers and employées) should 
be given more participative rights. To this end, future 
wage commissions should be expanded to include at least 
three trade union représentatives and three employers with 
'powers' to participate in debates during the commission's 
délibérations. 
The question of the 'power' of the union and the employers 
représentatives is crucial it is. argued, because presently the 
one or two union/empioyer représentatives on the 
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commission are normally there as mere observers denied 
powers to challenge decisions designed to rob workers of 
their rights. The net effect of this 'powerless' position 
is that the trade unión leader merely enjoys the prestige 
and the publicity of being selected to serve on the com­
mission. Indeed, it can be argued that the philosophy 
of allowing one or two labour management representatives 
on the panel is a camoflaged exercise designed to woo the 
'social partners in the country into believing that the 
government wage tribunals or commissions are usually 
proportionately represented. While in reality, the trade 
unión leader and his employer representative counter-part 
are no more than the 'yes group' in the panel. 
Another serious problem with the wage tribunal or 
commission 'awards' arises in the private sector. Usually 
each award meant a huge increase in wages for the workers; 
the argument, then, is that if small scale employers such 
as those around Ikeja, Apapa, and Ilupeju industrial 
estates with very little cash turnover were obliged by 
forcé or any other means to implement the commission 1s 
recommendations (as usually the case) , ^ and pay higher 
wages on a scale comparable to those established in the 
public,sector, many of them will be forced to the 
"receiver". This is because organisations have other 
costs associated with production other than labour costs 
to consider. 
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Finally, it is held that even within the public 
sëctor it is open to question whether it is practicable 
to compare the jobs of the top-people realistically for 
équitable income rémunérations. Take for example, the 
quest of comparing the jobs of such people as University 
professors with those of Permanent Secretaries and other 
functionaries; criteria of output, qualifications required, 
and the extent to which thèse qualifications are interna-
tionally valid, will ail differ between occupations in the 
public employment. 
However, now that we have examined the ' pros and cours1 
ôf the wage commissions, perhaps it will be worthwhile 
to have a closer look at their impact on certain macro-
economic issues such as prices, employment and other 
related indicators before drawing up conclusions on this 
Government backed wage détermination 'mechanism 1. 
(c) The Impact of Wage Tribu'ftà'ls or Commissions 
At the risk of over-simplification, we shall limit 
our discussion to the following key issues thus - prices, 
labour unrest and employment. 
i ]Prices*: Perhaps one of the most dreaded conséquences of 
a wage tribunal or commission in Nigeria is its impact on 
prices generally. Because every award is usually accompa-
nied by a corresponding increases in prices throughout the 
country, leaving the wage-earning class worst off. But, 
one might ask how does this price increases corne about 
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during the period o£ an award? 
The truth is simply, that in Nigeria any year the 
government décides to set up a wage commission, for one 
reason or another, before even the government appoint 
members of such a commission, Urban (city) traders such 
as those in Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna and Enugu will start 
putting up the prices of their goods from say NS.OÛ five 
Naira to N7.00 seven Naira. This initial move may be 
regarded as the first stage 'of the wage commission occa-
sioned 'price metamorphosis'. 
After the commission has deliberated on its terms 
of référence and perhaps corne up with a range of recom-
mandations, on getting such information the co-traders 
would once more increase their prices in spite of the fact 
that such recommendations were yet to receive government 
approval. This might be conceived of as the 'second stage' 
in the traders wage commission award euphoria. At this 
stage, we have to emphasise that the average worker in the 
ministry still regards the newly appointed wage commis-
sion / with scepticism ». - ". Because, first, 
expérience has shown that at times such wage recommenda-
tions hardly get government approval. An example was In 1964. 
' when as a resuit of- the then '"Minister ôf Finance's pressure 
the government rejected the Morgan Commission on the grounds 
that such wage award would resuit in an increase in capital 
cost to the Fédéral government programme to the extent 
N20,62S,500 Naira, and in récurrent expenditure of 
20 
N6 , 888 , 24 0 Naira . Secondly, even if such wage 
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recommandations were to receive government approvai, the 
worker has yet to £ind it in his pocket. 
When the Federai government finally approves such 
an award and a white paper is published to that effect, 
thèse 'ubiquitious vmarket traders"' for the third time 
in a row mark up their prices in excess of 30 to 60 percent. 
At this stage, even the peasant farmers and the village 
petty-traders now join hands in increasing the prices of 
locally produced staple food items such as gari, beans 
and cassava pulps. 
Furthcrmore, the climax of thèse price increases would 
be reached when, after passing through a network of bureau-
cratie procédures the award 'and its bonus finally gets 
into the worker's pocket and he or she steps into a high 
Street shop to buy the goods. There and then prices of 
goods would jump again to as much as one hundred to one 
hundred and thirty percent, depending on the type of 
goods. Consumer durables such as HI-FI equipment, 
refrigerators, and electric fans usually have a mark-up 
price of about 150-200 percent. The net effect of thèse 
'abnormal' price increases is that, at the end of the day 
the worker discovers that the^ value of the "'bundle of Naira' 
(paper money) in his pocket has~. béen reduced sub'stantially 
because cost-push-inflation has caused the purchasing power 
of the Naira to be eroded. Indeed, very often most 
. workers might regret having had such an award at ail; 
and would have preferred not to, as one of the Luggage 
Loaders in the Nigeria Airways pointed out during an 
145 
interview with the researcher .(séè Chapter 6).- An elderly man 
who comes from Urhobo in Bendel State told the researcher: 
"My son to be frank I don't like 
all these Udoji and Adebo wages 
because they make Naira to worth 
- nothing". 
Clearly, the aftermath of the Udoji Wages and 
Salaries Commission Award in 1974/75 bears a clear testi-
mony to the inflationary tendencies of the wage tribunals. 
From Table 15, it can be seen that in 1973 (pre-Udoji) 
basic consumer food items such as sugar costs 20 kobo ; 
and in 1974 when Udoji award was gathering momentum, sugar 
price went up to 25k. Then immediately after the awards 
in July 1975, the price of St. Louis sugar rose to 55k 
showing one hundred and seventy-five percent "increase. 
The table further shows that a staple food item such as 
rice increased from N5.00 Naira in 1973/ 1974, to N10.00 
in July 1975 that is 100 percent increase. Similarly, 
consumer durables such as refrigerators (locally made) 
increased by 25 percent, while electric fans increased 
by almost 40 percent. The same table further reveals that 
car prices jumped from (example Bium 2,500) N7,650.00 
AT. 1 0 7 / 1 +-
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Udoji awards that is 39 percent. 
Table 15.1 further reinforces the view that the value 
of money-wage increases granted by the wage commiss ions is 
rapidly diminished when real wage increases are considered. 
It can be seen from the table that in December 1973 the 
consumer price index stood at 202.9 and by December 1974 
14 6 
Table IS. Movement of Prices of Selected Items in Lagos 
Pre- and Post-Udoji 
Item Pre-Udoi i 
1973 
1974 Post-Udoj i 
1975 
Sugar CSt. Louis) 20k 2 5k 25k 
Bread (16 Oz) 10k 15k 20k 
Sardines (Queen of Cost) ; 18k 35k 38k 
Bournvita 80k N1 .00k N1 .35k 
Beans ( 1 tin) N5.00k N5.00k N6.50k 
Rice (1 tin) NS.OOk N5.00k N10.00k 
Key Soap 30k 39k 45k 
Lux (Large) 8k 12k 17k 
Omo 20k 30k 35k 
L.P. Record (Locai) N3.50k N5 .00k N6-8.00k 
Beef (one pound) 4 5k N1 .50k N1 . 00k 
Regrigerator ^180. 00k N180.00k N225.00k 
Electric fan - N86.00k N120.00k 
Star Beer - 40k 55k 
Fiat 124 - H2530,00k N2735.00k 
Bium 2500 S7650,00k . N10630.00k 
Source : Ukandi G.Damàchi,
 y H. Dieter Seidel and Lester 
Trachtman - Industrial Relations in Africa^Macmillan 
Press Ltd., London, 1979, Table 5.6, p. 185. 
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it had gone up to 224.0 showing 10 percent increase. While 
between January 1973 and January 197S the consumer price 
index rose £rom 172.6 to 237.6 an increase of about 38 
percent. 
However, thèse price increases were checked in 
the second part of 1975 following the July 29th coup which 
saw a new military administration in power; but for this 
change of government, with more strigent social and economie 
measures, most of the value of the increases in money wages 
could have beeh wiped out, within a year^as in the 
21 
previous years.. Even so, the government at times do 
acknowledge the fact that thèse awards do precipitate 
undue pressure on 'prices'. For example, while receiving 
the Adebo Wage Commission second and final report in 1971, 
It comment e d'i il 
"Although it is known that the 
awards in themselves will merely 
intensify the pressure on prices, 
it is not generally known that 
their impact on forêign exchange 
reserves is equally disastrous." 
22 
i)Labour Unrest: Another impact of the wage commission or 
tribunal, it is argued, is that the commission and its 
awards help to generate rather than reduce massive labour 
unrests which they are established to curb. An examination 
of the 'timing and pattern' of thèse industriai conflicts 
over the periods of the awards supports 
this argument. For, expériences have shown that each 
award such as the Morgan Commission in 1964, Adebo in 
1970/71 and Udoji in 1974/75, has always been àccompanied 
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Year and Month Consumer P-Index Food Index 
1973 January 172.5 206 .0 
February 182.6 214.0 
March 182.6 211.7 
.April 186.7 211 .9 
May 189.8 224 .7 
June 194.5 233.2 
July 194.4 231 .7 
August 193.2 228 .4 
September 189.6 221 .4 
October N.A-. N.A 
November N.A. N.A 
December 202 .9 244 .9 
1974 January 203.7 244.6 
February 204 .6 245 .4 
March 206.2 246.8 
April 215.3 261 .3 
May 212.8 260.3 
June 218.5 268.4 
July 216.3 254.3 
August 216.5 261 .3 
September 219.6 262.1 
Obtober 216.9 256.3 
November 221 .7 264.8 
December 224 .0 269 .8 
(Cont inued) 
Table 15.1 Central Bank of Nigeria Low Income Consumer 
Price and Food Index (Base Year - 1970 = 100) 
149 
Yeärand Month Consumer P-Index Food Index 
1975 January 237.6 293.0 
February 251 .9 316.4 
March 262 .4 324.2 
October 305.7 394.0 
Source : CentTal Bank o£ Nigeria Annual and Monthly Reports 
Lagos (various years). 
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by unprecedented levels of labour unrest in the country, 
23 
particularly among the employées in the private sector. 
As can be seen from table 15.2, the amount of indus-
trial unrestf (normally expressed in the form of strikes, 
and man-days lost) reached abnormal proportions in the years 
of the wage commissions awards. For example, in 1959/60 
the year of the Mbanefo Commission awards, the number of 
strikes rose from 54 to 69, and the number of man-days 
lost equally rose from 70,862 to 160,479 showing an increase 
of abour 126 percent. In 1964, the year of the Morgan 
Commission the number of strikes went up from 69 in 1960 to 
170, while the number of man-days lost reached an ail time 
record of 1 ,300 ,000 . 2^ The number of man-days lost was 
highi because of the gênerai strike following the awards. 
The strike lasted for 13 days and almost ail the workers in 
the fédération were involved. Similarly, in 1971, the 
year of the Adebo Wages and Salaries Commission awards, 
the recorded number of strikes rose from mere 50 strikes , 
in 1970 to 143 strikes in 1971 one hundred and eight-six 
percent increase. 
Moreover, in the years immediately after the Udoji 
awards the wave of massive industrial unrests was being felt 
that is 1976, and 1977. The number of strikes increased " 
from 105 in 1973/74 to 354 in 1975; while the number of man-
days lost rose from 148,130.1 in 1973/74 to 357,028.2 an 
increase of about 141 percent. In the following year 
1975/76 the trend remained the same with even a substantial 
increase in the number of man-days lost because of sporadic 
15Ì 
Table 15.2 Strikes, Man-Days Lost and No of Workers 
Involved 1960-1981 
Year No. of strikes Man-days lost No.of workers 
1959/60 69 160,478 36,667 
1961/62 58 ' 57,303 18,673 
1962/63 45 53,039 N.A 
1963/64 6 2 : 94,907 45,409 
1964 1700 1 ,300,000 73,447 
1965 125 • 238,679 N.A 
1966 59 54,165 N.A 
1967 66 80,171 70,955.5 
1968 32 461 ,137 N.A 
1969/70 46 718,946 N.A 
1970/71 143 224,470 78,474 
1971/72 85 63,254 31 ,915 
1972/73 71 105,415 43,676 
1973/74 105 148,130.1 '41 ,52 7 
1974/75 354 357,028.2 126,818 
1975/76 264 439,296.3 122,456 
1976 130 225,709.6 83,126 
1977 1 72 136 ,349 59,270 
1978 67 200,374 29,392 
1979 79 892 ,870 93,4.49 
1980 170 957,116 N.A -
1981 131 1 ,040 ,042 181 ,678 
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Sourees : 1. 
2 . 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
6. 
Notes : 
+ 
/ 
Annual reports of the Federal Ministry o£ Labour 
(various years) summary of industrial disputes. 
Yesufu T.M. - An introduetion to industrial 
relations in Nigeria,London, 1962 , p . 57 . 
Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Economic and 
Financial Review, 1975-80, Table 14. 
Cohin Robin - Labour and politics in Nigeria 
1945-1971, Heinemann, 1974, pp. 194-195. 
Fashogin, T., - Industrial Relations in Nigeria -
Development and Practice, Longman, 1981, Table 
6.1 , p. 77, 
Daily Times Business Times Weekly Review, issue 
of January 1982. 
Years following a major award in the public sector. 
The increase in the number of man-days lost 
in 1981 was attributed to three things. 
(a) The N.L.C. (Nigeria Labour Congress action 
day. 
(b) Strike by the Bendel State Teachers 
(c) Strike by the workers of Wimpey Bonus and 
Roof Nigeria Ltd. 
Stoppages recorded ranged from 3 hours to 2 days,.' 
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strikes by workers employée! in the private sector. Indeed, 
up till 1977, thèse unprecedented levels of industrial 
2 5 
unrests were still being felt. 
Table 15.3 reinforces the argument further that wage 
tribunal or commissions perpetuate industrial disputes 
rather than reducing them. In Table 15.3, it cah be seen 
that even during the colonial era the wage commission awards 
have always been accompanied by significant proportional 
increases in the number of industrial unrests in the coun-
try. Although available évidence seems fragmentary in 
terms of quantity and quality in the years 1946 and 1964, 
nonetheless it can be argued that there is 'a positive 
corrélation' between the wage commission awards and the 
number of strikes and other aspects of worker behaviour in 
Nigeria. 
Earlier in the discussion, we did emphasisethat the 
majority of strikes that resuit from the Commissions awards 
occur mostly in the private sector as shown in Table 15.4. 
Anyway, it is very ironie that the private sector should 
record such a high strike incidence when in actual fact 
ail the wages and salaries review Commissions are appointed 
on behalf of the public sector employées, and not for the 
sake of private sector employées; though such awards later 
2 6 
find their way into the private sector. Given this 
position, one might be forced to ask why then the wage 
award fuss in the private sector? 
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Table 15.3 Selected Wage Tribunals and the Accompanying 
Number of Strikes. 
Year Commission No. of Disputes No. of Strikes 
1946/47 Miller/ N. A 28 
1954.55 Gorsuch 76 43 
1959/60 Mbanefo 140 65
 % 
1964/65 Morgan • N.A 195 
1966/67 Elwood 233 89 
1970/71 Adebo 270 124 
1974/75 Udoji 655 354 
Source : (1) Tayo Fashoyih - Industrial Relations in 
Nigeria, 'Development and Practice, 
published by Longman, 1981, Table 6.2, p.78. 
(2) Federai Ministry of Labour quarterly 
review (various years). 
(3) T.M. Yesufu - An Introduction to Industrial 
Relations in Nigeria, Oxford University 
Press, 1962, page 59. 
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The answer, though arguable^is that'the; 
private sector employées feel that as part of the nation's 
labour force who shop in 'the same 'open market' like 
their counter parts in the public sector, (who benefited from 
Such government award) , they should not be denied such 
wage awards. An employée from A.G. Leventis (private 
company based in Lagos) had this to say to his manager 
immediately after the Udoji commission awards report was 
published in 1975: 
"Government should pay us the Udoji awards 
after ali we buy from the same market". 
This private employee's attitude and reaction to these 
awards explain why as Cohen puts it 
"the vocaibulary of workers activity 
in the private sector is replète 
with références to the government 
commissions - workers presenting 
demands to their employers for 
"their Gorsuch, 'their Morgan', 
'their Adebo and 'their Udoji 
awards'V M 
2 7' 
Table 15.3 shows the pattern of strike distribution 
in the private and public sectors. It can be seen that 
the ratio of strike incidence in the private sector to 
the public sector during the periods under discussion is 
very highly indeed. The proportion ranged from 1.6:1 in 
1966/67, 1.4:1 in 1971 and 5.9:1 in 1974/75 to 9.6:1 
in 1975/76. Although this type of ratio comparison may 
be quite misleading because, the private sector employées 
constitute only a third of the wage-earning labour force. 
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Table 15.4: Strikes by Sector 1966-78 
Year Private Public Sector 
1966/67 56 33 
1967/68 43 20 
1968/69 16 13 
1969/70 36 17 
1970/71 84 52 
1971/72 72 2 
1972/73 60 8 
1975/74 •" 90 1 5 
1974/75 303 51 
1975/76 . : 239 25 
1976/77 105 25 
1977/78 144 9 
Sources: (1) Federal Ministry of Labour unpublished reports 
-i 
(2) 0 - Sonubi, "Trade Disputes in Nigeria, 
J
; ^  - ' ' 1966-1971", Nigeria Journal.of Economic and 
Social Studies XV2, 1973. 
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nonetheless, what is illuminating in thèse strike figures 
is that they manifest as Fashoyin observed: 
"the illusion brought on collective bargaining 
machinery by the customary extrapolition of 
public sector wage tribunal awards to the 
pr ivate séctor *" 2g 
As regards some of the reasons behind the apparent high 
strike incidence in the private sector, the most singled 
out reason is the failure by majority of the private 
employers to implemeht a wage commission award. Apparently, 
in 1975/76, this reason accounted for 95 percent of the 
29 
reported strikes and lockouts in the private sector. 
A government statement in 1958 suggests that the government 
was apprehensive of the fact that wage awards by its 
appointed wage commissions precipitate massive industriai 
unrest in the year or years such awards were made. ^ This 
is because while describing the year 1957/58 in terms of 
labour unrest it describes it as: 
"one of stability, and optimism, 
punctuated here and there by 
occasional outbursts of localised 
disputes. The absence of any major 
révision of the structure of govern-
ment wages and salaries was no :doubt 
one explanation of the comparatively 
stable situation". 
In cono-lusion, it is argued that increased industriai 
unrest in the Private Sector is brought about by the workers 
desires to emulate the Commission's Pay increases in the 
Public Sector. 
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(iii) Unemployment 
In addition, it is argued that wage commission awards 
usually have a serious négative effect on employment levels 
which they are supposed to boost and protect. The 
government did acknowledge this view in 1971 while commi-
ssioning the Adebo Commission. It noted 
"Under certain conditions their effects 
(wage awards) on the employment levé 1 
may be négative where they cannot be 
fully absorbed under conditions of 
increased production" 
Clearly, there are several ways by which thèse wage awards 
can ser iously affect employment levels negatively as the 
government noted above. One could be through massive 
réduction in the number of workers hired by private employers 
compelled bylaw to implement ail that a wage commission had 
recommended. Secondly, job losses could resuit from 
'closures' by firms which after paying such commission awards 
to its employées find it difficult to continue in business. 
For undoubtedly, exper iences have shown that each time 
thèse 'awards' were made and the small scale private employers 
which dominate the Nigeria labour market forced (by combina-
tion of employées' pressure and the authorities)to pay such 
massive wage increases, their effects on employment levels 
were always disastrous. Because usually the tendency is for 
thèse desperate private employers to capitalise on the 
négative side of such an award and start cutting down the 
rate with which they hire labour, with the view to reducing 
the apparent abnormal labour-costs occasioned by the awards. 
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An application of a basic macro-economic theory of a 'firm's 
demand for and supply of labour in an imperfect labour 
market may illustrate how thèse massive wage awards affect 
employment both in the short and long run in the co'untry 
would be in place. 
For the purposes of this illustration, we are assuming 
that (a) there is no corresponding increase in demand for 
productivity levels to absorb or offset such'wage increases. 
(b) there is no-wage discrimination practiced by our-
bypothetical employer, 
Using the graph in figure one, assuming that before the 
Udoji Commission's award, an employer in the private sector 
was paying N4.00 Naira per hour that is a wage • O.W. on the 
graph for each worket hired; and so was prepared to hire 
the labour market supply of OLI. The labour cost or wage 
bill at- this wage rate will be 0WX.0L1 , which is the area 
of rectangle OWBLI. Moreover, at this wage bill neither 
the firm's profit margins nor its survival is threatened, 
hence, no retrenchment of workers, no shorter working 
week and threats of redundancies. 
Now suppose, because of the wage commission awards 
the firm was forced to increase its hourly rate of pay 
(as often the case in Nigeria) from the relatively N4.Û0 
that is (OW) to NS.00 Naira, that is from OW to 0W1, 100 
percent increase. The question might be what happens 
next? Obviously, with this level of increased "wage bill" 
the employer's response and attitude would almost be 
predictable. As a short-term measure the employer would 
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Figure 1 . Graphical Illustration or the hypothetical impact of 
Wage Commission Award on Employment Level. 
Naira 
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respond immediately by reducing the number of daily hired 
workers from L1 to L2 so that the company can survive, at 
least. This action would mean people being thrown out of 
their jobs either through compulsory redundancies or by 
t. any other means which the employer might consider • necessary . 
While the few lucky employées who might be left to maintain 
essential services may be forced to accept shorter working 
week. Apparently, this would be the order of events in 
those firms with good financial resources which can still 
remain in business after the payment of thèse awards to 
their employées. But, for those firms in "shaky financial" 
positions which after implementing the wage commissions 
awards would find themselves out of business, the risks 
of mass job losses are even more grave. In that, as the 
firm moves to the "receiver" so would its entire work force 
be forced into compulsory redundancies, thereby lengthening 
the dole queue. 
The response which the researcher got from the 
interviews held with the Nigérian Employers Consultative 
Association Officiais in Lagos during the field work 
reinforces the above assertion. Though a set of data 
showing the number of workers being retrentched and the 
firms affected would have been more ideal. During the 
interview a NECA officiai pointed out that in 1974/75 
the year of the Udoji Awards a survey carried out by NECA 
research unit (reports not usually made available to the 
general public) among its affiliated company members 
revealed that over ten thousand workers employed in the 
private sector lost their jobs. "Mòre than f i ve thousand 
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employees were placed on shorter working week. The 
official further disclosed that over ten percent of its 
member firms or companies were forced out of their 
businesses after implementing the recommendations of the 
Udoji Wages/Salaries Review Commission. Hence, the 
argument that the wage commission awards generate 
unemployment instead of helping to create employment 
through this medium of 'pump priming' of the economy 
by the government, is supported by the employers. 
In this analysis, we have attempted to explain 
what the wage commission or tribunal is, its composition 
and operation. We have also examined its advantages 
and disadvantages as well as its impact on certain 
key macro-economic factors. It was found that the 
wage Commissions have not shown themselves to be a 
wage fixing mechanism which 
(i) minimises Cost-Push inflation; 
(ii) prevents industrial conflict; 
(iii) avoids the danger of unemployment; and 
are not necessarily the most conducive means 
to economic growth. 
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3.9 Wage détermination through the-Collective 
Bargaining Process' 
i 
This section sets ont. to examine the collective 
bargaining process in Nigeria; i f s historical develop-
ment, structure and practice and constraints on its 
effectiveness. An important point about collective 
bargaining in Nigeria is that inspite of the support by 
successive administrations it-has not been particularly 
successful as a mechanism for wage.'determination. However, 
later in the thesis we intend"to show how collective 
bargaining can be organised. 
The term 'joint negotiation or consultation*was first 
used in labour-management relations in Nigeria in 1937. 
This was when the then colonial authorities established 
'provincial.wages committees' throughout the fédération. 
These committees were responsible for reviewing public 
32 
service employée wag e s per iodica lly. The member s of 
the committees were composed of government officiais -
Resident, District'off icer s» and some1 • local -heads. Workers or""their. rèprë-
. sentatives were not given seats. - In 1942, however,owing to mounting 
agitation by the workers the composition of thèse committees 
was expanded to include the workers and their représenta-
tives. 
These committees functioned for a number of years 
before experiencing mounting opposition from both the trade 
unions and the workers, the latter claiming that the 
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provincial wage committees were no longer fulfilling their 
expectations. Following this wave of workers discontent 
which culminated.in the 1 945 general strike, the provincial 
wage committees were dissolved. In 1948, following the 
result of the investigations conducted by Mr. T.W. Cowan * 
of the United Kingdom Ministry of Labour and National Service, 
Whitley Councils were set up."3"3 Consequently, the functions 
of the departmental committees were confined to an examina­
tion of matters concerning individual departments. These, 
arrangements meant that the^Whi'tiey Councils became in effect 
the machinery-for the collective bargaining^while the depart­
mental committees became consultative committees.-
The new system (the Whitley Councils) consisted of 
three councils 'A' 'B r and ' C charged with the responsibi­
lity for overseeing the problems of senior, junior staff 
I 
and industrial/technical employees respectively. Each 
council was empowered to enter into negotiations with 
.employees or their representatives were necessary and to 
settle disputes (within the public service). A major 
feature of the Whitley Councils system which needs emphasis 
is its scope, in that while the traditional bargaining 
machinery in the private sector could be on a house, industry 
or national basis; "Whitleyism" was nationally oriented, 
an all-embracing machinery covering federal, state and 
somet ime s local government employees. This all-embrac ing 
or national scope advantage me.ant that a significant pro­
portion of groups of employees or bargaining units can 
appropriately be covered by one negotiating process. 
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However, inspite of this advantage of national scope, 
after a year's - opération (i.e. 1949) the Whitley Council 
System was found to be defective, as a conséquence became 
unacceptable like its predecessor - the provincial wage 
committees. Several reasons were quickly advanced for the 
3 4 
failure of the Whitley's Councils by the authorities, . 
Firstly, Whitley councils were unsuccessful because they 
failed to fulfil the purpose for which they were established. 
They were supposed to act, as mechanisms for effective wage 
nepotiations. Instead the councils served merely as con-
sultative machineries arid this rôle was not acceptable to the 
authorities because it could not achieve set objectives. 
Secondly, the councils failed because of representational 
disputes, indecisiveness, bureaucracy and lack of govern-
ment support. Thirdiy, the various wage tribunals and 
commissions periodically set up by the government, to be 
responsible for wage détermination and conditions of service, 
especially for the public employées^rendered the councils 
position^useless, in that thèse periodic wage commissions 
took over their function. Although following the advice 
of Mr. F. Carruthers of the United Kingdom Ministry of Labour 
in 1951, the councils were reconstituted they were still 
defective. 
Apparently, because of the failure of the Whitley 
Councils, the Udoji Wages and Salaries Review Commission of 
1974/75 supported the idea of the establishment of a National 
Public Service Negotiating Council. The Council 
would be responsible for matters relating to wages, arbitration 
and centralisation of the machinery for negotiation 
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The Current Position of Collective Bargaining 
Récent studies in Nigeria suggest that the collective 
bargaining process remains largely private sector dominated 
despite government's apparent commitment to the 
System. Tables 15.5 and 15.6 clearly reinforce. the current 
position of collective bargaining in both sectors of the 
economy. In Table 15.5 it can be seèn that out of a total 
of 316 collective agreements registered under Decree No. 21, 
1968 and Decree No. 53 of 1969{see'Chapter 2.7) 291 or 
92 percent/collective agreements, 40 of which have been 
revised by the Fédéral Government took place in the private 
sector; while only 25 or 7.9' percent took place in the 
public- sector. 
The table further reveals that in the large public 
corporations such as the Railways, Coal Board and Airways 
collective agreements hardly took place; contrasting sharply 
with the high proportion of collective agreements registered 
in commerce, banking and insurance (in the private sector). 
Table 15.6 shows that in May 1974, out of 87709 workers in 
125 establishments who were involved in collecgive agreements 
notified under section 5(1) of Decree No. 55 1969, 84699 
workers or 97 percent came from the private sector. On 
aggregate, however, coverage is st ill very low. 11 is 
reckoned that collective bargaining is operating in 3.7 
percent of establishments employing 10 persons or more and 
by only 23.2 percent of registered trade unions. 3 6 
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Table 15.5 Collective Agreements Registered under Decree 
No. 21 1968, and Decree No. 53 1969, 
[Private Sector) 
S/No Industry Collective 
Agreements 
Re vi se d 
Agreements 
Employées 
Union 
Involve-
ment s 
Total 
Agreements 
1 Shipping/Shipping 
Agencies 10 3 7(8)* 13 
2 Stevedone & Dock 2 - 2(2)* 2 
3 Road Transport 12 - 12(9)* 1 2 
4 Air Transport & 
Travel Agencies 1 - U D 1 
5 Mining, Oil explo­
rations, Prduct ion 
& Ref inery 14 3 . 14(8)* 17 
6 Food and Drinks -
Brewing Mineral-
water Prod. 20 3 20(19)* 23 
7 Textile & Clothing 32 6 32(29)* 38 
. 8 Paint s, Chemicals, 
Vegetable-oil 
Processing 1 5 4 15(14)* 19 
9 Rubber manufactur­
ing & Retreading 
& Plastic 13 6 13(12)* 19 
10 Cernent Manufactur­
ing 8 1 8(1)* 9 
11 Engineering & 
Metal Products 27 2 27(24)* 29 
12 Agriculture, 
timber & Plants 8 - 8(8)* 8 
13 Commerce, Banking 
& Insurance 53 6 53(45)* 59 
(Continued) 
f r -
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S/Mó Industry Collective 
Agreements 
Revised 
Agreements 
Employées 
Union In-
volvement 
Total 
Agreements 
14 Hotels, Catering 
& Enterta inments" 
Excluding Radios 
& TV 16 6(6) 6 
15 Technical Sales 
& Services 12 - 12(8)* 12 
16 Petroleum, Gas 
& Oil Mkt. 10 5 10(7)* 15 
17 Motor Trade 11 - 11(10) 1 1 
18 Printing Info. 
& Allied 
Trade 10 1 • 10(10) 1 1 
19 Building & Civil 
Engineering 12 - 12(8) 12 
20 Paper Products 
& Services 15 15(15) 15 
I Total(Private) 291 40 288(251) 331 
\ 
PUBLIC CORP 
AGREEMENTS 
COLLECTIVE 
0RATIONS -
NOTIFIEE: 
AGREEMENTS 
COLLECTIV 
RENEWED 
E 
1 Radio & Televisión 2 - 2(2) 2 
2 Marketing Boards S 
Finance Corpora­
tion 2 2(2) 2 
3 Development Corps . 4 - 4(4) 4 
4 Electricity/Niger 
Dams. 2 1 2(2) 3 
5 Railway 1 - 1(2) 1 
6 Ports & (shippings) 2 - 2(2) 2 
7 Coal - - - -
8 Airways 1 - K D 1 
9 Universities (Inc . ) 
Teaching Hospitals 4 - 4(4) 4 
10 Printing & 
Publishing 2 - 2(2) 2 
• 
Total 20 1 
- . 
20(21) 2 
(Continued) 
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PUBLIC SERVICE - COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS NOTIFIEE 
S/No Industry Collective 
Agreements 
Revised 
Agreements 
Employers/ 
Union 
Involvement 
Total 
Agreements 
1 Education 1 - K D 1 
2 Local Govern­
ment 1 - K D 1 
3 Public Works 1 1 (1> 1 
4 Transport & 
Aviation 2 - 2(2) 3 
Grand Total 
(All sectors) 316 42 313(277) 358 
Source : 
ILO/DANIDA African Regional Wages Seminar, November 1974, (ILO 
Geneva 1975), Appendix II, pp. 88-89. 
Table 15.6 Collective Agreements - Notified 
No of Workers Involved 
Industry 1970 1971 1972 1973 Jan-June 
1974 Total 
1. Shipping & 
i Shipping Agen­
cies 322 _ 3368 3690 
2. Air Transport 127 - - - 127 
3. Mining, Oil, 
Exploration . 46 1858 2500 598 2329 7331 
4. Fooja & Drinks 6866 214 1273 134 2 9695 
5. Textile & 
Clothing 1 3599 408 -J 7078 ; 158 21243 
6. Rubber Manuf. 
& Plastic Prod. - 819 210 574 60 1663 
7. Cernent CGlass, 
Clay) Concrete 980 - 613 1149 - 2742 
8. Engineering & 
Metal Prod. 606 98 403 - 220 1327 
9. Agriculture, T 
Tirhber & 
PIantation 1 136 . . 22 _ 11 58 
10. Commerce, Bank­
ing & Insurance 
& Allied 4114 8075 333 11338 2184 26094 
11. Technical Sales 
& Services 814 - - 300 540 1654 
12. Petroleum, Gas 
& Oil 2107 - 988 1414 - 4509 
13, Printing, Infor­
mation & A 550 - - 26 1215 1791 
14. Paper Products 
& Services 324 425 694 442 - 1885 
Total 31 591 11897 5751 24264 11416 84909 
Total 
Upplirants in data (51)45 (15)12 (16)12 
(25)23 (13)11 (120)103 
ander Sector 5(1) of Decree No.55, 1969. 
PRIVATE SECTOR (1970-1974) 
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PUBLIC CORPORATION 
i i , i i 
No. Of Workers Involved 
Industry 1970 1971 1972 1973 Jan-June 1974 Total 
1iElectricity 
including 
Niger Dams 
Authority(3) 408 30 28 466 
2 .Universities 
Including 
Teaching 
Hospitals(2) 2544 - - _ 2544 
Total Corpo­
rations (5) 2952 30 28 3010 
Total Pri-
vate(120) 
103 31591 11897 . 5751 24264 11416 84699 
*Grand Total 
-(125)108 34543 11921 5751 24264 11224 87709 
*Includes No 
Awaiting App-
roval 29(28) - - 249 18577 11416 30242 
Source : 
ILO/DANIDA African Regional Wages Seminar,. Dar-es-Salaam, 
18 to 29 November 1974, Appendix III, pp. 90-91. 
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On the basis of the above statistics, it might be 
argued that the position of collective bargaining in Nigeria 
contrasts sharply with the high standards established in 
the UK from where it was imported into Nigeria over a century 
37 
ago, In that, presently in the United Kingdom, over 75 
percent of the workers in the public/private sector such 
as workers employed by the post office, steel industry, 
British leyland, and the coal mining industry to mention a 
few, are covered by collective agreement. The remaining 
25 percent or even less mainly from agriculture, catering 
and retail distributive trades have their wages fixed by 
38 
the wages boards and councils. Similarly, in the United 
States, collective bargaining remains the principal mecha-
nism for wage détermination in both public and private 
sectors. 
In addition, recent officiai industriai records of 
most developing countries suggest that collective bargaining 
was gathering a lot more momentum in thèse countries than 
before. For example, in Kenya out of a total number of 
762,000 workers in paid employment in 1972, 414,723 workers 
or 54% were covered by collective agreement; and in Aprii 
1974, the total number of collective agreements registered 
39 • 
was 95. * In the Caribbean countries, especially in 
Antigua, Grenada, Jamaica and Guyana significant proportion 
of the workers have their wages fixed through the collective 
bargaining processa 0 
The relative position of collective bargaining in the 
above mentioned developing countries raises one interesting 
question. : if collective bargaining can be successfully 
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used for determining workers' wages and salaries in these 
countries equally under-developed like Nigeria; why has it 
failed to function in Nigeria or what are the constr.aints 
i 
on its successful application? This question will be 
treated in due course. In the mean time, perhaps it will 
be worthwhile to start off by examining the structure of 
collective bargaining in the country. 
(c) The Structure of Collective Bargaining in Nigeria 
The Joint Industriai Council (JIC) sometimes referred 
to as the Joint Negotiating Council is the main bargaining 
machinery in the country, particularly in the private sector. 
The Constitution for such C o u n c i l s was established by the 
Wages Board and Industriai Councils Decree No. 1 of 1973, " 
which came into force in October 1974. Earlier the Morgan 
Salaries and Wages Review Commission had in 1964 recommended 
its establishment among the catalogue of recommendations 
41 
made to the Federai government. 
The 1973 Decree provides for the establishment of 
Joint Industriai Councils by employers and workers; 
extension of the Councils collective agreements and exemption 
of marginal employers from the agreement. It further 
provides for the setting up of an area minimum wages 
committee and National Wages Board for the régulation of wages 
and conditions of service for unskilled and semi-skilled 
4 2 
workers at the state and national level. In the public 
sector(civil service)there is the 'National Public Service Nego-
.tiating Councils' (NPSNC) normally rëgafded as the tira-in child'óf 
- 174 
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the Udoji Wages and Salaries Review Commission òf .1974. 
The (JIC) Joint Industriai Councils in Nigeria , it 
i 
could be argued aredependent to some extent on the degree 
of 'mutuai understanding existing between the social partners' 
(employers and the unions). This is because the powers and 
scope and composition of JIC ' s are'var ied from one .industr ial 
group to another. The main function of the Joint Industriai 
Councils was first specified by the Morgan Wages and 
Salaries Review Commission in 1964. The Commission recom-
mended that :* 
"Each Joint Industriai Council 
should meet at least twice a year 
and should be charged with the 
responsibility for dealing with 
wages and salaries, gradings and 
regradìngs , and conditions of 
service, within its own sphère 
throughout the Federai Republic". 
44 
\ 
Perhaps an analysis, and examination of an NJIC in an 
industriai group would provide valuable information 
regarding the structure, powers and functions of the JICs. 
The chemical and non-metallic industriai group which 
Lever Brothers (Nigeria) Ltd. is a member company will 
provide a good example. In this industry, ali décisions 
relating to Substantive and procédural issues are taken 
by the National Joint Industriai Council for the Chemical 
and Non-metallic Products Employers Fédération (called the 
Fédération) and Non-metallic Products Workers (called 
the unions) . 
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Under the industry's Procedura! Agreement Part 1: 
Citation and Scope: made in August 1979, the Social 
Partners agrée asfollows: f 
"1 . That the Fédération accepts 
the union as the sole représen-
tative and negotiating body for 
ail eligible membêrs of the non-
senior staff of the various com-
panies in the industry, within the 
meaning of the Trade Union 
(Amendment) Decree No. .22 of 1978 .',' 
2. That the Fédération and the Union 
shall enter into collective bar-
gaining on behalf of their respec-
tive members on all matters 
relating to the following: 
A. NEGOTIABLE SUBJECTS: 
Negotiable Items at National Level 
1 . Wages and salaries 
2; Hours of work 
3. Overtime and Rates 
4. Annual Leave Holiday 
5.^  Leave Allowance 
6. Sick Benefits 
7. Maternity Benefits 
8. Acting Allowance 
9 . Housing Allowance 
10. Transport Allowance 
11 . Call in Allowance 
12. Out of Station Allowance 
13. Transfer Allowance 
14. Redundancy 
3. "That the union acknowledges that 
the Federation's member companies 
have a right to manage their 
'respective companies in ways 
and manner consistent with their 
survival in business". 
4 . "That the Union undertakes 
not to interfère with the normal 
functions of the management 
whcih give member companies of 
the Fédération the sole right and 
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responsibility to conduct their 
business in such a marni e r as they 
consider £it. It ìs accepted that 
the union is free to approach 
management of the Federation's 
member companìes over the welfare 
of its members". 
Article 1 , Part II of the Procedural Agreement dealt with the 
objects of the 'Council 1. Some of the objects of the Council 
included ' 
a. "To secure the largest possible . 
measure of agreement and co-
opération between the fédération 
and the union in all inatters 
listed under Part 1 of this 
agreement, with a view to increas-
ing efficiency and productivity 
combined with well-being of those 
employed". 
b.. "To vary or amend from time to 
time agreements, décisions or 
findings. reached by the Council", 
c. "To secure the speedy and impartial 
settlement of real and alleged 
disputes and grievances, on . 
negotiable matters". 
d. "To consider the adequacy or 
otherwise of the machinery for 
settlement of grievances between 
parties in the irídustry and henee 
to use their best endeavours to 
ensure that no strikes, lockouts 
or any other action likely to 
aggravate a situation shall take 
place until such a time as the 
machinery provided by the law for 
the settlement of industriai 
disputes have been exhausted". 
MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITIONS : (Article 2) As earlier emphasized, 
the JIC membership is largely guided by the structure of 
the industrial group. The picture here in the chemical and 
non-metallic industry is that the Fédération (employers) 
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and the union (workers) have equal représentation. The 
NJIC is made up of fourteen (14) members, seven (7) s 
accredited représentatives of the fédération and seven (7) 
représentatives from the union. The chairman of the NJIC 
cornes from the fédération, usually a senior représentative; 
while the vice-chairman is selected from among the union 
représentatives normally a senior représentative, 
(article 2) 
Artide 4 of the procedural agreement deals with the 
Negotiating Patterns : in the following word.s: 
"There shall be ONE National Joint 
Industriai Council for the Industry 
to deal with all negotiable matters 
of common interest mentioned under 
Part II, Paragraph 2 of this 
Agreement provided that any negotiable 
matters of domestic nature shall 
be negotiated at locai company 
level. Artide 5 of the procedural 
agreement covered the frequency of 
Council Meetings - orderings.'' 
DURATION OF AGREEMENT: (Article 8) Agreements reached 
on any of the substantive issue mentioned under Part I of 
this agreement are normally designed to be operative for 
a minimum period of three years, effective from the date 
of signing the agreement. However, during this stipulated 
période if new 'wage rates' émerge as a resuit of ne'w dialogue 
between the government, the NLC and NECA (as has been the 
case in the last four years) the NJIC would meet again to 
review the existing wage rates in the light of the latest 
development. 
I 
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Düring delibrations, if the Council fails to reach 
agreement on any matter, that 'point of disagreement' is 
reduced to writing and signed by both the chairman and vice-
chairman to be dealt with thereaf ter 1 in accordance with 
the provisions of any legislation/decree governing trade 
disputes which is in force. Part III of the procédural 
agreement dealt with grievances. Individuai grievances and 
collective grievances as enunciated in Section 3(1) of the 
Trade Disputes Decree of 1976. 
INDIVIDUAI GRIEVANCES: The Council agreed that every 
effort shall be made to deal with ali individuai grievances 
at the local member company level by the individuai, per-
sonally or through the branch union or Joint Negotiating 
Council. In the event of a .stalemate,the matter may be 
referred by the branch union to the National Union's Execu­
tive Council which may ask that the matter be raised at the 
National Joint Industriai Council, in which event, if the 
matter be so serious, the National Joint Industriai Council 
> 
may hold an extra-ordinary meeting to résolve the matter. 
For the individuai grievances the machinery for settlement 
is from the local member company to the NJIC whose décision 
is final. The operating grievance procedure is represented 
in Figure Two. At the local member company level the 
search for peace follows the normal organisâtional procedure; 
from the employée to the foreman, the personnel managers 
or sectional heads and the branch union. 
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Figure 2. 
NATIONAL JOINT ~ 
INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL 
(NJIC) 
NATIONAL UNION 1 S 
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
BRANCH UNION OR JNC 
(Reports) 
BRANCH UNION vs 
P. MANAGER Locai Members Company Level 
EMPLOYEES vs 
SECTIONAL HEAD 
EMPLOYEE vs FOREMAN 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
INDIVIDUAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
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COLLECTIVE GRIEVANCES: Under collective grievances the 
'council' agreed that 'any grievance arising from a breach, 
real or alleged, o£ existing terms and conditions of service 
in ail the matters that are subject to negotiations mentioned 
in Part I of the Procédural Agreement which may affect any 
group of employées or any member Company "should first be 
referred to the member company. If no satisfactory solution 
is found, within 28 days, then such matter could be refer-
red by the branch union through the General-Secretary to 
the National JointIndustrial Council"; see Figure 2.1. 
However, if the existing negotiating machinery fails 1 
to break the 'dead-lock1 within the industry; the matter would 
then be referred to -conciliâtion. then if there is no .solution, 
to arbitration. If after arbitration the stalemate was not 
broken,y the matter is then finally referred to the 'Industrial 
Courts 1 whose décision is final and binding to the parties 
in the Dispute or Grievance. During this process of nego-
tiation the Trade Disputes Decree of 1976 makes it illégal 
to go on strike or effect a lock-out until the Minister of 
Labour had been informed. Contemplated strike action must 
not be taken until after the expiration of 3 months fol-
lowing the publication of the arbitration award? 5 
Section (c) Part III of the Procédural Agreement 
established the local Joint Consultative COmmittees at 
local company or branch level to deal with consultation 
items at company level (see attached list below). A local 
Joint Consultative Committee is a forum for the regular 
exchange of views and information between the member 
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Figure 2 . 1 . 
INDUSTRIAL COURTS 
CONCILIATION 
I 
Outside the 
industriai group 
(Statutory 
machinery) 
NATIONAL JOINT 
INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL 
NJIC 
A 
MEMBER 
COMPANY LEVEL 
COLLECTIVE GRIEVANCES PROCEDURE 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
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company and représentatives of its employées, on„matters of 
mutual r interest'. 
JCC items at Company Level 
1. Laundry 
2. Shift 
3. Lunch subsidy 
4. Examination expenses 
5. Production bonus V 
6 . Christmas bonus 
7. Product pack 
8. Long service award 
9. Scholarship award Cstaff and/or children) 
10. Funeral benefits 
11. Médical schemes ^ 
12. Study leave/Examination leave 
15! Compassionate leave 
14. Non-accident bonus 
15. Hazard allowance ' 
A Local Joint Consultative Committee is bared from discussing 
negotiable items (normally carried out by the Fédération 
and the Union) which are covered by collective agreement. 
Finally, it is worthy to note, however, that until 
recently the formation of the JICs (Joint Industrial 
Councils) have been based on individual (house) enterprises 
with only a handful found in company-wide establishments; 
this situation serrously affected the structure of col­
lective bargaining for a very long time in the country. 
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In the public service, the premier bàrgainirìg machinery 
is the 'Public Service Negotiating Council 1 which succee-, 
ded the Whitley Council in 1978, 
aims and objects of the Council include: 
a. To secure the greatest measure 
of co-operation between the govern-
ments of the fédération in their 
respective . rôles as employers 
and the general body of civil 
servants in all the public services 
of the fédération; 
b. to deal with grievances of civil 
servants ; and 
c. to promote industriai peace and 
efficiency in the public services 
of the fédération. 
On the functions of the 'Council' the Constitution provides 
that the Council shall: 
a. Have general responsibility for 
. negotiating ail matters affecting 
the conditions of service of civil 
servants ; 
b. advise the government whcre nece-
ssary of the best means of utilis-
ing the ideas and expérience of 
civil servants with a view to 
improving productivity; and 
c. Review the general conditions of 
civil servants e.g. recruitment, 
hours of work, promotion, dis-
cipline, salary fringe benefits 
and superannuation, provided that 
in matters relating to recruitment, 
discipline and promotion, the 
council shall restrict itself to 
general principies. 
46 '• 
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DISPUTES/GRIEVANCES PROCEDURE 
The disputes/grievances machinary- in the public 
service is simular to that in the private sector. 
Individuai grievance has to pass through the normal 
organisational stages; thus from.employée to Supervisor to the 
head of department. While collective disputes/grievances 
undergo the same processes ^ allowing the 'counc il' to intervene 
if e solution, cannot be found within the Local Union Brauch/ 
Department level. 
However, in the event of a dead-lock, as Figure 2.2 
depicts [Disputes procedure) the Council agreed that 'all 
disputes or différences whatsoever shall be referred to the 
Federai Ministry of Labour for settlement in accordance 
with the Trade Disputes Decree No. 7 of 1976 or any 
statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time 
47 
being inforce". The main problem with the public service 
Council is that negotiations between the Council and the 
government rarely takes place. As the President, of the Nigeria 
Civil Service Union noted in his article in the Daily Times 
titled -"Collective Bargaining - a mockery in civil service"; 
"Regrettably, despite thèse lofty 
objectives and functions of the Coun-
cil negotiations rarely takes place. 
Worst still, conditions of service 
are reviewed arbitrarily and fringe 
benefits curtailed apparently without 
regard to workers opinion and without 
référence to the Council".. 
48-
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Figure 2.2. 
FEDERAL MINISTRY 
OF LABOUR 
/ 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
NEGOTIATING. 
COUNCIL 
> 
In the event o£ 
deadlock (ali disputes 
or differences are 
referred to Federai 
Ministry of Labour above 
MIN-ISTERIAL 
LEVEL 
PUBLIC SECTOR: !DISPUTES ! PROCEDURE 
As provided in the Trade Disputes Decree 
No. 7 of 1976. Mainly for the Civil Servants. 
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The above statement suggests that the pubiic service 
negotiating Council is antere cosmetic: exercise and that 
the authorities stili have much préférence for the 
periodic wages and salaries review commissions. 
MAJOR CONSTRAINTS ON EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
PROCESS IN NIGERIA 
The irony of collective bargaining as a mechanism 
for wage détermination in the country, is that, despite 
the overwhelming support and ~.avowed commitment by the 
authorities its efficacy and credibility have remained 
4 9 
very doubtful. For example, in 1955, the then Prime 
Minister of Nigeria Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belewa issued the 
first policy statement supporting the doctrine of voluntary 
collective bargaining for the détermination of wages. 
The statement came at a time when the régional governments 
were granting abnormal wage increases to workers in order 
to get their votes. The Prime Minister emphasized that: 
"Government re-affirms its confidence 
in the effectiveness of voluntary 
negotiation and collective bargaining 
for the détermination of wages. 
The long-term interest of government, 
employers and trade unions alike 
would seem to rest on the process 
of consultation and discussion which 
is the foundation of democracy in 
industry. Government intervention 
in the gênerai field of wages 
should be limited to the establish-
ment of statutory wage-fixing 
machinery for any industry or 
occupation where wages are ûn-
reasonably low by référence to the 
gênerai levels of wages. Any other 
policy would seem likely to lead to 
political influences and considérations 
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entering into the détermination 
of wages with effects that might 
be ruinous economically, and which 
would have serious adverse consé-
quences for the development of sound 
trade unions." ' 
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While the Prime Minister was making his policy state-
ment in Lagos, his Labour Minister then, Late Chief Festus 
Okotie-Eboh was almost at the sanie time addressing the - Inter 
national Labour Conference in Genève-reiterating the. the government 
policy on the same issue. At the conférence, he 
unequivocally stated that his government was adhering to 
the British prototype model,, which he claimed had ali the 
necessary 'clauses 1 that underlie the ILO Conventions 
of 1948 and NO. 98 of 1949. With the following -L S 
words he went on: 
"Can the various types of collec-
tive bargaining familier.to older . 
industriai societies thrive in the 
différent conditions of under-
developed countries today? This 
is an important question which in 
the view of my government permits 
of only one answer. We have 
followed in Nigeria the voluntary 
principles which are so important 
an élément in industriai relations 
in the United Kingdom. There is 
no doubt that Government interven-
tion in the field of wages can have 
very adverse effects, in developing 
countries at least, on trade union 
development and therefore on labour-
management relations, unless it is 
restricted to those fields where 
collective bargaining is either 
non-existent or ineffective. 
Equally it is my view that compulsory 
arbitration must inevitably have 
adverse effects on the seriousness 
with which both parties enter the 
earlier stages of negotiation. 
Compulsory methods might occas-
ionally produce a better economic or 
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politicai resuit, but labour-
management must, I think, find 
greater possibility of mutuai 
harmony where results have been 
voluntarily arrived at by free 
discussion between the two. parties. 
We in Nigeria, at any rate, are 
pinning our faith on voluntary 
methods" 
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Furthermore, the Federai Government adhérence to the Anglo 
saxon model was further re-echoed both before the Morgan 
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Commission in 1964, and after the general strike in 1965. 
More recently, in 1969, a government policy statement reit-
erated its long-ternu commitment to the principio of voluntary. 
collective bargaining in the following words: 
"The Ministry encourages employers and 
workers to try to settle questions of 
wages and conditions of employment by 
collective bargaining and only inter-
venes in the last resort, in the pub­
lic interest, as an impartial arbiter. 
It fully supports the Principles and 
\ Practice of free and voluntary negoti-
ation, collective bargaining and joint 
consultation. The policy is based on 
the belief that those directly concer-
ned in the productive process are best 
placed to find the answer to their 
problems".1 
The question arises: why has the principle of 
voluntary negotiation and collective bargaining failed to 
function as an effective mechanism for wage détermination 
after such long-term commitment to its doctrine by 
successive governments? Available évidence, though, 
controversial, suggests that several factors have been 
responsibie for its ineffectiveness. 
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Firstly, it is argued, that the catalogue of 
government législation') in the f ield of industrial relations 
in the last 15 years, set has curtailed the activities 
of trade unions and even threatened their very existence 
bears much of the blâme. . It is reckoned that during the 
13 years of military rûle a set of more than 14 restrictive 
5" 4' 
Labour Decrees were enacted. For example, in 1973, 
there were (a) the Trade Union Decree No. 31 (1973) which 
régulâtes the structure of labour organisations (b) the 
Wages Boards and Industrial Councils Decree which set up 
Industrial and National Wages Boards for fixing workers 
wages and salaries, and other conditions of service. In 
1974, there was the Labour Decree NO. 21, which régulâtes 
employer-employée relations in industries. The Trades 
Disputes Decree NO. 7 (1976) defined power relationship 
between the social partners In bargaining situation. 
Section 3(1) of the same decree made it imperative 
f.or the parties in _collective bargaining _ 
to specify methddsof settling' disputes ". ' 
in the collective agreement .The Trade Disputes(Emergency 
Provisions) Amendment Decree NO. 53 (1969) makes it illégal 
to go on strike or effect a lock-out until the Minister 
.of Labour had been informed and reviewed the situation. 
Strike_action must not be taken until the expiration of 
3 months following the publication of the arbitration 
award. 
Before the Disputes Decree of 1976 there were a 
number of other Decrees particularly, during the civil war. 
For instance, the Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) 
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Decree No. 21 (1968). This Decree was macie at the hight 
of the civil war, with the objective of keeping ali workers 1 
together so as to crush Ójukwu's rébellion.^ 5 The use of 
words such as strikes and lockouts were totally illégal 
and trade unionists faced possible prison sentences for 
organizing or contemplating to go on strike. The trade 
union Decree NO. 27 (1969) was aimed at streamlining the 
structure of the trade union movement. More recently', 
there have been a number *of Decrees such as the Trade 
Disputes (essential services) Decree No. 23 (1976) which 
stipulâtes that workers providing essential services such 
as those employed by the National Electric Power Authority 
(NEPA)jMinistry of Works (Water and Sewage Division)^ 
should not embark on industrial action."56. Furthermore, the 
directives of the newly formed 'productivity, prices and 
incomes board, particularly with respect to wage and 
salary guidelines and approvai of collective agreements 
are seen as constraints on the process of voluntary col-
lective bargaining-.,(Chapter -¿¿9) 
* 
On the other hand, it can be argued that a country 
like the United Kingdom in récent years 'has witnessed a 
séries of législation ^ in her industrial relations ,. 
and that Nigeria should not be an exception. For example, 
in 1971, the conservative government enacted the Industrial 
Relations ;Act which was highly criticised because of its 
mixture of reformist and restrictive measures by many 
industrial relation writers. 5 7 The I.R.A. 1971 was repealed 
by the Labour government in 1974 and was replaced by 
TULRA (1974) Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 
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which withdrew British Collective labour law to a much 
more voluntary position. In 1975, the Employment 
Protection Act was enacted. The Act further confers more 
basic legal rights to individuals(workers). Some of the 
provisions included: guarantee payments(ss 22-28), mater-
nity pay(ss 36-38), Trade Union membership(ss 53-56), and 
rights in insolvency(ss 63-69). In 1978, some Sections 
of EPA were amended in the EPCA 1978(Employment Protection 
Consolidation Act 1978). The Employment Act 1980, enacted 
by the Conservative government repealed certain statutory 
procédures which were enacted for the benefit of trade 
unions and their members; it erodes the legal position 
of trade unions and employers who may wish to uphold the 
closed-shop and restricts the so-called trade union immuni-
5 8 
ties. Moreover, the new Employment Act of 1982, dealt 
a further blow to the trade union immunities. 
1
 However, the basic argument has been that most of 
the Decrees or législations enacted by the Federai 
authorities have been too restrictive. It is argued that 
these decrees were designed to frustrate trade union 
attempts to build a strong and united labour movement which 
the government perceives as a source of industrial unrest 
59 
and would provide for communists to breed. For example, 
the Trade Disputes(Emergency Provision)Decree No.53 1969, 
later repealed in 1976,makes it illegal to embark on indus­
trial action. The Labour Decree WO.21 of 1974 which commenced 
on 1 August,1974, regulated all labour relations,particularly 
employer-employée relations. This Interventionist approach 
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through légal enactments is more restrictive than the 
, approach in the United Kingdom. • With the exception of the I.R.Act 
1971/ which contained a mixture of reformist and restric­
tive measures; and the 1980 Employment Act, àimed at 
limiting trade union immunities, intervention.' through légal 
enactments has been modest, at least until the 1982 Act 
came into force. 
Secondly,it is argued by the authorities,particularly . 
the Wage Commissioners, that collective bargaining as a 
mechanism for wage détermination is inadéquate and hence 
unsuitable for the country because it is felt that collec­
tive bargaining cannot assure économie growth, full employ­
ment and the maintenance of equilibrium between prices and 
incomes. For example, the Morgan Salaries and Wages 
Review Commission in 1964 noted: 
"The Commission's opinion on the existing 
machinery for wage détermination was that 
the process of collective bargaining as 
supported by Government, and as practised 
by employers and workers in both sectors, 
had been very détective and of limited 
scope in the country". 
Similarly, in its own report in 1970-71, the Adebo'Wage 
Commission objected tothe use of collective bargaining 
exclusively for wage détermination especially in the 
public sector, arguing that: 
"The use of collective bargaining would not 
alone keep wages in proper national balance, 
both as regarded comparison between the 
sectors, and in relations to avaiiable res­
sources. More generally, is such a Sy s t e m 
likely to assure simultaneously, distribute 
equity, économie growth, full employment and 
monetary stability". 
61 
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This lack of confidence in the effectiveness of 
collective bargaining as a wage determination process even 
by the authorities who are supposed to be committed to it 
has earned collective bargaining a mixed reception among 
the other 'actors' - employers and trade unions.. This 
situation makes it even more difficult for the workers to 
give hundred percent backing to the principle of collective 
bargaining as a very strong alternative to the present 
method - the ad hoc wage commissions or tribunals. 
Thirdly, another constraint on the effective collective 
bargaining process in Nigeria(a problem faced by all' 
institutions engaged in data collection and analysis) is the 
dearth of information on vital factors such as cost-of-
living trends, labour market situation, wage comparison 
and economic conditionswith which both the employers and 
unions can fall back on. As collective bargaining is in 
part an attempt to settle disputes by an appeal to reason 
rather than to force, when data-on these factors are not 
available the normal process of give and take becomes 
severely disrupted. For example, discussions on trends 
in real wages very often suffer from the absence of 
indicators of changes in consumer prices of workers in low 
income group. Another deficiency is in respect of data 
on wages. The authorities hardly carry out industrial 
surveys. And if at all such a survey was carried out, 
publication of the results are very often delayed, 
or issued in a form that limits, their value as a basis 
for negotiation. A common feature also is that, 
frequently information is collected but not compiled, 
194 
disseminated or properly analysed. Sometimes, when wage 
surveys are carried out by the ÑECA (Nigeria Employers 
Consultative Association) results of their findings are 
often restricted to their member employers companies only, 
and not made available to the public. .This leaves most 
trade unions, whose resources for conducting their own 
wage investigation are limited^ with fragmented information. 
The problem with this sort of data collected unilaterally 
(by the employers) is that they are often viewed with 
-suspicion ahd contempt by^ trie union;-' 
The disclosure of information for.collective bar-
gaining purposes within individual enterprises in.Nigeria, 
is largely a matter of management discrétion- The main 
reason being that the disclosure of such information would 
amount to revealing secret company information which 
might be used to the advantage of their business competitors. 
But, in certain developed countries such as the UK and 
the USA, this problem has been recognised and employers 
are required by law to disclose certain information. For 
example, in the UK, the Employment Protection Act 1975 
places a general duty on employers to disclose information 
for bargaining purposes. The ACAS Code of Practice (1977) 
provided some examples of such information, and thèse include: 
pay and benefits, conditions of service, manpower, per-
formance and financial statistics on costs and profits. 6 3 
Similarly, in Jamaica Paragraph 16 of the Labour Relations 
Code of Jamaica states that: 
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"Collective bargaining is more 
meaningful if the parties are 
in formed on the matter s be ing 
negotiated.- The parties should 
aim to meet all reasonable 
requests for information which is 
relevant to negotiations in hand, 
and in particular, management 
should make available information 
which is supplied to the share-
holders or published in annual reports"64-
Furthermore, it is argued that the persistent basic 
disagreement of employers and trade un ions, over owner-
ship and management 'rights* are an impediment to 
developing collective bargaining relationships. The 
basic disagreements stem from the employers assumption 
that their 'rights' would be deprived of them or eroded 
if workers or their representatives were allowed to sit 
on the same negotiating table with them; or were to be 
consulted in decisions affecting workers working lives. 
Reinforcing this assumption, the Federal Ministry of 
Labour reported in 1972 that: 
"In many cases -:it appeared to be still 
widely believed by employers that to 
cónsult workers would affect, in an adverse 
manner , the presumption sanctity of manage­
ment' s author ity and prerogative, that such 
practice would undermine discipline if 
management plans for improvement should be 
*subject to criticism by subordinates."
 q 
Consequently, in Nigeria, over seventy-five percent 
of employers detest the idea of their firms having any 
form of trade union O r g a n i s a t i o n . ^ The few amployers w h o 
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accepted the formation of trade unión in their firms, 
prescr ibed the type of unión structure, and unión officials 
they vjere prepared to make deals with. This conditional 
acceptance is necessary in the employer's view because, 
a strong unión official and well-organised unions are 
perceived as potential threats to the employers. Henee, 
some employers prefer the formation of 'house unions' which 
are powerless, and in practice a little more than company 
run departments. In companies where trade unions are feund 
to be strong and very mili tant, "such strong unión officials 
were at best transferred to a remote village where they 
become incapacitated through lack of support from workers 
or at worst given the sack by their employers".^ 
1
 As Smock found during his study of Coal Miners' Union 
at Enugu. • He noted that 
"the outspoken president of the unión was 
transferred to another mine where manage­
ment thought he wouId be more carefully 
Watched", C Q 
Because of this negative attitude towards unions, 
most employers often find it difficult to recognise trade 
unions for collective bargaining purposes. Very often 
under the pretence that African workers were not 'ripe' 
for trade unionism or collective bargaining, a view usually 
held by foreign employers.^ 9 Sometimes, as the former 
President of the Nigerian Ports Authority Workers Union 
told the researcher during an interview: 
197 
"an employer might refuse to recognise a unión 
because he reckons that the Joinfe Consultative 
Committee(an employer-employee discussion panel) 
does better job: than a formal trade unión." 
Moreover, a firm might refuse to bargain with a unión 
when the unión representative is not perceived by the 
management as 'one of our boys'(usually an employee of the 
company). These 'outsiders* as they are called were pre-
ferred(by workers) to 'house' leaders because of their 
negotiating skill and ability to win more concessions 
for unión members" 
tn- Nigeria nothing compels an employer 
to recognise a trade unión. While the Labour Decree and 
Labour policy set forth the framework under which unions 
may legally opérate there is no legal provisión made for 
compulsory recognition of unión by an employer. This 
pieture contrasts sharply with the legal provisions for 
unión recognition(before the Employment Act 1980 at least) 
in the U.K., where employers were by law required to recogni 
independent•trade unions for collective bargaining purposes, 
if such a unión applied for recognition and met the require-
71 
ments. In addition, a channel through which a unión may 
seek assistance in an event of an employer's refusal to 
recognise it was established. An independent trade unión 
could complain straight to ACAS in the event of failure by 
an employer to recognise it for bargaining purposes. 
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Secondly, because of their negative attitudes towards 
the unions, employers very often make unrealistic wage offers 
during negotiations or fa il to imp lerne rit in full all the items 
agreed in the collective agreement. It is argued, that many 
of the strikes that occur in Nigeria are as a resuit of 
employer s' failure to nonour the terms of collective agree-
ment. 'Aire estimated that between 1960 and 1970, an 
annual average of six percent of reported disputes involved 
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failure to impiement collective agreement terms. For 
example, the Federai Ministry of Labour reported that a six-
day strike, involving the Former Mid-western[now Bendel) 
State Development Corporation and its 13 71 employées was as 
a resuit of the corporation's failure to implement in full 
the terms of the collective agreement between the corporation 
and the employées 
In sum, it is argued that thèse factors (non-union 
récognition, failure to implement collective agreements, 
unrealistic wage offers and a poor approach to negotiation) 
which are the manifestation of employers negative attitdues 
towards unions, adversely affect the functioning of wage 
détermination through the collective bargsining process. 
The fourth and perhaps the most serious constraint on 
the effective collective bargaining process in Nigeria, it 
7 4 
is argued is rivalry between trade union leaders, abuse 
of office by union officiais and the irrational and pro-
liferated structure of the unions. It is argued that 
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union leaders are very often found engaged in pitched-battles 
over union posts, such as the posts of the président and 
the general secretary. For example, in 1975, the battle 
for the NLC(Nigeria Labour Congress)President among union 
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leaders reached unprecedented proportions. This 
leadership struggle is not peculiar to National offices 
or posts only, it is equally a common feature of the 
local branch unions. 
The problem with the leadership bickering or wrangling 
is that while it is being fought these union officals .' 
hardly had the time to concentrate on vital problems 
facing their members. The net effect of this bickering 
and wrangling is- that it weakens the unions(particularly 
its bargaining capacity), and makes for instability in 
labour-management relations."^ In conclusion, it is 
argued that the catalogue of Decrees, dearths of 
information, employers" attitudes and Union leadership 
rivalry are the main constraints on effective collective 
bargaining process in Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
WAGE DETERMINATION THROUGH THE NATIONAL MINIMUM 
, WAGE AND PRICE5 AND INCQMES POLICY.. 
4.10 National Minimum Wage: 
The preceding chapter examined the two main mechanisms 
for wage détermination in Nigeria, namely the collective 
bargaining process and the independent wage commissions. 
Collective bargaining was found to be ineffective conf ined. 
mainly to the private sector inspite of the overwhelming 
support and avowed commitment to its tenets by the govern-
ment. The independent wage commissions were widely used 
but very unpôpular among the trade unions and the employer s. 
This chapter is concerned with the examinâtion of 
minor methods for wage détermination in the country; thus 
the national minimum wage and the Priées and Incomes Policy, 
which if properly developed would assist in the future 
development of collective bargaining process in Nigeria. 
The national minimum wage does not mean for the whole 
country, but for différent catégories of workers maihly 
the lowest income group. Although a very récent development, 
we shall attempt to examine their objectives, 
attempts at their introduction in the country, the fixitig 
machinery,^ and the cTfrrent argument about themj starting 
first' with the national minimum wage. 
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The practice of minimum wage" régulation is generally 
considered to have first started in New/Zealand and Australia 
around the turn of the Century. ^  It was specifically used 
in thèse countries as a device for.the prévention and settle-
ment of disputes. Under the New Zealand industriai 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1894, the court of 
Àrbitration was empowered to settle industriai disputes 
by issuing awards fixing minimum wages that were to" 
be binding on all the workers in that District where the 
dispute had taken place. Shortly thereafter, other coun-
tries followed suit; and among the first was the United 
Kingdom. The UK adopted the minimum wage législation in 
1909 with the view to eradicating Tsweated labour 1 in the 
low-paying sectors. 
•From about the mid-1930s, and especially after the 
second world war the number of other countries adopting 
minimum wage régulation grew rapidly. The few countries in 
which minimum wage régulations were not considered necessary 
or had been confined to a limited number of workers because 
of their extensive reliance on collective bargaining process 
3 
were Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.' 
The wide acceptance of the minimum wage régulation principle 
is reflected by the nature of support which the séries of 
ILO instruments on it have attracted. First, the ILO produced 
minimum wage fixing machihery convention 1928 (No. 26) 
which has been ratified by 89 countries. Over half of these 
ratifications havé occurred in the last 15 years. Secondly, 
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the ILO minimum wage fixing machinery (Agriculture) 
Convention 1951 (No. 99) aimed to provide protection for 
more workers. The last instrument in the séries being the 
ILO minimum wage fixing convention 1970 (NO. 151) conceived 
with the special problem of the developing countries in 
mind. 
In Africa, although the législation on minimum wages 
was adopted quite early, it was not until thé 1940s and 
1950s that effective laws and a number of minimum wage 
fixing decrees were implemented on a significant scale. 
In many parts of Africa the introduction of a minimum wage 
was the resuit of colonial policies initially designed to 
deal with special labour problems. As the ILO 1 978 con­
férence - RT RLD/1978/D1 noted: 
"The basic explanation for the 
prevalence of minimum wage régu­
lation is undoubtedly linked with 
labour market conditions in many 
developing countries. On the one 
hand, the poverty, high rates of 
unemployment, lack of marketable 
skills and poor information avail-
able on alternative employment 
opportunities combined to make the 
position of many wage earners 
exceptionally vulnerable. On the 
other hand, the weaknesses of the 
Trade Union movement and the 
limited coverage of collective 
agreement meant that direct 
legislative action was the only 
means of providing some form of 
protect ion". 
4 ^ 
Despite the wide acceptance however, problems have 
occurred with regard to the définition of basic objectives, and 
the criteria and the machinery for fixing minimum wage« 
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BASIC OBJECTIVES OR ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MINIMUM 
WAGE SYSTEM 
Broadly, a country might bave various objectives in 
mind for the establishment of minimum wage system; however, 
at the risk of over simplification,only four basic objec­
tives can be identified for discussion. The first objec­
tive or role of minimum wage régulation it is argued is 
to provide protection for a small group of low-paid workers 
considered to be in a very vulnerable position in the labour 
market. Such groups of workers include home workers or 
young, unskilled/semi-skilled and female workers. The role 
is based on the assumption that minimum wage fixing should 
be a highly sélective instrument of government policy, 
limited in application to the above mentioned groupsof 
workers who^because of particular characteristics,,are in 
a very weak bargaining position. The aim of this objective 
is not to bring about a major change in income distribution 
but to remove manifest anomalies in the wage structure.^ 
However, while such a role or objective for minimum 
wage régulation is comparâtively easy to pursue and is 
unlikely to generate significant adverse economie effeets; 
it suffers from being very limited in the contribution it 
can make to the réduction of poverty. Because, first, 
its effectiveness as anti-poverty tool is limited by the 
fact that low wages are only one ,of many causes of poverty 
particularly in .developing countries. A-'range of factór's such 
«as unemploy-ment and Underemployme.nt. 
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lack of opportunity for advancement to good Jobs and 
large family size migbt have contributed to the high 
poverty rate and not necessarily low wages. Just as 
N.N. Franklin noted: 
"a low general level of 
wages is for the most 
part a Symptom rather 
than a cause of poverty." 
6 
Secondly, minimum wage rates affects wage earners only; 
whereas this group of people represent a small proportion 
of the labour force in most countries. For example, in 
Nigeria, figures published recently by the Federai Office 
of Statistics show that the proportion of urban wage-earners 
to the total population is 0.0464; those in the rural . 
areas 0.08770 and the self-employed 0.0766 . 7 
The second rôle or objective sometimes prescribed 
for minimum wage régulation (closely related to the first one) 
is for the élimination of 'unfair compétition'. This 
objective reflects the view that while employers are free to 
compete among themselves in respect of price, quality of • 
product, design and sales, compétition should not be at the 
e Apen s e of the wor k e L" s ~ m o th e r wo r d s , iL should no L affect 
workers wages and established terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Application of this objective is strictly restricted 
to those industries v/hich are thought to have a potential 
f or.-'1 unfair I wages in most countries. 
However, the problem with this rôle is that in practice, 
it is very difficult to isolate waht constitutes 'unfair 
wages' because of variations in interprétation 
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and conceptualization; particularly in developing économies 
which usually include both employers and workers at very 
différent levels of prosperity, sophistication and develop-
ment. For instance, a wage that might be considered 
'unfairly low' if paid by a large-scale established employer 
to devoted and experienced workers in the modem sector 
of developing economy might seem 1inappropriately high' 
if it were fixed as the lowest wage that could legally 
be paid to an inexperienced or unskilled worker by a small-
scale established employer. Hence, the difficulty in 
determining what constitutes an 'unfair wage' in a given 
s ituation. 
Thirdly, a broader objective for;a minimum wage system, 
it is argued involved 'the establishment of a basic floor' 
for the wage structure. Under this approach, the intent 
is not to cause major changes in the prevailing levels of 
wages but rather to make a modest contribution in poverty 
réduction by providing 'safety-net' protection for ail 
low-paid woikers. This rôle'is based on the belief that 
minimum wages can only make a positive contribution to 
the achievement of social and economie goals when they are 
confined to protecting the lowest paid wage earners against 
the vagaries of the labour market. 
Again, the problem here is that cfdeciding the 
level at which the basic floor should be established; 
for although the 'basic floor minimum wage concept' seems 
relatively easy to administer deciding upon appropriate 
level fo r the floor is more an uphill task than the 
fixing of rates for individuai industries. In that, 
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data on industry wage rates are usually much' more detailed 
and complete than équivalent information for a given 
région or for a nation as a whôle. Moreover, complementary 
information on labour and product market conditions in indiv-
riddai industries would permit ground assessment of the poss-
sible effects of an alternative level of minimum wages on 
the prevailing pattern of wages and employment. To carry-
out, such assessments at the régional or national level 
can be much more difficult and problematic. Consequently, 
those charged with the responsibility of fixing general 
minimum wages are often forced to take their décisions on 
the basis of highly fragmentary information and in a state 
of considérable uncertainty about the likely effects. 
Furthermore, an additional drawback it is argued, is 
the lack of adequate considération given to the différences 
that may exist in the extent of modernisation or advancement 
of various industries and in the kinds of labour hired 
when floor minimum wage is fixed. For what might be con-
sidered a reasonable general miminum wage in certain indus­
tries may be totally unacceptable elsewhere. 
The final and perhaps the most comprehensive objective 
of minimum wage involves its use'as a general wage policy 
instrument to alter the general level andJstructure of 
wages in line with broad national economie and social 
goals; such as rapid economie growth, price stability and 
an improved distribution of income. This rôle or objec­
tive présumes that minimum wage has a major influence 
on the general movement and structure of prevailing wages 
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in a country. It.is argued that, for a country particularly 
a developing one, to attain set macro-economic goals such 
as controlling the rate of inflation, and achieving high 
levels of employment the authorities have to corne to grips 
with wage movements especially minimum wages; which 
usually have a major influence on the overall level of 
average wages. While on the other hand, it is also feared 
that in periods of economie recession or galloping inflation, 
the purchasing power of wages may be seriously affected if 
left unprotected. This will in turn affect the level of 
demand for goods and services with most serious impact on 
employment prospects and investment on new plants and 
machinery. 
The main attraction of this objective for minimum 
wage fixing lies on the fact that, unlike other objectives 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it makes available 
direct means of bringing about greater consistency in a 
number of independent wage décisions and national economie 
and social priorities. However, while this objective 
clearly demonstrates that it has the greatest capacity to 
bring about an improved income distribution and economie 
performance; nonetheless, it is by far the most difficult 
rôle to ìmplement effectively and runs the greatest risk 
of producing latent or unintended adverse economie reper-
cussions particularly in the developing countries. For 
instance, with a range of highly complex and uncertain issues 
involved the wage fixing authorities are usually found battling 
with means of reconciling conflicting pressures towards 
economie stabilisation and équitable income. 
Additionally, when minimum wage régulation is confined to 
the establishment of .general rates, one of the factors hinder-
ing effective decision-making is.the uncertainty surrounding 
what the effect will be on the wages actually paid. This 
uncertaingy is essentially due to the impossibility of pre-
dicting the magnitude of the indirect effects on wages abòve 
the minimum. Another problem with this objective for minimum 
wage fixing is that, its use as a general wage policy instru-
ment implies that the highest governmental authorities can 
set wage:lèvels with the view of achieving the national econ-
omie objectives with or without the consent of the workers and 
employers whose rôles are vital in any industriai relations 
Systems. And it is argued that this would be a very serious 
issue particularly in the developing countries where the 
government authorities' capacity to take and implement such 
important décisions very satisfactorily have sometimes been 
doubted if not questioned. 
In summary, it is argued that although the four objectives 
or rôles are related and in some respects can be considered to 
differ from each other only by degree, and can be pursued 
simultaneously, but such objectives or rôles should be in the 
light of broad government's socia-l and economic objectives. 
In particular, minimum wage fixing cannot constitùte a major 
élément in a general wage system. The vièw is rein-
forced by Nigeria's expérience. 
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(b) THE MINIMUM WAGE IN NIGERIA 
Perhaps there is hardly any other aspect of ' industrial 
relations issue in Nigeria that has attracted as much govern-
ment, employers and employées attention in récent years as 
the national minimum wage issue. On the one hand, the fédéral 
government authorit.ies attempted to establisb an acceptable 
national minimum wage rate in the light of broad national 
social and économie objectives. On the other hand, the workers 
protested very vehemently, claiming that such recommended 
national minimum wage rates were against the interest of the 
workers. 
The national minimum wage issue is enshrined in tixe consti­
tution of the Fédéral Republic of Nigeria. Item 33 in the 
Exclusive List set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the 
Constitution includes the power to: 
"Prescribing a national minimum wage for the 
fédération or any part thereof'.g 
In spite of this strong légal backing the national minimum 
wage issue has remained a source of embarrassment to the 
authorities. The only consolation now it is argued, is that 
the new eivilian administration with the help of the Minimum 
Wage Act 1981 appears to be getting to grips with this highly 
sensitive issue. However, in the succeeding sections we shall 
set out to examine the various machineries for fixing the 
national minimum wage rate over and above the government 
recommendation. But, first let us acquaint ourselves with the 
évolution of the national minimum wage in Nigeria. 
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EARLY ATTEMPTS AT THE INTRODUCTION OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM 
WAGE IN NIGERIA. 
C1) !lReport on "the facti fl.nding Commission on the 
nónimum wage question:- 1955 . . 
The first properly documented early attempts at the 
introduction of a national minimum wage in Nigeria, was 
begun by the Western Regional government which inpOctober 
1954 reported to the Federai government that it proposed to 
supplément the wages of unestablished staff under its 
employment so that daily paid employées received no iess 
that 5.0 shillings per a day for a 44 hour week. 
The Western government expressed the hope that the Federai 
government would follow its initiative by agreeing to pay 
a minimum wage of 5.0 "shiirìngs per day to unestablished staff 
employed by the Federai Government in the Western Region. 
Consequently, the Federai government appointed three 
federai government officers; namely , the Civil Service 
Commissioner, the Deputy Financial Secretary and the 
Deputy Commissioner of Labour; and charged them with the 
responsibility of collecting relevant data, that would 
enhance the délibérations of the Council of ministers. 
The Council met on 25-October 1954, and after its discussions 
issued a statement on 26 OctobeT 1954 which was published in 
the local newspaper on 27.10 . 1954?"*'; In its report to 
the Federai government, the panel outlined some of the 
possible financial and economie implications of the 
introduction of a National Minimum Wage of 5.0 shillings per d 
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Few of the panel's pessimistic observations at the 
introduction of a national minimum wage of 5.0 shillings 
in Nigeria will be discussed here. 
—— ' 
The Panel's observations were as f'ollows: -
1 . "The panel felt that an introduction of a national minimum 
wage of 5.0 shillings would lead to a considérable 
increase in federai government annual expenditure which 
would probably have to be met by increased taxation. 
2. That it would greatly increase the cost of implementing 
r 
the 1955-60 Development Plan and .... it could probably 
be necessary to curtail thèse plans drastically. 
3. Increase practically ali costs and prices, but it is 
not possible to estimate the degree of inflation which 
would result. 
4.. Cause the majority of local existing industries to pass 
their increased costs on to the consumer, but a few 
industries might reduce their labour force. New 
industries might be discouraged from coming to Nigeria 
and existing industries might be discouraged from 
12 
expanding.'" i * 
This panel's report had the effect of discouraging 
any other serious attempts at the introduction of a 
national minimum wage for a number of yeärs,. 
rot until after independence were further attempts made. 
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'The Morgan Commission on Wages and Salaries Review 
One of the terms of référence of the Morgan Commission 
on Wages and Salaries 1963-64 was: 
"To examine the need for the 
introduction of a national minimum 
wage and to make recommendations." 
In its report (Paragraph 29) the commission expressed the 
following views: 
"The minimum wage is much more than 
hypothetical concept. From the 
point of view of effective and 
harmonious industrial relations, 
it is of great practical signifi-
cance. It must therefore be 
practical and realistic, in terms 
of the necds of the worker, the 
capacity of the industry or 
employer to pay, in terms of its 
likely conséquences for the 
atmosphère of industrial relations 
and for the economy as a whole, 
as well as in terms of the machinery 
available for its enforcement". 
13 
Commenting on the report of the commission, the 
federai government pointed out that it recognises the 
need for a living wage for ali the workers in the country; 
but stressed that such a living wage must be in the light 
of the country's social and economie objectives. Pointing 
out that 
"extremely large increases on 
existing wages would disrupt the 
economy seriously and would be 
impracticable of implementation 
because many employers may be 
unable, immediately meet the cost 
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and this could resuit in immediate 
retrenchment of labour and an 
aggravation of the already serious 
problem of unemployment." 
Although the national minimum wage issue took différent 
dimensions after the .Commissions report, the Commission 1s 
views and cautions expressed by the federai government in 
terms of its introduction remain the guiding factors to 
date. As we move on to examine the varions machineries 
for fixing the national minimum wage in the country perhaps 
the 'issue' will become clearer. •• 
• - c 
The National Minimum wage fixing machinery. 
In general terms, the methods of fixing minimum wages 
include a broad and varied range of practices that are not 
easily categorised. At the risk of over simplification 
four basic patterns have been distinguished here; namely, 
through the acts of the legislature, executive authority 
décisions, boards with powefs of effective recommendation 
and.boards with final decision-making authority. It is 
worth emphaslsing that the boundaries between thèse caté-
gories are not always clear-cut because of the existence 
of complex and changeable arrangements of shared respon-
sibility, and the fact that within each category there remain 
wide variations in practice. 
In Nigeria, however, before the 1979 Civilian Adminis-
tration took over, three minimum wage fixing machineries 
can be identified. Namely (a) the Industriai Wages Boards 
r 
220 
which consists of: (i) the National Wages Board and (ii) 
the Area Minimum Wages Committees estabiished under the 
Wages Boards and Industriai Act No. 1 of 1973, following 
the Morgan Salaries and"Wäges Review Commission of 1964. 
(b) By the use of collective agreements; and(c) the use 
of ' fair wages clause 1 . 
The Boards 1 délibération arrangements can be described 
as an amalgam of centralized and decentralized tendencies. 
Centralized in the sense that most of the key décisions on 
the national minimum wage issues(rates to be paid and zones 
to be included, and effective dates) is decided by the 
National Wages Board in Lagos for the low income workers. 
Decentralized, in that, the Area Minimum Wages Committees 
based in the'various capitals of the states are given the 
power óf reviewing the minimum wage rates for the unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers in the states from time to time; 
with a v i e w to establishing a national minimum wage, which 
is passed on as a recommendation to the National Minimum 
Wages Board in Lagos. 
Membership of the Industrial Wages Boards consists of the 
représentatives of both the employers and workers, in addition 
to federai and state government officiais appointed by the 
Federai Ministry of Labour. The duties of the Industriai 
Wages Boards include the détermination of minimum wage for 
industries where wages are thought to be unreasonably low; 
or where no proper machinery exists for the effective 
régulation of wages and other conditions of employment for 
15 
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the workers. While the main functions of the National 
Wages Boards include the periodic examination of the 
adequacy of the minimum rates of pay for unskilled and semi-
skilléd workers, in the light of any recommendation feceived 
from the Area Minimum Wages Committees, with the view to 
establishing a National Minimum Wage. 
(ii) By the Use of Collective Agreements: 
This is carried out by making collective agreements on 
minimum wages legally enforceable on the parties under the 
provisions of S.2(3) of the Trades Disputes Act 1976. Under 
the provisions of this Act, the Minister of Employment, 
Labour and Productivity is empowered to make an order by 
which the whole or part of the terms of a collective agree­
ment are made legally binding on the parties to which they 
r e l a t e . 1 6 
(iii) The third and "final method .is by the use of the fair 
wages 'Clause v. This is done by enforcing the terms of the *Fair 
Wages Clause' in ali public contracts; by which contractors 
are required to conform to special pay arrangements as regards 
the rémunération of their workers. This is regardless of 
whether the contractor has union members in his employment 
or not; and or, whether he was party to any pay negotiating 
machinery or n o t . ^ Although the wages boards may seem to nave 
some form of authority On .minimum wage policy matters, their 
independence from the Federai Government can hardly be 
viewed as compie te, Past exper iences nave shown that proposais 
or recommendations by these boards nave either been seriously 
altered to the annoyance of the boards or completely rejected 
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by the Federai Authorities. Contrasting :sharply with the 
expériences in other countries where minimum wage régulations 
are extensively used. For example, in Mexico the wage 
fixing boards enjoy a high degree of independence, with the 
chairman of the National Minimum Wages Board having the power 
to order the publication in the officiai gazette of adopted 
resolutions. 
Furthermore, one major weakness of the Boards 
Arrangements! is the frequency with which the boards meet. 
It is argued that the boards rarely meet formally to review 
minimum wage rates in the light of new changes in the 
economie sphère. It is reckoned that since the formation 
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of the boards in 1973, they have only met thrice. This 
view is reinforced by the fact, thatfduring the military 
administration). the minimum wage of N70. 00 Naira remained 
unadjusted or unreviewed until October 1979 when the civilian 
administration took over, and recommended a new national 
minimum wage of one hundred Naira M100.00. 
Besides, these Boards are seen by some critics as mere 
cosmetic exercise established by the authorities to appear 
to be taking workers' interests into account. 
(e) Recent Developments in the Minimum Wage Fixing Mach inerjes,. 
On returning to civilian rule on October 1 1979, the 
power for prescribing the national minimum wage for the fédé-
ration or any part thereof was removed from the 'wages boards" 
and vested unto the 'National Assembly(Legislature) . Following 
this transfer of power a new Minimum Wage Act came into 
being by the middle of March 1981 - the 
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'Minimum Wage Act 1981'. The impact of the new Act was 
quickly felt by the low-paid workers in the federation. 
For no sooner was the new law passed than the National 
Minimum Wage of N70.00 Naira was raised to all-time high 
of N125.00 per month. Housing and Transport Allowance 
increased to N15.00 and 10.00 Naira per month respectively 
for each worker. This leaves the lowest paid worker a gross 
earning of N1 50.00 Naira per month now in the country. ^ -P . 
However, this'-legislative . •". approach has 
often been criticized because it is thought to be too drawn 
out and very inflexible and therefore likely to produce 
serious delays in the taking of decision For example, 
in the United States where legislation' has been regularly--' 
used since the 'Fair Labour Standard Act of 1938' it has 
been the subject of continuing criticisms. And on several 
occasions attempts have been made to change the law so as 
the provide for automatic or more flexible forms of minimum 
wage^âdjustment.''' Furthermore, it is argued that the 'legis­
lature' does..not constitute the most appropriate forum .for 
taking dec i s ions on min imum wages because it is handicapped by 
the lack ôf relevant and adequate information relating to 
.the broad issue of wage determination. 
The Philippines experience in the 1950s and 1960s 
over the use of legislative acts to prescribe minimum 
wages helps to compound these accusations of inflexibility 
and unpopularity of the method. It is reckoned that during 
these periods each legislative act on minimum wages was 
accompanied by wide-spread controversy. 
i 
The Philippine authorities were-forced to abandon the use of 
thèse législative -aets, and to look for a permanent body to be 
charged with the responsibility for/minimum wage fixing. 
The président of the Philippine republic summed up the 
situation in the following emotional words: 
"Up to noWj our efforts at 
raising the minimum wages have 
been political acts, emergency 
measures not based on a facile, 
objective considération of the 
realities relevant to wage déter-
mination. I think it is time we 
departed from this irrational, 
dislocating and costly practice." 
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Judged by the foregoing expériences it does seem 
that the setting up of a National Minimum Wage through the 
législative process looks quite unpopular and cumbersome. 
On the other hand, it is argued that since the 'appointed 
Boards 1 approach has failed to function properly in Nigeria 
since its inceptionin 1973, the new législative approach 
shoiild be given a chance. By giving this new method a 
fair chance it is argued, that the authorities would then 
be able to make a choice between the two methods in terms 
of suitability. •" 
(f ) CRITERIA FOR FIXING THE NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE IN NIGERIA 
Perhaps one- of the most difficult aspects of the 
administration of a national minimum wage System is 
defining meaningful criteria to guide the fixing of the 
rates. 'Qriteria' are often seen as being 
225 
of significant importance for ensur ing that minimum wages 
attain the objectives set for them and that decision-
makiny is not arbitrary but principled and reasoned. 
In this discussion, we shall examine very briefly the most 
gênerally accepted er iter ia for min imum wage f ixing and 
the additional criteria in use in Nigeria together with 
the problems associated with their application. 
Despite the apparent difficulties, the criteria 
most often identified are usually variants of one of the 
following four concepts : 
1. the needs of workers; 
2. wages or incomes elsewhere in the economy; 
3. the employer's capacity to pay; 
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4. the requirements of economic developments. 
\. 
In Nigeria, however, following the Morgan Commiss ion 
report on Wages and Salaries in 1964, the government noted 
in paragraph 5 of the sessional paper No.5 of 1964 as 
follows: 
"The minimum living wag e, however 
désirable on grounds of social 
justice must be related to over-
riding considérations as: the 
ability of employers to pay; the 
possibility of retrenchment and 
its effect on the présent unem-
ployment situation ; the possibility 
of further price increases; the 
effect on farmers and the peasants 
generally who consfeitute about 
80 percent of the country's popu-
lation; and the adverse effect on 
national economy during the 
current development plan per iod" . 
25 
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However, in the 1970s as the general economie outlook 
became more promising following the surge in the 'National 
Revenues': , with corresponding increases in the cost of 
living, adjustment to the existing criteria became very 
crucial though not quite outside .the generally accepted 
criteria discussed above. Consequently, the following 
criteria are now being used in determining the level 
of the National Minimum Wage: 1 
a. The cost of living and the changes there in or the 
productivity of labour. 
b. The promotion of exports and the need to make the 
products of Nigeria's industry competitive in the 
ECOWAS (Economie Community of West African States) 
and international markets. 
"c. The nature of the work. 
d. The possibility of effective enforcement. 
e. Economie factors, including the requirements of 
economie development, levels of productivity, the 
desirability of attaining and maintaining high levels 
of employment and investment and balance of payments 
equilibrium. 
f. The general level of wages in the country. 
g. The employer's capacity to pay. 
h. The needs of the workers (with or without special 
mention of the needs of their families). 
i. Wages paid for comparative work elsewhere in the economy, 
or more generally the relative living standards of 
other social groups.^ 
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While conceptually appealing though, it is argued 
that their efficacy is limited by the fact that they are 
incapable of providing
 t 'precise answers as to how the 
level of the minimum wage is to be calculated. In fact 
it has proved a daunting task to derive a mechanical formula 
or simple yardsticks to be relied upon exclusively for 
minimum wage fixing. For example, the employer's capacity 
to pay criterion is amclassic case of where 1definitions v 
and interpretations constitute problems-., as is\th'e'' ' neéds of 
workers' criterion; 
The capacity to pay issue has frequently been 
injected into collective bargaining negotiations by 
management as a reason for opposing certain unión wage 
demand. Conversely, it has often been introduced by trade 
unión officials as a proof that a company was financially 
boyant to meet unión demands for a wage increase. A 
firms ability to pay determines whether it can make a 
choice between 
(a) paying above the national level or industry average 
in an effort to attract better employees; 
(b) or to keep their wages in line with comparable firms 
or 
(c) paying lower wages and possiblydévising a means to 
attract new labour. 
However, with this criterion two questions are 
discernable: (a) For an undertaking what is to be the best 
test for capacity and incapacity to pay? To give a clear-
cut answer to a complex question of this nature wouldn't 
be an easy going exercise. Because, by trying to provide 
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an acceptable answer other poser s or quest ions would crop 
up. For instance, to answer the above question where do 
we base the test or what measures should be considered in 
the circumstances? Should such a test be based on a 
firm's reported profits(in its return on capital employée!?), 
ïf so, how much should be regarded as an acceptable profit 
level(that is the level or margin of profit) on which 
ability to pay or not to pay can be judged. Undoubtedly it 
would be very difficult to establish because most firms 
hardly publish in any one particular accounting period the 
actual 'profits' realised. 
It is argued that this inaccuracy in financial state--
ments makes it even more difficult to determine when a firm 
was financially viable^ as to be able to pay its workforce or 
when it is financially incapable. Or should incapacity to 
pay be manifested in différent ways outside financial stand? 
If so, at what level or frequency should a firm be 'shaking 
o u f its workforce for the workers to be convinced that truly 
the firm was incapable of paying its workforce. Or should 
the number of firms forced out of business in an industry 
reach a certain number before the workers realise that the 
firm was no longer capable of paying them? Undoubtedly, 
unless thèse questions have reasonable and judicious answers 
application of capacity to pay criterion will be meaningless. 
The second question is thus, at what--level should 
capacity to pay be assessed, should it be within an industry, 
firm or at the national level? Usually the minimum 
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wage fixing authorities often found themselves in a 
quandary when making such a choice. Should it be industry 
or firm based? or should it be nationally oriented? 
Selecting a particular.'level' is compiicated by the fact 
that each level(, industry or nationale attracts 
support. While the former, implies that différent wage 
mimima or rates should be fixed for différent industries 
depending on the industry-'s level of prosperity, the latter 
implies a uniform national minimum wage. However, the 
advocates of the former (industry level) claim that it is 
the only way to enable the working people to share in 
the prosperity of the enterprises where they work and to 
reduce différences between profit and wage incomes, although 
quite contrary to the principle of equal pay for equal 
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work. 
On the other hand, it is argued that a nationally 
assessed wage level will take into considération the 
capacity to pay of employers in the low-wage sectors. And, 
even if employers with a greater capacity to pay decide to 
provide higher wages this could be done through the 
collective bargaining process. Because since such higher 
wages would not be imposed by law it would be less likely 
to distort the wage structure very significantly to 
hinder the pursuance of other macro-economic policies 
(such as achievement of full employment, price stability 
and balance of payment equilibrium). Hence, the problems 
of using the ability to pay criterion for minimum wage 
fixing. 
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' ( U ) The needs of workers 1 criterion 
,.... Ì-I / f -t r~ 
Reinforcing the imprecise nature of these criteria 
further is the needs of workers criterion. Because it 
has not been easy to come up with a clear-cut définition 
of needs of a worker for various obvicjus. reasons. First, 
it is argued that experts in nutrition are yèt to agrée on an 
acceptable way of determining which needs should be 
included in the workers budget. This is mainly because 
of the marked variation in individual's wants and needs 
which are compounded by différences in physical character-
istics, work environment and body metabolism. For while 
calculations may allow for variations according to age and 
sex it is usually considered impracticable to attempt to 
deal with différences in weight, health, environment or 
level of activity, even though they may have an important 
effect on requirement. 
\ 
Moreover, the problem becomes even more complex when 
deciding upon Di^ets that will meet specified requìrements 
in terms of vitamins, calories, protein and minerais. 
There can be a lot of différences in individual's diets 
depending on where the priority lies; whether top priority 
is given to cost-effectiveness (reducing costs) rather 
than ensuring variety in diet or conforming with the exist-
ing recipes. Furthermore, when it comes to non-food needs 
it becomes even more problematic, because of determining 
expenditure areas. The question that arises for 
example, is thus should only expenditures considered 
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essential for subsistence or survival needs be taken into 
account or should social needs be considered as well? 
Anyway, assuming the former, how is to be decided, what 
are essential expenditures on clothing, housing, health anc 
transportât ion? Again, defining absolute standards for 
non-food expenditures is made more difficult because of a 
general récognition that they vary with national condi­
tions such as climate, social security arrangements and 
essentially the stage of economie development attained 
by the country concerned. For example, in the USA non­
food expenditures account for -approximately two-thirds 
of estimated poverty level incomes as ©pposed to between 
a half and one-quarter of such incomes in developing 
_ - 28.-' , 
countries. 
Secondly, assuming it was possible to arrive at 
i 
some workable spécification of needs, yet there remains 
i 
\ 
the issue of whose requirement ought to be assessed for 
minimum wage fixing purposes. Should the référence worker 
be a bachelor or the head of a family (married man)? If 
the latter is selected as is usally the practice, what 
family composition should be assumed? Should it be a 
synthetic composition, considered to be représentative 
or désirable? (for example a man, a woman and two or thre 
children) or should recourse be made to some Statistical 
measures of the average or typical family? If the latter 
procedure is adopted, should the measure be based on ail 
the workers or on only those likely to be affected by 
the national minimum wage increase? V/ould the minimum wag 
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be sufficient enough to provide the entire needs of the 
head of family and his family? Or should considération 
be given to the average number of income earners per 
family? Undoubtedly, the way in which thèse questions 
are answered will have a major influence on the income 
or earnings considered essentially for meeting a worker's 
needs. Yet there is no simple means of making the necessary 
choices; and practices vary enormously from one country 
to another. 
Moreover, it is argued that no matter how the family 
composition and income earning pattern was selected, there 
will always be that problem of 'représentation'. Because 
if as often the case, the required wage for an 'average 1 
family assuming full employment, is computed this would 
be more than enough for a bachelor, while stili being 
totally inadequate for a large family with only irregular 
employment for example, an Ocho passenger' at Iddo 
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Motor Park or a Cocoa farm labourer.' Hence, the inhérent 
difficulties in using budget estimâtes to calculate 
required national minimum waged dìrectly, and the dilemma 
of the worker needs cfiterion when fixing minimum wages. 
However, despite the difficulties discussed above, 
it is suggested that some attempt should be made to 
specify criteria since minimum wage régulation is too 
important a process to be left unguided. Also, whilé simple 
operational rules for the minimum wage fixing authorities' 
may not exist, it is essential that the wage fixing 
authorities be equipped with some useful points, hearing 
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in mind the basic Tùie to be played by minimum wage system 
in the national and broad issue of wage détermination. 
Thus, it is suggested that where minimum wage régulation 
is limited to the fixing of rates for a few low paying 
industries, the wage fixing authorities should be advised 
to be la.rgely guided by the criterion of f comparable-wages ' 
that is to consider wages payable in other industries. Or 
if minimum wage régulation is to provide 'safety-net' 
protection, the wage fixing authorities might be instructed 
to improve the position of the lowest paid workers without 
bringing about major changes in prevailing wage structures. 
Moreover, it is argued that in a developing economy such as 
Nigeria, minimum wage of unskilled workers, urban as well 
as rural, should be related to the average level of living 
ofpeasant cultivators, after due allowance had been made 
for différences in the cost of living, the nature and 
intensity of the work and the amenities of the two ways 
of "life. For, in addition to being conceptually measurable, 
comparison of this kind is thought to encourage équitable 
distribution of 'fruits of economie progress 1 between the 
rural and urban areas. 
The arguments-; 
(
-Oyer, .and a bove the difficulties of determining cri te ria 
în Nigeria today^much of the controversy surrounding 
the efficacy of minimum wage fixing dérives from the level 
of uncertainty concerning its economie and social impli-
cations. On the one hand are those (mostly capitalists) 
who remain convinced that any attempt to raise wages by 
the authorities over certain levels that would not be of 
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économie benefit to the employers is b'ound to lead to 
unacceptable déclines in employment rates. While on the 
other hand.are those for whom références to the possible 
économie implications .of minimum wage fixing are no more 
than a camouflaged attempt to deny workers décent standards 
o fliving or rather in a more gênerai language their own-
share of the 'national lake' (the oil money) . 
In any case, since the nature of this study would 
not permit us to enter into any exhaustive arguments in 
order to establish which 'school of thought' is right or 
wrong with possible value judgements, we shall limit our 
discussion to some of the conséquences of 'minimum wages' 
as enunciated by some well known associations such as the 
Nigérian Employers Consultative Association, the Ministry 
of Labour and Government agencies. The issues to be dis-
cussed here are the impact of minimum wages on (a) gênerai 
level of wages (b) effects on économie growth (c) effects 
on prices, (d) standards of living and (e) level of employ-
ment, with a practical illustration of its effect on 
agriculture and mines industries. 
'( i:. ) Minimum wages and gênerai level o^-wages : 
The argument here is that there is "a close relationship 
between movements in minimum wages and on wages actually 
paid". That wage structure is often strongly résistant 
to change and to the extent that differentials are pre-
served, higher paid workers also benefit from increases 
in minimum wages. Thus minimum wage fixing may be a more 
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powerful instrument for raising the general level of wages, 
with more pervasive effect than is usually thought.*.*^ 
However, on the other hand, it is arguable that the effects 
that minimum wages have had on wages actually paid are 
not obvious. This '.is because effects dépend to some 
extent on the coverage and type of minimum rates fixed. 
Where thèse rates are restricted to certain industries, 
and where the whole occupational wage structure is estab-
lished rather than just a single minimum rate, determining 
the number of workers who might have had their wages 
affected is not easy. In addition, the actual impact of 
minimum wages will equally dépend to great extent on their 
levels relative to the previously existing pattern of 
wages. 
" Effects on Economie growth: 
As far as^the effects ori economie growth are concerned 
, -1 : . " 
•rthe-assumptions here by both NECA and the government 
agencies are that: 
(a) 'Wage increases certainly make for high costs of 
production and, also in most circumstances for 
higher prices. 
(b) Wage increases may lead to increases in productivity 
which may partly or wholly offset their effects òn 
costs of production; but increases in productivity 
achieved at the cost of increased capital and manage-
rial inputs will tend to make thèse resources scarcer 
and dearer in the rest of the economy 
Another way in which wage increases may have unfavour-
able effects on growth is by intensifying the balance 
of payments difficulties. They may make it more 
difficult for Nigeria to seil her products abroad 
and they may lead to an increased demand forimports 
* u "M 
of consumer goods. r 
In this respect, perhaps the key issue would be to 
establish whether minimum wage changes have ever 
affected retums on capital, reduced government funds 
for non-wage expenditures or caused a détérioration 
in the balance of paymertt before jumping into 
conclusion. On the other hand, allowance must be 
made for the possibility that if there were unemployèd 
resources due to a fall in aggregate demand, higher 
wages may have stimulated consumption expenditure 
and eventually employment and growths. Moreover, 
under certain conditions minimum wages could contri-
bute to economie growth by inducing a more rapid 
switch of labour and capital resources from low wage 
industries to more productive uses. < 
- i 
*( i i i ) -Effects on Pr/ices, Standard of 'l'iving and 
level of Employment: , . 
The authorities firmly believe that minimum 
wage increases would hav.e the following effects on 
prices/standard of living. and level of employment: 
(a) 'The problem of finding productive work for 
school leavers and others who need it is causins 
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governments in the fédération a great deal 
of anxiety; the effects of higher wages on 
employment opportunities are among the most 
important considérations to be borne in mind 
in fixing wage rates; 
-the increase in the demand for essential 
consumer goods with more or less substantial 
rise in their prices, since a rise in demand 
would not automatically lead to higher pro-
duction; 
with money incomes remaining constant for those 
who do not directly benefit by the minimum 
wage or higher prices, a rise in prices will 
mean that the real incomes of those groups 
will fail. Prominent among thèse groups are 
the peasants and the farmers in the traditional 
sector who constitute about 70 percent of the 
population; 
^he cost of implementing projects and programmes 
will rise. Migration from the rural to the 
urban areas will increase with adverse consé-
quences on agriculture, rural development and 
the Green Révolution; 
4tfiére is also the question of enforcement, . 
Apart from the issue of the machinery for 
effective enforcement, it would be futile 
to try to enforce the payment of a national 
minimum wage fixed by authority if the économie 
sector in which the workers are employed is 
not sufficiently productive to pay the minimum 
wage".33 
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To buttress the foregoing assertions the authorities 
had to demonstrate the impact of abnormal minimum wage 
increases, usìng two indus t-* rial units as an example -
agricultural industry and mining industry- First the 
relationship [in agricultural industry) between the level 
of wage rates, cost of production and the prices of 
specified commodities such as rubber, palm oil and cocoa 
is outlined "in Table 15.7 (a) 
Table 15.7(a) reveals that among the commodities 
produced only cocoa production is a worthwhile project. 
The losses incurred by the other two commodities (rubber 
and palm oil are such that it will be un-economical 
for any one to recommend a continuation in their production. 
Hence, the authorities concern for minimum wage increases 
and rates. 
In conclusion, it is argued that the apparent 
'mixed up' in the national minimum wage issue stems from 
the fact that the authorities have not been able to 
specify clearly what the role of minimum wage régulation 
is in the national system of wage détermination. More 
attention it is argued should be paid to the problem of 
specifying appropriate rôles for 'minimum wage' régula-
tions on the basis of a careful assessment of the alter-
natives in the light of national, social and economie 
conditions. Given. the problems of establishing mechanisms, 
:défining criteria dnd predicting its effects^ the détermination 
of national minimum'wages is unlikely to become a centrai 
feature of Nigérian wage détermination. 
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R U B B E R 
Wage per month Cost of produc-
tion 
Commodity Board 
Pr'ice Effect 
N61 .80 p.m. N670 .00 p.ton N690.0 N20 (profit) 
N84.50 N870.00 N690.0 N180 (loss) 
N100.00 N970.00 N690 .0 N280 (loss) 
N110 .00' N1939.00 N690.0 N340 (loss) 
N120.00 M1090.00 H690.0 N400 (loss) 
P A L M 0 I L 
N61 .80 p.m. 
N84.50 
N799 p.ton 
(average) 
NI 149 p.ton 
(average) 
N450.00 
N450.00 
K344 (loss) 
N699 (loss) 
C 0 C 0 A 
Wage per month 
and % of labour 
cost to total 
costs 
N61 .80 (35 .81) N822 N1 261 M439 (profit) 
N84 .50 (45 .3%) N965 N1 261 N296 (profit) 
N100 (49.4%) N1044 N1261 H217 (profit) 
Fr:jnge Benefits 
1. Free Housing (single room for unmarried and double, 
room ofr married 
2. Free medicai treatment (for ail members) of household 
living on plantation). 
3. Free plots of land provided for workers to grow their 
own crops. 
Labour Component: The labour component of the cost of 
production of thèse commodities is about 50$ 
Source : NECA News Sept./Oct. 1 980. Nigeria Employers 
Consultative Association, Yaba, Lagos. 
Table 15.7(a) Facts and Figures to Illustrate Relationship 
of Wages to Cost of Production 
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Table 15.7(b) Metallic-Mining 
Minimum wage negotiated in the industry as at 
31:3:80 was N53.07 per month. 
Minimum wage on 24:6:80 came to.N100.00 per month 
Percentage increase 86 percent 
Effects: 
The additional cöst to one of the Tin mining 
companies for adopting N100.00 per month as 
minimum wage was N1 ,000 ,000 (one million Naira) 
Fringe Benefits 
a. Free housing 
b. Free water supply 
c. Generally free electricity supply 
d. Transport to an from work 
e. 20% of daily rate for each night as overnight 
allowance: 
t 
Source : Ibid . , pp . 16.17..' 
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Prices and incomes policy originated in the indus-
trialised countries where it "has been used mainly as 
a short-term policy instrument to tackle certain diffi-
cult macro-economic problems such as inflation and 
•34 
unemployment. ' It is a policy instrument which is just 
gaining ground in -developing countries. The 'termT 
is used in many various ways. Sometimes it is used to 
denote no more than the setting by governments of general 
goals for changes in the structure and level of prices 
and incomes. At >"the other extrême, the term is 
used to describe not only the setting of targets or 
objectives to be attained with the assistance of various 
fiscal and monetary measures, but also direct attempts 
by governments to influence or control the fixing of 
various prices and incomes. 3 5 It is the latter that 
we- would focus our discussions. 
In the United Kingdom for example, the issue 
usually takes various forms but mainly two principal-
norms have always been experiented on since 1965. They 
have*been geared either to the claims of social equity 
or to those of industriai efficiency ?^ An equity-
based policy is usually associated with flat-rate . 
norms, for example, the £6 per week limit introduced 
between July 1975-July 1 976 . 3 7 " While an efficiency-
based policy recognizes the tenet of linking wage in-
creases with productivity growth, a sort of indexation. 
4.11 PRICES AND INCOMES POLICY. • 
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This was the norm in opération in the United Kingdom 
in 1973/74. It is often expressed in percentage terms. 
Given that prices and incomes policy instrument 
is fast becoming a regulär " tool" in the armoury of 
most governments in particular developed countries, 
and in récent years the developing nations have been 
showing a great deal of interest, one might ask what 
actually do they hope to achieve with this policy 
instrument? In other words, what are the main objec-
tives for prices and incomes policy. 
(a) Objectives 
Broadly, various government might have différent 
range of aims or purposes for the introduction of a 
prices and incomes policy in the midst of the traditional 
fiscal and monetary instruments.. Some of the reasons 
might be geared towards winning the macro-economie 
policy 'battle' such as acute unemployment as well as 
balance of payment difficulties. 
However, there appear to be three distinct objec-
tives for the introduction of prices and incomes policy 
by most governments.^particularly when in balance of 
payment diff iculties , and thèse include : f irstly , the 
anti-inflationary objective. The rationale of this 
aim being the instrument to be used as a vehicle for 
slowing down the rate of rise of money incomes with a 
view to reducing the pace of price increases and to 
raise out-put. This objective présupposes that money 
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incomes - that is wages, rents, profits and interests 
are the main "factor's" behind high inflationary tenden-
cies in an economy. That to reduce prices generally 
and raise output, wage and related money incomes have 
to slow down or be kept in line with productivity 
increases. 
The second objective for prices and incomes policy 
is to achieve "equality" among employées regardless of'the 
position/;ahd their bargaining potential in the pay 
hierarchy. That in ali and ali no group of workers 
should be singled out for preferential treatment. In 
other words, prices and incomes policy is being used 
here as a vehicle for achieving an équitable income 
distribution. With the view to narrowing the incomes 
differential gap between the various.groups of employées. 
Particularly, the differentials between the skilled 
and unskilled manual workers, as well as the rural and 
urban differentials. 
The third and perhaps the most important objective 
for the introduction of prices and incomes policy is to 
improve pay structure in the interests of efficiency, 
high productivity and more stable industriai relations. 
The objective présupposes that with improved pay system, 
workers would have the incentive to work more effective-
ly and efficiently and thereby increase productivity. 
Furthermore, it is believed that an improved pay struc-
ture would create a peaceful industerial relations 
atmosphère - no strikes and lockouts, since workers would 
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bave no grounds to foment industriai strife. 
A striking point about thèse objectives worthy o£ 
comment is that, in récent years, most governments, have 
tended to place primary emphasis. on the anti-inflation-
ary objective, with a certain weight on efficiency. 
Emphasis' , on equity has been gathering less momentum 
probably because of the fact that what is "équitable" 
is very difficult to judge both in the concept of social 
justice and in the practice of regulating conflicts 
between interest groups. And secondly, in recen V years 
politicai power of unions is fast diminishing because 
of séries of labour législations which in most cases 
are often designed to shift the balance of industriai 
power. This "swing" in favour of anti-inflationary 
objective tends to highlight the seriousness which 
modem industrialised governments attached to inflation. 
The problem is that it is not quite clear whether 
the foregoing objectives or aims would necessarily be 
the same reasons. for the introduction of prices and 
ìncomes policy in the developing countries. Would 
thèse developing countries have différent objectives 
considering their more vulnerable économies? Or would 
the aims/objectives be similar as in the developed 
countries? Surely, answer(s) to this question would 
be provided as we attempt to examine the situation 
in Nigeria a developing country. 
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In Nigeria, formai prices and incomes policy is 
a very recent development as with many other developing 
countries. However, some of the reasons for its late 
development when the other mechanisms for wage déter-
mination have had early development in the country are 
discussed below. For example, the concept òf collective 
bargaining started during the colonial administration in 
the late nineteenth century - the Anglo-saxon modelT 
though it was not so successful because of the imperfect 
'"39! 
nature of the Nigérian labour market t h e n A l s o within 
the same period in 1942, the current main mechanism for 
wage détermination in the country particularly in the 
public sector - wage commissions or arbitrations - was 
introduced. 
Some of the possible factors for the;', late develop-
ment of the prices and incomes policy it is argued include 
•firstly, the government' perception of the whole • 
'question' of prices and incomes policy which seems to 
suggest two things. First, a certain degree of uncer-
tainty of the desirability and effectiveness of such a 
system; and secondly, 'scepticism' in respect of its 
success. The élément of -scepticism arising from the-fact 
that Nigeria has never had an articulate and deliberate 
incomes policy that would make "relevant data" available 
which to great extent the 'subject' dépends for its 
success. The urge for an incomes policy reached its 
climax in the Second National Development Pian (1970-
74), following Morgan's Wage and Salaries Review 
Commission recommendations in 1964. The pian notes: 
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"In an increasingly sophisticated 
economy, the absence of an incomes 
policy can negate other developmental 
efforts and engender social frus-
trations. Two important national 
objectives in the présent plan 
are the active promotion of a great 
and dynamic economy on the one 
hand, and the establishment of 
a just and more egalitarian society 
on the other. The simultaneous 
pursuit of economie growth and 
distributive equity cannot be 
successful without a carefully. 
formulated incomes policy. Some 
of the social dilemas in the deve-
lopment process of Nigeria can be 
traced to the absence of an obser-
vable incomes policy." 
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Following this concern for an incomes policy, the 
'Adebo Wages and Salaries Review Commission 1 made spécifie 
proposais for the establishment of a national productivity, 
prices and incomes board which will be responsible for the 
establishment of 'norms and guidelines' in ail sectors of 
the economy. The govemment 1 s response as enshrined in 
the White Paper on the Adebo Commission's report was one 
of great discouragement. It noted: 
"Thèse recommendations require 
further detailed study and closer 
examination in order to ensure the 
success and effectiveness of any 
body that may be set up. Further 
consultations would also need to 
be undertaken with employers, the 
trade unions and other sections of 
the community before the far-
reaching changes envisaged under 
the NPPIB can be effectively 
introduced." 
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, - Moreover, fthen the issue of incomes 
Policy was further taken up in the first progress report of 
the Second National Development Plan the government noted 
once more : 
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"The whole question of incomes 
policy requires a more detailed 
articulation. Any serious and 
effective incomes policy requires 
adequate statistical catégories of 
income in the economy, and an over-
all distribution of income between 
persons and groups. Such data are 
not get available in the country 
and in their absence, it is difficult 
to articulate and implement a well 
seasoned incomes policy". 
This last officiai statement further reinforces that the 
government had no keen interest in the establishment of 
such a mechanism. 
The second possible reason for the late development 
of the prices and incomes policy might be due to the fact 
that twenty years after politicai independence wage-
earners stili account for 7-8 percent of the work force or 
3.45 percent of the population (in 1980). And since prices 
and incomes policy acts on prices, incomes, profits and 
interests and has very little to do in 'kind' or with 
agriculture the authorities might have felt that the need 
was not an urgent one. 
Thirdly, the authorities believe in the effectiveness 
of the traditional policy instruments - fiscal and 
monetaryregarded as panacea for ali macro-economie 
problems by most developing governments might be a signi-
ficant contributory factor. Finally, it is only of recent 
that most developing governments perceive inflation, 
unemployment and related macro-economie objectives as 
serious economie problems, hitherto they were never 
thought of as problems since most of these governments 
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were quite unapprehensive of their impact, on the economy. 
Surely, the foregoing reasons might not look so plausible 
and convincing because of déficient of empirical backing 
[particularly with respect to the last two points), but 
it does not diminish the fact that they in association 
with other forces are responsible for the late introduc­
tion of prices and incomes policy in Nigeria. 
Government's intention for a formai prices 
and incomes policy was made in 1975, during the launching 
of the Third National Development Plan 1975-80. Hitherto, 
there was no formai prices^and incomes policy though a 
lot of moral suasion had been in practice. This new 
policy instrument was spelt out in the following govern-
ment statements. 
"During the plan period, the income 
review process will be institu-
tionalized by the establishment 
of a permanent agency for the con-
tinuous évaluation of trends in 
incomes, prices and costs of reliable 
basis for the review of wages, 
salaries and taxes in the public 
and private sectors of the economy." 
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As a testimony to its commitment to the above policy 
objective, the government promulgated a Decree in 1976 
called'the Productivity, Prices and Incomes Board Decree 
No. 30. This Decree established what is known today as 
the Productivity, Prices and Incomes Board (PPIB) , the 
main machinery for the prices and incomes policy in the 
country. The création of this Board became inévitable, 
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fìrstly, because of the pressure of wage inflation on the 
economy which assumed alarming proportions immediately 
following the 'Udoji Wages/Salaries Review Commission 
Awards 1974/75. For instance, the consumer price index 
for the lower income group rose by 33.5 percent in 1975 
with a modest change in the succeeding year 1976 to 22.0 
44 ,:' 1 ' 
percent. Table 15depicts further the movement of 
income and prices during the years. 
Secondly, the création of (PPIB) was in part due to 
the graduai fall in industriai production. For example, 
in 1977, the overall index of industriai production ìn-
creased by only 3.7 percent as against an increase of 19.0 
percent in the preceding year. Similarly, the output of 
selected number of agricultural commodities declined by 
22.7 percent compared with a decline of 5.5 percent in 
19 76 - ^ ^ The main function of the productivity, prices 
and incomes board was to advice the federai and state 
governments on national incomes policy. 
\ (b) Features 
The significant features of the Nigérian Prices and 
Incomes Policy are firstly its introduction as an anti-
inflationary instrumenta The assumption being that by 
controlling domestic prices and incomes urban inflation 
can in turn be greatly reduced. Secondly, the implicit 
policy of narrowing the gap between the high and lower 
income groups. Here, there is a consensus among the 
authorities that incomes poiicy (which tends to affect the 
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incomes of thos e in the high grade salary level mostly), 
would help to narrow the income gap between the high and 
lower paid workers as incomes redistribution instrument, 
ït might be argued however, that the success of this 
policy dépends to some extent on how it is applied, be-
cause if not properly applied it may become counter-
productive. 
Thirdly, an effort to improve labour productivity. 
The linking of productivity to incomes policy is of great 
importance in Nigeria because of the graduai fall in 
labour productivity in recent years in the country. 
Finally, there is an attempt at some degree of wage 
indexation (that is the linking of wage increases to 
price increases), though this has not been very successful 
because of the periodic wage commission awards which in 
themselves cause consumer price indices to rise to alarming 
rates. With the resuit that attempting to link pay 
(already excessively awarded) with cost of living index 
in similar note would only mean adding more "fuei" to a 
furnance, hence the less emphasis on it. In any case, the 
purpose or aim does not départ from the characteristic 
objective of most incomes policies which is to s-low down 
wage increases relative to price increases. 
The question then is how effective is it as a 
mechanism for determining wage rates in Nigeria? Surely, 
to provide cohérent answer(s) to this type of question 
demands firstly a great deal of Statistical information, 
which unfortunately is not available here. Secondly, 
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inference of this nature should be for a longer period of 
time in order to provide good basis for comparative analysis. 
Again, the few numbér of yeaxs prices and incomes policy has been 
in opération in Nigeria (1977-80) constitutes another 
problem. ^.Infact, this latter point accounts partly for the 
spatial treatment so far, and might as well affect succeeding 
analysis. As a new policy instrument still in its embryonic 
stage it would be difficult to présent a detailed account 
of its opération, more time is required for proper etvalua-
tion - and assessment to be ma de*. However, air examination 
of the year 1979/80 in which .information was available and 
in which the new policy had its first full-year opération 
would be illuminating. 
The type of incomes policy in opération in Nigeria 
is based on an amalgam of equity and efficiency, with 
greater emphasis on efficiency - which 'as- noted earlier -
recognizes the pxinciple of linking pay increases with 
productivity. Prices and incomes policy prescriptions are 
usually designed to cover both the public and private sec-
tors. In the public sector for example, therei'sthe govern-
ment appointed (ad hoc) wage commissions; while in the 
private sector collective bargaining process is the main 
mechanism. The pay policy in opération in 1979/80 could 
be described as efficiency-based because the 'norm' was 
expressed in percentage terms and related to output. 
The prices and incomes policy guidelines which were 
spelled out during the 1979/80 budget speech under section 
'E* entitled income policy prescriptions specifiedï that • 
t . ''there should be no increase in 
the salaries, wages and fringe 
benefits of employees in grade 
levels 07 and above in the public 
sector as well as those on similar 
grades in the private sector. But 
because car basic allowance of 
N600.00 Naira to employees in the 
public sector had been abolished, 
50 percent (N300.00) of the allow­
ance would be added to their 
salaries on a once-and-for all 
basis. For other categories of 
employees in both public and 
private sectors they would receive 
10 percent salary incraese during 
the year." 
46 A 
The above statement implies that workers in both public 
and private sectors on salary grade leyels 07 to 17 (thàt 
is from the executive officers EOs to Permanent secretaries) 
in the public sector and those on similar grades in the 
private sector for the year 1979/80 had no wage increases 
at ali. While the low-paid workers in both sectors mainly 
the unskilled and semi-skilled received 10 percent wage 
increase. 
With respect to professional incomes, it was stressed 
that for the fiscal year 1979/80, there should be no 
increases in remunerations - fees, allowances, and 
other perquisites in cash and kind - for non-executive 
members of the boards in both private and public sectors. 
That remunerations paid to non-executive board members 
should be subject to withholding tax of 12-5 percent for 
profess ional services - architects, estate-managers, as 
well as fees, and retaineers paid by public and private 
organizations and scale rates were all pegged at the pre­
ceding years level. 
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As for dividends, the-guideline provides that 
with effect from the 19 79/80 fiscal year, companies should 
not déclare:; nor distribute dividends in excess of 50 percent 
of its after-tax profit in any one financial year. In 
addition, companies were instructed to submit information 
relating to equity capital-scripts issues, changes in equity 
capital, total dividends distributed between 1976/77 and 
1978/79 and their reserves to the PPIB (Productivity, 
Priées and Incomes Board) charged with the responsibility 
of monitoring the progress of thèse measures. As a back-
up to the actual. enforcement pf thèse measures some 
législations were proposed.4"^ 
; 
Finally, with regard to prices , the guideline 
provide that: ^' * fimporters of heavy industrial 
machinery should not mark-up their resale price by more than 
25 percent of the landed cost. Secondly, that the rates, 
fees and commissions charged for advertisements in the 
média and by advertising agencies retain their preceding 
fiscal year prices. Thirdly, that importers/dealers in 
motor spare^ parts should not apply a factor of more than 
2.5 percent to the C I . F . (Cost, Insurance and Freight) , 
instead this should be arrived at by adding the approved 
local costs. Fourthly,that increases in prices might be 
allowed only on condition that a company. could not absorb 
increases in cost without undesirable conséquences to it 
or that a company had not contravened that provisions of 
the 1978/79 and 1979/80 incomes policy guideline. Lastly, 
that establishments granting increases in salaries, wages 
and fringebenefits to their employées should not pass on 
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the increase to consumers through higher prices." 
Over the question o£ its effectiveness as a mechanism 
for wage détermination in the country, we did argue earlier 
that owing to the fact that prices and incomes policy was 
a new development in Nigeria and coupled with paucity of 
data, measurement of its performance and effectiveness 
would be difficuTt. However, available évidence though 
fragmentary in 1979/80 in respect of its performance sug-
gests that pay andprice increases moderated, as a resuit. 
For example, in January 1981, the annual rate of domestic 
inflation dropped from over 35 percent in 1980 to 24.1 
49 1 
percent.- Pay settlements in the private sector were 
within the government national minimum wage limit of NI 20 
Naira per month for the unskilled and semi-skilled. 
Hitherto, the private sector employées (unskilled) were 
paid ten percent higher than their public sector counter-
parts. In addition, rents were kept at the 1979/80 fiscal 
year guidelines particiilarly in the Lagos metropolis. 
Furthermore, this fragmentary évidence seems to 
suggest that if the authorities were to tackle prices and 
incomes policy issues in a more rational manner it could 
be the ideal policy instrument for the 1980s, that would 1 
help Nigeria in its fight against high domestic inflation, 
Instantly, this invites another question which is: how can 
the image and the effectiveness of prices and incomes 
policy be improved in Nigeria as a wage détermination mecha-
nism, or as an ordinary policy instrument? Which takes us to 
the vital issue of 'recommendations' in the next paragraphs. 
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Admittedly, prices and incomes policy is fraught 
with difficult problems. Présent is the problem of decid-
ing an avera^e norm. The policy-maker usually finds himself 
in a dilemma, because of the problem of deciding which norm 
to be recommended for the year in question. Could it 
be nill norm for the year? or Should a norm of about 2-3 
percent be allowed for that year? Secondly, there is the 
problem of devising machinery for applying .the norm and 
allowing for the exceptions in some way; in particular 
a décision has to be made on whether the system should be 
ar;compulsory system or that based on full co-operation 
of the other social partners - employers and employée 
représentatives. - Thï'rdly, there is the problem : .": 
o£ deciding what should be done about non-wage 
-incomes'; such as those from subsistence 
farmers in the rural areas, should they be included? Or 
dropped in the policy. Finally, another problem arises from 
the multiplicity of points of décision, and the complexity 
of many of the agreements reached. 
In addition, to the above problems, therè is also 
the inconclusive debate over the efficacy of the prices and 
incomes policy as a policy instrument. Some commentators 
in western Euopre have argued that incomes policy has not 
proved particularly successful in countries where it has 
been adopted as a policy instrument to stabilize prices. 
One of such commentators was Saunders who noted that 
countries that practised incomes policy have not tended 
to enjoy more price stability than those not using it, 
citing France and the Nordic countries expériences as an 
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example, Saunders observes: 
"there is no obvious list of 
successes, that is no convenient 
group of countries which consis­
tenti/ followed an incomes policy 
and consistently had significantly 
more stable prices than the average." S. 
51" 
** 
In récent years, similar debate has been going on in the 
5 2'-'" <" 
United Kingdom among académies and industrialists. . 
Surely, with the prices and incomes policy entangled 
in this Tweb f of problems and uncertainty, people might 
argue whether it is worthwhile recommending it as a policy 
instrument to a government with which to fight rising prices 
and income. In any case, since we are most concerned with 
theoplight of prices and incomes policy in Nigeria we shall 
proceed with the outlining of a set of proposais which it 
is thought would improve the effectiveness of prices and 
incomes policy in that country. Broadly, there are a 
number of positive steps or measures which a government can 
take in order to create an effective incomes policy to 
assist in the task of economie development. 
Firstly, in this context, it is proposed that the 
authorities review and if possible establish a new machin-
ery in'Nigeria to handle prices and incomes policy issues. 
The présent machinery productivity, prices and incomes 
boards) is ineffective because of its advisory rôle. The 
new machinery that is being advocated for should be indepen-
dent body with a wide range of powers particularly discip-
linary powers which would enable it to discipline non-
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conformers to agreed principles. The new body which may 
be called 1Pay and Price Commission' should be composed 
of ten members - government-employers, trade unions and 
farmers représentatives, as well as académieswell-versed 
in industriai relations matters. Thèse members should be 
part-time members. In addition, there should be five full-
time officiais who would assist in the running of the 
secrétariat together with some clérical officers whose 
jobs would be to scan for wages and related data -
prepare and hâve them analyzed for the commission. 
The functions of the commission would be: 
(a) "To issue 'guidelines annually in respect of 
pay, prices and profits for both public and 
private sectors, for example norms etc. 
Cb) To undertake through a standing committee, the 
^ review of wages and salaries for both sectors of the 
economy annually, along the collective bargaining pro-
cess lines, - thus doing away with the govêrnment 
appointed (ad hoc) wages and salaries review 
commissions. 
(c) To determine in liason with the various state 
marketing boards in the fédération the levels of 
producer prices that would be both reasonable from 
the general economie strategy and acceptable to the 
farmers as an incentive to higher productivity. 
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(d) To monitor ail wage/salary settlements £or :the 
two sectors, with a view to preventing excessive 
wage settlements. 
This set of proposais represent a departure from 
the existing frame-work on which current machinery - the 
PPIB is working. As noted earlier fthe PPIB performs only 
advisory function, with the resuit that its terms of référ-
ence is usually very parochial. Surely, if the new body 
(machinery) was given ali the necessary support - .légal 
and financial by the authorities to perform the above 
set of functions, the effectiveness of prices and incomes 
policy in the country might be enhanced. Because it is 
quite difficult for a government to implement prices and 
incomes policy very successfully no matter how well organi-
zed, and the level of economie activity unless it possesses 
a powerful 'machinery' through which to implement this 
1
 53'*'' 
policy. More so, in a country 1ike Nigeria where the 
traditional price control machinery (PCB (Price Control 
Board) has not been very effective. For inrecent years the 
government has conceded price increases when faced with 
persistent demands for a price increase by some companies 
and organized urban traders, hence, the need for the 
, • 54 
new machinery .-
Secondly, it is recommended that the authorities be 
committed to the process of 're-education' of both trade 
union leaders and the eroployers with a view to telling them 
'what prices and incomes policy was ail about. This is 
crucial because, firstly prices and incomes policy is a 
2 5 9 
new development, in Nigeria as in most developing countries, 
and such re-education process would help to create a 
graduai awareness among thèse social partners. Secondly, 
few educated trade "unionists in the trade union 
movement still perceive pricesand incomes policy and its 
attendant 'guidelines' as a restrictive tool carefully 
designed to deprive them the opportunity to raise their * 
living standards. Surely, such re-educative process would 
help to define and put across more perspectively to a wider 
'- audience the object and nature of prices and incomes 
pòlicy in the economy as a whole. 
Thirdly, the authorities should^be as flexible and 
innovative as possible in its sélection df pay norms 
(that is assuming that the new prices and incomes commission 
which could have taken care of this issue advocated for 
was not established)* By being flexible we mean, that if a 
particular 'norm' for example, fiat-rate wage increases 
was adopted for a period of 2 to 3 years and it failed to 
yièld the expected resuit, another 'norm1 such as efficiency-
based Ce.g. wage indexation) should be tried. In other words, 
the authorities should not rely on a particular 'norm' 
over a very long period particularly when such a norm has 
been observed to be counter-productive. More so, when no 
one particular norm has been found to be a panacea for 
the ills of prices and incomes policy. What*seniore, in the 
UK for example, in the autumn of 1974 and summer 1975, when 
it became apparent that the social contract (an understanding 
that unions would moderate pay demands in return for speedy 
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Implementation of particular social and industriai policies 
by the Labour administration) was not having any effects 
on wage-inflation a new pay policy (flat-rate was introduced). 
Hence the suggestion. 
In this Section, we have attempted to examine the 'term' 
prices and incomes policy and its rôle as a mechanism 
for wage détermination in Nigeria. As a new development 
in Nigeria, coupled with baucity of Statistical information 
it was not possible to give an exhaustive treatment of its 
opération in this role hence, we had to contend with a 
spatial analysis of its features. In any case, incomes 
policies, like minimum wages are really 'objectives' with the 
'mechanism',being only part of the problem. Difficulties 
are the constitutional arrangements, criteria and conséquences 
of such policies suggest, as was the case with attempts to 
introduce the national minimum wages, that these are 
per ipheral to the main problems of wage détermination. 
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CHÄPTER FIVE 
THE NIGERIAN TRADE UNION - ROLE IN WÄGE DETERMINATION, 
AND MAJOR ORGANISATIONAL PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED 
PRESCRIPTIONS. 
5.12 Role in Wage Determination 
The preceding chaptecs examined the'various mechanisms 
of wage détermination in Nigeria. It was found that the 
Collective bargaining Process has, inspite of the over-
whelming support by successive governments to the 'concept'-
been very ineffective. The ineffectiveness was attributed 
to two main factors. Firstly, many employers' displayed 
negative attitudes towards the trade union 'récognition'. 
Secondly, the Government's failure to practise voluntary 
collective bargaining with its own employées, despite 
being committed'. to collective bargaining since the 
colonial era."'" This chapter sets out to examine the role 
of Nigérian trade unions in the wage détermination process, 
with a view to discovering the extent to which the unions 
have been influencing pay détermination; and the'organ-
isational problems of the unions. Understanding of the 
trade unions' role in pay détermination is essential because, 
the success or failure of collective bargaining process in 
an industry dépends so much on the bargaining capability 
of the unions. 
The role of trade unions in wage détermination process 
in recent years has been a subject of continuous debate 
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among académies, particularly économises, from both 
2 
dëveloped and the developmg countries. In this 
discussion, the writer intends to argue in support of the 
"School of Thought" which believes that the Nigérian 
Trade Unions have influenced the wage determinât ion process 
in the country on the basis of available documentary ' 
évidence. ; 
(cw The Debate: 
In Nigeria, this debate has taken a new dimension 
with industriai relations discussion in the past twelve 
years being dominated by the issue. The argument has been 
tò establish whether the Nigérian trade unions do influence 
wages and wage lèvels in the country to any significant 
extent. In particular, the issue has been whether changes 
in wage rates have occurred as a resuit of union pressure 
brought to bear on the government. Closely associated 
with the debate are W.M. Warren and Elliot Berge who were 
3 
later joined in the debate by J. Weeks and Peter Kilby. 
The debate has been between two schools of thought; 
on the one hand, are those writers such as Elliot Berge and 
J.F. Weêks who argued that Nigérian Unions do not play a 
significant role in the wage détermination process. While 
on the other hand, are writers such as W.M. Warren who 
argue that the unions have been playing a major role in 
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the country's wage setting process. The debate was 
started by W.M. Warren in 1966, when he wrote that in 
Nigeria politicai pressure from the unions between 
4 
1939-1960 induced the government to raise wages. The 
assertion was countered by Elliott Berge who argued 
that unions politicai pressure and their effects on 
wages was'very negligible, if such an influence existed 
during the period. 5 Thereafter, Peter Kilby and John F. 
Weeks and Robin Cohen later joined in the debate. 
Kilby tilting to Warren's side; while Weeks adopted 
Elliot Berge's'view. 
Weeks argued that the unions have not been playing 
an active role in the wage détermination process arguing 
that in actual fact, the Nigérian trade unions were 
impotent, he asserts: 
"The fact that the government 
in power seeks to woo wage 
earners by raising wages 
does not by itself imply that 
trade unions are powerful. 
The mere existence of an 
urbah wage-earning prolétariat 
unorganised and unaôJthor ised 
and amorphous, may be sufficient 
to induce government to 
sustain real wages out of real 
or imaginary fears of the 
"violent potential of this group." 
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Literally taken, Weeks comment implies that unorganised 
workers in Nigeria possess 'politicai influence' which 
can be brought to bear on the government, and hence, 
force the authorities to review their wages in order to 
avert possible violence but that the trade unions add 
little to this influence. 
Weeks went on to advance some reasons other than 
those relating to governmental fear as to how wage/salary 
increases are influenced. He notes: 
"One can build a model of wage détermination 
in the Nigérian context which is consistent 
with union weakness and the strike pattern 
(that is, there,is a rise in strikes after, 
and not before, a government award), For 
humani tar ian, institutional, and ideolog ical 
reasons the government commiss ions a major 
review about every five years." 
\ 1 
To buttress their argument, the 'school' (Berge et al) 
further stressed that increases in wages in Nigeria might 
resuit from ideological preconception or from moral 
sentiments, from the ideas on social justice shared by the 
ruling elitistsand not necessarily by union militancy 
or politicai pressure. 
On the other hand, from the opposing camp Kilby et al, 
attacked Berge and Weeks on their extremely pessimistic 
views over the rôle of Nigérian trade unions in wage 
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setting issues . This ' school 1 conténdè';that the Nigérian 
trade unions have played, and probably stili play a vital 
rôle in the wage détermination process in Nigeria. 
Commenting on the issue Kilby argued that : 
Trade unions have played an 
important rôle in mobilizing, 
magnifying and channelizing 
the discontent of government 
employées suffering a graduai 
érosion of their money wage, 
thèse union activities have resul-
ted in more fréquent wage tribunals 
and larger awards than would other-
wise have been the case. Though 
such wage increases have not been 
through joint negotiation or 
collective agreement. " 
Arguing on a similar line, Cohen stressed that 
"Union pressure can be directly 
linked to the décision of the 
government to set up nearly ail 
the wage commissions, and that 
where union pressure was not 
involved there were either 
possible or probable reasons 
for the government's concerned to 
wish to attract support or deflect 
dissent from workers and their 
unions'. ,
 n 
In summary, Cohen notes that 
"the factors that have the most 
fréquent and perhaps most con-
sistent explanatory value when 
considering wage détermination 
process were those associated 
with union 'pressure, politicai 
sensitivity to potential urban 
discontent, and attempts to win 
politicai support from trade 
unions (organized group of 
workers) and their allies especially 
during elect ions.' 
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Undoubtedly, thèse somewhat différent views aired 
by thèse writers look cohvirïcing"'when viewed in isolation. 
However, the fact remains that at best some of the writers 
missed the point at 'issue', and at worst most showed a 
total lack of under standing of what is involved in 
Nigérian politics as the criticai assessment of thèse 
varying views would reveal shortly. 
(b) A cri-t-icai—assessmentnew sensé of directions 
Earlier in the discussion, we did stress that some 
of thèse writers views, particulaTly those of Berge and 
Weeks, would be further examined. In his assertion 
Weeks argued that the Nigérian trade unions were 'impotent' 
as far as wage issues were concerned. He claimed that the 
mere existance of urban prolétariat, unorganized and 
amorphous, was what induced government to sustain real 
wages out of real or imaginary fears of . sudden escalation 
of violence by the grou p and not necessarily because of 
union pressure. 
In the light of this assertion, it-
is inconceivable that the 'mere existence of an unorganized 
and amorphous* prolétariat alone induced either the pre-
or post-independence governments to sustain workers 
real wages without union involvement directly or 
indirectly. To begin with, during thèse periods 1930s/ 
40s that Berge and Weeks were referring to, the colonial 
governments hardly recognised the existence of 'organised 
labour' (the early trade unions e.g. C.S.U.) inspite of the 
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association with the nationalists seen as potential threats 
to the colonial administration, let alone unroganised 
labourers squattin'g around Lagos suburb. The question 
arises what sort of unorganised and amorphous labour was 
Weeks referring to? Perhaps, he might have felt that he was 
referring to that sort of ' unorganised• labour' found in the 
United Kingdom and the US during the same period who were 
literate and knowledgeable. 
Weeks failed to appreciate the fact that the type of 
unorganised labour he was referring to that might influence 
the ogvernment was mostly illiterate and predominantly rural. 
It was made up of farmers who were perhaps coming to the 
urban centres for the first time to enter into wage payment. 
The only type of job available for t h i s g r o u p of urban pro-
létariats was 'domestic work'(servants to colonial adminis-
trators) and henee the idea of collective bargaining' was 
too remote and alien to them. In other words, our argument 
implies that the so-called amorphous and unorganised urban 
proletariats of the period were not in a position to pose 
major threat to the government and induce her to increase 
wages. What is more, there is hardly any évidence to 
date to suggest that eìther the pr e- or post-independence 
governments(Federai or State or Regional), have tried to 
'head off ' social d iscontents through bypass ing the unions 
and appealing directly to the so-called 'urban masses'. 
Furthermore, one can hardly understand the philisophy 
behind Weeks' assertion of trade union 'impotence' during 
273 . 
this period particularly in the 1940s when in actual fact 
the tremendous courage and détermination shown by the 
unions during the period have never been exhibited since 
then. For instance, the first wage committee set up by 
the colonial government in November 1941 was as a resuit of 
i 
trade union ag itation over 'Cost of Living Allowance common1y 
referred to as 'War Bonus'. The committee which was chaired 
by Mr. A.F.B. Bridges, Senior District Officer then, had the 
following terms of référence: 
"To consider the adequacy or otherwise of 
the rates of pay of labour, and of African 
government servants and employées in the 
township of Lagos, having regard to any 
increase in the cost of living which may 
have occured since the outbreak of war, 
and to make recommendations as follows: 
a. Whether a temporary increase by way of 
bonus or other addition to pay should be made. 
b. whether any other form of relief is 
désirable, such as, for example: 
i. Free meals at work, 
ii. Provision of good cheap meals on purchase, 
iii. Stricter price control, 
iv. Rent restriction, and 
v. Provis ion of quar ters or assisted. schemes 
for tenements". ^ 
Following the Committee's délibérations the following salary 
increases were recommended. For example, officiais who 
were earning £1.14s. per day or mensem was to have their 
pay rate increased to £2^.12s. per mensem; while those 
earning over £4.00 per mensem(£48 per annum) was to have 
an increase in pay of £2 per mensem (£72 per a n n u m ) . 1 3 
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In addition, but for the union pressure, the 1945 
general strike caused by the unwillingness of the government 
to honour its pledge following the COLA awards (above) 
could not have taken place, and later resulted in the setting 
up of another wage commission - the Tudor Davis Commission 
of 1945. The commission after reviewing both the price 
level and the government offer of 20 percent which the 
unions thought was too small after the strike had been 
called off made the following fresh recommendations that: 
"1 . The cost of living allowance 
existing in July 1945 be in­
creased by 50 percent with 
effect from the variouss dates 
on which work was resumed after 
the general strike; 
2. the 50 percent award should apply 
not only to African earning £220 per annum 
per annum or less but also to the 
special allowances paid since 
October 1944 to African 
employees, those salaries were 
over £220, except for those 
receiving local allowances 
because they held superior posts; 
3. although the future cost of 
living allowances payable under 
(1) and (2) would be payable 
together with the future wages 
in the normal way, the retros­
pective cost of living allowances 
•which were payable under (1) 
and (2) should be paid to the 
African civil servants by being 
credited to them in post office 
savings accounts or in bank 
accounts or in the various 
treasuries from which they drew 
their pay; 
4. the award should remain in 
force until a new wage structure 
was set up by a team of statis­
tical officers and nutritionists 
which should set up within two 
years' from the date of the 
report." • 
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These recommendations no doubt helped to increase both the 
wage rates as well as the working conditions of the African 
workers during the period. Moreover, in the post-independence 
years 1960s and 1970s, over seventy-five peicent of government 
wage commissions have been commissioned through union pressure 
brought to bear on the government.' 
An example of such union pressure which has resulted in 
the setting up of a wage Commission in the 1960s was the 1964 
general strike. The main cause of the 1964 general strike 
which did not involve actual 'physical withdrawal of labour 
but a 'sit-down strike or work toMrule*".was a claim for 
wage increases made by the Zudonu committee report forwarded 
in 1961 by the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria. Following 
this uncompromising attitude of the government even after . 
séries of deputations by the trade unions, a représentative 
meeting of ali registered unions which convened in Lagos on 
September 12, 1963, recommended two actions. The first was 
the setting up of a Joint Action Committee of Nigeria trade 
unions to pursue the wage demand and the second was a general 
strike to be called on September 27, 1963, if their demand 
was not met. To contain the strike the government appointed 
a six-man commission 6f enquiry headed by Mr. Justice 
Adeynika Morgan, to investigate: the existing wage structure . 
and to "make recommendations .••. 
Additionally, in 1974/75 'union pressure' was again 
in évidence following the release of the Udoji Wages and 
Salaries Review Commission awards which treated some 
catégories of workers such as the medicai doctors less 
favourable than others. Because of this unfavourable 
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'award' to the medicai doctors the Nigérian Medicai 
Association protested very vehemently and threatened 
to withdraw their services if the government failed to 
increase their wage awards. Following this protest, the 
government was forced to grant 40.percent interim award 
to the medicai doctors. However, realising that the doctors 
had been granted a further 40 percent award, there was 
a wide spread protest and demand for similar wage increases 
by workers from all sectors of wage employment in the 
country. This development forced the federai government 
to grant additional 30 percent wage increase to ail public 
servants irrespective of their current earnings.16 ' 
Consequently, government strategy of harmonising private 
and public sector wages was seriously affected. 
Furthermore, in recent years, union pressure on 
government for improved working conditions, fringe benefits 
and good wages has been on the increase. For example, on 
22nd July 1980, at the Nigeria Labour Congress's 17th 
meeting of its National Executive Council, the NLC demanded 
from the government the following issues: Firstly that 
a. employers of labour including 
the governments, procure and 
guarantee car loans from banks 
for their employées who qualify 
for such loans ; 
b. employers of labour including 
governments should absorb any 
interest on such loan above 5 
percent and 
c. employers of labour including 
governments should restore fully 
car basic allowances. 
Secondly, that the national minimum wage be increased from 
N100 to N300.00 per month for all the workers in the fédération. 
1 
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Thirdly, that the minimum pensions should not be 
less than the national minimum wage at any given time. 
During the time of the demand minimum pension was N33.00 
per month. 
Although thèse demands were not immediately met 
by the government but they did influence the government 1 s 
décision: on the various issues. For example, because 
of the 'union pressure' the government was forced to 
increase the national minimum wage from N100.00 to N125.00 
per month. And at présent, the NLC's (Nigeria Labour 
Congress) demand for N300.00 per month national minimum 
wage is stili ranging. On the basis of the foregoing 
évidence it is argued, that the assertion of union 
r
. impotence* by Weeks seems unfounded. 
Conclus ion 
Ail and ail, taking thèse somewhat différent views 
into considération, it is strongly argued that the 
Nigérian unions have played a significant rôle in the 
wage détermination process in Nigeria, though they have 
not succeeded in bringing about such wage increases 
through their own round table v$y intensive negotiation as 
in the UK and the United States. However, as far as the 
debate is concerned, the writers have missed the core 
issue about the unions rôle in wage détermination. For 
even the ordinary man in the Street of Lagos is fully 
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aware that seventy-five percent of the govcrnment 'wage 
commissions' which later recommend workers wage rates 
and other conditions of service were ail commissioned as 
1 8 
a resuit of union pressure on the government. However, 
what is exactly not clear is the sort of influence the 
unions have or exert on the tribunals and their final 
recommendations. . For example, it could have been interest-
ing to know if unions can through their pressure force 
the wage tribunals to divert from their original intended 
wage recommendations in other to please the workers. 
It is on this basis that we argued that the debate 
should have been to establish 
'whether the Nigérian unions have 
influenced (or have been influen-
cing) the décisions of the wage 
commissions which they 'bring into 
being' in terms of levels of wage 
increases; instead of the relatively 
broad issue of unions rôle in wage 
détermination.' 
There is no doubt that a debate alone this specific 
area would have been academically stimulating, as well as 
providing compelling arguments pf general interest. 
In summary, it is argued that the assertions by 
such writers as Berge and Weeks that the Nigérian unions 
do not have powers with which to influence wage rates 
amply demonstrated a lack of understanding of what is 
meant by unions' politicai power. 
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5.13 Major Organisatioftàl Problems and Suggested 
Prescr iptions 
The preceding section examined the rôle of the Nigérian 
trade unions in wage détermination process. It was argued 
that the trade unions nave played a significant rôle in 
the wage détermination process in Nigeria though such 
wage increases were not secured through "round table" 
negotiation. This section will examine some of the major 
Problems facing the unions. In addition, some sugges­
tions will be put forward to reduce or eliminate the 
Problems óf the movement, and to enable them play a more 
effective role in the wage détermination process whether 
through politicai action or collective bargaining. 
The Nigérian trade union movement consists of voluntary 
independent organisations, and, as with many other countries 
particularly the developing ones, its organisational 
Problems are many and fairly intricate. These problems 
can best be classif-ied into two broad headings thus -
(1) the primary or basic problems; and, (2) the secondary 
problems. The primary problems are those problems which 
are a reflection of the characteristic feature of the 
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traditijDnal or pre-industr ial societies. These problems 
include : 
(a) Lack of adequate funds. 
(b) Abuse of office by trade union officiais. 
(c) Rivalry between trade union leaders, and 
(d) 'Poor 1 éducation. 
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The secondary problems are those problems common " 
among démocratie organisations in all societies. These 
include : 
(a) Growing apathy within the membership of trade unions; 
(b) Problems of union multiplicity; 
(c) Employer attitudes towards trade unions. 
Part of the reaearcher^s field work - in 1981 was aimed at 
obtaining by way of interview with office holders an 
impression of the présent position. 
The introduction of a new national labour policy in 
1975 demonstrated how deeply concerned the government has 
been over thèse problems. Some of the objectives of the 
new labour policy include: 
(a) "The need to give a new sensé of direction and 
a new image to the trade union movement in Nigeria; 
(b) the desirability of removing completely from 
• the trade union arena ideological or external 
influences which have plagued Nigérian trade 
union unity for more than a quarter of a centur y ; 
(c) the need to rationalise the structure and 
organisation of trade unions and to ensure 
that they are self-sufficient financially 
in future, and not dépendent uponforeign 
sources of finance, and 
(d) the need to provide facilities for trade 
union éducation in order to improve the 
quality of trade union leaders and the 
gênerai knowledge and understanding of 
the purposes of trade unions by the rank 
and file members of thèse organisations' 1 . 
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Suggestions on how the government can set about attaining 
the above objectives to effectively reduce or eliminate 
thèse major problems facedby the labour movement are 
discussed a t t h e e n d o f t h i s section. 
However, to understand the nature of both primary and 
secondary problems it is necessary to analyse the growth ' 
and structure of Nigérian trade union. 
The growth and structure of Trade Unions in Nigeria * 
Background Information 
The growth of trade unions started immediately after 
the trade union ordinance of 1938{discussed earlier in the 
te.xtjwhich legalised trade union activities in the country. 
Following the 'ordinance' var ious types of organisations 
including those which were not qualifieid to be accorded 
trade union status such as the organisation of self-employed 
and v'arious e.thnic/tribal clubs were registered as trade 
unions. The employers association were also registered 
under the ordinance. 
The net effect of this 'free for all' registration 
exercise was half a C e n t u r y of trade union proliférations. 
In an attempt to get the situation under control, the 
government enacted the Trade Union Decree No.31 of 1973. 
The Decree among other thingsstipulated for the deregistration 
of unions as well as for the amalgamation or mergers and 
takeovers of smaller unions into a bigger and more viable 
organisations capable of ensuring seif-sufficiency 
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finaricially. The Decree also contained a provisión which 
empowered 'fifty1. workers to be registered as a trade unión. 
This last provisión encouraged the growth "of small, 1musb-
room' unions, to the extent that by the time the 'adminis-
trator ' of trade unions appointed in 1976 to look into trade 
unión activities started work in early 1977 there were more 
than 1,000 unions in the country. 
As the military government was determined to rationalise 
the structure and organisation of trade unions, in December 
1978, it promulgated the trade unions(Amendment)Decree No.22, 
1978. This Decree stipulated stricter provisions for the 
registration of trade unions. Contained in the Decree was 
the list of registered and recognised trade unions selected on 
the basis of the Administrator of trade unions 1 recommen-
dations. The structure evo1ved seventy nat iona 1 un ions and 
associations for labour, management and employers; made up 
of 42 industrial unions, 9 employers associations, 15 sénior 
staff associations and 4 professional associations. It is 
worthy to note that in Nigeria, when defining the term "trade 
unions' for legal purposes that the term usually include the 
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employers as well as other professional associations. The 
position is in sharp contrast with the United Kingdom, where 
Section .28 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974 
defines the two types of organisation. 
In Nigeria, the growth of registered trade unions has 
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been quite dramatic. From a mere fourteen registered 
trade unions with a total membership of 4629 workers in 
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1940, the movement had grown to 946 unions(total number of 
merging unions) with membership of estimated 837375 workers 
by 1978, as table 16 depicts. Taking the 1975-80 estimated 
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employaient figure of 1,500,000, 56.percent of employées 
in establishments employing ten or more employées were 
members of a trade union:. Table 16 further reveals that 
since 1940, that the number of.trade unions has been rising 
steadily, particularly in the 'Ì950s, though with very 
little corresponding increase in union membership. 
Trade union structure can be analysed from two angles : 
first from the 'size* of the union; and secondly the trade 
union 'type ' . 
Taking first of ali the size of the unions, the aggregate 
membership of trade unions in Nigeria at the end of 1978 
was estimated to -be 837375(Table 16), and appendix D. This 
was 81420 members more than the total'at the end of 1975. 
Although Statistical information for the years 1980 and 19 81 
wer e not available in the federai office of statistics 
durìng our enquiries, aggregate membership of the trade unions 
for the periods should be below one million, as one statistics' 
officer noted. The trade union structure as enunciated in 
trade unions (Amendment) Decree No.22 1978, of seventy 
national unions, and association consisting of 42 industriai 
unions, 9 employers associations, 15 senior staff assoc-
iations and 4 professional unions (discussed earlier in the 
text) remains the 'structure' to date (appendix D ) . 
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Date No. of 
Unions 
Total 
member­
ship 
Date 
No of 
Unions 
Total 
member­
ship 
1940 14 . 4629 1961 402 281124 
1 941 27 1 7521 1962 435 . 324203 
1942 80 26275 1963 . 502 352790 
1943 85 27154 1964 551 577911 
1944 91 30000 1965 615 519000 
1945 97 •41000 1966 631 520164 
1946 100 52747 1967 674 530000 
1947 109 76362 1968 696 540000 
1948 129 90864 1969 721 550000 
1949 - 140 109998 1970 809 600000 
1950 .144 144387 1971 873 655215 -
1951 129 152230 1972 949 816382 
1952 131 143282 1973 1077 • 843509 
1953 152 153089 1974 1043 • 775280 
1954 172 165130 1975 1008 755955 
1955 232 175997 1976 1 170 881198 
1 956 270 198265 1977 N. A. ' N.A. 
1957 298 235742 1978 946 837375 
1958 318 254097 
1959 - 347 259072 
1960 360 274126 • 
P.T.O. 
Table 16. The Growth in Union Numbers and Membership 
in Nigeria. 1940-1978. 1 
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Explanatory Notes: 
1 . The figures reflectëd here are the available 
statistics to date 
Sources : 
1. Fédéral Ministry of Labour (now Employment 
and Productivity) Annual Reports various years. 
2. Amucheazi, Et. al., Readings in Social Sciences, 
issues in National Development: Enugu, Fourth 
Dimension Coy Ltd., 1980. 
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In figure 3, unions are grouped according to the 
number of members and numbers of unions that make up such 
grouped numbers. It can be seen from figure 3, that 
unions organising less than 1,000 members accounted for 85 
percent of the registration; while over 50 percent of all 
unions have less than 250 members. In contrast, the 
largest unions with 50,000 or more members accounted for 
less than one percent of the total membership of unions. 
When compared with a country such as the United King-
dorn, a différent picture émerges immediately. The United 
Kingdom has fewer trade unions(at least before December 
1978), a higher proportion of trade union membership. For 
example, in 1980, the aggregate membership of trade unions 
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in the U.K. was nearly 13 million (12,946,578 to be 
precise), with a total of 438 trade unions. While in 
Nigeria there were over -;9Û0 -trade unions with total member-
ship below a million in 1975. As for the trade union 
membership distribution, the différences between the U.K. 
and Nigeria becomes even more apparent as Table 16.1 depicts. 
It can be seen from the Table that at the end of 1980 there 
were 280 unions each with fewer than 1,000 members, . 
including 187 with under 500 members. These 288 small 
unions together accounted for a little over one percent of 
the total membership of ail unions.. While the 25 largest 
unions such as the TGWU and the AEUW each with over 100,000 
or more members together accounted for 79.4% of the total mem-
bership of ail unions. Table 16.2 shows the number oftrad'^ • 
unions and the aggregate membership at the end of each year for the 
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No. of 1 
Unions 
50,000 and Over 
20,000-50,000 
10,000-20,000 
15 5,000-10,000 
76 1 ,000-5 ,000 
280 251T1,000 
426 51-250 
105 1-50 
1 5 1 0 1 5 20 25 50 
P.T.O. 
Figure 3: Trade Unions '- Numbers and Membership, 
End 1976 1 
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Explanatory Note: 
1 . The only comprehensive trade union numbers and 
membership distribution statistics to date. 
Source: 
Federal Ministry of Labour records of the register 
of trade unions 1976. 
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Table 16.1. Membership of Trade Unions At the End of 
1980, by Size and Number in The United Kingdom. 
Number of 
members 
Number 
of unions 
Total mem­
bership 
Percentage of 
(1000) No of 
unions 
Member­
ship of 
all unions 
Under 100 69 4 15.8 0.0 
100-499 118 28 26.9 0.2 
500-999 45 32 10.3 0.2 
1 ,000-2 ,000 56 88 12.8 0.7 
2,500-4,999 39 140 8.9 1.1 
5,000-9,999 25 167 5.7 1 .3 
10,000-14,999 7 82 1 .6 0.6 
15,000-24,000 21 392 4.8 3.0 
25,000-49,999 19 725 4.3 5.6 
50,000-99,999 14 1 ,024 3.2 7.9 
1 00 ,000-249,99S 1 5 2,518 3.4 19.5 
250,000-8, more 10 7,749 2.3 - 59.9 
Total 438 12,947 100.00 100 .00 
Source: 
Department of Employment Gazette February 1982, 
Volume 90, No.2, (special feature) pp. 54-55. 
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past ten years. The table reveals that trade union member-
ship has been on the increase since 1972 although union 
membership fell by 3.7 percent in 1980. The table also 
shows that the number of trade unions declined by almost 
4 percent between 1979 and 1980 from 456 to 438. The picture 
here contrasts sharply with the situation in Nigeria where 
until 1978, the trend was vis-visa- - low union membership 
but a significant.increase in union numbers (table 16). 
On Table 16.2 in the UK, the average membership per union 
increased from 20,000 in 1970 to almost 30,000 in 1980. 
Trade Union Types 
Anether way of looking at the structural features 
of a trade union is by examining the union 'types' existing 
withìn a country. As explained earlier in the text, in 
Nigeria, the term 'trade union' is used to cover those 
other organisations in the 'labour relations' such as the 
employers and professional associations. In Nigeria, prior 
to 1978, trade union 'types' were classified by the 
federai government authorities in accordance with the 
catégories of workers that make up such membership. On 
this basis, trade unions were usually classified into 
Craft Unions, Industriai and General Unions. Also 
included were the employers and the various unclassifiable 
organisations that were allowed to be registered under the 
Trade Union Ordinance of 1938. Table 16.3 shows the trade 
union 'types' operating in the country before 1978; while 
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Year Number of 
unions at 
the end of 
year 
Membership at the 
end of the yr(000) 
Total 
Percentage 
change in 
membership 
since pre-
vious year 
Maie Femade 
1970' 543 . 8,444 2,743 11,187 +6.8 
1971 525 8,382 2,753 "11,135 -0.5 
1972 507 8,452 2,907 11 ,354 + 2.0 
1973 519 8,450 3,006 11 ,4 56 + 0.9 
1974 507 8,586 3,178 11 ,764 + 2.7 
1975 501 8,729 3,466 12,193 + 3.6 
1975* 470 8,600 3,427 12 ,026 -
1976 473 8,825 3,561 12,386 + 3.0 
1977 481 9,071 3,775 12,846 + 3.7 
. 1978 
i 
462 9,238 3,874 13,112 + 2.1 
1979 456 9,545 3,902 13,447 + 2.6 
1980 438 9,156 3,790 ' 12,947 -3.7 
Source: 
Same as Table 16.1. Department of Employment Gazette 
February 1982, Vol.90, No.2. 
Table 16.2: Changes in Numbers and Union Membership 
1970-1980 in the United Kingdom 
292 
table 16.4 reflects new changes since the 1978, trade unions 
(Amendment) Decree No. 22, which re-structured the entire 
trade union structure. 
THE CRAFT UNIONS: 
Like most craft unions elsewhere in the world for 
example in the United Kingdom, the Nigérian Craft Unions 
were mainly interested in craftmen, hence theytended to 
organise all employées in a single or related occupations 
irrespective of the industry in which they were employed. 
Examples of such unions then in Nigeria were: the Union of 
Survey and Draughtsmen, the All Nigeria Union of Electrical 
and Allied Employées; the Western Nigérian Painters Union; 
and the various carpenters and mason unions. 
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS : / 
The next type of union was the industriai union -
which constituted 46 percent of the total union membership 
in 1971. The industriai unions were by far the largest 
group of unions. This group of unions recruited ail 
employées in a particular industry or service regardless 
of their grade or occupation. Infact, most of the 
'industriai unions' were really 'in-house' or company 
unions. It is worth emphasising, however, that, the phrase 
'company union' or enterprise union as used in Nigeria 
does not necessarily mean a company dominated union, rather 
it is so referred to because it was a union organised within 
a single firm or an employer. 
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Table 16.3. Types of Registered Organizations Jan-19 70-
September 1971 in Nigeria (in percentages) 
% 
Employers' Organisations 5 
Craft Unions 19 
Industrial Unions 46 
General Unions 1(3) 
Guilds 27 1 
Unclassifiable 2 
100.00 
Explanatory Notes 
1 . This figure includes various Drivers T Unions which 
are difficult to classify because of the variation 
in partownership. 
i 
Sources : 
Cohen, R., Labour and Politics in Nigeria (1945-1971) 
Table 4.3 London: Heinemann Ltd., 1 974 , p. 118'; Also 
see Damachi, U.G., et. al., Industrial Relations in Africa, 
London: Macmillan, 1979, Table 5.5, p. 179. 
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In the business of wage negotiation, house unions 
usually channelled their 'demands' to the employer through 
the 'central labour organisation', and more often than not 
preferred their représentatives to be 'fédération offi­
ciais' instead of their own local officiais. Examples 
of such unions then include: 
Akere Dock Workers, Union, 
Niger Benue Transport Company Workers' Union, 
Berec . (Nigeria) Limited Workers' Union, 
Ibru Group of Companies Workers Union of Nigeria, 
Bakare Workers* Union, 
Decca and Allied Workers' Union and 
Omo Sawmill Workers Union. 
Among the industriai unions were the 
Railway and Ports Workers' Union, and 
the Amalgamated Tin Miners of Nigeria African Workers 
Union. 
GENERAL UNIONS 
This group of unions constituted only approximately 
one percent of the total union membership. These unions 
recruited any workers irrespective of the industry or 
occupation in which such employées were employed. Good 
examples of such general unions include: 
The UAC and Associated Companies African Workers' Union; 
and the John Holt African Workers' Union -
catering for both skilled and unskilled workers. 
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Total Number Percentage of 
Total Membership 
Employers Organi­
sations 9 0.3 
Industriai Unions 4 2 1 . 94.5 
Senior Staff 
Association 
15 
15 
0.93 
0.93 
Professional 
Association 4 0.07 
Total 70 95.8 Z 
Explanatory Notes: 
1. This figure is an 'amalgam' of all the 'Union Types' 
enumerated in table 16.3 - Crafts fGeneral, Guilds 
and Unclassifiable. 
2, The total percentage could not add up to 100 percent 
because of the non-availability of estimated member- 1 
ship in some organisations, for example - The Nigerian 
Union of Journalists, and the Association of Senior 
Civil Servants. 
Source 
Compiled from the list of Trade Unions enshrined in-the 
Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree 1978 (Decree No. 22) Laws 
of the Federal of Nigeria, 1978, P.A117, Section 5(7) 
Table 16.4: Types of Registercd Organizations in the New 
Trade Union Structure in Nigeria 
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The next type of unions as shovm in table 16.3 
were the 'GUILDS' which were not supposed to be regarded 
as formai trade unions. They were the group of unions 
that were salvaged by the 'terminologies1 used under the 
trade union ordinance of 1938 - "that any group of five 
employées, if they chose can form a union". In other 
words, this 'clause' caused various organisations which 
were hitherto not recognised as trade unions to be régis-
tered and given trade union status during the period. 
The group was nothing more than the co-operative societies, 
the bulk of which were craftsmen accountable to themselves 
only. By today 1 s standard, such unions couldn't have had 
any chance of registration at ail. Examples of such 
'unions' include: 
The Ote Tomo Native Herbalist Union registered July 1941 
with a membership that hardly exceeded 10 people; the 
\ 
Ijesha Goldsmiths Union, and the Lagos Cycle Repairs 
Union. 
Furthermore, in table 16.3 is the employers organi­
sation' (discussed earlier in the text) which only very 
few qualified under the provisions of the Trade Union 
Act. Out of 837 organisations registered in September 
1971, the employers organisation constituted only 5 percent 
25-, ' 
of the total membership; 
The remainder of the unions shown in the same table 
which accounted for 2 percent of the registered organi­
sations in 1971 have been designated 'unclassifiable' . 
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The term 'unclassifiable' was applied to thèse organisations 
because of the degree of proliférations among the organi-
sations that made up the group. Such organisât ions . include : 
the Shoe makers, the weavers, mechanics, leather workers 
and related trades. 
As shown in table 16.4, following the federai govern-
ment's new National Labour Policy in 1975, and the sub-
séquent législations that followed, particularly the Trade 
Unions (Amendment) Decree NO. 22 of 1978 a new trade union 
structure emerged. Düring the 're-structuring ' exercise 
in 1977, most of the unions such as crafts, general, 
guilds and the unclassifiable discussed earlier were integ-
rated into the industriai union. Consequently, there are 
four types of registered trade organisations in the new 
trade union structure as against six that registered before 
1978 (Table 16.4). The detailed (revised) New Structure 
of Trade Unions in Nigeria as at December 1978 (no changes 
hâve- taken place since then) is reflected in Appendix 
*D'. With regard to the major problems of the Nigeria 
trade union movement (Union of Workmen) mentioned earlier 
in the text, the time is now due for the examination of 
thèse major organisational problems hence the subject of 
the nex-t paragraphs . 
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(A) PRIMARY PROBLEMS 
(i) Lack of Adequate Funds 
Broadly speaking, the importance of adequate 'flow 
of funds* to trade unions as, it is to most other organ­
isations in recent times, cannot be over-emphasised. The 
ability of a trade union to both contemplate and sustain-
any strike action w o u l d v e r y much dépend on 7 the 'heaviness' 
of the union's purse. For in récent years, contemplated 
strike actions have either been abandoned right from the 
outset or started only to be suspended after a few days 
action because of -inadequacy of funds. In effect, a 
union or unions which cannot organise or sustain strike 
action - seen by some industrialists as a union's most 
'deadly weapon' would obviously find it difficult if not 
impossible to retain the overwhelming support of its 
.members at ail times. 
Funds are also necessary to the unions to enable them 
to pay the wages and salaries of the trade union officiais, 
other employées wor k ing for the un ion ; and to cover other 
administrative and overhead costs. Moreover, rising 
compétition for membership between the trade unions and 
other"social organisations in m o d e m times meant that 
unions ought to provide friendly benefits for their members 
in order to retain their unqualified allegiance, or lose 
its members to ethnie or tribal unions - the competing 
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social organizations. Hence, the overall timportance o£ 
adequate 'cash flow' tp trade unions. Yet, in Nigeria, 
the average financial income of trade unions remains' 
very low. 'Why do the Nigérian trade unions .suffer from 
this financial hardship one might be apt to ask? 
Apparently several factors might be responsible 
for the trade unions perenial financial wëakness but the 
two reasons usually advanced are namely -
1. The small size of union membership; and 
2. the fact that only a small proportion of registered 
I i 
members pay their union subscriptions regularly. 
First, with regard to union size, it is clear from 
(Fig. 3 )f that in Nigeria there are several. 
unions but with few members. Unlike the United Kingdom 
'26 
where the trade union density is higher. It is often 
said that the 'strength' of a trade union lies with its 
V 
'27 
membership. In that, the more mémbers a union bas on 
its register the more cash it is able to generate every 
month or year through membership subscriptions. This 
assertion (membership strength) would be. true of a"V 
union:.with - 'committed"' .-members,* but not foc"ail unions.* 
while a union with very- few-members on 
its register as was usually the case with most Nigérian trade 
unions in the early sixties and sëventies,the incidence of a 
gloomy yearly financial prospects become s. a permanent feature . 
For example, in the 1950s and 60s when the average income 
300 
of most unions could not reach ninty pounds £90.00 per 
annum, the big unions such as the NUT (Nigérian Union of 
Teachers) and the Nigérian Union of Railwaymen were having 
good financial returns because of their numerical 
strength. 
With respect to inability of the registered members 
to pay their union subscriptions, the researcher fouhd 
that in the Nigeria Airways Limited, only 15 percent of 
the trade union members were paid-up members or financial 
members as they are sometimes referred to. At the Lever 
Brothers (Nigeria) Ltd., over 50 percent were paid-up 
members. However, to assert that unions are poor because 
members fail to pay their monthly or weekly dues only poses 
the more fundamental question of: why are members so adamant 
about their monthly subscriptions? As far as the answer 
to this question is concerned opinions vary markedly. 
On the one hand, are those who argue that the inability of 
the members to make regulär union, subscriptions was a 
conséquence of poor wages and salaries paid to the average 
wage-earner. And that even when such subscriptions were 
made at the existing poor wage levels they were bound to be 
2 8 
very small and therefore inadequate. While on the 
other hand, it is sometimes held that workers propensity 
to support an Organization financiallly dépends on what 
such an Organization can offer to its workers, socially 
2 9 
and economically. For instance, in our survey of the 
Nigeria Airways Limited Workers, about twenty-five 
percent of the workers said that they would be Willing to 
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join the Nigérian Airways Workers Union if they were sure 
that the union would meet their expectations - raise 
wages and improve other working conditions. About 70 
percent of the workers belonged to différent ethnie or 
tribal unions [an organisation of members of the same tribe 
e.g. Ibos, Yoruba or Hausa), which they pay their sub-
scriptions to every month. (See chapter 6.15) 
Moreover, there is a substantial évidence to support 
the view that in Nigeria, workers support ,for trade unions 
tended to reach its climax during and immediately following 
a period of intense wage agitation; and that many unions 
do corne into being during thèse periods, only to wither 
30 
away immediately afterwards. In 1943, it was reported 
that union members merely regarded trade unions as 'sticks 
to beat their employers and to extort from them higher 
31~ 
wages". In récent years, this rather extreme view about 
\ . 
trade union functions have not materially altered or changed 
"as our survey revealed. Over 85 percent of the workers 
from both companies (Nigeria Airways Ltd., and Lever 
Brothers (Nigeria) Ltd.,) considered that their unions 
existed mainly for the purposes of agitating for higher 
wages for them. While the remaining 15 percent believed 
that the 1 battie ' by the unions for better working 
conditions generally was a legitimate trade union.-" obliga-
tion to its members. Wurth this sort of narrow perception 
of the nature and function of trade unions at the.back of 
their minds, it is only natural that financial support to 
the unions will become highly an obligatory issue; and they 
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can only throw their support when there is a wage agitation 
or wait until a new wage award had been won. 
In contrast, the role of the ethnic organizations 
which receive continous financial support all year round 
is to provide 'friendly benefits'.. Such benefits include 
death benefits, assistance regarding native marriage 
expenses and during the illness of a member, and the repar-
triation of the destitutes from the city; 'activities which 
by their nature are more regular than wage agitation 1 .-32-
Apparently, it is not that the concept of 'friendly benefits' 
is too alien to the Nigerian unions; indeed the consti­
tution of most unions do make provision for 'friendly 
benefits', but the truth is that in practice very little 
is done (if any at all) to make them available to the 
members. A study by M.O. Kayode which examined trade union 
records in the paying-out of benefits to its members in 
1962 reinforces the assertion that the unions care very 
little for their members in terms of friendly benefits 
provision/. It was found that 72 percent of' the unions 
sampled paid no benefits whatsoever to their members, while 
20 percent paid a total of £50.00. In all, it was dis­
covered that only 8 percent of the unions rendered benefits 
of more than £50.00 each to all their members in one year? 3 
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it can 
be argued that the financial plight of the Nigerian 
trade unions is not merely a direct consequence of its 
members poor wages, and hence unable to pay 'dues', but 
basically a result of unions 'unwillingness' to provide 
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those services (like the ethnic organizations) which 
enhances total and unqualified support for an organization. 
However, to avoid continuing 'financial embarrassment and 
subsequently improve their financial position, it is 
suggested that the welfare of their members especially the 
provision of friendly 'benefits' should be made a top 
priority; as the early British trade unions (friendly 
societies) provided for their fellow club members. During 
these periods even though clubs had no visible machinery 
to coordinate co-operation between clubs existing in dif­
ferent trades, the clubs were often generous .in their 
response to exceptional appeals for assistance. For example 
in such cases as a difficult strike or a prosecution 
involving a member from another trade, these clubs would 
make liberal contributions out of their own savings or 
appeal directly to their members for voluntary contribu­
tions. Club members were so confident in their different 
trade clubs that they looked forward to these 'clubs' 
to provide them with benefits such as sickness or old age 
when the need arises. As Pelling noted: 
"The reasonably prosperous artisan 
looked to his trade club to 
provide him with sickness, old 
age and funeral benefits", 
34 ' 
It is the sort of 'friendly benefits' which the Nigerian 
trade unions should aim to provide for their members. 
Consequently, it is suggested that the trade unions 
should as far as possible try to identify themselves with 
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some of the so called 'friendly benefits' which the 
average Nigérian esteems very highly. For example, 
organizing visits (on Sundays) to members who are ili and 
hospitalized, presenting gifts to the family of a member 
'blessed' with a new child, or getting married for the first 
time. Equally important is an introduction of interest 
free short-term 'cash advance' to members, to meet unexpec-
ted domestic problems. The point being emphasized here in 
respect of 'cash advance' is that if a member was confronted' 
with cash difficulties instead of rushing to the 'tribal 
organizations ' , which are usually Willing to make such cash 
advance in return for total membership allegiance, he 
should raise such cash from trade union sources. For^ 
having received such financial assistance from the union, 
there is no doubt that such a member would be pr'epared to 
sacrifice the last 'Nairaand Kobo' in his pocket as his 
monthly or weekly trade union dues. The member made the 
'sacrifice' because he was xonvinced that the union -would 
always come to his resene financially if needs be. The 
moment Nigérian trade unions started practising this 
'scheme' there would be tremendous increases in both mem­
bership and the monthly income returns. 
Furthermore, since most of the Nigérian trade unions 
financial problems bave been constantly associated or 
linked with 'misappropriation of union funds' by the 
union leaders, it is suggested that the provision >of 
the trade union Decree of 1973 on trade union financial 
returns be reviewed with a view to enforcing it more 
.vigorously. 
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In addition, as the présent administration lias lifted 
the ban on international affiliation and foreign aid to 
industriai unions, it is strongly suggested that financial 
aids to trade unions be channelled through the Federai 
Ministry of Labour and paid into the unions 1 account instead 
of passing such financial assistance through union leaders. 
Moreover, trade union officiais should be made to recognize 
that such financial assistance was for achieving specific 
un ion obj ectivcs such as éducation, tra ining and adminis-
tration and not for private pockets. 
On the other hand, it is suggested that both the 
state and federai governments should from tìme to t ime 
render some financial assistance to the unions to enable 
them meet new investments, overheads and administrative 
costs. The présent system whereby the government had to 
wait until 'the unions start complaining of 'cash shortages 
before reacting should be reviewed. For, financial 
assistance rendered at such a 'criticai time, will only 
help perhaps to clear the unions 'cumulative debts 1 while 
still leaving the union in a desperate financial position. 
Fìnally, the présent 1 automatic check-off: system 
should be encouraced. and kent under close scrutinv 
to deter.possible financial malpractices by eithef 
the employers or the trade unions themselves. 
In sum, it is believed that with .extra -
regulär financial assistance from the governments(states 
and federai), a more positive approach by the unions 
towards the provision of 'friendly benefits' just as the 
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19th Century British trade unions did; there is no doubt 
the unions would start .fco. 'break-even' by 1985, something 
difficult to imagine at présent. 
(ii) Abuse of office by Trade Union Officiais 
Since the trade union movement's inception in 1938 
no aspect of its numerous 1 short-Comings 1 has received 
so much attention and comment as the accusation of abuse 
of office by its officiais." That trade union leaders play 
a central rôle in the practice and conduct of industriai 
relations is crystally clear. The job'of organizing the 
union and the overseeing of its daily opérations fall 
within the domain of thèse officiais'; in particular 
the président, general secretary and the tr.easurer. It 
is they that handle endless complaints by members for 
redress, formulate union policies and objectives and" work 
rules. 
Moreover, it is they or their accredited représenta-
tives that carryout wages and related negotiations on 
behalf of their members with-an employer or any negotiating 
machinery within an industry. The responsibility of com-
plying,with the law guiding the practice of industriai 
relations, such as to Tender returns and proper accounts 
of unions' cash-movements over a specific period falls 
upon them. So also is the task of representing workers 
on government instituted Advisory Committees or Boards 
for example ,on wage Commissions and other related' committees 
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Because of thèse considérable responsibilities, the 
occupation requires honest people with a sensé of judgément 
and appréciation, sensé of humour and dévotion to duty.Y.et in 
Nigeria, there." is hardly any government commission or tribunal 
right from the colonial era which has not remarked about 
the aImost complete absence of thèse qualities within the 
trade union leadership, and the severe repercussions it 
has had on the conduct of industriai relations generally. 
For example, in 1949, the Fitzgerald Commission noted: 
"Many advantages gained by 
workers are safeguarded and 
improved by efforts made jointly 
by the trade union and the 
employer. If this work is to be 
effective, it is essential that 
the problems should be approach-
ed with a sensé of responsibility. 
We regret to say that the évidence 
that has been adduced before us 
convinces us that the trade union 
leaders, in the great majority of 
cases at ail events have shown 
little sensé of that responsibility." ' 
3,5 
Nor have the post-independence expériences presented a 
différent picture. In 1977, . ' government white paper on 
the Adebiyi trade union tribunal accused the central 
labour 'unions of 1 rackettering, abuse of office, person-
al ity cuit, politic isation, corruption , conflict of interest s 
and similar malpractices ' ,'3^ The tribunal further pointed 
out that between 1969-1975 that the central labour organi-
sations were run with little regard for system and care. 
The leadership the paper claimed:, 
"exhibited little if any, sensé 
of responsibility or accountability 
to workers they représentée!. 
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However, one might ask what offence(s) constitutes 
abuse o£ office? In Nigeria abuse of office by trade 
union officiais can take various forms, but in the main, 
over 75 percent of such accusations centre around finan-
cial embazzelement and misappropriation of funds. 
Reports of trade union officiais being accused of 
enriching themselves with union funds have been wide-
spread at all levels of trade unionism from the house 
unions to the central labour organisation. Though most 
of thèse accusations are at times bourne out of malice 
by members to discredit an of f icial . particularly,. 
where such an officiai cornes from a différent ethnie-or 
tribal background. Nonetheless, a significant proportion 
of thèse accusations are always founded. For instance, 
a government commission appointed to investigate incident 
leading to the shooting of coâl miners at Enugu in 1949 
found thati 
"a great deal of the industriai 
tension at Enugu was caused by 
the utterly unscrupulous manner 
in which Mr. Ojiyi used his 
position as secretary of the 
union (Colliery Workers Union) 
to increase his influence and 
improve his own personal position..... 
We axe not at ali 'impresseci by the 
évidence which he has'submitted con-
cerning the sum of £1,500 which he 
received personally out of a levy of 
a little more than £2,500 subscribed 
by the miners at a t.ime when the un.-i.ón. 
was without funds.... His behaviour 
at best showed a great interest in 
his own financial improvement than 
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vi"?: was consistent with his dévotion 
to the course of the miners, and • -
at worst exposed him to the 
charge that he delibeiately used 
his position to enrich himself 
at the exoense of the union's fund.". ."^o ' 
3 8 / 
Mr. Ojiyi's case was not an isolated case as indi-
cated by the convinctions of some trade union officiais 
during thèse periods. For example, in 1958, an officiai 
of the Electrical Workers Union of Nigeria was convincted 
for stealing the sum of £'18.16 from the unio.nTs fund.. „. 
While in February 1959, two officiais of the amalgama-
ted union of African Staff Clérical and Technical Workers 
of Metal Containers Apapa, were convincted for forgery 
and giving false information to the registrar of trade 
' . 40- -
unions. 
In recent years, the situation has even taken 
greater dimensions as the several reports of inquiries 
set up by the government and other institutions in the 
1970s have indicated. For example, in 1971, the report 
of the Board of Inquiry into the affairs of the amalgamated 
Dockworkers Transport and General Workers Union reported 
of widespread bribery and corruption and other forms of 
malpractices within the union's leadership.^*" 
While the government tribunal of inquiry into the - *-
activities of.trade unions in 1977 found large-scale misapp-
oriation, embazzélément of furtds (gifts,and dues) and wide-
spread bribery-and corruption among the leaders'of the various 
trade unions. 
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Going through the finances of one of the central unions 
(ULCN) United Labour Congress of Nigeria during the 
inquiry, the tribunal found that officiais of some 
affiliated unions demanded gratification before paying 
in their 'dues' to the central union (ULCN), failing 
which they would ' unilaterally cut dovm their membership 
4 2 
figure and thereby pay reduced, monthly dues. The scale 
of these unprofessional union activities forced the tribunal 
to recommend the proscription of eleven influential 
trade union officiais from further participation in trade 
union activities in the country. While many others were 
severely reprimanded and forced to refund the cash embezzled. 
Chapter 2(iii-iv) of the document - Summary of Recommen­
dation states: 
"We recommend that 
ii. Chief Odeyemi should no 
longer be allowed to hold 
any office in the trade union 
movement; 
iv. if Mr. A.I.A. Okere is to 
continue in the trade union 
movement he should mend his 
ways." ' 
While Chapter 3 Section I & II state: 
"We recommend: 
I. that early Steps be taken to 
carryout inoiiiry into DR. J.O. 
Otegbeye's assets and liabili-
ties since 1960 ; 
II. that Mr. Odeleye be called 
upon to refund N800.00 with 
simple interest at 10% for 
nine years period 1967-1976." 
43 . 
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Furthermore, apart from thèse examples of sheer dishonesty 
exhibited by th'ese officiais, on numerous occasions they 
"have been accused of victimization and intimidation of their mem-
bers .Cases of union leaders demanding money or any other 
gifts from their members before their grievànceswith an 
employer can be given proper attention have also been 
reported. Members have also been forced by unscrupulous 
union officiais who want to remain 'in office to vote for 
them during an élection by threatening the jobs of such 
members. ^ J 
In addition, union officiais have always been accused 
of deliberately repudiating collective agreements_ reached 
with an employer when it has been discovered that those 
terms were unpopular with the ' membership or just as a 
strategy for retaining the waning interest of the members. 
Union officiais have also been frequently accused of even 
rejecting the awards of arbitration tribunals which they 
had voluntarily submitted to,where ali the 'demand' put" 
forward by their union had not been fully met «'"mainly bec ause 
- ... • 46 . u • 
of corruptions. 
Moreover, it is also a characteristic of some union 
officiais to make unrealistic demands such as wages and 
other conditions of service from their employers or cali 
out the workers on strike from time to time. The reasons 
for this sort of action are two-fold. First, it is an 
easy means of forging soliderity within the rank and file. 
Secondly, it is a means by which the union leader can 
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demonstrate to the members that their overall interest 
still remains his top priority - (securing good pay and 
conditions of service$) and that he is also the tight man 
for the j ob. 
The question then arises how can these 'ills* be 
cured or reduced? To begin with, any suggestions aimed at 
total eradication of this seemingly chronic disease at the 
présent stage of the country's social and eocnomic deve-
lopment should be discounted. This is because^the unpre-
cedented level of bribery and corruption even at the very 
'corridors 1 of those entrusted to stamp-out these criminal 
acts would make such an exercise impossible. Rather, what 
is required at this stage is to devise a means or method 
of reducing their présent levels. To this end, it is 
suggested that persons convicted of serious criminal 
offences in this context offenses such as embazzlement and 
misappropriation of public funds and related crimes should 
be barred from taking up trade union posts for life. The 
présent'practice of allowing ex-convicts to take up trade 
union posts after a few yearssuspension should be dis-
couraged. It would be recalled that in 1963-64 the Morgan 
wages and salaries review commission made a similar recom-
mendation which was only accepted in 'principle' by the 
Föderal government. 
Secondly, in order to create atmosphère of mutuali 
confidence and respect between the workers and their 
employers, it is suggested that the 'Calibre' of trade 
union leadership should be much higher than obtainable at 
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present. By this we mean, that for a person to be elected 
or appointed as a trade unión leader he shoüld have both 
good financial and educational background. In that, if 
a person with sound financial background was chosen as a 
leader, 'money' woüld not be the solé motivating factor 
for accepting that office. He might be aiming to derive 
'higher order needs' such as self-fulfilment, 
and self-actualisation from the new job. 
During the researcher's interview with a sénior 
official of the Nigeria Labour Congress at Surulere, Lagos, 
a trade unión official made a remark which supported the 
above view on future trade unión léaders' financial background. 
The official told the researcher: 
"My son, the sooner we stopped 
electing or appointing hungry people 
i to run trade unión affairs in this 
country the better it would be for 
^ us trade unionists. Some persons 
take up unión office to fill their 
empty stomachs, nothing short of 
that." 
47 
Similarly, with modérate educational qualification at 
least school certifícate ('GCE '0' level) and training , as 
well as good ' exposure^'. , the leaders would be able to 
appreciate what management of an organisation' s resour-
ces in particular human and capital assets actually 
involved. At present, majority of the trade unión leaders 
have standard six certificates with only a handful with 
government class four. 4 8 While those unión officials 
with school certifícate, higher school certifícate, 
! 
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dëgrees and diplomas are extremely difficult to corne 
by. This situation contrasts sharply with the présent 
situation in the United Kingdom where most union leaders 
are degree holders. For example, the general secretary 
•of the TUC the équivalent of NLC (Nigérian Labour Congressi 
holds a masters degree. 
Finally it is suggested that in future ail registered 
and recognised unions should be compulsorily instructed 
to' submit to the certification officer ail documents 
djenoting that a bank account had been opened for and 
on behalf of the trade union in a specified bank two weeks 
after registration. This is necessary because most union 
officiais entrusted with union funds hardly differentiate 
between the cash coming from their own personal 'purse' 
with those from the unions; since he secures both his own 
cash and the unions in the same place - before the 1960s, 
a small square box with two partitions in the middle 
usually hidden under his bed: There is no doubt that 
the above suggested approach would help to reduce the level 
and frequency with which trade union funds are embezzled 
at the moment. 
'"(ili) Rivalry between Trade Union 'Leaders 
Rivalry, personal/politicai, among trade union, 
leader s in Nigeria is becoming a permanent feature of 
the N iger ian Labour movement. Insp ite of numerous 
government efforts and measures in the 
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last two décades to rid the unions of this problem it has 
persisted. No doubt rivalry can be healthy in some 
circumstances. but in this context, the nature of rivalry 
being referredto is whatthe government has described as 
the 
"umbridled show of power among the 
union leaders which is not calcu-
lated to serve the interests of the 
workers, nor the course of the trade 
union movement as a whole." 
.49" '': 
These include among other things subversive activities 
and unwarranted cut-throat compétitions in union matters. 
An 'issue' which has seriously affected both the movement' 
limited bargaining role and its cohesiveness. As one of 
its vétéran leaders Wahab Goodluch of (NTUC) Nigeria 
Trade Union Congress) admitted during an interview. 
He said: 
"If leaders have a common front, 
no employer can have the gut to 
threat workers with levity and 
hope to remain in business." 
50 • 
But what is or are the cause(s) of this chronic 
disease one might ask. Undoubtedly, a number of factors 
might be responsible. However, in the main is the 
'crave for power' among the union leaders - in order to 
control the trade union's financial resources. Other 
reasons include ideological différences, political party 
affiliations and ethnie/tribal sentiments. 
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In Nigeria, most trade union leaders believe that 
the posts of a general-secretary/président and treasurer 
are for a '-acquiring wealth•!; • sincethese officiais control 
the unions 'purse', often rendering dubious account of 
their stewardship. As the late président of the Nigeria 
Ports Authority Workers Union (Samuel Omeruo) stressed 
dur ing our interviews with h im at his Apapa Quays .off.ice*: 
"it is difficult to convince our;. 
members that we are ' there' to 
perform the trade union functions. 
A good majority of them feel that 
we are in office to make money 
for ourselves." 
Surely, with this sort of impression fairly rootcd in 
their minds, the tendency is for them to struggle amo'ng 
themselves for thèse top posts. Trade union leaders 
occupying less important positions or positions below 
those of the penerai Secretary, Treasurer and Financial 
secretary can usually be seen 'betting' their lives for 
the sake of grabbing either the post of the general-
secretary or a treasurer. It is not uncommon to see union 
leaders at thèse times (élection times) engaging in sub-
versive activities within the union Organization. The 
aiiii being either to unseat the current general-secretary 
or treasurer and take over his position or to carry-out 
a smear compaign to render such Opponent inelligible for 
future élections. 
Some trade unions leaders even go to the extent of 
engaging the services of a 'Native Doctor' - to organise 
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'charms' or 'juju' for them sijp as to influence the pace 
of events. For example in 1972-73, the late Mr. Omerua 
mentioned above had this expérience during one of his 
union's presidential élections. He once confided to the 
researcher who was then residing with him at Apapa-
Marine Beach in 1973 : 
"My son, fellow contenders to this 
post of président want to kill me ; 
I have decided not to accept KOLA-
NUTS even from my best friends 
during any of our meetings until 
after the élections." 
What's more, if at the end of such bitter campaign the 
union leader fails to be selected or elected as either the 
président or general-secretary, then he would immediately 
start compaigning for the 'split' of the union into several 
factions; in a bid to achieve his life long ambitions'that 
of becoming a président or general-secretary.^"*"' 
Reinforcing this 'crave for power' assertion further 
are some of the responses which the researcher got during 
séries of interviews with some current trade union 
officiais and employers association officials. In an 
interview with a trade union officiai at the NLC (Nigeria 
Labour Congressi headquarters at Surulere-Lagos , the union 
leader.an elderly man from the Eastern Part of the country 
with vast expérience in trade union affairs had this to 
say when asked, what do you reckon to be the main causes 
of rivalry among your colleagues? 
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"Enyi (meaning my friend) , the 
rivalry between my colleagues is 
nothing but a fight for 'power' 
for the control of union 'purse'^ 
as far as I am concerned any other 
explanation contrary to this is a 
delusion. I thought it is high 
time we stopped deceiving our-
selves, we love Naira too much." 
A railway worker (Chief Printer) in the Printing Division 
of the Nigerian Railways, Head office at Ebutta metta, 
Lagos replying to the same question said: 
"The struggie is for 'power' to 
control vast financial resources 
coming from foreign sponsors such 
as the ICFT, and the WFTU; every 
trade union leader wants to be 
like Wahab Goodluck, H.P.Adebola . 
and Michael Imoudu, owning mercedes 
benz cars and Controlling thousands 
of Naira in their accounts at the'' 
various union expenses." 
These clearcut responses ran parallel to Cohen's 
responses from a cross section of university workers which 
he^ interviewed in 1974 . The workers held the trade union 
leaders partially responsible for the lack of labour 
unity. The workers claimed. 
"Union leaders like too much money 
and do not care about the welfare 
of the workers; leaders are un-
trustworthy, fighting for their 
pockets only and not for the 
common w o r k e r s c o 
Furthermore, when an officiai of the Nigeria Employers 
Consultative Association (NECA) was asked a similar 
question in his office at Commercial road Yaba during 
an interview with the researcher he replied: 
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"To be candid rivalry among 
trade union leaders these days 
is nothing but a calculated struggle 
for 'who' controls the union's 
financial resources. Trade union 
leaders are no longer in the union 
for the sake of performing the 
traditional trade union roles, 
many sees it as an avenue for 
enriching themselves." 
With respect to the other reasons namely - ideological 
differences, political party affiliation and ethnic or tribal 
sentiments, in Nigeria a trade union leader, is either labelled 
-a'Marxist (communist trade unionists, usually backed by W.F.T.U.) 
or a prorWestern (sponsored by the ((.C.F.T.U.) , 
"\Jiftia\«t. * usually happen' is that, at the Central Labour 
Organisation level when policy issues or decisions are 
being taken, union leaders would start compaigning 
vigorously for their 'ideas' or beliefs to dominate 
the final decisions to be reached. As a consequence, if 
at the end of such deliberations the policy decisions, 
favoured a particular 'group' say the pro-western 
ideologists, the marxist/communist group would immediately 
declare such decisions reached as null and void with 
charges of unconstitutionality and undemocratic. And if 
the confused situation was allowed to find expression in 
the next meeting that would be the end of such central 
labour organisation, since one or two factions would 
emerge as a result. 
Indeed, this was one.of the problems that hindered 
various attempts made at the formation of a central labour 
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organisation in the country in the early 1940s right up to 
1976 when all the four central labour organisations were 
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banned. For instance, it was ideological differences 
between Imodu Michael (a marxist militant union leader) 
and Henry Popoola Adebola [a moderate pro-western union 
leader) that led to the demise of the first (TUCN) which 
later split into two factions - NTUC led by militant 
5-4 • 
Michael Imodu and the TUCN led by H.P. Adebola.' 
Similarly, with regard to political party affilia­
tion, and ethnic or tribal sentiments, the chain of events 
and the consequences thereof are often the same. This is 
true because in the early fifties a trade union leader could 
find himself isolated for affiliating with a particular 
political party such as N.C.N.C (National Co,uncil of 
Nigerian Citizens or the Action Group (A.G) against the 
wishes of the rank and file members. For example, a 
group of traxle union members could withdraw both their 
monthly subscriptions and membership to a central labour 
organisation for affiliating with a particular political 
party. 
Trade union members or leaders sometimes take uni -
-lateral action(in the -form of withholding or refusing to make 
monthly subscriptions') against a central labour organisa­
tion for having its leadership dominated by a particular 
ethnic or tribal group such as Ibos, Yorubas or Hausas 
which the rank and file is opposed to. A case in point 
being an incident in April 1981, when the NLC,the only 
central labour organisation in the country"'' designated 
'-y 
A recent case which has been mentioned earlier in the text can 
be further cited as an example of how rivalry among trade union leaders. 
:häs-'affected trade union : bargaining rble in recent years. In 1980, the 
April 20th and 21st as 'days of action' to force the federai government 
to back down on its hardline attitude over the restoration of car 
allowances to workers and an increase in the national minimum wage. 
The président of the Nigérian civil Service Union based at Enugu in 
the Eastern part of the country refused to call out his members to 
participate in the NLC's day of - action because of certain undisclosed 
reasons. However, ìt was later gathered that the reasons behind the 
président's(Mr. David Ojelli) action had both politicai and ideological 
as well as tribal connotations. The accusation was later confirmed by 
a senior trade union officiai at the NIC head office in Lagos during 
an interview with the researcher. 
Regrettably, this leadership rivalry is seriously affecting the 
already limited bargaining rôle of the trade union movement. Rivalry 
between two union leaders who are supposed to be representing their 
union on a wage negotiation would mean, that the union so involved would 
find it difficult to appoint a représentative since each leader would be 
struggling to emerge as the officiai union représentative. Secondly, 
the employers might not be Willing to enter into negotiations with the 
unions because of representational dilemma resulting from leadership 
rivalry. Moreover, rivalry within union leadership would mean lack 
of cohesiveness and consensus - essential prerequisites for any wage 
negotiations, particularly when dealing with an uncompromising employer. 
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Nigérian Labour Congress after its National Executive 
Council meeting on July 23, demanded among other things from 
the government N300.00 Naira per month minimum wage. 
The communique read: 
"Congress reaffirms and maintains 
its position on the N300.0Û 
National, minimum wage demand.... 
Conséquences of failure would 
lie squarely with those who 
prevent this tripartite body from 
accomplishing its task . " 
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At the end of the meeting the NLC issued a statement in 
which it warned that if by Decomber of the same year the 
government fails to meet its demand that the congress 
would embark on an industriai action (the usuai sanction 
available to trade unions during wage negotiation) to 
force the government to concede wage increases. The 
'ultimatum' as most Nigérian newspapers branded the NLC's , 
threat during the period came and passed without the government 
giving in ito the', demand. " To" demohsttaté that it'meant 
'business,', the NLC asked its entire affiliated unions 
to call out their members on strike for the 20th and 21st 
April 1981. 
As noted earlier, the président of the Nigérian Civil 
Service Union Mr. David Ojcli now the deputy président of 
the NLC, instructed his members not to take part in the 
'days' of action because of ramifications over the posts 
of président, secretary and treasurer which Ojeli and his 
men wanted. 
I 
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Numerous cases of this nature have in récent years 
been reported in the private sector as Mr. Omerua former 
président of the NPA workers union told the researcher 
during an interview. He. noted: 
"We have been losing in almost 
all wage negotiations because 
we are not united. If we were 
united, who are the employers 
to tuss us like coin." 
Although Ojeli later denied this accusation arguing 
that his decisjLon had nothing to do with 'leadership 
struggle', some NLC officiais whom we interviewed during 
the period maintained that it was the most important 
single factor. One officiai told the researcher. 
"Dón't mind Ojeli and hishençh 
men, he (Ojeli) wanted to b'e""" 
the président of NLC by force 
when Sunmonu Hassan had been 
duly and democratically elected 
by the members." 
Because of the ineffective industriai action which resulted, 
the NLC lost its battle to force the government to concede 
the N300.00 minimum wage. The government agreed to pay 
N125.00 Naira. In any case, we are not implying that the 
government coùld have conceded to the NLC's 
original N300.00 Naira demand had the strike been success-
ful. Rather, what we are saying is that if the trade 
union movement had fought as a 'body' regardless of the 
success or failure of the industriai action, the government 
offer of N125.00 could have been improved to at least 
N150.00 Naira per month. 
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The question then arises what should be done to get 
this somewhat apparent chronic disease under - control? 
To reverse the trend it is suggested firstly, that the 
federai government in collaboration with the central labour 
organisation should from time to time (at least at the 
end of every month) organise a seminar on 'workers1 édu-
cation' inainly for trade union leaders from all parts of 
the country. The aim of such periodic seminars would be " 
to remind the leaders of their roles and responsibilities 
which they owe to their unions, members and to the general 
public. 
Secondly, more stricter disciplinary measures by the 
government is further suggested. By this we mean, if for 
example, it was discovered that officiais of a recognised 
and registered trade union were competing or struggiing 
among themselves for the purposes of . taking over a parti-
cular post such as that òf -a general se.cretary or a treasurer 
-in a union, in a manner dìvorced of ''démocratie principles', 
the certification officer should be instructed to de-
register such a union and those officiais proscribed from 
further trade union activitìes for life. This last sugges-
tion might seem tco severe a measurc if con3idered in 
isolation, but if one considers the alarming proportions 
which rivalry between union leaders have reached in the 
last ten years, it becomes a worthwhile suggestion to 
make. At least it would serve as a déterrent to other 
'.greedy1 trade union leaders contemplât ing such an 
undemocratic action. 
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(iv) Poor Education 
Underlying most of the problems confronting both 
employers and trade unions in Nigeria today is the need 
for éducation. The question then arises, what type of 
éducation do the workers and their leaders need? There is 
no doubt the Nigérian workers and their trade union leaders 
need both 'formai or basic and the labour éducation'. 
The former has to do with académie - learning to read and 
write, while the latter involves a good knowledge of the 
content and opération of labour relations and related 
matters. • " 
First, for the workers it is no exaggeration to 
state that over sixty-five percent of the trade union 
members have no basic éducation. Infact, a good majority 
of the manual workers have no primary six certificate let 
alone a secondary schoöl qualification. As for their 
union leaders, a significant proportion of them are known 
to be college drop-outs, 5 6 only a handful have mànaged to . 
acquire government 'class four' certificate. 
This poor educational background affects both the 
trade union membership and cohessiveness. This is because 
most trade union members very often refuse to attend 
weekly or monthly meetings because such meetings were 
conducted in 'English language' which they do not under-
stand. Those members who would not isolate themselves 
from, trade union activities would instead look for the 
unions with their own tribal or ethnie background. For 
exàmple', ' the îbo workersN Wohld look :forward to; 
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Ibo dominateci unions, so would the Yorubas and Hausas. 
The reason behind the search foT tribal/ethnie 
dominated unions by thèse 'uninformed' workers is fox easy 
and uninhibited access to the officiais who preside over 
the meetings; whom- ' they ( 1uninformed 1 workers) can 
approach for an explanation to certain key issues using 
i ' -
their local languages. .Confusions have always arisen at 
the end of union meetings as members who claimed that they 
never followed the délibérations of a meeting because it 
was conducted in 'English language' demand 'word for word' 
explanation of the décisions reached from either the 
secretary or uther officiais. Particularly, when sensitive 
issues such as the disbursement of union funds had been 
discusseci' during such a meeting. Trapped in this sort of 
social problem no doubt the need to provide both the workers 
and their leaders with" basic or formai 'éducation-becomes 
even more crucial. 
As regards to the second type of éducation - the 
labour éducation, - which can be described 1-iterally as a 
sort of industriai relations training in a vocational sensé, 
it is vital for workers, union leaders, employers and 
indeed ail those interested in labour relations in a modem 
industriai society. First, to the union leaders,.it is 
very essential, for.even though much has been donc in this 
direction by the government, it is not uncommon to see 
top union officiais who do not understand what collective 
bargaining is ail about. This statement is arguable, but 
the responso which the researcher got from most of the 
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And yet 'coliéetive bargaining' is one of their most 
impor tant funet ions. 
Also there are a -good proportion of trade union leaders 
who have not seen either the trade union ordinance of 
1938 or the post-independence labour Acts and Decrees, let 
alone mastered their provisions. This contrasts sharply 
with the position in the United Kingdó™ where a signif'i-
cant proportion of the union leaders can recite some 
of the provisions of most labour enactments such as 
trade union leaders interviewed during the surveys supported 
the assertion. For example, during our interviews with 
some union officiais at the NLC(Nigérian Labour Congress) 
Headquarters at Surelere Lagos; of the twenty officiais 
whom we asked about issues relating to collective bargaining/ 
agreement, only 5 percent or 4 of the officiais was able to 
make meaningful and constructive Statements about collective 
bargaining process. In addition, a statement by the depüty 
président of the NLC on Saturday July 5, 1980 while > 
addressing trade union leaders supports our argument. 
During that conférence the deputy président David Ojeli noted 
"The need for educating members of trade 
unions cannot be over-stressed. Trade 
union movement has an important rôle to 
play in the social and economic develop-
ment of Nigeria. To be able to play that 
rôle, it must engage in extensive workers' 
educational activity. It is also not 
uncommon to see top union officiais who 
do not know what collective agreements are 
and what some of their main contents should 
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the 'Industriai Relations Act 1971 (IRA 1971), TULRA (Trade 
Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, EPA 1975 Employment 
Protection Act and the New Acts EA 1980 (Employment Act). 
Furthermore, as pointed out earlier in the discussion a 
good number of trade union leaders can hardly diffërentiate 
between their own 'purse' from the unions. Or even their 
own personal property from those that belong to the union 
because of their illusive impression that by virtue of. 
their positions anything that belongs to the union 
automatically becomes part of their property. All these' 
are direct Symptoms of lack of labour éducation, which is 
an 'awareness* creating mechanism or device in an industriai 
society. 
As -for the workers, the overall importance of on-
the -job ^ training, labour éducation cannot be over empha-
sised. The trade union members need éducation not only 
fo'r the exercise of their rights, freedom and privilèges, 
but equally in the discharge of their duties and respon-
sibilities as trade unionists and Citizens. Lamentably, a 
significant proportion of trade union members in Nigeria 
today are handicapped by their lack of this essential 
'tool'. This is evidenced by the fact that a good number 
of them do not know who their national secretary or 
treasurer is, let alone to keep abreast with the events 
in the industriai relations world. For this and related 
reasons labour éducation is very cruciai to them.^ 
For the employers, éducation is required to promote 
fuller understanding of the;.economic and social significance 
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of trade unionism and a willingness to embark on consul-
tation and negotiation instead of confrontation. In 
addition, the employer who is abreast of the 'times' 
is the first to recognise the value of sound, independenf 
and reasonable trade unions capable of representing the 
interests of their members. Moreover, éducation by impart-
ing understanding can help reduce the area of labour-
management conflict and promote the substitution of reason-
ing and conciliation for émotions and force. 
Under thèse circumstances, one might ask what have 
successive governments been up to in promoting this widely 
discussed issue? Available évidence suggests that government 
efforts in this regard have been relentless, but ineffec-
tive. For example, between 1949 and 1951, the government 
awarded scholarships to some trade union leaders to enable 
them study 'Labour affairs' in institutions in the United 
Kingdom. Among the beneficiaries were B.E. Endem, W. Garber, 
R.N. Okohi of the African Loco Drivers Union, V.D. Uwemedimo 
of the Nigérian Civil Service Union, E.O. Songonuga "of the 
.association of Railway Civil Servants and A.F.A. Awolana of 
thè Nigérian Union of Teachers. Unfortunately, thèse 
f: 
scholarship programmes were abandoned in 1951 because of the 
disappointing attitude of most of the beneficiaries. 
Disappointment was caused because most of them (union 
leaders) on returning to the country took up lucrative 
appointments in the civil service, some in the private 
sector without due considérations to the 'reasons' why 
the scholarships were awarded to them in the first place. 
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For example, of the six trade union officiais to whom 
special scholarships were awarded to study in the United 
Kingdom in 1950, 3 joined the civil service after their 
courses, 2 took up appointments in private industry, while 
5 8"" 1 ' 
one remained in the United Kingdom to study law. 
However, inspite of thèse early set backs, post-
independence gove.rnments have remained as determined as 
ever to promote thìs essential 'tool 1 for good labour 
relation. In 1976 , the Federai military government decided 
to take 'the bull by the horns', to this end, a 
government directive as contained in section 3 ( 1 )(a)(ii) 
of Decree No. 44 of 1976, charged the administrator of 
trade unions with the responsibility among other things 
for 'promoting the éducation of members of trade unions 
in the field of labour relations and related fields'. 
As if this move was not enough,the government went on to 
outline the aims and objectives of labour éducation in a 
government white paper. Paragraph 5 section 70 of the 
paper states ; 
"the aims of this educational pro-
cess are: 
1. to enable participants who are 
essentially parties in labour 
relations determine the existence 
and nature of their problems if 
any, 
2. to enable the partners to under-
stand the relationships and the 
conséquences of their own 
activities for labour relations 
T
.' ''
;and the society, 
3 . to enable the partners to 
formulate immediate or long-term 
plans and solutions to the 
problems."
 q Q 
•33V 
Following this renewed effort by the federal government, 
in 1977, arrangements for the establishment of a 'National 
Institute for Labour Studies' were finalized. The 
National Institute was to have two large divisions - the 
vocational and académie divisions. The académie division 
was to comprise the"following departments which represent 
areas of major concern and study in labour relations 
- Department of trade union studies . 
- Department of labour relations and personel management 
- Department of labour laws and labour policy 
- Department of social studies and community development 
- Department of politics, government and international 
affairs 
- Department of research, éducation ^and' training. 
Scholarships were to be made available to deserving students 
pursuing courses in the institute. However, inspite of 
thèse tremendous efforts by the government a lot still 
remains to be done in this field. Which raises the ques-
tion, what should be done to give labour éducation a new 
identity which will reflect its increasing importance to 
the Nigérian society, and assist to promote the process 
of collective bargaining in the country? 
Since labour éducation has featured in a number of 
discussions and studies in the country, for example, the 
Tulatz Report of 1954 on Workers éducation in Nigeria, 
the 'Orr Report of 1 963 . and the Workers' éducation confér-
ence of 1971; our suggestions would centre around those 
areas that have not been adequately covered. First among 
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the áreas is the área of 'workers éducation' which 
aithough mentioned in the above reports and conférences 
has as yet to receive proper attention. Emphasis in the 
last few years has been on éducation and training of 
management to the neglect of 'workers' who are also 
essential 'partners' in the conduct of industrial relations. 
The federal government acknowledged this serious neglect.-
r 
Commenting on the issue, the then commissioner for labour 
and productivity Brigadier Henry Adefope noted: 
"the éducation and training of 
management have been accorded their 
proper place in the scheme of 
things. In contrast to this, not 
much has been done by the govern­
ment in the area of workers éducation.'V60J 
In view of this neglect, it is therefore suggested that 
"workers education:* be accorded the same status as manage­
ment éducation and training. Because, as thé federal • ••-
military government pointed out, "strength cannot negotiate 
with weakness". Literally meaning that if management 
alone has ail the qualities - skills, and expertise 
necessary for negotiation, with 'labour 1 having none, it 
would be difficult for the 'social partners' to enter into 
meaningful negotiations because of their marked différences 
in knowledge and understanding. After ail, workers must 
have knowledge and skills, courage and resources, and 
ability to think independently so as to make free, 
mature and intelligent judgement. 
Secondly, it is suggested that the proposed National 
Instituto for Labour Studies when set up should have 
branches throughout the nineteen states. This would not 
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only be cost effective in terms of reducing travelling costs 
from say Enugu, Zaria or Owerri to Lagos for workshop 
seminars, but because of its 'nearness' many local workers 
would be attracted. This is because the old traditional 
'idea' of not travelling too far away from ones family is stili 
rooted in the minds of most Nigérian workers, particularly 
among the 'f armer turned wage earrier ' who wouldn't 
• r ; - • 
TÎKe the idea of sleeping outsidé their homes even for 
a night because of their cultural beliefs and values. 
Î Thirdly, further encouragement should be given to abour éducation by making scholarships to the National 
Institute automatic on admission, discounting the idea of 
Jfederal character' (a policy that in every aspect of 
federai government concern - employment, scholarships and 
sports,all the states should be proportionally represented) 
as far as possible. In that, it tends to deny suitably 
qualified candidates opportunities of being selected. 
Fourthly, successful participation in or completion of 
some labour éducation programmes in any of the labour 
institutes should be a pre-requisite for an élection and 
appointment to certain posts in the trade unions, for 
example, the posts of a general secretar y,, près ident and 
treasurer. Furthermore, the NLC (Nigérian Labour Congress) 
and its affiliâtes (the industriai unions) should as a signof 
interest and deep concern in labour éducation commit at 
least 5 percent of their annual budgets to the éducation 
and training of their members. Their présent attitudes of 
waiting for the government to finance or sponsor every form 
of training should be eschewed. 
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As regards basic or formai éducation^it is suggested 
that workers especially the 'illiterateT should be encouraged 
to register on part-time basis in any nearby académie 
institutions either around their places of work or near 
their homes to enable them acquire the art of reading and 
writing. Surely, unless the issue of basic or formai 
éducation on the part of thèse illiterate workers was 
tackled first to give;. them the elementary 'expo'sûre', 
the highly specialised issue of labour éducation would 
have no meaning to them. After ail, to climb a 'ladder 
one has to start from 'step one 1 before progressing 
to the last step. 
In sum, the aim of labour éducation should not merely 
be to provide information on practical issues such as organi-
sation of works, government and management of unions and 
correct ideology; but should also be structured or 
ta'ilored to stimulate awareness, critical évaluations of 
labour relations and other issues which affect the quality 
of life in a modem society. The subject matter for such 
éducation being suggested would include: 
a. Aspects of industrial relations, particularly,the 
content and role of collective bargaining process -
* with much emphasis on the substantive and procédural 
rules. No doubt -, thls. would help workers to 
understand more about collective bargaining process. 
b. Leadership training - this aspect of educat ion 
would assist the workers to be aware of the role 
of leaders in industrial relations and 
related disciplines. 
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c. Aspects of rôle of government in inclustrial 
relations generally . This would help to clear 
the impression among workers and their leaders 
that the government intentions has always been to 
suppress the labour movement. 
d. Human relations - the advantage of this subject is 
, '•: that it would inculcate in workers and their leaders 
those essential 1 inter-action tools' necessary 
for maintaining good relationship with fellow 
workers. In addition, the chances of supervisors 
or foremen treating fellow workers like appendages 
would be diminished. 
SurelyLabour éducation* structured as recommended above 
would create that high level of understanding now lacking 
in both workers and their leaders necessary for successful 
functioning of collective bargaining process in a country. 
\ 
'(Bj THE SECONDARY PROBLEMS 
1 Growing apathy wit'hin the membership of~ the' • ' " 
Trade.Unions. ' • _
 ; 
Jundamental and vital to any democratic institution 
is the active interest and participation of the ordinary 
rank and file members in the décision process. Without 
such full participation and interest by the rank and file, 
sooner or later such an institution becomes dominated by 
minority éléments and dictators who may wield the 
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powers invested upon them arbitrarily to achieve their 
personal needs. Yet, in recent years majority of the 
rank and file members of the Nigérian trade unions rarely 
show any interests in what their unions are do ing. To a 
certain degree, it is the '"financial ' position of the trade 
union that actually reflects the extent of membership 
interest and commitment to the cause of that trade union. 
For, a worker who is interested in his union will also make 
it a point of duty to be paying his weekly or monthly dues 
regularly. Undoubtedly, the f inaneial pos ition of the 
Nigérian trade unions as already discussed, adequately 
demonstrates the scale of apathy within the trade union 
membership. 
In addition, trade unions leaders complain of poor 
attendance at scheduled union meetings, and the researcher 
during this survey was able to confirm their claim. This 
is because the researcher found that among the werkers 
who claimed to be members of the National Union of Air 
trasnport Service Employées at the Nigeria Airways, only 
one in nine had attended their union meeting within the last 
2 years; (See chapter 6.15) Móreover,J -the' past "Ministry of- ' Labour 
reports do show that members interest .and sensé of commit­
ment to union activities were 'sporadic' and only viewed 
necessary when members were in need of something for 
example,'wage Claims' to be negotiated. As the former 
federal commissioner of labour - Brigadier Henry Acre-fope''-
noted in his speech: 
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"It is noted that trade union 
members are usually alive to their 
responsibilities only when matters 
such as wage increases etc., 
affecting them require their parti-
cipation, but, they see no need 
for regular attendence at trade 
union meetings when the situation 
is quiet. The keenest and most 
conscientious are left to undertake 
union bus iness . V 
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Reinforcing the former commissioner's state-
ment was a similar observation made by a senior trade 
union officiai in charge of 'membership administration r 
at the Nigérian Labour Congress head quarters during an 
interview with the researcher. He noted when asked to 
comment on the general fpoor attendance' at scheduled 
union meetings by members: 
"Our members rarely attend 
ordinary routine weekly or monthly 
meetings; unless such a meeting 
was specifically called for 
the .discussion of improvement in 
their wages and other working 
conditions. Personally, I view this 
'logie' with great contempt, for 
without thèse routine weekly or 
monthly meetings it would be extre-
mely difficult to review existing 
policies in the light of our overall 
objectives. Believe it or not some 
members do not bother to put appear-
ance at their branch meetings after 
registration." 
One question that émerges from the foregoing dis-
cussions is: what can the membership apathy be attributed 
to? Undoubtedly a number of factors might be accountable 
for this rather ugly situation within the trade union 
movement. In the years preceding and immediately after 
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politicai independence in 1960, two reasons were usually 
advanced to explain the situation. First, it was held 
that most of the traditional workers in Nigeria were not 
permanent employées but had paid employment on temporary 
basis.with the view of returning to their home towns and 
villages after sometimes. In other words, a sort of 
'migratory1 labour.. Some traces of this -type of 
workers can stili be found in some parts of the country 
today, particularly among the Ibo and Yoruba communities. 
Those workers who seek wage employment for the purpose 
of raising 'cash' sufficient enough to pay for their 
'fiancee's dowrìes; and as soon this objective was 
achieved they would go back to their respective villages. 
This type of employées it is argued can hardly be interested 
in trade unions whose main functions are among other 
things the negotiation of long-term conditions of employ-
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ment. 
The second reason centred around 'level of under-
.standing among the workers. It is held that because of 
the prevalence of illitracy most workers are unable to 
appreciate the role of trade unions and even to follow 
the proceedings of trade unionr,' meetings because it is 
conducted in English language which many do not understand. 
For most of them, to remain in a gathering where they would 
be treated like 'leprosy patients' because of foreign 
language was something they could not bear since a sighi-
ficant proprotion of them were 'traditional title' holders 
such as *Eze (chief) and Mazi. Hence the ir. préférence for 
tribal meetings where they can speak and be spoken to. 
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In recent years, however, growing apathy within the 
trade union membership has been largely attributed to 
the gross inefficiency in the administration of most 
unions, rather than the issues of migratory labour and 
illitracy. This is mainly because, in the last thirty 
years most employments have been ön permanent basis. For 
example, during this survey the researcher discovered that 
in both Nigeria Airways Limited and the Lever Brothers 
(Niger ia) Ltd . (See Chapter "6 ."15 ) a substantial majority of 
'the resppndents have been on continuous employment for more 
than twenty year s .Hence, i-t is -argued that workers are 7 ' 
discouraged because of fhe'-large scale fnauds and corruption 
anong the trade union leaders. To the extent that--those few 
workers keen to develop interest and sense of commitment 
by paying their 'dues' regularly and contributing in other 
related trade union activities become totally disillusioned. 
Secondly, it is held. .that the prevalence of leadership, 
r'ivâ'lry-arröng union leaders for 'their personal advantages, •_ 
ïnfused -"fear in the actual and potential ' membership. 
This is because, most of the members would feel that. the 
internal squabbling among the union leaders would seriously 
undermine their capacity to carryout union rôles and, 
functions which the union leaders were enthrusted with. 
In other words, many fear that 'members interest' would 
not be properly represented because of the leadership 
wrangling.. 
However, a fundamental question whiçhone would li-ke 
to ask is whether trade union membership apathy is 
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unique to Nigeria. Or whether it is a^general problem 
faced by most voluntary organisations in a democratic 
environment at certain stages of their development. Trade 
union rank and file apathy is not unique to Nigeria, it 
is as explained above, a common problem of most voluntary 
organisations in a democratic environment. This view is 
supported by the fact that in the United Kingdom trade 
union membership apathy was one of the major problems 
facing the British Trade Union Movement in the years before 
records show that only a few members were attending their 
branch union meetings regularly. B.C.Roberts found that 
between four and seven percent of the members do turn up 
for branch meetings. 
On the other hand,-however,it can be argued that a 
marked différence exists between the situation in the United 
Kingdom(during the period)and Nigeria. In the first place, 
most British trade union members are 'literate' who can 
read and understand the 'minutes' of a union's meeting sent 
to them directly by post or through newspapers and special 
union Journals, and comply with union instructions without 
difficulties. Secondly a significant proportion of them 
are financial members(those members who subscribe certain 
amounts of 'cash' weekly or monthly to their unions), 
so that membership apathy wouldn't affect the finances sig­
n i f i c a n t e . Besides, in the' United Kingdom, 'trade unionism 1 
Was been so well . ' integrated'' into both the social and 
economic system that one can reasonably perceive it as form-
ing part of the British way of life - thus the organisation 
Donovan Commission of 1965-1968. 63 Trade Union 
64 
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carefully knitted with devoted union leaders of outstanding 
characters - that the rank and file can afford to 'muck.' 
about with this type of problem without serious consé­
quences. In Nigeria, it is quite a différent picture. 
First, a good majority of the workers are illitrate 
who cannot even read their own private letters with 
confidence let alone to read proceedings from previous 
union meetings and Journals to follow events in the union. 
As indicated earlier in the discussion, most trade union 
members are not financial members - in other words though 
they have registered as members they do not pay their 
weekly or monthly dues to the unions. Whatsmore, the 
country has yet to appreciate what trade union functions 
and obligations are about before the question o'f accepting 
it as part of the social and economie system arises. 
Under the circumstances, the assertion that trade union 
membership ap.athy is a product of démocratie institution 
seems to hold no grounds. 
Apparently, the concern in Nigeria should be how to 
eliminate or reduce the problem from its présent proportions, 
rather than its définition. In order to eliminate or 
reduce this problem, first, it is suggested that intense 
'workers éducation' be given a top priority by the federai 
government in future labour policies. This is because 
part of the problem centres around the rank and files 
failure to appreciate the true nature and functions of 
modem trade unionism. 
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As stressed earlier in the discussion, the federal 
government should organise 'workers seminar' with special 
feature on some aspects of industrial relations such as 
the role, nature and responsibilities of trade unions to 
the society as a whole from time to time. Greater govern­
ment involvement is suggested this time because over the 
years the few "workers education committees" organised 
by the unions have had little impact on the workers 
perception of trade unión functions and roles. 
Secondly, since the recent rank and file apathy is 
as a consequence of lack of confidence in the trade 
unión leaders' potentials and capabilities; particularly , 
over their management of unión finances and related issues, 
it is strongly suggested that these leaders be advised 
to mend their ways in order.to regenérate membership 
confidence. 
In sum, however, inspite of the last suggestion, 
what the present level of membership apathy in Nigeria 
needs is intense 'workers education' so that workers can 
fully appreciate what trade unionism is all about; 
otherwise membership apathy would be dififcult to 
eliminate. And this will se'riously affect the cohduct 
of industrial re.lations and in particular, the collective 
bargaining process. 
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( i'i) . Problem of size and union multiplicity 
Apparently, trade union multiplicity is no longer 
considered to be such a major problem as it was few 
years ago. This is because of the catalogue of measures 
taken by the federai government in the mid-1970s. For 
example, in 1973, the trade union Decree NO. 31 of 1973 
which stìpulated that 'no less than fifty workers may 
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legally form a trade union' was promulgated. The Decree 
further provided for the formation of and amalgamation and 
fédération of small registered trade unions into bigger 
and more viable organisations. Another measure was the 
introduction of a new National Labour Policy in 1975 
(discussed earlier in the text) which among other things 
called for the de-registration of unions of self-employed 
persons that registered under the repealed trade unions 
ordinance of 1938; who were not organisation of workers' 
as defined in the trade unions decree NO. 31 of 
19 73."' 
Prior to these meàsures, the entire trade union 
structure was described as being irrationally proiiferated and out-
6 6" 
dated. Undoubtedly, this description adequately portrays 
the 'Nigérian trade union structure before 1977 indeed 
as had been indicated earlier in the text in Table 16 
and figure 3 respectively - thus the prépondérance of 
small unions especially 'house unions' with relateively 
small membership in size. As figure 3 has shown it can 
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be seen that almost two thirds of the unions had 2 SO 
members or less. The few largest unions with 50,000 or 
more members accounted for less than one percent of the 
total membership. Of the 1008 unions recorded in 1975 
for example with a total membership of 755,955, over 100 
unions had*a membership of not more than 50 each. 
As emphasized earlier, the union 'size' problem 
was further complicated by the multiplicity of trade 
unions (Table 16). The comprehensive list of trade unions 
which was prepared in the office of the registrar of 
trade unions in 1977 shows a total number of 936 registered 
unions. Out of this number, 721 unions were found to 
cover workers organisations (later used to form the current 
industriai unions); 50 unions were connected with super-
visory/management staff associations, 44 related to employers 
associations. The remainder (115 unions to be precise) 
termed 'miscellaneous1 represented associations of self-
emplpyed persons or individuai owners of various businesses 
Which by définition should'nt nave» .been caïfled trade 
"6 7 
union organisations." The net effect of this union multi-
plicity on the .Nigérian trade union has been to incapacitate 
'the Unions 'ih:, their barçaining rble^performance and 
cohesiveness . The question that arises is.'what canhthe trade u 
multiplicity in Nigeria be ascribed to in the. years, preceding 1976/77 ? 
Undoubtedly, various factors are responsible for 
this multi-unionism. However, what is still not clear is 
the extent thèse factors were actually responsible for 
the situation. Firstly, it is held that the legal pro-
visions for the registration of new trade unions 
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enshrined in the trade union ordinance of 1938 , mentioned 
earlier in the text were extremely permissive. 
The provisions provided for 'any group of persons or 
employées of up to five or more in number the right to 
constitute themselves into a trade union'. 5^ The argument 
is that ,the provisions had the effect of encouraging 
proliférations within the unions instead of preventing 
it. For no sooner it became clear that any group of five 
or more persons could form'any thing' and called it a 
trade union and get away with it, than splinter "groups 
or factions started turning out new unions like 'cars' 
Coming out of the production lines. 
.Indeed, during these periods, mere différences in 
opinion or ideas expressed between individuai members 
in a social club or other related institutions usually 
resulted in a split and the formation'of new unions. 
For example, the split of the (TUCN) (Trade Union Congress 
óf Nigeria) the first trade union to be formed into two 
unions - the NNFL(Nigerian National Fédération of Labour) 
and the TUCN (Trade Union Congress of Nigeria) was to 
some extent a conséquence of mere différences in views 
or ideas between the trade union leaders. For what 
happened was that a group of trade union leaders (the 
radicals) favoured an affiliation with the N.C.N.C (National 
Council of Nigérian Citizens (formerly the National Council 
of Nigeria and the Cameroons) a politicai partyt w'hile 
the other group (the conservatives) did not want any form 
of affiliation with politicai organisât ionstarguing that 
trade unions should be excluded from politics. Since they 
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could not agrée on a common Ttenet* there was a disagree-
ment which led to the formation of a rival fédération, the 
NNFL (Nigérian National Fédération of Labour) in March 
1949. 
Trade union matters which in normal 
circumstances were not subjects of contention and prolonged 
debates were suddeniy tur.ned into protracted and heated 
arguments by members who were confident of eating their 
'cakes' and having them back the next moment. In other 
words, those who were convinced that they can easily break 
up their unions today and form new ones the next day as 
long as they were up to five members without difficulties. 
For example, the split of the merger central labour 
organisation - the All-Nigeria. Tx'ades Union Fédération and 
the National Council of Trade Unions of Nigeria in 1961, 
was as a resuit of routine "suspension from office", 
which in normal circumstances would have been enforced 
without problems. That split had occurred when chief 
Michael Imodù- président of the Trade' union congress of 
Nigeria was suspended from office. His supporters did 
not take kindly to the suspension, and at a meeting held 
atthe Empire Hotel Idioro Lagos, a new union called the 
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Nigérian Trades Union Congress was formed. 
On the other hand, it might be argued that tfcis ' 
(Trade Union Ordinance 193S) though permissive cannot be 
--blamed as-:such for the ' union-fliultipiicity** during-the period. 
because there were some provisions in the 'ordinance* which were 
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deliberately designed to discourage the formation of small 
unions. For example, the requirement that applications for 
registration of unions cannot be considered until after the 
expiration of a period of at least six months could have 
been discouraging enough. Moreover, in the United Kingdom, 
(at the same period) there was no stipulation of a particular 
size of membership to qualify as a trade union organisation, 
except that of the general law which stipulâtes that every 
association must be composed of at least two persons, 
(though registration was not compulsory then) requires a 
membership of at'-least seven persons~ 7 0* y e t , the trend in 
the United Kingdom had not been for the formation of small, 
and weak unions of the scale prévalent in Nigeria during 
the period. 
Secondly, * : the 1 greediness* of most trade union, 
general secretaries over personal aggregate incomes are 
seriously to blâme for the union multiplicity and pro­
liférations of the period. This is because most of 
these secretaries believed that their monthly ihcome 
(gerterated from one source possibly an amalgamated 
union) was notencugh. Hence, some of them felt that by 
organising several small unions whether viable or not in 
addition, such unions could be avenues for extra income. 
Indeed, reports of a union secretary being in charge of 
six to seven small unions in the years before 1973 were wide-
spread. For example, in 1949, Nduka Eze was the general-
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secretary of a UAC company union as well as secretary 
to other company unionsand the Nigérian Labour Congress 
Tl-
Cthe Central Labour organisation then) . 
The only exceptions to the above statement were 
those few unions which were granted 'check-off orders' 
after 1961. when the compulsory check-off system was ìntro-
duced (though later abandoned). Even so, the check-off 
system during the period was very defective because,, it was 
subject to union^officiais' manipulation. In a survey 
of the financial returns of 62 unions which practised the 
check-off system in 1966, it was fòund that the salaries 
and allowances of trade union officiais jumped from 
£26,500 to over £44,500 within a year; while the payment 
of grants to ordinary rank and file members totalled only ,. 
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2.5 percent of the unions' receipts. As a conséquence, 
thèse general secretaries with deep-seated interests, 
in the affairs of small and unviable unions abhorred, 
challenged and contested any move towards amalgamation, 
fédérations or mergers during thèse periods. In addition, 
most of them protested against mergers . " and amalgamations 
to 'safe-guard' their jobs, since certain amalgamations or 
mergers would mean the loss of job or displacement. 
'Thirdly, it is held that the attitudes of most 
Nigérian employers had a 'loi; to do with the trade union 
multipi icity. This is due to the fact that a signif i-
cant proportion of these employers promoted and encouraged 
the formation of 'house'or company unions (discùssed 
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earlier in the text) which they preferred to negotiate 
wages and related negotiable items with because of the 
s 5 5 
'house unions' weak bargaining position. Nationally 
organised unions with the potentials, skill and tactics 
for "negotiations" were seen as major threats to the 
company by the employers since they wouldn't be able to 
brào'e their way through as they did with the house 
unions. As a resulta such large and powerful unions were 
either banned from operating in the companies or allowed 
to operate in industries where the union représentatives 
would be 'mere shadows of themselves'. In other words, 
operating under the domination of the employers with 
virtually no form of trade union authority. 
Fourthly, that ethnie aqd regional 
considérations helped to encourage multi-unionism in the 
country. In that, they bave the tendency of promot-ing 
union factionalism or in creating rivai foci of 
interests. For example, immediately after the Decree of 
May 1967 which created the first twelve states in the 
country, trade union leaders started organising unions 
within the boundaries of the new states. 
Consequently, within the first five months of 1971, 17 
unions had been registered with the names of the newly 
created State Governments boldly included in their 
* 7-4 • 
descriptions.'-- Examples of such unions include: the 
Kwarâ' State Washermen Association and the Western State 
Stone, Sand and Gravel Blasters and Diggers Union. 
The logie behind the formation of'~these kinds 
350 
of unions might not necessarily be for industriai or 
economie reasons alone, politicai considération might be • 
one of the main reasons thus to promote the image of the 
newly created state so as tb gain further unqualified state 
'identity*. However, if conceived as politicai rather than 
economie gesture, such patriotism has had the unfortunate 
effect of creating more small, unviable unions into being, 
than its politicai considérations. 
Furthermore, it is held that trade union multiplicity 
in Nigeria during the period was as a conséquence of dif-
y* 
fusion of 'industriai enterprises' to areas widely di-
vorced geographically and poorly served by the communica-
tion net-work in the country. The point being made here 
is that trade unions established in industries located in 
'remote areas' with no means of effective communication 
find it difficult to be in 'constant touch' with the 
'parent unions' in the city centres. As a conséquence, 
when such local unions 'sought for an advice or clarifi­
cations of certain industriai relations matters from the 
'parent union' located in the city and fail to get such 
an i advice the tendency then would be for the 'local' 
union to resort to making do with any piece of advice or 
information gathered locally. I f this situation 
(break-down in officiai communication] was allowed to 
continue for a very long time, 'close-ties* with. the 
.parent union in the city centre" would bëcome loose and highly 
questionatole. The resuit would be a 'break-off from the 
parent union in the city by the local union; on the grounds 
4> •• 
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that the 'parent union' was no longer or have lost the 
interest of its members outside the city centre. Within 
weeks of this 'break-off1 a new trade union would émerge 
under a différent name with fresh policies and objectives 
T.M. Yesufu underscores this point, while commenting on 
some pockets of Timber and Rubber establishments in the 
Bénin, Delta and Ondo provinces; ne -pointed out that 
"because of the 'remoteness' of 
some local unions from any mcans 
of transportât ion or communica-
tion, organisation at the local 
level becomes a sine quanon.'U,-
The question then is what is to be done to prevent 
a similar situation arising again. As noted earlier, the 
problem is now under control, what is needed is the tight 
ening up of those measures guiding trade union formation, 
and registration since a relaxation of thèse measures 
would mean the prépondérance of small and unviable unions 
once more in the country. 
Furthermore, it is held that the présent number -
seventy national unions and associations for labour 
movement is far too many, that this number should be 
further reduced to fifty or even less. By reducing the 
number-of national unions and associations the authori-
ties would create rooms for more effective control; and 
more importantly, a significant proportion of industrial 
unions would becomeoself-financing. The provision in 
the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 22 of 1978 that 
fifty workers can effectively form and register as a 
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trade union should be further re-examined, for it seems 
to suggest an 'invitation' to the formation of more 
unviable unions. The number should be increased to at 
least 250 or more workers to curb possible trade union 
proliferation . 
(.iii) .'" The Nigérian employers négative attitudes 
towards. the-Trade Unions. *•
 r\ \ 
— -
 ( N . 
In the industriaiised countries such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States, employers (private and 
public) do not advocate_the élimination of the trade unions 
no matter the degree of their différences. Nor do they 
resist the formation of unions in their firms or com -
panies for fear that their prerogative powers and authority 
to control the firms would :be taken over by the trade 
unions. There are no extensive anti-union campaigns to 
either discredit or undermine the nature, functions 
and tenets of the trade union movement. Generally, hard 
feelings about trade unions are sporadic and only at the 
peak when there are threats of an industriai action. 
Good examples being the ASLEF Drivers/British Rail, and 
the Health Service Workers (COHSE) cases, in June/July 
1982. In both cases, neither of the employers - British 
Rail nor the National Health Service called for the total 
abolition of the trade unions concerned,rather what did 
happen was intense union-management negotiations.• 
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At the end c-f the ASLEF (Associated Society of 
Locomotive Engineers and firemen) Drivers/British Rail 
dispute, the B.R. management did not single out the 
ring leaders or the trade union organisers of the strike for 
spécial punishments - such as transfers from the city 
centre to a remóte village; and outright dismissal. Thèse 
pessimistic views of trade unionism and the application of 
retaliatory measures for industrial action rarely find 
•expression in the dictionary of the labour-management in 
either countries. 
In Nigeria, however, the situation is différent, 
though it must be stressed that a small proportion of 
employers with positive attitudes do exist. That is those 
who have adopted very progressive industrial relations 
policies in their firms or companies believing that workers 
Werywhére have the right to organise into trade unions for 
collective bargaining purposes as in the developed countries. 
Nevertheless, a good majority of thèse employers do not 
believe that the trade unions have a place or should have 
a place in the labour-management relations. Not because 
they are unaware of the ILO (International Labour Organi-
zations) convention 98 on workers'*right to organise and 
enter into collective bargaining with employers'. Infact 
(NECA) (Nigérian Employers Consultative Association) which 
a significant proportion of them are affiliated to is 
guided. by many international labour organisations con-
ventions such as those relating to termination of employment 
on employers' initiat ive, social security , industrial 
accidents and occupational safety. Moreover, N.E.C.A. 
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normally nominate. its delegates to the ILO annual 
conférences on the practice' of industriai relations within 
thèse employers ranks. In effect, the question of labour-
management affairs 'awareness' among thèse employers seems 
a bit remote. 
In the. circumstances, one might ask 
why are thèse employers so indifferent? Answers to this 
question are simply that,
 t some group of employers 
regard trade union organisations as big threats to their 
sie 
prerogative powers and authority to run their companies. 
Secondly, most employers perceive the trade unions as 
obstacles to the overall survival of a company. This 
is because they feel that trade unionism is synonymous 
with industriai conflicts - strikes, lockouts and related 
issues, which have the effects of distorting production and 
profitability levels in an organisation. The views 
expressed by some managers and NECA officiais during our 
surveys support . '"the above explanation. For example, when 
a NECA officiai (Assistant Director) was asked: 
wh^ some employers do not often welcome the idea of having 
a trade union organisation in their firms'. He replied: 
"My good friend, but why should one 
like to associate himself with an 
„ organisation which does not want 
ones-.progress. To be realistic our 
trade unions are not like those you 
see in the developed countries such 
as the United Kingdom, which are 
aware that the economie interest 
of their members depend much on the 
progressive performance of the 
employers; in that as profits increase 
wage demands and related ìssues are 
adjusted. Nigerian trade unions are 
highly politicised, with ethnic and 
tribal sentiments finding expression 
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in almost ali r.heir functions as 
trade unions- Mostemployers feci 
that the best approach is to keep 
them as far away as possible. 
The last point I don 11 subscribe to 
because unions and management have 
to work as a team." 
Again, a personnel manager from Lever Brothers (Nigeria) 
Ltd • t (see chap.6.15)who was asked the same question observ 
"I think we must admit that it 
is difficult for a man after 
several y'ears of personal efforts 
to bring up a company to accept an 
organisation or movement in his 
company which would after some 
times start demanding equal power 
in décisions affecting the running 
of the company, henee, most employers 
reluctance." . 
On the other hand, some people might argue that these 
negative" ' atti tudes 1 are not unique to Nigérian employers, 
-arguingthat in every part of the world, wherever a strong a 
articúlate trade union organisation exists it usually 
constitutes to the employer a restriction of his power, 
and a potential danger in the 1abour-management reiat ion s . 
Judged by the United Kingdom expérience particularly,in 
the early fifties and sìxties, the Nigérian employers 
grim-faced attitudes are not out of proportions, how-
ever, what is most disturbing is the ferocity with which 
it is meted in Nigeria. The trade unions being treated 
as if they had come from another Tplanet' and no longer 
that part of the institutions engaged in the task of social 
and economie development. Take for example, the question 
of trade union récognition, which is very vital to the 
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conduct of industrial relations because of its effect on both 
Unions and employers in collective bargaining. Recognition 
gives the unions a sense of achievement; secondly it gives 
them the impression that they are actually part of the decisión 
niaking process in the company, since they take part in wage 
and related negotiations on equal térros with the management. 
As far as the trade unions are concerned recognition by 
employers is a source of inspiration. To the employers, 
trade unión recognition helps to reduce trade unión 'sus-
picion' of management on certain key industrial relations 
issues. In addition, it helps to reduce threats of conflict 
within the firm
 vwhich normally distort:. production. 
Trade unión recognition in Nigeria was seen in a different 
light by the Nigerian employers, as a consequence, it con-
stituted a major problem which the trade unions had to face 
until 197 8 when trade unión recognition "by employers was made 
compulsory by the federal government through the Trade Unions 
(Amendment) Decree no.22 of 1978. Section 22{2) of the 
Decree stipulates that: 
rIf an employer deliberately fails to 
recognise a registered trade unión such 
an employer would be liable on summary 
conviction to a fine of N i , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 7 7 
Prior to 1973, when the first move to accord recognition 
to registered trade unions was made by the Government through 
7 ñ 
the-Trade Unions Decree No.31 of 1973,., /employers were 
not under any obligation to recognise registered trade unions 
in Nigeria, even though the trade unions ordinance of 1938 
had legalised trade unión ism. T.M. Yesufu underscores 
—, 
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this point, he notes: 
"In Nigeria, there is nothing to compel 
an employer to recognise a trade union 
or to deal with it. While the trade 
union ordinance sets forth the conditions 
under which a union may legally operate, 
there is no provision for compulsory r 
recogn ition of a un ion by an employer". 
Consequently, only very few unions were accorded employers 
récognition during the period and they were mainly the 
strong and powerful ones. Thèse include: The Defunct 
Amalgamated Union of UAC African Workers of Nigeria, 
the Nigérian Union of Teachers and the Railway and Ports 
Workers 1 Union. 
In spite of this lack of 'légal' obligation, one 
might ask: why were the employers not keen in recognising 
the trade unions for collective bargaining purposes during 
during thèse periods? Some of the reasons given were: 
that an employer might refuse to recognise a trade union 
because in his'view the (JCC) Joint Consultative 
Committee(an employer/employée discussion forum), 'can 
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do the job of a trade union'. Secondly, most 
employers (foreign employers) refused to recognise unions 
on the grounds that 'African workers were not''r ipe' for 
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trade unionism or for collective bargaining'. 
In any case, the merits of the foregoing arguments aside, 
the fact remains that they were able to gain grounds and 
hinder trade union récognition because of lack of 'légal 
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obligation 1 on the part of the employers £or the recogni-
tion o£ unions. 
Indeed, the issue of trade unión recognition during 
these periods in Nigeria contrasts with'the 
experiences in a country like the United Kingdom (at least 
after the second World War) where,employers were compelled 
by law to recognise trade unions for collective bargaining 
purposes. It must be admitted, however, that compulsory 
unión recognition during the period was not all together 
successful because the courts perceived the procedure as 
an infringement of an individual liberty. The case of 
Grunwick v Acas (Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service) in 1978, on recognition being a classic example of 
the failure of this legal compulsory recognition, of trade 
unions. In this case, the House of Lords rulecí that 
ACAS's report recommending recognition of APEX (Association 
of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff) 
by Grunwick Management was void. Lord Salmón in the 
House of Lords accepting Lord Dennings (then master of the 
Rolls) earlier views in the Court of Appeal on the nature 
of ACAS recommendation for recognition commented: 
"Such an interference with indi-
vidual liberty could hardly be 
tolerated in a free society un-
less there were safeguards against 
abuse 
' 82'. 
However, inspite of this fear of possible infringe-
ment of individual liberty, legal enactments existed to 
deal with the issue of trade unión recognition. For 
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example, the Conservative government in 1971 enacted the 
Industriai Relations Act 1971, which introduced the legai 
right for registered trade unions to apply for récognition 
by employers. And whereby an employer refuses to recognise 
a trade union for collée tive barga ining purposes the trade 
union had a statutory right to apply for récognition. In 
addition, the Labour government's 1974 (TULRA) Trade Union 
and Labour Relations Act further made provisions on the 
question of trade union récognition. What's more, under 
the EPA 1975{Employment Protection Act ss 11-16} now repealed 
by the EA{Employment Act 1980) s.l9(b) trade unions cert-. 
ified as independent trade unions had the right to apply to 
ACAS for a recommendation for récognition by an employer 
8 3 
for purposes of colleet ive barga in ing. No doubt, thèse 
series of enactments made it easier for' trade unions to 
obtain employer s récognition. 
On the other hand, it might be argued that the British 
trade unions were faced with similar problems years before 
the recent laws on trade union récognition were passed, 
that Nigeria's case is by no means unique. Surely, such a 
counter argument would hold and even perhaps gain mor e 
ground had the Niger ian employers refusai to recognise trade 
un ions- been done in a mor e rational and soph isticated approach. 
Because, it is not uncommon to see most employers in Nigeria 
inciting tribal or ethnie rows within a trade union organisa-
tion, with deadly and unfounded accusât ions ; such as the 
leadership being dominated by union prone and militant Ibos. 
Or other forms of highly sensitive accusations that would 
create ' suspic ion 1 among the ethnie 
3 6 0 
groups (Ibos, Yorubas and Hausas) in the union, in an 
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effort to destroy that trade union: 
Moreover, whereby the foregoing strategy proves 
ineffective most employers would resort to either trans­
ferring the union, officiais to the remote villages in the 
country side where,:it is believed that.'their 'guns' wouLd be 
silenced. In other words, in areas where their capacity 
to influence the rank and file members would be signifi­
cante reduced. Employées who participate in any form of 
industriai action could face outright dismissal. Hence, 
it is held that most Nigérian employers attitudes towards 
the trade unions have something ...more .--than • a ' îefusal-. 
to accord the unions récognition. The belief 
among most trade union officiais is that.,a good number of 
employers are bent on destroying the trade union movement 
in the country. . . . 
The vital question then, is how can this problem 
be solved? Luckily, the New National Labour Policy of 
1975 coupled with subséquent Decrees particularly 
the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree NO. 22 of 1978 dis-
cussed. earlier in the text, brought in some relief over 
the issue. Trade union récognition for collective bar-
gaining purposes is now automatic on registration by 
employers, as well as the Nigeria Labour Congress and the 
Federai Government. This being the case, a number of 
suggestions would be made. Firstly, it is suggested that 
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the Nigerian employers be 'advised' to adopt a more 
positive attitudes towards the trade unions which would 
enable them (employers) to tolérate the idea of trade 
'unionism' in the labour-management relationship. This 
is because, legal sanctions though very useful in certain 
cases^are usually not an effective 'medicine' for attitude 
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change. - Particularly, if on the negative side, since 
sanctions would have the effect of creating a temporary 
attitude change while leaving the central issues un-
resolved. Nigerian employers need to recognise that the 
trade unions are part of the economic and social system, 
agents of social change actively involved in the task of 
nation building; as recent NLC 'communiques' since 1980 
have demonstrated. For example, one might ask, if the 
Nigerian trade unions were not part of the 'economic 
system' why should the NLC's National executive council 
resolve among other things at its 17th meeting in July 
22nd 1980, on the issue of Air lifting of Nigerian 
Pilgrims to Mecca' that: 
"Congress demands that in accor-
dance with Decree No. 16 of 1975, 
the airlifting of Nigerian 
pilgrims to.Saudi Arabia be 
handled by the Nigeria Airways 
while the welfaTe of the pilgrims 
is handled by the Nigerian 
Pilgrims Welfare Board. Congress 
condemns the unpatriotic role of 
the Nigerianswho deprive our; 
National carrier - the Nigeria 
Airways the privilege to carry 
out its mandated function in pre-
ference to foreign monopolios." 
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Moreover, if the trade unions are so 'selfish and 
cared' only for the welfare of their members as current 
employers attitudes seem to suggest, why should the same 
NLC's National Executive Council be bothered about the 
'old pensioners' who are no longer their financial 
members? On the minimum pension issue, the NLC noted: 
"the N33.00 per month minimum pension 
being given to pensioners as a 
national disgrace in the light of 
our present day level of socio­
economic development. Therefore, 
congress demands that minimum 
pension should not be less than 
the national minimum wage at any 
given time . " 
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Undoubtedly, the foregoing NLC's resolutions on these 
'sensitive issues' have clearly demonstrated that the 
Unions have objectives, roles and owe a certain degree 
of obligation not only to their members but also to the 
general public, and hence deserve a more positive atti­
tudes from the employers. 
Apparently, what is needed is a high degree of 
co-operation and mutual understanding between the Nigerian 
Employers Consultative Association (NECA) and the 
Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) which would enable both 
institutions to deal with every aspect of labour-
management problems with less emphasis on Decrees and 
sanctions. "-It is not being implied here that legal enact­
ments are unnecessary peruse, more, so, in a country where the. 
employers can be very difficult -to deal with* Rather 
what is being argued, is that under the circumstances; 
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it is a change of attitude which would touch the very 
heart of the problem that is required and not the 
one; - that would merely ! , N A Scotch the snake without kill-
ing it" as legal sanctions tend to do. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that intense manage­
ment, labour éducation Cdiscussed earlier in the text) 
be encouraged, not only to involve workers and trade 
union leaders in the cosmopolitan city centres of Lagos, 
Enugu and Ibadan}but should be 'structured' to embrace 
workers, managers and trade union officiais in provincial 
centres, such as Abakilike, Umuahia, Zaria, Ondo and 
Warri, who actually require this 'spécial' éducation. 
In this chapter we have been able to examine the role 
of the Nigérian trade unions in pay détermination and -
some of the organizational problems facing themi which 
have seriously affected both their limited bargaining role, 
and the ef f ectiveness of collective bargaining ..process-
in the country. To give collective bargaining a chance 
of survival, it was. strongly suggested that intense 
labour/management éducation be encouraged at ail levéis 
for a more positive attitude towards collective bargaining 
process by the 'social acto rs', particularly, among the 
employers and the government. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDIES OF THE TWO 
ORGANISATIONS WHERE THE INVESTIGATION WAS CARRIED PUT. 
6 . i 4 Re se a ce h Méthode-log y 
This chapter sets out to examine the 'research methods' 
used in the process of obtaining 'data'.for the survey, 
and some of the difficulties encountered. It is also the 
intention of the chapter to describe, and compare and 
contrast, the two organisations where the survey was 
carried ou t. The choice of the two organisations, may be 
arguable; however, in the main, both' were chosen because 
of the nature of the 'sample frames' found in both com-
panies which met the basic sample requirements for the 
investigation of this magnitude. 
The study is confined to the title of the investi­
gation though interesting issues have been explored in 
the process. In order to obtain adequate and relevant 
information for the inqu i ry, 1react ive ' and 1 non-reactive' 
methods of data collection were used,^ " On the reactive side, 
an exhaustive séries of sur veys were car r ie.d out; whi le 
on the non-reactive area (use of secondary sources) books, 
government publications, statutory documents, and 
periodicals and related publications, were exhaustively used. 
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(a) Field-work 
The field wotrk which spread over several months 
was carried out during the 1Spring/Summer 1 of 1981 at 
two Lagos based companies - Lever Brothers Nigeria 
Limited and Nigeria Airways Limited. The survey was 
done in two phases: the first was the 'Pilot stage' 
"wfîich lasted for a period of six weeks. In this 
phase, the researcher was able to Pre-test some of 
the 'multi-techniques* to be used during the actual 
survey such as administering of questionnaires, inter-
2 
viewing and sample control. 
Pre-testing was done in such an informai manner 
that the employées hardly realised that they were engaged 
in an académie survey. Most of them even had the 
impression that their company was carrying out its 
annual job appraisal scheme which normally demands the 
sacrifice of a fraction of their time". If this initial 
approach had been formalised as such, it could hâve 
seriously affected the actual or main survey scheduled 
for two months later. Because both managements could 
havè found it difficult to convince their employées for 
another 'time' sacrifice within such an interval. 
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The pilot survey was of great significance to 
the entire survey in that, first, it provided the 
Researcher' with the opportunity to re-examine the 
whole package of survey techniques available. For 
example, from the results of the pilot survey it was 
possible for the 'researcher' to discover that the 15-
minutes allocated for individual Cinterviews was not 
<sutf iê'ient and • that time' was' ad justed to-30-trvinutes . • 
Secondly,after. the pilot survey, it became apparent that the 
services of three Nigérian Assistants would be required. 
The assistants from various ethnie or tribal backgrounds 
(Ibo, Hausa, and Yoruba) would help as interpreters 
since most of the- employées from both companies came 
from rural areas. Thirdly, the pilot survey afforded 
the 'researcher' the opportunity to examine in more 
détail spme "of the • dichotomous questions that characterised 
the questionnaires, with. a view to determining those 
that required re-structuring and other related issues. 
Fourthly, the researcher was able to realise that 
it would be quite rational to reduce the 'sample frame' 
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from 3,000 as originally planned to 1,000 employées (that 
is 500 workers from each company instead of 1,500) for more 
efficient and effective control. Moreover, the pilot 
survey provided the researcher the opportunity to know 
more about the companies in terms of management and the 
general ..-disposition of employées. 
Phase Two of the survey started in April 1981 a 
week after the three-day national stfike declared by the 
NLC had been resolved. This phase involved the actual 
administration of both the questionnaires and the 
interviews - structured and unstructured. At this stage, 
unlike the pilot survey, the management of both companies 
became deeply involved with respect to interviews and 
other related issues which the survey demanded. 
i ' • 
The Samples 
In the course of the enquiry, a cross-section of 
employées and managers from both companies - Lever Brothers 
Ltd and Nigeria Airways Ltd were interviewed. In addition, 
some other institutions such as government agencies and 
officiais, trade union officiais and university lecturers 
were also interviewed mainly by unstructured interview 
technique. 
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Employees: 
The sample consisted of 1 ,000 employees drawn or 
selected from each of the company's annual 'Staff Returns 1 
from various sections and departments. Table 17 depicts 
the overall rate of response in the survey by the employees. 
Of the 1,000 employees selected, nearly 15 percent were 
found to be 'ineligible' due to various reasons: some 
were under age (below 17 years), secondly most of them 
had been in" the service for less than three months. 
The assumption here being that, an employee with less than 
six months working experience does not stand a chance of 
knowing on a reasonable scale what is going on in the 
company in terms of the hard-core Labour Management 
Relationship. 
In the Nigeria Airways Ltd.,.266 employees (53.2%) 
were found to be eligible for interview. While at the 
Lever Brothers Ltd., 310 employees that is 62 percent 
4 
responded. Furthermore, as table 17 shows, 20 percent of 
those with whom we sought an interview refused to co­
operate for various personal"reasons. Non-contacts, due 
mainly to sudden attack of illness with hospitalization 
as the ultimate accounted for -3 percent. 
Managers 
During the survey a total of thirty (30) managers 
from both companies were interviewed. These included' 
middle managers ranging from personnel and Industrial 
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Table ] 7. Response Rates of Employées of Both Companies 
Ail Employées 
No. % 
Nigeria Air 
No % 
Lever 
No 
Brothers 
0 
0 
Workers 
Intervicwed 576 - 57.6 266 53.2 310 63 . 8 
INTELLIGIBLE 
Under Age 
(Below 17) 
l 
109 1Ô-/9 62 12.4 47 9.4 
Served less 
than 5. we 50 5 12 2.4 "38 7'. 6 
REFUSAI. 200 ^20 124 24.8 76 15.2 
NON-CONTACTS 
Ill/IIospitalized 1 5 '. 1.5 9 1.8 -6 1.2 
Other Reasons 50 5'= 27 5.8 23 4.6 
Total 1000 100 500 100 500 100 
Source.: Compiled from the raw data collected during the 
surveys 
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Relation Officers to line managers in similar grades. At 
the LBN (Lever Brothers) 20% or 3 managers could not meet 
their appointment with the researcher. While in the Nigeria 
Airways, 40 percent or 6 managers were unable • to do so. 
Ï Up in the -organisations hierarchy, the: senior : 
.^managers: Group Personnel. Managers, çh-ief accountants, 
marketing managers and group industrial relations advisers 
were also interviewed. However, it is important to 
point out, that our interviews with this group of managers 
were quite informai they were not subjected to rigid 
structured interviews and questionnaire completion as 
their employées. 
The Design of Questionnaires and Problems of Administering 
'them among the Selected Workers 
Before discussing the %any'-problems encountered 
while administering the questionnaires, a-word 
or two about the structure or design of the questionnaire 
would be in place. The questionnaire designed for both 
companies had fifteen questions each. It was divided 
into two sections or parts. The first section was made 
up of 'factual questions' - six in number - on issues such 
as sexrf âge, educational qualification and marital status 
and work expérience. The essence of this 'design' is to 
enable us discover the effects of thèse variables on the 
workers attitudes to and perceptions of the key issues -
wages, conditions of employment and related issues. 
Empirical évidence does show that thèse variables do 
actually influence workers attitude to great extent.^ 
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Whi.le the second part was désigned to build upon the first 
part, and consisted of gênerai opinion questions scaled to~ 
elucidate degrees of agreement and disagreement on the 
various key issues. (Appendices A & B) . 
In the course of the survey, one of the most hectic 
moments was during the administration of the pre-tested 
questionnaires and interviews. ' Because some of the 
employées particularly in the Nigeria Airways Ltd.,blatantly 
-frefuscd to cooperate on the grounds that endless surveys 
have been carried out in the company by various research 
organisations - government and private institutions alike. 
Thèse had raised workers expectations but had produced no 
apparent benefits; Moreover, as the•enquiry was being 
conducted at a time when the National Airline had been sub-
jected to mounting criticisms from both government officiais 
and thè genetal public because of its poor financial perfor-
mances, it was not easy to get the total coopération required 
of the employées. Most of them were afraid of giving infor-
mation relating to their financial rémunération away to 
researchers or any other group of information 'hunters' 
since many thought that it cculd seriously jeopardise their 
promotion chances. The leader of the 1 lu'ggage loaders' in 
charge of the afternoon shift told the researcher and the 
asistants one afternoon while the team was trying to obtain 
certain information from him;"OGA make you leaveus alone, 
we have been told not to discuss about our pay and conditions 
of work with anybody; I beg you people go and meet our 
bosses in their offices". 6 This response simply 
implies that the leader was not prepared to.give 
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any information relating to thèir pay and other related 
issues. 
Dn one particular occasion, a clerk demanded to 
know how much the researcher was prepared to offer them 
in terms of cash payment before èven accepting the ques-
tionnaires; despite the fact that the purpose of our 
survey had been made known to them a month earlier. 
What's more, the 30-minutes individual interview 
was perceived of as 'time wasting' by most of the employées. 
As a conséquence, out of 500 employées selected for the 
survey only 266 of them showed up. (See table Ví*^)-
Unfortunately, this apparent stalemate could not have been 
solved by reporting to the management for officiai action, 
After ail the employées were under no obligation to 
co-operate with the team. 
i 
\ However,after a series of consultations and discus-
sions with some académie friends at the University of 
Lagos, we decided to adopt a more subtle, informai and 
flexible approach so as to win back their confidence. 
Firstly, we decided to change the interviewing venue from 
the offices to the nearest staff canteen; secondly, to 
meet the employées in small groups of say five or four 
during their break periods and have them lavishly enter-
tained in the canteen a day or two before the scheduled 
interviews. Clearly, as a resuit of this 'entertainment 
first' and interview later approach the turn out became 
more reasonable and in addition employées were prepared 
to give some vital information to the researcher and 
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and his assistants. Though the new approach was at 
extra financial cost we were able to complète the survey 
in the company without further problems. 
At the Lever Brothers Nigeria Ltd., however, it 
was quite a différent picture. P.rior to the researcher ' s 
commencement of the survey in the company, the chairman/ 
managing director, "ah; académies had made. elaborate arrange-
ments towards the exercise. Heads of various departments 
were given the tasks of arranging for suitable 'venues 
and times' for administering both the questionnaire and 
the half-an hour individual interviews without serious 
disruptions to their daily production schedules. 
Consequently, the questionnaires were'idistributed to the 
selected employées through their various sectional heads 
a week before, with spécifie instructions on how and where 
to submit completed questionnaires. 
As for carrying out the 30-minutes interview, 
however, one has to stress that there were anxious moments 
indeed. To the team's greatest surprise, some of the 
employées conducted themselves in a manner quite contrary 
to expectation during the process. For instance, some 
would just corne into the interviewing room only to walk 
out a-fter few minutes without answering a question put 
forward by the researcher and his team. Others would 
corne in only to question the researcher why successive sur-
vévs carried out in the firm in the past have not had a 
positive outeome. In fact, at a certain stage it does 
seem to the 'team' that the employées were saying 'now 
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look here, we gave you our best while you were adminis-
tering the questionnaire this time it wouldn't be easy 
going, you have to pay ©f course by cash for our co-
opération. This uncooperative attitude was particularly 
exhibited by the employées from the NSD (Non-Soapy 
Détergent) section. They felt that they were sacrificing 
their 'break-periods' (the ideal time accepted by the 
management for conducting the interviews) in the most 
unrewarding manner. 
Once again, to counter this apparent négative 
attitude by thèse LBN workers, we decided to revert to 
our old tactics of 'entertainmènr f irst ' and interviews 
later* as we did in the previous company - the Nigeria 
Airways. To this end, we made elabórate arrangements 
with the canteen staff as to the time', and the number 
of our selected employées that could be attended to each 
time. Although the financial cost was enormous but it 
was more economical than the previous company. What's 
more the strategy worked and the workers started reacting 
more" positively to our requi.rements. Anyway what fis instruc-
tive in the foregoing discussion is that it does highlight 
the extent of corruption in that society, and further 
reinforces that 'language of corruption' accepted even 
in the highest places "that nothing goes for nothing". 
In the course of the survey, visits 
were made to some institutions such as the trade union 
secrétariat at Surulere Lagos; the Nigeria Employers 
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Consultative Association (NECA) based at Yaba, Lagos for 
interviews with the officiais. The Federai Ministry of 
Labour and Productivity, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(its research and development department), and the 
•Federai ministry of economie development were 'also 
visited for informal interviews with officials and document 
collection. In addition, the federai office of statis-
tics offices at Ikoyi were visited and useful statistica! 
information made available to the researcher. Moreover, 
during the survey the researcher was able to have some 
useful académie discussions with some of the académie 
staff at the Universities of Lagos, Nsukka and Ibadan. 
The Daily Times of Nigeria Ltd with its resourceful 'data 
bank' which dates back into the early sixties and seventies 
was another useful spot the researcher called at in 
search of valuable material. 
<d) Limitations 
Specific limitations arising from the survey must 
be delineated because in a survey of this magnitude,, it is 
quite natural that Problems would -arise 'including 
both sampling .and non-sampling erro.rs. We must" 
• admit that the bulk -of ' .-the limitations 
were conséquences of non-sampling errors (such as lack 
of records, non-responses and non-contacts).. Our expér­
iences in the Nigeria Airways Ltd., at the height of the 
survey ,reinforces this lack of records assertion. The 
research officer in the Airline acknowledged. "that the 
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company had no reliab1erecord. 
Furthermore, we must admit that our sample did 
not include workers from other industriai locations 
in Lagos such as Ilupeju, Isolo and Badagry. This 
was deliberately done because of the spécifie nature 
of the study. In ali and ali, problems of non­
sampling errors — the major limitation 
in par.ticular the lack of records, was seen 
as a challenge to the researcher and his assistants 
and hence forced them to utilize ali available resources 
with the result that the work is based on a wider 
range of sources than originally envisaged. 
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6.15 CASE STUDIES - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSTS. 
(A) Lever Brothers (Nigeria')Limited 
This section is mainly concerned with the descrip­
tion, compar ing and cons trasting of the two organisations 
- Lever Brothers Nigeria Ltd., and Nigeria Airways Ltd., 
where the investigation tookplace. Special attention 
would be focused on the following issues : Owner sh ip/ 
control, workforce, and industriai relations activities, 
particularly in the area of labour/management conflict. 
The choice of the organisations for this study, as 
pointed out earlier, is dictated mainly by the nature 
of 'sample frame' found in both 'companies - i.e. large 
workforce, and yéars of expérience in industriai 
relations matters particularly in aspects of pay 
\ 
déterminations. 
Lever Brothers(Nigeria Limited is an incorporated 
company engaged in the manufacture and sale of déter­
gents, edibles, sundry food/drinks and toilet prépara­
tions . Lever Brothers(Niger ia) Limited, one of the 
oldest surviving and perhaps most progressive manu­
facturing companies in the country is the 'brain child 1 
~ the"" son of : a Bolton greengrocer',-William Hesketh Lever. 
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The man who through sheer entrepreneurial ability 
became one of the founding fathers of Unilever 
Limited. The name Unilever, coined in 1929(after 
the death of William Hesketh Lever' in 1925) was an 
amalgam of Unie Margarine of Netherlands and Lever 
Brothers of England/^ Consequently, two limited 
companies emerged - thus the Unilever Ltd., London 
and Unilever MV Amsterdam, albeit under common board 
of directors. Each company gives the other free 
access to its patents, trade marks and prodüction 
processes. 
Unilever, under its overseas programme, extended 
its business activities into Nigeria, there it was 
incorporated as West African Soap Company, on April 
1923. In 1924, it became fully operational at the 
Apapa location. It started with.tne production of 
laundry soaps of the- Key, Sunlight, and Magnet brand; 
by 1951 Lux tablet soap was introduced into the 
Nigérian market. On February 19th, 1954, a Nigérian, 
Lady 0.M. Abayomi opened a margar ine f actory wh ich 
was registered under the name Van Den Bergh 
385 
(Nigeria) Ltd., at Apapa-Lagos. In the spring of 1955, 
the two companies merged and formed what is known now 
as the Lever Brothers (Nig.) Ltd., (LBN) with its head-
office at Dockyard Road^Apapa. Two years later, the 
Aba brandi based in the former Eastern région of Nigeria" ' 
now Imo State, was opened, with the initial production of 
Laundry soaps. In sum, Lever Brothers (Nigeria) Limited 
is an offspring of Unilever Ltd Overseas Plantations 
Group. 
) OWNERSHIP 
LBN is owned jointly by the parent company - Unilever 
Ltd London/Unilever MV Armsterdam and v by some Nigérian 
r
 rl 
businessmen. Before the federai military government 
indigenization Decree in 1976", the Unilever owned almost 
95 percent of the equity. However, the position changed 
soon after the 1976 decree in favour of the indigenous 
entrepreneurs v/ho now owns 60 percent of the company ? while 
the Unilever has 40 percent of the share capital. The 
présent structure of the board of directors reinforces 
this share capital distribution. There are eight Nigérians 
on the 'Board', three British and a Nether land" na'tional. 
NATURE OF BUSINESS/PRODUCTS 
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Lever Brothers since its formation in 1955, has 
moved from a 'Bar soap' making factory to a 
multi-product company now. As emphasized earlier, Lever 
Brothers is^engaged "in the„ manufacturing and marketing 6f 
détergents, edible oil 'fats and toilet préparations. 
LBN's development pace since 1955 has been very considérable 
For example, in 196 3, it started making tooth-paste and 
Astral cream at the Apapa factory; a year later (1964) 
one of the most complex and modem equipped factories 
was opened at Apapa - the Non-Soapy Detergent (NSD) factory. 
By 1967, it was able to produce 3,000 tonnes per annum, 
now the capacity has gone up to 50,000 tonnes per annum. 
Moreover, in 1979, LBN entered into a new area of 
production altogether - drinks consequently, the 
'Tree top 1 fruit and drinks were introduced at Apapa. 
The récent addition to its catalogue Is the fBlack currant' 
fruit drink aJlibena équivalent" . Barely twenty-six years 
after formation LBN today produces a wide range of products 
which can be grouped under four main headings, namely: 
1. Détergents soaps and NSD e.g. Lux and Omo. 
2.. Edibles - fats, dairyy Blue Band Plants and 
Holsum margarines. 
3. Sundry foods and drinks 
4. Toilet préparations. 
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However, for the détails of the products produced and 
their current prices see appendix E. 
(iii) PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY -
Each of the.four production plants at the Apapa 
location is made up of a net-work of complex . modem 
equipment. Thèse production plants are built to spécifi-
cation, specially adapted to meet the needs- of a particu-
lar product such as sundry foods and drinks. Production 
. in the plants is carried out through a chain of intricate 
chémical processes or reactions ; consequently there 
is évidence of low-ma.nning in the production lines. The 
industry is one of the few capital intensive industries 
in the country. Most of the raw materials used for 
production are semi-processed materials imported from 
the United Kingdom. An example of the production System 
is p.resented here '
 f to illustrate • some of the . . 
chemical processes involved in the production of the 
détergents such as Blue Omo and Surf. 
There are three sections in the plant,namely, the 
packing section, sulphonation and making section. 
Basically, there are no différences in the making of 
Omo and Surf, the only différence arising from 
9" 
colourat ion. 
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Chemical Process 
The first chemical process is sulphonation{making 
of A.D.) (Active Detergent), the material that actually 
washes mater ials (ciòthes, etc : ) . After sulphonation 
the next chemical process is called "process burning'. 
which is burning of sulphur to melt into 'dry air' to 
form sulphur dioxide S03; which is used'to sulphonate 
alkali benzene and sulphuric acid. After neutralizing 
the mixture with sodium bicarbonate.(NcC03) the résultant 
product is the Active Detergent Pest. 
•i' 
The next process is to move the A.D. Pest into Storage 
tanks, ready for the next chemical reaction called Slummy-
Making which is in the making section of the NSD plant 
(non-Soapy Detergent). Here, the A.D. Pest is put in 
a mixture of sodiu.m alkaline synalite and water (at this 
juncture blue dye is added if Omo) and sodium carboxiter 
lecramy suplhate(STS) and Sodium Cellulose(SCMC) and 
Sodium Mylemate Tripreymene Phosphate(STPP). After 
these various chemical processes, the mixture which 
contains 40 percent sfimmy .mosture and 8 percent mushallin 
is pumped through the pumps ready for drying. Drying 
the mixture into powdered form takes place in a giant 
tower containing hot air of abour 350°c. 
On coóling, the powder is perfumed at the packing 
stage, this process is called floridization. Equally at 
the section it is adequately ensured that each finished 
packet carries the right label, and the right quantity. Th 
process is supervised by the powder handling un it of the 
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section. At the end of this last process, the product is des-
patched :v to the warehouse for onward transmission to the 
various consumers. 
Two of the,features which need to be emphasiséd 
•'are firstly, the low level of man.ning in the..production 
.lines and: — x secondly, there is a high degree of 
specialization on the shop floors. Moreo.ver, there are 
no signs of aliénation and estrangement among the rèla-'o 
tively elderly and young workers on the production lines 
which are the symptoms of automation in modem factories. 
' •.(.iW)ORGANISATION AND CONTROL 
For proper co-ordination and the ultimate réalisa-
tion of its organisational goals, LBN is organised into 
seven divisions or departments under a chairman who is 
al'so the chief executive. Lever Brothers (Nig.) Ltd 
• has a total of twelve directors including the chairman. 
Out of the twelve directors, nine are executive directors 
while three are non-executive directors - six Nigérians, 
two Britons and a Dutch. Thèse men are charged with the 
overall responsibility of formulating and interpreting 
company policy objectives. In addition, they supervise 
the tactical and operational plans within the various 
funetions. Table 174shows the LBN 1 s organisât ional 
chart. 
To give a vivid account of the company's various 
functionaries, perhaps an examination of thèse directors 
Table 17 J The LBN Organisation Chart 
CHAIRMAN/MANAGING 
DIRECTOR 
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN 
M/DIRECTOR 
MARKETING 
DIRECTOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DIRECTOR 
TECHNICAL 
DIRECTOR 
NEW INVESTMENT 
DIRECTOR 
RESIDENT 
DIRECTOR 
MARKETIN 2 ADVISER 
MARKETING MANAGER 
SALES 
DIRECTOR 
PERS 
DTRF 
ONNEL 
CTOR 
FINANCIAL 
-DIRECTOR.. 
GROUP MGTEEV CONTROL 
I.R. &~-:TEC. LER 
\PVTSFR ADVISER! FINANCE 
w 
O 
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responsibilities in more detailfirst would be in place. 
First, the vice-chairman, who is also the deputy director 
of the company, acts on behalf of the chairman whenever 
he is away on other duties. He is also responsible for 
supervising the works of the technical, commercial, 
marketing and sales directors. Bot'h the personnel and 
the financial directors are under the direct supervisión 
of the chairman/managing directoría Nigerian). During the 
survey, the researcher questioned one of the sénior managers 
on the logic behind the company's organisational set-up 
which looks a bit unusual, in that the other directors were 
reporting directly to the deputy chairman/deputy managing 
director. The sénior manager(Director of Personnel) 
replied: 
"^ 'My friend, the essence of this 
arrangement is tó reduce as much 
as possible red-tapes inherent in 
i óur modern businesses so as to 
genérate smo'oth, undistorted co-
\ ordination and communication 
throughout the organization". 
The Technical Director supervises the actual 
transformation of the raw materials into finished products. 
It embraces the reception and refining of oil and production 
of soaps, non-soapy detergents, edible and toilet pre-
parations. Also included are the maintenance or 
modification of the elecj;rical and mechanical equipment, 
and the technical services department which handles the 
packaging designs, development and quality control of 
products. This department has a works director(based 
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at Aba), who supervises the daily operations at the Aba 
factory. The department also incorporates the technical 
efficiency section which is presently manñed by work 
study experts. 
The Marketing Director is charged with the responsi1-
bility for presenting the finished products to be consumers. 
His department is also involved in marketing research, 
forecasting, test-marketing and market analysis. The 
new Investment Director has the overall task of inter-
preting strategic LBN policies which allow for. improvements 
of its market share and profit margins through factory 
expans ion; 
The Commercial Director heads the department which 
performs auxiliary functions to support and ensure the 
smooth running of the technical department. The department's 
functions include planning, buying, of raw materials, 
warehousing and distribution of the finished goods. 
The Personnel Director is charged with the recruitment, 
selection and placement of employees as well as their train-
ing and development. Equally, his department is responsible 
for welfare and industrial relations, translating and main-
taining the company's personnel policies and problems. The 
personnel división or department handles the company's 
security and health services. 
Next in line is the Financial Director who supervises 
the services department with the assistance of the 
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Administrative Manager. Thèse include the légal department, 
the Company Secretary who deals with company secrétariat 
and légal matters ranging from such issues as transfer 
of sharesrto the handling of claims for damages. Also 
included is the financial controller who looks after the 
section of the company's finances. The department's 
activities range from cost control to the analysis of 
financial positions. The department also monitors 
cost . and efficient, variance, control payments as 
well as the préparations of the company's capital 
expenditure and budgets. 
Finally, the Sales Director is in charge of 
• --t&ie. sales--d-e'partment , • whose task is to convert the 
company's finished products into cash. 
^v)THE WORK FORCE 
\ ' " * -' •" 
As at 31st March 1981, there were 499 managers at 
the LBN, composed of 457 maie and 42 female managers. 
The managers are graded in the following order: 
I. Superintendents: Thèse are immédiate supervisors 
at the factory offices, most of whom have put 
in over 20 years of service in the company with 
3 ; . ; ..relatively very poor educationaî background. 
II. The Trainee Managers: Thèse are managers with 
little or no job expérience,, mostly recruitcd 
directly from the various institutions of higher 
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éducation(Polytechnics and Universities) to 
be trained for functional rôle in the 
organisation. 
III.The Middle Managers: This group of managers 
are mainly old and experienced with moderate 
educational background. Most of them rose from 
the ranks and have served the company for a good 
number of years. 
t. 
IV. Senior Managers: At the LBN,ras iè'often the case 
in most multi-national companies, there are few 
top senior managers. At the time of our survey 
they numbered below one hundred, out of a total 
of 499 managers. This group of managers have 
good educational qualification and years of 
relevant expérience on their jobs. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that at the 
LBN over 70 percent of those occupying managerial positions 
are graduâtes. Statistics of the labour force supplied 
by the company's personnel department shows that 3-4 
percent of the managers hold a masters degree, while 0.5 
percent have higher degrees such as M.Phil and Ph.D. 
Table V ? . 2.. shows the occupational distribution of 
managers. 
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Job Title No. 
Sales Managers 58 
Marketing Managers 21 
Accountants 65 
Engineers 92 
Personnel Managers 16 
Production Managers 45 
297 1 
Notes : 
1 . The Figure here does not include those managers 
at the Aba factory. 
The table shows that there are more engineers than any 
other type of managers in the company. This is mainly 
because of the 'technical nature' of the company's 
business. Closely following the engineers are the 
accountants, the sales managers and the production 
managers. 
OTHER EMPLOYEES 
Further down the line, the following occupational 
distributions can be observed. 
Table 17 Occupational Distribution of Managers. 
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Table 17. '3 Occupâtic-nal Distribution of other Employées 
Job Title No 
Store supervisors 37 
Craftsmen 187 
Draftsmen ' 4 
Office supervisors 13 
Typists/secretaries 33 
Laboratory assistants 59 
Radiographers ' 1 
Nurses 5 
Security Assistants 9 
Operatives 2064 
Instrument technicians 58 
Cashiers 2 
Laundry supervisors 1 
Total 2473 
i 
Source: Compiled from data supplied by the 1BN management 
It is discernable from table 17.3 above that there 
is a substantial number of craftsmen in the company. 
After the operatives the craftsmen (the labour aristo-
crats) of the detergent manufacturing company form the 
largest single group of workers followed by the laboratory 
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i&S'ffistants. The prédominance o£ this type of 'workers' 
highlights the specialized nature of the company's busi-
ness opération. 
As regards the operatives which constitute over 
eighty-five percent of the company's workforceV Kthé majori 
of them are 'first-time' employées from the various remote 
areas around the country. A significant proportion of 
them have never had any form of work expérience and were 
only picking up wage-employment for the first time in 
their lives. During an interview with the researcher one 
of the operatives,a young man in his early twenties from 
Ibuzo, in *. Bendel State admitted: 
'^ Oga (boss) I have never been 
to Lagos before, and true-true 
this is my first time of working 
for somebody and receiving money, ail 
the time ï used to work in my 
father's cocoa plantation." 
i 
On the whole they were young group of workers, with an 
average âge of 19, and relatively poor ^educational 
qualifications. 
However, for statistical purposes, the workforce is 
classified into three major groups, namely: the managers 
Cthose-occupying managerial positions), staff (from the 
foremen to those in related positions) and the 
operatives - unskilled or general labour employées. The 
company employées over 4,000 workers throughout the 
country, the figure of 2473 reflected above is only for 
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. Apapa f ac tory complex in Lagos where the survey was 
carr ied out. 
vi} TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 
Lever Brother s <N ig.)Ltd., i s a h ighly un ion ized 
company, almost all the employées(with the exception 
of the managers) are trade union members. The 
main union in the company is the Lever Brothers 
Workers Union ofNigeria, which is a member of the 
National Union of Chemical and Non-metall'ic Products 
Workers. This industriai union is affiliated to 
the Central Labour Organisation - the Nigeria Labour 
Congress)NLC); (See Chapter 2.6). There are few 
shop-stewards, six in number, of whom we interviewed 
five during the survey, one being based at Aba factory. 
' One striking • thing about these shop-stewards is that 
even though some of them had no good educational 
qualifications they Shouldered their responsibi1ities 
very well. 
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meets once a month at the company's main canteen 
during lunch-time, with members attending regularly 
and in good numbers. The monthly membership payment 
i is one Naira,collected through the check-off system 
and paid to the locai branch union(LBWU). 'At the Aba 
factory-, (the Locai Union), has" Jurisdiction 
3 9 9 
over certain ^consultative items - normally discussed at 
the company level such as laundry, shift, lunch subsidy 
and cxamination expenses are tailored to meet local 
condit ions -
,(vii)INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Lever Brothers (NigO Ltd according to Fashoyin 
is among the 'few organisations in the country with a 
formalised labour relations polie yv^ , ' and henee, enjoys 
industrial' harmony. The company T's industrial relations unit 
is headed by-Mr. Obi,- who-is assisted by three Industrial 
Relation Officers. During-an interview Mr. Obi told the; 
researcher: 
"Generally, we have good labour-
- .»- .management -relationship in this 
company; I am sure you will dis-
cover this when you examine 
our 'industrial indicators' 
such as strike incidence, labour 
turnover and absenteeism rate." 
Since the company's formation in 1955, collective 
barga m ni n ha1" be^i1 ^ main mor-baTi.is¡n for the determi -
nation of its workers wages. Before the streamlining of 
the Nigérian trade union structure in 1978 by the federal 
military government, national or industry-wide bargaining 
was virtually non-existent in the company. The bargaining 
scene was dominated by plant-and" informai bargaining. 
Following the federal government's 'Wages Boards and 
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Industriai Councils Decree 1973 which among other things 
provided for the establishment of 'Joint Industriai 
Council s ' within the industriai groups for the purposes 
of industry-wide agreement, industry-wide bargaining was 
adopted rjy the company. 
The industriai group's National Joint Industriai 
Council made up of employers and workers représentatives 
deals with ali negotiable items at the national level 
such as wages, salaries, hours of work and redundancies. 
However, within the locai company level, the Local Joint 
Consultâtive 'items1 such as shift, laundry and lunch sub-
sides are dealt with. Before recommending a particular 
wage level for the 'group' the NJIC would first of ail 
consider what the government basic national minimum wage 
per month'is. For instance, if the government 1 s basic 
minimum wage was N60.00 per month, the NJIC would then 
recommend some percentages over and above the government's 
basic (usually between 17 to 20 percent) . ! 
With respect to disputes or grievances, there is a 
laid down procedure for handling individuai and collective 
grievances without violating the 'procedure provided by 
the Trade Disputes Decree of 1976 No. 7 )later amended by 
the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Decree 1 97 7 No. 54 (See chapter 5.7). 
Agreement reached is normally for three-year period, with 
rooms for adjustments if needs be. 
Earlier in the discussion, we did mention the 
company's 'industriai indicators' , an examination of thèse 
'indicators' now would be in place. 
(a).Strike Proaess 
Judged by the strike statistics o£ similar indus-
tries around Apapa industriai area (for the years 1975-
81),such as the Union Trading Company (UTC), Metal Box 
(Nig.) Ltd„and Trebor Mints (Nig.) Ltdjwhich recorded 5, 
-4 and 6 stoppages respectively*thè LBN wìth only 2 stop-
12 
pages is not strike prone'- Between 1 975--.and 
1981 " the company had only two stoppages as noted above -
one occurred in 1975 following the Udoji Salaries and 
Wages Review Commission awards. 1 3 As one o£ the personnel 
officers - Samuel Uwaluekeh explained during an interview 
with the researcher: 
"The strike, my dear was as a 
result of the Udoji'National ' . 
Cake'. But the irony in the 
whole issue is that we are not 
government employees which the 
so-called Udoji Cake was meant 
for." 
The second and perhaps the only major industriai stoppage 
was in 1979 whcn there was a row between management and 
the employees over canteen seating arrangements. The 
strike involved ali the employees from the supervisbry 
grade down to the operativos, and lasted for five days 
(Table- 1 7 ..4) . Since 1 980 to date no stoppages (resulting from 
Labour/Management relationship), have been reported. 
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i. 
Year No. o£ . 
stoppages 
No. of 
workers 
involved 
Durâtion 
of 
strike 
Cause of strike 
1975 1 1214 1 day 
Sympathy strike result-
ing from Udoj i Award. 
1976-78 - - - -
1979 1 
Entire 
workers 
2428 
5 days Çanteen seating 
arangements 
1980 - - - -
1981 C n ' 1 
Entire 
workers 
2528 
4 days 
NLC ' days of 
action 
Source : 
Compiled from data gathered from LBN Labour Records, 
and magazine (Lever News) etc. 
Explanatory Note: 
1 .» The figure is for the Ist quarter of 1981; and 
NLC Stands for the Nigeria Labour Congres s. 
Table 17. 4. Lever Brothers (Nig.) Ltd., Summary o£ 
Stoppages 1975-81. 
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(b) Labour Tu m o v e r 
Because of paucity of Statistical information front 
comparable companies such as the Union Trading Company 
(UTC) and Metal Box (Nig.) Ltd., the issue could not 'be 
given a vigorous analysis. However, during an interview 
a senior personnel manager told the researcher: 
"Among the member companies in 
our inclustrial group the company 
recorded the lowest labour 
turnover rate last year; it was 
between 5-6 percent. I thought 
we are allright in this respect." 
The personnel manager 's eia im was later conf irmed by the 
Assistant Deputy Director of the Nigeria Employers 
Consultative Association (NECA) during an interview with 
the researcher. 
(c'V"Absenteeism Rate 
In sharp contrast with labour turnover rate, absen-
teeism rate is fairly high at about 20 percent although 
when compared with the prévalent rate in similar indus­
tries a round Apapa, i t can be sa ici to be moderate . For 
example, UTC (Nig.) Ltd., Metal Box (Nig.) Ltd and Trebor 
Mints (Nig.) Ltd recorded 25, 22 and 23 percent respec-
tively in the same period. 1 4 An examination of the pattern 
and nature of the company's monthly absenteeism rate 
shows that absenteeism among the junior employées is parti-
cularly high during the months of April to October each 
year (Table 1 7 ..'s and Fig. 4). 
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. MONTH NO. OF EMPLOYEES 
April • . 89 
May 103 
June 135 
July 128 
August 108. 
September 109 
November 58 
January 93 
February 108 
March 115 • 
April 185 
Total 1231 
Source : Compiled from data súpplied by management. 
Explanatory Note: 
1. According to the personnel officer in charge of 
NSD section) the absenteeism record reflected 
- here is the normal yearly pattern (at least for 
the last five years). 
Table 17.!?; LBN Absenteeism Record 1 1 980-8 1 . 
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"During each November, we are 
always a 'full house' and em­
ployées work like ' donkeys-1' in z 
order to make enough 'Naira' 
for the Christmas shopping. 
After November, it is always a 
problem." 
Ironically, in the middle of December, the number starts 
rising again because f at this time most workers are now 
inclined to leave their jobs to do Christmas shopping. 
I-n_f âct, of ten most of them would decide from there to 
go on 'unofficial holidaysj, perhapsin order to get 
the best of the Christmas festivities. As the personnel 
director - Chris Enuke noted: 
"At this timo of the year, the-rn 
is usually a Christmas hysteria 
among our junior employées which 
usually resuit in a cut down in 
production throughout the 
factory." 
However, as indicated in table 17.5 by January the 
absenteeism rate will start to decline. The main reason 
being that many of the workers are now short of 'cash' 
The table shows that in November each year, that 
there is usually a sharp drop in the number of workers 
reporting absent from duty. The explanation offered for 
the trend is that between November and the first 
week in December employées tend to be regular on duty in 
order to generate enough 'cash' which will enhance their 
purchasing power for the Christmas shopping. As the 
company's group industriai relations adviser Mr. Obi 
noted: 
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Figure. 4. Graphical Representation of LBN Absenteeism 
Rate April 1980-April 1981. 
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after the Christmas 'bumper1 shoppings,in effect, 
they start being more serious with their jobs again. 
This trend will continue throughout February and part 
of March, after which the rate Starts picking up again 
(Figure 4). In view of the group industriai relations 
adviser's perception of the issue, the researcher 
s 
asked him: Please what is an "acceptable" level of 
absenteeism in this company? He replied: 
"As far as we are concerned 
the 'acceptable' level is anything 
between 50-60 absentées per month. 
I can assure you anything more than 
'this level' is unacceptable to the 
company". 
In sum, it can be argued that the current Statistical 
évidence on the few 'industriai indicators' though 
fragmentary suggests a high degree of industriai 
i 
harmony at the Lever Brothers (Nig.) Ltd. 
(B) NIGERIA AIRWAYS LIMITED 
Although the coloni zat ion of Nigeria was 
completed in 1900, and the amalgamation of its Northern 
and Southern provinces completed in 1914, it was notuntil 
• after 36 •. years , thaC^signif ic'ant commercial aviation talks 
really started in Nigeria. Prior to this date, the history of 
- "aviation- in this part of the world had been largely dominated 
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by the Royal Air Force. However, an Airline that was to serve 
Nigeria, Africa and the rest of the world in commercial 
aviation emerged in - 1959 as'one of its advertising 
periodicals noted: "Nigeria Airways, we have come: 
15 -1 " 
a long way". 
Immediately. after the first World War, a group of 
• • ì 
Royal Air Force aircraft flew from Khartoum' (North 
Africa) and landed at Kano Racecourse, and this was recorded 
as the first powered flight to Nigeria. Incidentally, 
during this time one of the R.A.F. pioneering Pilots 
discovered that Nigeria's climate, topography and wind 
pattern was ideal for flying. Consequently, further 
flights were made, this time from Sudan and 
Egy.pt t'o 'z. Kanò ;••';.•= the " p ilot s - using Iracihg grourids" -_'.r • -
and polo fields as suitable airfields. 
During. 'this period, three other Royal Air Force 
pilots were making regulär flights between Lagos and 
other parts of the country, while the Cairo-Kano flights 
became an annual service. Additionally, through the 
efforts of the Imperial Airways,predecessors of the British 
Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), Nigeria became the 
first African country to have Air Postal services. 
The year 1936 saw the ' start of commercial avia-
tion in Nigeria with increased frequency in weekly services 
between Khartoum and Lagos. However, during the Second 
World War, civil aviation in Nigeria was suspended; but 
soon afterwards the West AfTican Airways Corporation 
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(WAAC) was establìshed to serve Nigeria and other V/est 
African countries."* The West African Airways Corporation 
which was organised by four West African countries under 
British administration. [Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and 
Gambia) became insolvent after thirteen years of commercial 
aviation, and later surrendered its services to the 'Nigeria 
Airways'. By May Ist 1959, the Airline became the sole 
national flag carrier after the federai government had 
bought : ali the shares owned by WAAC. 
i ( i) Nigeria Airways Fleet 
Graduating from the use of aircraft such as Doves, Hérons 
DC.3,and Piper Aztecs,iri the early days,"the national airline took 
a step forward by acquiring short, medium and long range 
\ jets. Inìtially it was the Fokker 27 Turbo Props, followed 
byL its faster and more comjfortable sister the Fokker 28. 
Within seven years the airline had bought the Boeing 
Strato Cruisers - B707 and 737. As the business progressed 
the airline entered into chartered agreement with the 
BOAC and eventually a Vickers D.C.10/10s Jet joined ..the 
fleet. 
l ì 
At the time of the research, the airline owned a fleet 
of twenty-four operatidrîal aircraft, made up as follows: 
4 1 0 
AIRCRAFT TYPE NUMBER 
Vickers DC 1 0/1 Os . 2 
Boeing 707 
Boeing 737 3 
Boeing 727 2 
Fokker 28 6 
Fokker 27 8 
Total No. 24 
11 
The airline hopes to increase its 'fleet' between 
1982 and 1984, for its domestic and international services. 
For the domestic services - 10 Boeing 737, to phase out 
the current Fokker 27 séries which is becoming increasing 
uneconomical to operate. As the Chief Logistic Officer 
noted during an interview with the researcher: 
"We intend to buy more Boeing 737 
aircraft to replace the Fokker 27 
séries. We are operating the 
séries at a loss, this stems from 
the fact that only few Nigérians 
like to t T a v e l with the aircraft, 
in récent years." 
For its international route, the airline plans to buy 
four A 300 Airbuses, and two Macdonald DC 10/10s. The 
C o m p a n y intend to lease four Boeing 737 from TARI, a 
subsidiary of Irish Airline. Apart from acquiring new 
aircraft, there is also a corresponding increase in the 
411 
number of international routes which th'e airline is now 
operating; and arrangements have now Teached advanced 
stages for the opening o£ new routes. 
ISI) OWNERSHIP/ORGANISATION/CONTROL 
Nigerian Airways Limited is a state -owned company, 
under the supervisión of the federal Ministry of Civil 
Aviation. The affairs of the airline are managed by a 
Board of Eight Directors. Among the eight directors one 
comes from the Federal Ministry of Aviation, two from the 
Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Economic 
Development respectively, while the remaining five comes 
c i. '• 
fróm.within the organization. However, in September 
1979, the Federal Military Government contracted 
•> \ . ••• i" • - • 
the management of the Airline to KLM (Royal Dutch 
Airlines). Table 17.^6 reflects the airline's 
organisation chart. 
There are ten departments altogether in the 
company, namely: 
The Technical Service Department (which is the larges 
Marketing 
Field Services 
Audit 
General Administration 
Managing Directors 
Finance 
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Table 17.6 The Nigeria Airways Organisation Chart Sept.'79-Sept.'81 
M/DIRECTOR (KLM) 
KLM A DTR 
DIRECTOR 
PERSONAL 
Secretary 
to M.D. 
DIRECTOR 
TECHNICAL 
DIRECTOR 
MARKETINGCK 
KLM A DIR KLM ADIR KLM/V DIR KLM ADIR KLM A DIR 
DIRECTOR 
FIELD SERVICE 
DIRECTOR(B) 
FLIGHT PPS. 
^DEPT. -
MANAGER 
DEPT. 
MANAGER 
DIRECTOR 
FINANCE fBl 
DEPT. 
MANAGER 
DEPT. 
MANAGER 
DEPT. 
MANAGER 
STATION 
MANAGER 
STATION 
MANAGER 
STATION 
MANAGER 
STATION 
MANAGER 
STATION 
MANAGER 
SENIOR STAFF SENICR STAFF SENIOR STAFF SENIOR STAFF SENIOR STAFF 
JUNIOR JUNIOR 
STAFF STAFF 
JUNIOR 
STAFF 
JUNIOR 
STAFF 
JUNIOR 
STAFF 
JUNIOR JUNIOR 
STAFF STAFF 
Note: 1. In the Chart A, Directors are the KLM Supervisory Directors 
while 'B' Directors are the Nigérian Directors awaiting end 
of contract . 
Source : Department of Administration, Nigeria Airways, Airways House, 
Ikeja 
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Flíght Operations and; 
Company Secretary/Legal Departments. 
Each of the departments is headed by a Supervisory Director 
- a*KLM official and Functional Directoría Nigerian with 
little or no decision-fnaking authority) . In other words, 
authority flows from the KLM supervisory directors in 
each of these departments. 
It is worthy to note, however, that the current 
management structure of the state airline has been a 
constant source of controversy within the airline. 
Moreover, the structure has attracted much criticisms from 
members of the public who are seriously blaming the then 
Federal Mi 11tary government for the unácceptable management 
structure. Most Nigerian élites regard or view the govern-
ment action, in inviting the KLM officials, as an affront, 
17 
a sort of 'colonization'of Nigeria; "s economy. However, 
since 1982 certain changes have taken place within the air-
line's organisational hierarchy. The most significant change 
being that the KLM hired managers have vacated their posts, 
thereby giving Nigerian managers the chance once more to 
occupy decision-making seats. Table 17.6a shows the current 
organisation chart. 
(Üi) NATURE OF BUSINESS 
The ñame of the airline depicts actually the nature 
of its business. Simply it is engaged in the carrying 
of people(passengers) and goods(cargo) from one 
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Table 1 7 .._6aT. Current Nigeria airways Organisation Chart 
DIRECTOR 
MARKET 
CONTROL-
LER 
DISTRICT 
MANAGER 
MANAGING 
DIRECTOR 
DIRECTOR 
FINANCE 
SECRETARY TO M/D 
TECHNICAL 
DIRECTOR] 
DIRECTOR 
PERSONNEL 
CONTROL-
LER 
)I RECTOR 
Cr 
CONTROL-
LER 
DISTRICT 
MANAGER 
CONTROL-
LER 
CONTROL 
LER 
DIRECTOR 
FLIGHT OPS 
CONTROL-
LER 
CONTROL 
LER 
DISTRICT 
MANAGER 
DISTRICT 
MANAGER 
DISTRICT 
MANAGER 
DISTRICT 
MANAGER 
e 
STATION 
MANAGER 
STATION 
MANAGER 
STATION 
MANAGER 
STATION 
Î MANAGER ¡ 
STATION 
MANAGER 
STATION 
MANAGER 
Explanatory Notes: 
1. Reporting to the Controllers are the 'Chief and 
Principal' Officers for example Accountants. 
Source: Same as Table 17.6. 
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destination to another; usually from one country to another 
(in the international scene)) and from town to town 
locally. The airline covers domestic and international 
routes. In the domestic route it serves thirteen cities 
in the country from Lagos: and plans to open.new airports 
in five towns within the next few years. However, the 
main probiem with the domestic opération is that it is 
only profitable during Christmas season. TVhile between 
June and October each yearthe number of passengers usually 
drop to as low as forty percent. For example, in 1980, 
over 300,000 passengers were carried;of this number 
100,000 or 33 percent was carried during the month of 
December alone. . 
In the international route, the state airline serves 
more than 18 capitals in three continents of Europe, North 
America and Africa with a. good network for transist con­
nections to most East European cities such as Berlin and 
Moscow. The most profitable route in the international 
connections is London-Lagos. For example, in 1980 the 
airline earncd a total revenue of over N7 million Naira 
from this route, and from January to December the same 
Vftflr it cp-rr î (*.r\ na^^pnapr«; 1 1^f1 QÇÇ Vilnaram; nf 
J - - - — --r ^ ' J ^  ' - J - - -
18 
cargo and 217,622 kilograms of mail from London to Lagos. 
On the whole, the airline serves 20 cities, 40 towns, 
7 countries and 3 continents. A detailed analysis of 
passengers carried by 'carrier' (yearly measure of 
performance particularly whcn other carriers are involved 
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in a route) for the year 1980 is shown on appendix (F). 
The routes covered by the airi ine both domestic and 
international are reflected on appendix (G). 
(iv)THE WORKFORCE 
The airline employs over 8 ,000 workers throughout 
-i -its . 21" in-land stations , in ' the • country»: Lagos , 
'.the head office*'o"f the a ir line, has over 5 ,000 workers,* 
followed by Kano station with 800 workers. The smallest 
station is Zaria,a town in the former Northern Region; which 
has only 9 (nine) staff. At the time of the survey there 
wer e 1 70 7 senior staff arid 5432 junior employées in the 
company. The highest number of workers are employed in 
the Technical Services Department»over 1,600, closely 
followed by Marketing Department which employs 1,447 workers. 
Employées of the airline are classified into two 
'broad units - the Ground Personnel and the Aircrew. 
The ground staff is compo sed of the Admin istrat ive, 
Marketing, Finance Field Services and logistic employées. 
While the air personnel (crew) is nade up of Pilots, Flight 
Engineers and the Cabin Attendants (Air hostesses and 
stewards). 
The airline employs over 210 pilots and 400 
cabin attendants,mostly Nigérians. One intcresting aspect 
in the pilots and co-pilot career which needs to be 
mentioned is the network of processes which they usually 
undergo before reaching the captainship. In Nigeria Airways, 
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the basic type of aircraft is the Fokker 27 (F.27). To 
qualify for a place on the rìght hand seat of the F.27; 
pilots have to pass the Air Registration Board's various 
tests and gain a considérable amount of route expérience. 
From the F.27, the pilot graduâtes over a period of years 
(4-5) to the right hand seat of other more sophisticated 
and larger aircraft, by the 'same processes of courses, 
tests and supervised flights both locally and inter-i. 
nationally. 
At the top of co-pilots career, comes the command, 
and once again the captain Starts ali over from the F.27, 
and graduâtes over a period of years to the top of the left-
hand seat{usually the captain's seat in the aircraft). 
Flight engineers also have a career structure similar to 
that of the pilots, the différence being- that the Flight 
engineers do not graduate to command aircraft but rather 
mature into senior pilot-ehgiheers. 
The Cabin attendants are mainly young men and women, 
secondary school graduâtes.. with an addìtional fewyears train-
ing on various airline subjects. At the airways training 
school Ikeja, most of these cabin attendants are taught 
a range of subjects relevant to their role such as 
child care, service, and knowledge of wine and food. 
The ground personnel include: the loaders, ticket 
sales C l e r k s , clérical officers, ramp officers 
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and techniciahs. The luggage loaders are based in the 
departure/arrival baggage halls. Their duties include 
arranging passengers - luggage for customs examination 
and carrying luggage. after examination into the aircraft. 
The ticket sales clerks are 'at the various Air 
Booking Centres (ABCs). 'Their duties include booking 
reservations for passengers and selling of airline tickets. 
The 'Ramp 1 officers oversee that passengers, oar.go and 
mails that have passed through the airline's 'records' 
get into the aircraft for their various destinations. 
The clerical officers as usual handle the clerical duties. 
in the various departments - opening new files, preparing 
time sheets, and updating the company's records. Finally, 
it is the duty of the technicians to service and maintain 
the airline's aircraft fleet. Most of them are trained 
to handle all types of aircraft from F.27 prop-engines 
to the more sophisticated Boeing series. To up date the 
knowledge of the staff in various functions the management 
organises regular courses at the airline's various stations. 
TRAPE UNION MEMBERSHIP 
The level of unión membership at Nigeria Airways 
is relatively low, under 40 percent of the workforce is 
unionised. There are two 'industrial unions' in the 
airline : 
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a. The National Union of Air Transport Services Employées 
(NUATSE) which is mainly for the ground staff; and 
b. The National Association of Aircraft Pilots and 
Engineers(NAAPE) mainly for the Engineers and Pilots. 
The two unions are affiliated to the Nigeria Labour Congress 
(NLC) - Central Labour Organisation. Unlike the ground 
staff, trade union 'density' is ver y high among the pilots 
and engineers, over 60 percent of the Pilots/Engineers 
are members of (NAAPE) the pilotsunion. 
It is wortb noting, however, that within the airline, 
NAAPE - the pilots and engineers union is the only effec-
tive un ion, the other union, NUATSE, is weak, ma inly because 
of its inability to meet the expectations of its members 
particularly, over wage/salary issues and conditions of 
service. With respect to tr ade un ion subscr iptions, 
the ground staff pay one Naira(Nl.OÛ) per month, while 
the pi lots and engineers subscribe N5.00 per month. 
(vi) STATE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
It is very difficult to présent a true pictu re of 
the state of industriai relations in the national airline 
because of a dearth of information. However, fragmentary 
évidence gathered during unstructured interviews with some 
managers in the air line suggests a picture of disorder and 
disruptions. The statistics of the usuai 1indicators' such 
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as labour turnover and absetneeism rate examined supports 
this assertion. 
] g 
Like ail the other state-owned organisations ' in 
the country, the airlines wages and other conditions of 
service are determined through the 1 centralised' wage 
20 
System. The only group of employées not included in 
the system are the pilots and the flight engineers whose 
wages and other cond itions of employment are separately 
determined through 'negotiations 1. However/ as a member 
of the International Air Transport Association(IATA) the 
airline feels that its employées are under-paid. Hence, 
it. is arguing that its wage structure should be comparable 
with those of other IATA members. While this survey was 
going on in April 1981, the Fédéral Government was setting 
up a high-powered wage commission to examine the présent 
21 
centralised wage system with a view to recommending a 
différent wage structure for ail the para-statal organi­
sations in the country. The commiss ions report was 
published in 1982, it recommended among other things a 
différent wage structure for the para-statal organisations 
The fédéral government acceptée! the recommendation but has 
not been able to implement it. So far only the Central 
Bank of 'Nigeria employées has been paid the commission's 
recommended wage awards. The Nigérian Airways and other 
state-owned organisations are yet to be paid on the basis 
the commission 1 s recommendations. 
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With respect to the industriel indicators mentioned 
earlier in the discussion an examination would be in place 
now.. * 
(a) STRIKE PRONESS 
The airline, like its .sister stated-owned organisations 
is strike prone. The record of industriai stoppages in 
Table 17.7 bears a clear testimony. From the table it can 
be seen that within a space of five years the airline has 
had a total of 16 officiai stoppages(i.e.stoppages which 
had the support and backing of the trade unions) which is 
above the normal average when compared with other Airlines 
around Ikeja. For example, interviews with some of the 
officiais of thèse airlines - British Caledonian, Pan-
American and the French Airline (UTA) reveal that their 
officiai industrial stoppages are very low. The British 
Caledonian has in the last six years had only one stoppage 
and that was'in 1975 immediately after the Udoji Wage 
Commission Awards. While Pan-Am and the UTA have had 2 
and 3 stoppages respectively. Düring the period May 1975 
to April 1981 the state airline recorded over 5,000 man-days 
lost. Although Statistical information in respect of the 
other airlines British Caledonia, Pan-Am and UTA were not 
available, the Controller of industrial relations for the 
state àirline confirmed that 'man-days lost 1 for those 
airlines were very low. In 1981, alone the state airline 
recorded ten un-official strikes(i.e. unofficial in the 
sensé that it lacked both the support and backing of the 
unions.).carried out either by pilots or the 
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Year No. of 
stoppages 
Strike dura-
tion or nô 
days • :; 
>Ian-days 
lost 
No. of 
workers 
involved 
1975 3 5 23,300 8,000 
1976 3 4 2,900 1 ,000 
1977 2 3 2,600 800 
1978 1 2 1 ,800 1 ,050 
1979 2 3 1 ,500 " 500 
1980 1 1 1 ,300 800 
1981 3 4 23,800 8 ,000 
Ail the 
employées 
Total 16 22 57 ,200 20,150 
Source : 
Compiled from the Company 1 -^ records 
Table 17 .,7 Nigeria Airways Ltd - Summary of Known 
Stoppages. 1975 - To April 1981 
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engineers, the aitvtraffic controllers or^the lugg'age 
handlers. The causes of the stoppages over the period 
under discussion were mainly disputes related to wages/ 
r 
salaries as shown in table 17.8'. Grourid personnel embarking 
on few hours unofficial strikes because of wage disparity 
existing between them and the 1flying crew'. 
LABOUR TURNOVER 
Nigeria Airways labour turnover rate is alarmingly 
high compared with other airlines such as British Caledonia. 
and UTA CFrench Airline). Although records for the pre-
ceding years were not available (because, according to the 
airlines research officer "they were missing") the air-
line.'s labour turnover rate for 1980 was over 25 percent. 
While officiais of the British Caledonian, UTA and Pan-
Am told the researcher that they recorded 5, 6 and 3 percent 
respectively in the same period. The main reason for this 
high labour turnover rate in the state airline as explained 
by the Airlines Public Relations Officer Mr. Femi Ogunleye 
is that each year workers,particularly trained junior 
officers leave the airline to join other neighbouring 
airlines such as the British Caledonian and UTA where 
staff wages and other conditions of service are 
compet it ive. 
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Table 1 7 . .g Nigeria Airways Causes of Stoppages ' 
' for'the :year.s-19?5-1981. 
% 
Wages-payment/bonus 50.9 
Dismissal 1 .8 
Working conditions/facilities 10.8' 
Sympathy 32.7 
Démarcation 1 .8 
Redundancy 1.8 
Others Ce .g . safety) 0.3 
100:00 
Source: Compiled from company's Industriai records. 
Note 1. Officiai stoppages. 
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(c) Absenteeism Rate: 
At the time of our survey absenteeism rate was 
running at above 15-20 percent per month in the airline. 
At the same period the other airlines - British Cale-
donian, Pan-Am and UTA were recording 2, 3, 3 percent 
respecitvely. One of the personnel officers in charge 
of technicians{maintenance section) told the researcher 
that on the àverage 50 employées mostly junior workers 
absent themselves from duty daily. The monthly absent-
eeism record for the airline is shown in Table 17.9. 
The table shows that throughout the year, November being 
the only exception, absentéeIsm is high. 
In conclusion, it can be argued, that significant 
différences e.xist between the two organisations in terms 
of str ike ine idence, labour turnover, and absentée i sm 
rate. Each of thèse 'industrial indicators 1 was found 
to be higher in the Nigeria Airways Limited; which 
tend to suggest that the LBN enjoys a better labour/ 
management relationship than the state airline. 
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Table 17.9 Nigeria Airways Absenteeism Record 1980 - 1981 
Year Months . No. of employees 
1980 Aprii 150 
May 130 
June 140 
July 130 
August 120 
September 125 
. October 137 
November 188 
December 125 
1981 January 100 
February 126 
March 139 
Apr il 195 
Total No . of Absenteeisms: 1 ,750 
Source: Computed from company records 
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHARTER SIX 
For a good discussion of this topic see Moser and 
Kalton, Survey methods in social investigation, 
London : Heinemann -Educational Books Ltd., 1979. 
Also see the Journal of the Market Research Society 
1976 issue. 
The Interviewers Manual of the Survey Research Centre 1 
University of Michigan USA (1974) provides a good 
reading for an indepth discussion on interviewing 
techniques. See also Belson, W., The Design and 
Understanding of Survey Questions, London: (Gower 
Publishers, London, 1981). See also Yates, F., 
Sampling Methods for Census and Surveys. (Griffin 
and Company Ltd., 1981). 
The three-day national strike was called by the NLC 
(Nigérian Labour Congress) from April 20th-23 1981, 
to back up their demand for good pay and improved 
conditions of service for workers. 
These figures here represent the total number of 
employées in both companies that completed our 
questionnaires. Very few turned up for the 30-
minute individuai interviews. 
For a detailed discussion on this topic see the 
following works: Zeller, R & Carminés - Measurement 
in the Social Sciences (The link between theory and 
data) Cambridge Univers ity Press 1 98 0". Also see 
Yates F., Sampling Methods for Census and Surveys, 
published by Griffin & Company Ltd., 1981. See Kish 
L., Survey Sampling published by John Wiley & Sons, 
1 965. 
The expression is a mixture of Pigin/English language. 
Pigin language is widely used in offices and market 
places in Nigeria. 
History of LBN and its Présent Organisation presented 
by the Personnel Department-iof „Xever Brothers (Nig.)Ltd 
Apapa-Lagos, 1980, pp.1-3. 
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The indigenization Decree 1976 enacted by the 
Federal Military Government transferred 60,percent. 
or abpve of all multi-national companies (shares) 
situated in Nigeria to Nigerian Entrepreneurs. 
See Nigeria Today, (an officlal magazine) No.69, 
issue of June 1976. 
Explained as the process of putting a particular 
colour(s) of ' dye' to AD (Active Detergent) mixture to 
produce a desired colour. For a product like 0M0 
detergent blue dye is üsed for the colouration. 
Fashoyin, T., Industrial Relations in Nigeria 
(Development and Practice) the process of industrial 
peace, other companies include: Shell-BP, The Banks 
and Nigerian Tobacco Company Ltd., as well as the UAC 
group: London: Longmans Limited 1980, p. 139. 
In 1979, the government's basie monthly minimum wage 
was N60.00, the NJIC recommended N70.00 or 17 percent 
for the industrial group. Also in 1980, when the 
government basic monthly minimum wage went up to 
N100.O0 per month, the NJIC' s. recommendation was 
N120.00 (figures carne from the LBN management records) 
The strike statistics figures were supplied by. 
the LBN management. 
Udoji Wages and Salaries Review Commission (for 
Public Service Employers) Report 1974/75. Federal 
Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1975. 
"The figures were supplied by the LBN management 
(Personnel Department) and were later confirmed by 
both (ÑECA) and the other companies. 
Sky Power (The story of Nigeria Airways Facts and 
Figures) published by the advertising department. 
Ai-rways House Ikeja Lagos, December 1 978. Although 
Commercial Aviation in Nigeria started in 1936, 
Nigeria Airways became the sole national flag carrier 
on May 1st 1959. 
Ibid., op .cit. , pp. 4-5 . 
Afrik Air (An authentic Aviation Magazine for África) 
Volume 2, No. 3, 1981, p. 16. 
/ ' 
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18.1bid., op.cit.. p. 23. 
19.State owned organisations include: the Nigeria 
Railway Corporation, Nigeria Ports Authority and the 
National Electricity Power Authority (NEPA). 
20.Wages and Salaries'determined through government app 
ointed wage tribunals/commissions such as the Udoji 
& Adebo Wage Commissions. 
'21.0N0SUB0 Wages and Salaries Review Commission (for 
state owned corporations) Report 1982. Fédéral 
Ministry of Information Printing Division, Lagos, 
1 982. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
- " .THE RESULTS OF THE~~ SURVEY 
.7.16 Questionnaires and interviews analysed •" 
The preced ing chapter descr ibed the companies 
where the survey was • carried out. It is the 
intention of this chapter to evaluate those hypothèses 
developed for this study on the basis of the informa-
tion obtained from the survey The main hypothesis 
at this point is that Lever Brothers (N.rg ) Ltd. , workers ' 
are generally more satisfied with aspects of their 
Work environment than at Nigeria Airways, and this is 
related to the question of collective bargaining; but 
th is r elationship is 'marked' by var ious fac tor s, 
such as âge, .matital status and éducation - and the 
possibility of aliénation in employment. 
,For example, from the questionnaire responses' 
and the thirty minutes individual interviews, we dis-
covered that the first group of workers(between the âges 
of 17 and 23 years} were very dissatisfied with their 
pay, job, working conditions and the quality of their 
management. Wh ile on the other , the older worker s 
between the âges of 45 and 57 years with little or no 
académie qualifications were more satisfied with their 
pay and related variables. 
Also, in this chapter, we intend to examine the 
significance of worker attitudes in relation to pay 
431 
détermination, their levels of job satisfaction, to 
management quality, working conditions and promotion 
prospects; in a séries of hypothèses, each linked 
together by the underlying theory that thèse attitudes 
will be more favourable of the environment is 
'conditioned1 by the présence of collective bargaining. 
This involves looking at workers and managers' 
attitudes in détail, and attempting to identify spécial 
factors which might influence particular groups in 
more détail. However, befôre evaluating the hypothèses 
it would be in place to look at thèse 'factual issues' 
in the questionnaires mentioned above such as âge, 
and educational qualificationSwhich might influence 
levels of job satisfaction among the workers sampled 
in both companies. 
Firstly, the older workers, ail of whom were 
married with children, constituted 7.1 percent of 
the ;,workers sampled, with considérable number of 
years expérience in their jobs, were found to be 
satisfied with their,. jobs and pay. One of the reasons, 
was that with no recognizable educational qualifications 
such -as school certificates, and the G.C.O. '0' 
levels, some of them were receiving the wages of 
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pr ine ipal secr e taries and h igher execu tive of f icers 
which on the basis of their présent qualifications coüld 
not have been possible hence their satisfaction,Reinforcing 
the above explanation, a fifty-five year old fitter from 
the Lever Brothers (Nig.) Ltd told the researcher: 
"We should thank our stars for 
the job, pay and good conditions 
of work we are enjoying now be-
cause of âge and expérience in 
the job with no formai qualifica-
tion; had it been today that 
'paper qualification .is ruling 
Nigeria, I bet you we would not 
stand a chance. Because young 
men with long, long paper quali-
fications from Apapa to Ikeja 
Airport could have taken up ail 
the vacancies." 
Commenting on the same issue, a Nigérian Airways Luggage 
Loader told the researcher: 
"True, true we old men still 
working today with little or no 
educational quai if icationsshould 
be grateful to our God. Because 
with such, emphasis on 'paper 
qualifications in récent years 
we couldn't even have got an ordi-
nary labourer's job. You don't 
expect an employer to employ me 
with no qualifications when a 
TTÌOTÌ i.r T i- VI r. o t t Û r n n ^ l i f i r i -
tions is going withouta job. 
Indeed we are down too lucky." 
Clearly, thèse types of feelings among this group accounted 
for their high degree of job, pay and conditions of service 
satisfaction than ali the other âge groups. 
Similarly, the âge group (39-44) with relatively poor 
educational qualifications few years of job expérience, 
433 ' 
"If I say I am not satisfied with 
my job, and refused to do the job 
the waymy employers want it done , 
and they throw me out of job, 
where do you think I would get 
job in this country now and the 
money with which to cater for 
my young children, brothers and 
aged parents as I am fast approach-
ing retirement âge. To me, job 
satisfaction or no job satisfaction 
is for young men and women who have 
no responsibilities and have not ex-
perienced anything in life." 
Âpparently, in the Nigérian society and ir particular 
among the Ibo tribe, a young man who is not married no 
matter his educational qualification or his social economie 
status is hardly regarded as a 'full member' of his âge 
group until he gets married. On getting married, he 
becomes fully accepted and integrated into his âge group, 
married with grown up children and constituting 11.7 percent 
of the workers sampled were satisfied with their jobs. 
The.main reason given for the apparent job and pay satisfac­
tion was similar to that advanced by their seniors. The 
third group 31-38 year olds , married with young children, 
with higher educational qualifications such as degrees and 
diplomas, constituting 29 percent of the workers interviewed 
were found to be averagely satisfied with their jobs and 
pay mainly because of their family responsibilities -
bringing up their young children and helping out•other 
members of the very often large family. _ Reinforcing 
this /reason as the single most important 
factor, one of the Supervisors from the Nigeria Airways 
Logistic Department told the researcher during an interview: 
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and hence forth he would then be given an 'audience' in any • 
social gather ing whenever he wants to address his age 
group, club or village meeting. The belief among these 
traditional societies being that once a man gets married 
he assumes higher responsibilities and his chances of 
becoming a deviance to the village or community becomes 
remote. The reason for this is the belief that on getting 
married he becomes deeply invólved in the formulation of 
those 'norms and values' which bind their cohesìveness 
as a primary or traditional society. 
Workers in the age group 24-30 with good educational 
qualifications, a substantial number of them yet to get 
married, accounted for 37.7 percent of the workers sampled 
were dissatisfied with their job, pay and working conditions. 
One of the reasons given for being dissatisfied with their 
jobs was that they were not being rewarded according to 
their educational qualifications. A clerical officer 
attached to the personnel department in the Nigeria 
Airways told the researcher: 
"Boss, but how can I be satisfied with 
my job and pay, when after ali these 
years of suffering in the school you 
are placed on grade level 3. You hardly 
notice any difference between your pay 
and that of a labourer who has not got 
such a basic qualification. It is 
very disgusting." 
Similarly, a young man from the Lever Brother Ltd., who 
passed his G.C.E. Advanced Level in 1974, and was 
employed as 'Bar Soap Packer' in the Factory because he 
-couldn't find a job elsewhere told the researcher: 
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Finally, the youngest age group the 17-24 year: olds 
that constitutes 14.5 percent of the workers in the 
-Survey , predominantly unmarried, with moderate educational 
qualifications- school .certificate G .C .E . '0' Level and 
higher elementary were found to be very dissatisfied with 
their pay, job and related issues. The reason;was that 
their expectations were not being met. Most of them had 
• thought that with their school certificate qualif ic'ation 
(WASC) they would be recruited as managers with good pay 
and other fringe benefits, when they discovered that these 
expectations could not be met they started finding their 
jobs meaningless and estranged. . One young man from "the 
Lever.Brothers Ltd (NSD) Non-Soap Detergent section told 
the writer during an mterview: 
"Before I left the college last 
year to be sincere, I was of 
the impression that with school 
certificate one can find a nice 
rewarding job. It appears we 
have been leaving in 1WASC 
illusion' (the assumptìon that 
with School Certificate (WASC) 
you could become a manager 
overnight)." 
"Look at me", after ali these 
years in the college see the type 
of job I am doing. With this 
type of job teli me what scale of 
salary do you think that I would 
be placed? I have no grounds to 
be satisfied with my pay and job 
at ali." 
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(A) HYPOTHESES 
It can therefore be seen that factors such as age, 
qualification and famiiy responsibilities are important 
influence on job satisfaction. Given that the factors 
influenced.both'organisations, the research sought to 
demónstrate whether: 
. \ • ' • ' 
"Workers under collective bargaiñing 
industries derive more job satis-
faction from their jobs . " whieh brings us to 
. the job satisfaction hypothesis. . • 
If this hypothesis is to be regarded as of any validity, 
we would expect to find: 
a more satisfied workforce at the 
Lever Brothers (Nig.) Limited, 
with respect to their: 
(a) var ious aspects of work and management 
(b) pay and the way it is determined. 
As a test, workers in both companies were asked the extent 
to which they were satisfied with their work, and their 
replies recorded on a five point scale. Table 18 depicts 
the levéis of job satisfaction among the workers in each 
of the companies. The table shows that 80.3 percent of 
the lLBN workers were very satisfied with their jobs. ûver 
18.4 percent were satisfied with their jobs; while one 
and 0.3 percent of the workers indicated moderately satis-
fied and dissatisfied respectively. 
In contrast the general picture found in the Nigeria 
Airways Limited whose workers wages were 'centrally 
determined' through government appointed ad hoc wage 
4 3 7 
Table 18. Job Satisfaction: To what extent are you 
-satisfied with your présent job? 
Company Very sa­
tisfied Satisfied 
Moderate-
ly satis­
fied 
Dissa1-
tisf ied 
Very 
dissa-
tisfied 
LBN 80.3 
(249) 
18.4 1 
(57) 2 
1 .0 
(3) 
0.3 
(1) 
. 0.0 
(0) 
Nigeria 
Air­
ways 8.6 
(23) 
19.9 
(53) 
33.1 
(88) 
22.2 
(59) 
16.2 
' (43) 
Explanatory Notes: 
1 . Percentages 
2. Actual Number." of Workers 
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commissions or tribunals was one of disappointment. From 
the same table it can be seen that over 22 percent of the 
workers were dissatisfied with their work; while 16.2 
percent indicated that they were very dissatisfied. 
Not surprisingly, only 19.9 and 8.6 percent of the workers 
were satisfied and very satisfied respectively in their 
jobs. Even so, the overall 28 percent or more workers 
who indicated that they were satisfied with their jobs 
were later found to be mainly semi-skilled and skilled 
workers such as typists, technicians and component 
planners. The expression of job satisfaction among this 
group of workers reflects the status of their jobs. A 
less skilled group of workers which. was more satisfied was 
the aircraft luggage loaders. Thèse workers received 
tips and..other 'extra gratia' payments for their work in 
the luggage halls, the passenger lounge, on the tarmac" 
and the runway. 
According tò the personnel officer in charge of 
field employées ,,thè absenteeism- rate among those luggage 
loaders 'was the lowest among ali the sections;-in the 
Nigeria Airways Ltd".'In fact, this apparent enviable 
position of the loaders lhas earned them many enemies 
among their fellow workers from other units particularly 
from the clérical officers whose nature of job meant that 
they have to stay permanently in the airline offices 
updating records. Table 18.1 gives job satisfaction levels 
for a number of selected occupations in each organisation. 
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Job 
Code 
Very 
satis­
fied 
J 
Satis­
fied 
Moderate-
ly satis­
fied 
Dis­
satis­
fied 
Very 
dissa­
tisfied 
.LEVER BROTHERS NIGERIA LTü' 
Carpenters 
(1) 
38.5 23.0 23.0 7.7 7.7 
Electricians 25.2 20.0 40 .0 10.0 5.0 
Loaders 27.6 24.1 31 .0 10.3 7.0 
Supervisors 15.0 20.0 40 .0 15.0» 10.0 
Clerks 13.3 23.0 53.8 13.3 6.6 
Technicians 27.8 16.7 38 .8 
•.' 
,1 
11.1 5.6 
NIGERIA A! 
/ 
RWAYS LIMITED- . . 
Carpenters 21 .4 21 .4 7.1 21 .4 28.6 
Electricians 6.3 25.0 31 .3 25.0* 12.5 
Loaders 15.0 25.0 27.0 30 .0 15.0 
Supervisors 5.0 20.0 30.0 25.0 20 .0 
Clerks 9.2 12.3 44.6 27.7 • 6.2 
Technicians 10.0 20 .0 26.7 20.0 
* 
23.3 
Explanatory Notes : 
(1) All in percentages: - the size of the population 
ranges from 15 individuals [Lever Brothers Clerks) 
to 65 (Nigeria Airways Clerks) 
Table 18.1. Job Satisfaction by Selected Occupation and 
Company 
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The table shows that in the LBN 38.5 and 23.0 percent 
of the carpenters were very satisfied and satisfied res-
pectively- as against 21.4 and 21.4 percent carpenters in 
the Nigeria Airways. Twenty-eight percent of the carpenters inter-
viewed in the Nigeria Airways indicated that they were very 
dissatisfied with their jobs compared with seven percent 
in the LBN. From the table it can also be seen that the 
electricians, the Clerks, the technicians and the Super­
visors with the exception of the luggage loaders, were very 
dissatisfied with their jobs. For example, 23.3 percent 
of the technicians in the Nigeria Airways were very dis­
satisfied compared with 5.6 percent in the Lever Brothers 
(Nig.) Ltd. Earlier we tried to explain why the luggage 
loaders were more satisfied than their fellow workers 
such as the electricians, technicians and the clérical 
officers. It was later found that 'extra gratia' payment 
was not the only reason behind their expressions of satis­
faction. 
The second reason was because of the 'working environ-
ment 1 which covered mainly the baggage and the transit 
halls. These places were found to be well decorated with 
good lighting, toilet and catering facilities, unlike 
the Airways offices, that were ill-equipped. Thirdly, their 
job provided them opportunities to meet and make friends 
with foreign visitors who might be of financial assistance 
in the near future to them. Nigeria Airways records 
show that every year a significant proportion of 'luggage 
loaders' leave thé company for either the United Kingdom 
or the USA under the 'goodwill" of their foreign friends. 
Fourthly, the 'loaders' were hardly supervised by their 
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Surprisingly, the supervisors and the technicians 
from the Nigeria Airways who were supposed to be more 
satisfied with their jobs than even the loaders because 
of the preferential treatment given to them by the manage-
ment, were more disillusioned. As can be seen from table 
18.1 only 25 and 30 percent respectively of the supervisors 
and the technicians in the Nigeria Airways indicated that 
they were satisfied. Contrasting sharply with the 35 
and 44.5 percent respectively indicated in the Lever 
Brothers Ltd. 
Düring the 30 minutes interviews, the researcher 
wanted to know why some of the technicians were so dis-
satisfied with their jobs. When one of the technicians 
was asked to explain the reason behind their disillusionment, 
he noted: 
"I am not happy with ray job 
because I feel I am not being 
rewarded as an experienced skilled 
man like my colleagues in the 
other Airlines such as the 
Pan-Am (Pan American Airlines), 
British Caledonia and the UTA. 
I am quite convinced if I was 
working in a private organisa- < 
tion such as the Shell-BP, the UAG* 
group, Nigeria Tobacco Company or'" 
African Timber and Plywood Company, 
I couldn't have been searching for 
'Naira' with which to pay my 
children's school fees. Why should 
I then be satisfied with my job." 
Supervisors, and this created Tatmosphère' of individual 
accountability. Quite unlike their counterparts in other 
units who were subjected to constant supervision. 
The next question was whether workers believed 
that the pay they received was a fair reward for the effort 
they put into their work. By focussing attention on 
the relationship between pay and effort it was hoped to 
minimise the tendency of workers to respond to questions 
about' their pay by asserting themselves to be underpaid. 
Workers might answer that they believed themselves to 
be appropriately paid either because they were well paid 
or because they had confidence in the justice of the 
system determining-their pay. Both of these reasons 
might be présent, but if the tendencies were in opposite 
directions the response to the question could be expected 
to be inconclusive. Another possibility was that workers 
might answer the question in the negative because they 
believed that they were over-paid as well as because they 
believed themselves to be underpaid. This did not matter: 
either way such an answer would be significant in indicat-
ing lack of confidence in the system. 
The answers ih table 18.2 reflect the response to 
the pay satisfaction question. Again there is a high level 
of positive response from Lever Brothers and a spread 
skewed towards the negative end from Nigeria Airways. 
As can be seen from the table, 61.6 percent of the workers 
from LBN indicated that they were equitably rewarded, 
32.6 percent had a similar impression; while in the 
Nigeria Airways over 32 percent indicated that their pay 
was. not équitable with their effort. Also in the Nigeria 
Airways only 2.3 and 8.3 percent of the workers respectively 
4 4 3 
Company Very 
well 
Quite 
well 
Moderate-
ly well 
Not very 
well 
Not at 
all 
LBN 61 .6 1 32.6 4 .2 1 .3 0.3 
Ï191) 2 (101) (13) • (4) "- -d) 
Nigeria 
Airways 2.3 8.3 29 .7 27.8 32 
(6) (22) (79) ) (74) (85) 
Explanatory Notes : 
1 . Percentages 
"• 2 . Actual Numbers • of Workers 
Table 18.3. A Fair Pays Pay and A Fair Pays Work: Thinking 
of your wages. again, how far do you think that 
you are receiving a fair days pay for a fair 
days work? 
Company Strongly 
agreed Agreed 
Moderate-
ly agreed 
Pis-
agreed 
Strongly 
Disagreed 
LBN 4.5 1 23.2 57 .1 8.4 6.8 
(14) 2 (72) (177) (26) (21) 
. Nigeria 
Airways 0.8 9.0 43.2 19.5 27.4 
(2) (24) (115) 
—.—.— — —.———• 
(52) (75) 
Explanatory Notes: 1. Percentages 
2. Actual numbers of workers 
Table 18.2. Satisfaction With Pay: Thinking of your job 
and the pay that you receive for it. does the 
pay actually reflect the effort you put in? 
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believed that they Were being equitably rewarded. From 
the table, it can be further seen that 29.7 percent of 
the workers in the Nigeria Airways felt that they were 
being averagely rewarded as against 4.2 percent at the 
LBN. The higher percentage recorded in this respect (that 
is on average) in the Airways was due to the high pro­
portion of women and newly employed young workers who 
wanted to remain neutral. 
Furthermore, workers were also asked whether they 
received a 'fair days pay 1 for a 'fair days work' and 
the response again showed much lower levels of satisfac­
tion with pay at Nigeria Airways as reflected in Table 
18.3. As can be seen from the table, 4.5 and 23.2 
percent of the Lever Brothers' workers respectively agreed 
that they were receiving a 'fair days pay' for a 'fair 
days work'. While 57.1 percent moderately agreed. 
The picture at the Nigeria Airways was quite different, 
as can be seen in the table. Only 0.8 and 9 percent of 
the workers respectively agreed that they received a 
'fair days pay' for a 'fair days work'. As high as 
46.9 percent of the workers did not accept the view. 
Enough evidence was obtained from the study which 
support that workers under collective bargaining indus­
tries derive more job satisfaction from their jobs than 
their counterparts under other forms or mechanisms of 
wage determination such as through independent wage tri­
bunals or commissions. There are undoubtedly other major 
'factors'' outside the scope of this study that influences 
workers 1 job sat isf action,. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the<basis of the évidence obtained from the study, 
the hypothesis therefore, has a high degree of validity 
as an explanation to the view that workers under collec-
tive bargaining industries derive more satisfaction from 
their jobs. 
THE LABOUR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIPS HYPOTHESIS 
Briefly, the labour-management hypothesis may be 
stated as follo"ws: 
"Labour-management relationship are 
more cordial in industries or com-
. paniès under collective bargaining 
arrangements." 
Support for the labour-management hypothesis would be 
obtained if the Lever Brothers (Nig.) Ltd. showed: 
(a) More satisfied employées with quality of 
management. 
(b) More satisfied employées with working conditions; 
-t 
(c) more promotion prospects 
(d) *Fewer industrial stoppages and 
Ce) Lower absenteeism rate. 
'Workers in both organisations were asked how they 
would rate the quality of their management in dealing with 
aspects of the work situation, particularly employées 
problems and their replies recorded on a five point scale 
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table 18.4'J• Workers at Nigeria Airways Ltd., were less 
satisfied with the quality of their management. As can 
be seen from the table, over 9 and 20 percent of the 
Lever Brothers workers indicated that the quality of their 
management was excellent and very good respectively. Over 
55 percent thought that the quality of their management 
was good, while 7.4 and 7.4 percent believed that the 
quality of their management was bad and very bad 
respectively. 
At the Nigeria Airways Ltd., a different picture 
emerged only 6.8 and 7.5 percent of the employees thought 
that the quality of their management in dealing with 
employee problems was excellent and very good respectively. 
41 percent thought that it was simply good, while a 
significant proportion of them believed that the quality 
of their management was bad (26.7) and very bad (18 .0"percent) 
respectively. A comment by Nigerian Airways employee (a 
.'Ramp's officer) a middle-aged man in his early forties 
during an interview reinforced those figures in table 
18.4. The man told the researcher : 
"The Nigeria Airways management 
is not good. To be sincere, we 
have no good managers with the 
interest of the ordinary employees 
at heart; all they are after is 
for their personnal well-being, 
as soon they achieved this 
objective, the welfare of the 
other employees can go to hell. 
I can't agrée that a management 
with this type of attitude is 
good, can you accept this your-
self?" 
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Table 18.4 Quality of Management: How would you rate 
the quality of your management in 'dealing 
with aspects of the work situation, parti-
cularly employée problems? 
Company Excellent Very 
Good 
Good Bad Very 
Bad 
LBN 9-.4 20.0 55.8 7.4 7.4 1. 
(29) (62) (173) (23) (23) 2 
Nigeria 
Airways 6.8 7.5 41 .0 26.7 18.0 
(18) (20) (109) (71) (4 8) 
Explanatory Notes: 
1. Percentages 
2. Actual numbers; of workers 
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Furthermore, the workers were asked how they perceived 
their working conditions compared with those in similar 
industries. Table 18.5 summarises the responses by 
workers in both organisations. As can be seen from the 
table, 8.4 and 14.2 percent of the Lever Brothers ' (Nig. ) 
Ltd employées indicated that their working conditions were 
very satisfactory and satisfactory respectively as against 
3.0 and 15.0 percent of the Nigeria Airways Ltd. Over 
67:"percent of the LBN employées thought that their working 
conditions were average, while 6.S and 3.5 percent the 
workers believed that their working conditions were poor 
and very poor respectively. At the Nigeria Airways only 
33.5 of the employées felt that their working conditions 
were averagely placed; while^over forty-eight percent of the 
workers wei^e under -no illusion over the ir' working conditions , 
they believed that.the conditions were very appalling. 
The next question was about promotion prospects. 
Workers in both organisations were asked to indicate what 
their promotion chances were in their respective companies. 
Again, workers at Nigeria Airways were less optimistic 
with their perceptions of promotion prospects than were 
workers at Lever Brothers (Nig.) Ltd, (Table 18.6). As 
can be seen from the table 6.8 and 31.0 percent of the 
workers at Lever Brothers considered their promotion pros­
pects to be very good and good respectively. In addition, 
55.5 percent thought that they had a fifty-fifty chance 
of being promoted; while 4.5 and 2.3 percent of the workers 
considered their promotion prospects to be bad and very 
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Company ' Very sa­tisfactory 
Satis­
factory Average Poor 
Very 
poor 
LBN 8.4 14.2 67.1 6.8 3.5 
(26) (44) (208) (21) - (11) 
Nigeria 
Airways 5.0 15.0 33. 5 1 28.9 19.5 
(8) (40) (89) 2 (77) (52) 
Explanatory Notes: < 
1 . Percentages 
2. Actual numbers of workers 
Table 18.6. Promotion Prospects: Thinking of promotion pros­
pects in the company what do you consider your 
prospects to be? 
* 
Company Very good Good 
About 
average Bad ^ Very bad 
LBN 6.8 31 .0 55.5 4.5 213 
(21) (96) (172) (14) (7) 
Nigeria 
Airways 7.9 1:8.8 35.3 20 .3 • 17.7 1 
(21) (50) (94) . (54) (47) 2 
Explanatory Notes: 
1. Percentages 
2. Actual numbers of workers 
Table 18.5 Working Conditions: Characterise your working 
conditions (compared with those in similar in­
dustries or firms). 
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bad respectively. At the Nigeria Airways on the other 
hand, only 7.9 and 18.8 percent of the workers considered 
their promotion prospects to be very good and good 
respectively; while 35.3 percent believed they had a fifty-
fifty chance. What's ••more, as high as 20.3 and 17.7 percent 
of the employees considered their promotion chances to be 
bad and very bad respectively compared with 4.5 and 2.3 
percent reflected at the Lever Brothers (Nig.) Ltd. 
Another way of assessing whether cordial relation--
ship exists between management and labour in.an organisa-
tion is to examine the industrial indicators' such as 
strike incidence and absenteeism rate in that orgánisation. 
This is of signif icance importance in that,, where labour-
management relationship was cordial there would be fewer 
stoppages or industrial unrests, because each 'social 
partner 1 is apprehensive of its obligation to that organi-
sation. Similarly, in an organisation where a high degree 
of mutual understanding exists between labour and manage­
ment, employees hardly absent themselves from duty. 
Table 18.7 depicts the industrial stoppages recorded in 
both companies over a period of six years (1975-81). As 
can be seen from the table, between 1975 and 1981, Lever 
Brothers (Nig.) Ltd had only three stoppages - one in 
1975 and the remaining two between 1979-81; while Nigeria 
Airways recorded 15 industrial stoppages over the same 
period. In addition, as shown in the table, Lever 
Brothers had fewer 'working days lost' per 1,000 employees 
(18,996) than Nigeria Airways Ltd. which had 57,700 
working days lost per 1,000 employees. 
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No. of stop-
pages per 
1 ,000 ia ". 
employees 
Number of 
persons in-
volved per 
stoppages 
Duration of 
each 
stoppage in 
working days 
No. of work­
ing days 
lost per 
1,000 
employees 
LEVER 
BROTHERS 
1975-76 1 • 1214 1 2000 
1977-78 - - - -
1979-80 1 2428 5 12140 
1 9 8 1 C a ) 1 
L2428 2 4856 
Total 3 18,996 
NIGERIA 
AIRWAYS 
-
1975-76 6 ,91)00', 9 26200 1 i 
1977-78 3 1850 5 4400 
1979-80 3 1300 4 3300 
1 9 8 1 C a ) 3 8000 4 23800 
Total 15 57,700 
Source: Compiled from data supplied by the two companies* 
Explanatory Notes: 
1. The figures given here are mainly estimates because tne 
Company had no proper record. 
(ä) The figures are for the Ist quarter of 1981. The 
whole industries in the country were involved; it 
was a strike called by the Nigeria Labour Congress 
CNLC) 
Table 18.7 Strike Comparison. March 1975 - 1981 
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Table 1 8 . 8 Absenteeism Rate - Comparison . 1 9 8 0 - 8 1 
I 
C 0 M P A N Y 
Year Month Nigeria Airways Lever Brothers 
No_._ of employées 
1 9 8 0 April 1 50 89 . 
1 9 8 0 May 1 3 0 1 0 3 
1 9 8 0 June 1 4 0 1 3 5 
1 9 8 0 July 1 3 0 ' 128 
1 9 8 0 August . 1 2 0 1 0 8 
19 s o ; September 125 1 0 9 
1 9 8 0 October 1 3 7 1 0 8 
1 9 8 0 November 8 8 58 
1 9 8 0 December 1 2 5 1 0 7 
1 9 8 1 January 1 0 0 93 
1 9 8 1 February 1 2 6 1 0 8 
1 9 8 1 March 1 3 9 1 1 5 
1 9 8 1 April 1 9 5 1 8 5 
Total 1 7 0 5 1 4 4 2 
Source: Computed from the companies'records.. 
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Table 18.8 shows the absenteeism rate for the two 
companies. Again, as can be seen in the table, Lever 
Brothers (Nig.) Ltd had fewer absenteeism rate than the 
Nigeria Airways Ltd., although the difference in the total 
number of absenteeism recorded was not much. 
CONCLUSIÓN 
The study provided a significant support for the labour-
management relationship hypothesis. More Lever Brothers 
employees were satisfied with the quality of their manage­
ment, with their working conditions and also considered 
their promotion chances better than those of Nigeria Airways 
employees. Furthermore, the study showed fewer stoppages 
and lower absenteeism rate at the Lever Brothers (Nig.) 
Ltd than in the Nigeria Airways Ltd. Therefore, this 
hypothesis possesses a high degree of validity. 
THE TRAPE UNION DENSITY HYPOTHESIS 
The trade unión density hypothesis was summarized 
in the following terms: 
"Union density and worker participation 
in decisión making are higher in indus­
tries under collective bargaining." 
If this hypothesis is to be accepted as having any validity, 
we would expect to find: 
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Ca) Higher trade union membership at Lever Brothers 
(Nig.) Ltd 
(b) More expression of greater union involvement in 
the wage détermination process at Lever Brothers 
(c) More Lever Brothers employees awareness of 
'oomparability criterion' as the most important 
criterion in the détermination of wages 
(d) Higher proportion of Lever Brothers 1 employees 
supporting that information disclosure to workers 
is essential. 
Levels of trade union membership in the two organi­
sations reflected the influence of the unions. Table 18.9 
depicts the density of trade union membership in each of 
the companies. It can be seen from the table that over 
92 percent of the Lever Brothers employees were trade 
union members (Lever Brothers workers union) , while the 
density of union membership at Nigeria Airways was under 
40 percent (38.7). Of the 7 percent of the Lever Brothers 
workers not in the union, 5 percent were recentiy employed 
workers (some two weeks old, others a month) who had not 
yet decided to join the union. The remaining 2 percent 
were young single female workers who claimed that they 
were not interested in 'any trade union membership business'. 
There is no formal 'closed shop' agreementat Lever Brothers -
indeed, the practice of the closed shop is not yet widely 
established in Nigeria. 
The lower density of union membership at Nigeria 
Airways may partly reflect the higher proportion of female 
455 
Table 13.9 Trade Union Membership 
LEVER BROTHERS NIGERIA AIRWAYS 
% No": : % No", io 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
92.6 
7.4 
1O0.00 
287 
(23) 
310 
38.7 
61 .3 
100.00 
103 
163 
266 
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workers "-" Clerks and typi'sts"• •-• who are traditionally 
less likely to join unions. However, the low density might 
be attributed to the apparent inability of the few union 
officiais found in the 'Airways House' to influence wages 
and working conditions. The interviews suggested that most 
workers would be Willing to join the Airways union and 
contribute their support if it were given an effective 
rôle. Düring the interviews one respondent, a clérical 
officer, a young man in his early thirties from the Western 
part of the country told the interviewer: 
"Oga (boss) you think say we no 
like joinihg trade unions, abi 
we no get eyes to see the things way 
unions de,, do for the pilots and 
the aircraft engineers. The point 
be say we go join unions if they 
"go help us get better pay like 
other workers in the country." 
1 
There is clearly potential support for collective 
bargaining in Nigeria Airways, meanwhile the limited 
influence of the union is reflected in relatively low 
membership. 
An attempt was made to assess the demand for col­
lective bargaining by asking how far trade unions should 
be involved in determining wages. The response showed 
a strong feeling, that union should be committed to col­
lective bargaining at Nigeria Airways, but a less clear 
picture at Lever Brothers [Table 19). As can be seen from 
the table, over 64 percent of the Nigeria Airways employées 
felt that workers should be fully committed in the wage 
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Table 19. Unions and Wage Determination: To what extent do 
you believe that unions should be involved in 
the wage détermination process? 
Company Fully 
committed Commit te d 
Moderately 
committed 
Little 
committed 
No 
commitment 
LBN 4.2 ' 23 .5 51 .9 17.2 3.2 1 
(13) (73) (161) (53) .' c i o r 
Nigeria 
Airways 64.7 21.8 10.5 2.6 0.4 
(172) (58) (28) (7) (1) 
Explanatóry notes: 
1. Percentages 
2. Figures in brackets are actual numbers of workers 
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détermination process, while only 4.2 percent had the same 
feeling at the Lever Brothers. In addition, at Nigeria 
Airways a further 21.8 percent thought that they should 
be committed, while over 10 percent believed that they 
should be moderately committed. Only very few employées 
2.6 and 0.4 percent felt that they should have little 
commitment and no commitment respectively. This contrasts 
sharply with the responses from Lever Brothers, where a 
higher percentage (17.2 and 3.2 percent) of the respondents 
felt that they should have little commitment and no com-
mitment in the wage détermination process respectively. 
The overwhelming support for union involvement in collec-
tive .bargaining shown in the Nigeria.Airways rëflects 
conflict within the workforce over bargaining objectives 
and the performance of the union. 
Management and worker représentatives sometimes 
emphasise différent criteria of wage détermination. 
Management may favour profitability or the range of 
management-oriented criteria employed in job évaluation 
exercises. Union negotiators on the other hand, tend to 
lay emphasis on factors such as working conditions and 
comparability with other groups of workers. Workers 
familiar with collective bargaining could also be expected 
to emphasise thèse criteria. Workers used to having their 
pay determined by centralised methods give priority to 
the needs of efficient management may either reflect manage 
ment-oriented criteria or at least not be familiar with 
normal trade union arguments. The workers were asked 
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C O M P A N Y 
CRITERION LEVER BROTHERS NIGERIA AIRWAYS 
Number of hours worked 2 4 . 8 5 2 . 6 1 ? 
C77) c u o r 
Working conditions ' _:y 
(payscale) 4 . 5 7 . 5 
( 1 4 ) ( 2 0 ) 
Company profitability 7 . 1 1 5 . 0 
( 2 2 ) • ( 4 0 ) 
Comparability with 
similar workers •• 
elsewhere 5 2 . 6 21 .1 
( 1 6 3 ) ;(56) 
Job évaluation 
techniques 1 1 . 0 " 3 . 8 
( 3 4 ) ( 1 0 ) 
Explanatory Notes: 
1 . Percentages 
2 . Figures in brackets-actual numbers of workers 
Table 19.1 Criteria of Wage Détermination: Which should 
be the most important criterion in the déter­
mination of wages? 
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which criterion they thought should be the most imporant 
in 'determining wages, and the results broadly confirmed 
thèse expectations. Lever Brothers employées were aware 
o£ the importance of comparability (Table 19.1). As can 
be seen from the table over 52 percent of the Lever 
Brothers respondents believed that comparability criterion 
should be the most important criterion in the détermination 
of wages. Many Nigeria Airways employées showëd 
themselves to be unaware of the issues by responding that 
hours worked should détermine pay. This appeared to 
reflect a belief that civil servants on similar pay scales 
elsewhere actually worked much shorter hours. The présence 
of a minority (21.1 percent) emphasising comparability is 
accounted for by the fact that the pay of pilots and air-
craft engineers is determined by collective bargaining. 
Next, the employées of the two organisations were 
asked how important it was that workers should be given 
information about their employer Ts financial affairs. The 
use of financial information is an important part of the 
negotiating process. A workforce which values collective 
bargaining can be expected to be interested in the dis-
closure of information. Table 19.2 depicts the responses 
received from the respondents. Both workforces displayed 
a high level of interest in information about their em-
ployers' financial activities. This reflects the présence 
of collective bargaining at LBN and suggests potential 
support for bargaining at Nigeria Airways. However, the 
Nigérian Airways employées showed a higher support for 
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Table 19.2. Disclosure of Information: How important 
is it that workers should be given infor-
mation about the f irm T s f inancial activities ? 
Company Ver y "imp 
portant Important 
Moderate-
ly im­
portant 
Unimpor­
tant 
Very 
Unimpor­
tant 
LBN 41 .9 1 39.4 10.6 6.1 2.0 
Cl 3 0 ) 2 (122) (33) (19) ' (6) 
Nigeria 
Airways 58.6 28 .6 5.6 3.8 3.4 
C156) (76) (15) (10) (9) 
Explanatory Notes: 
1. Percentages 
2. Actual numbers of workers 
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information disclosure. Over 58 percent of the employées 
thought that it was very important, while 28.6 percent 
felt that information disclosure was an important part of 
the negotiating process. A small proportion of the employées 
3.8 and 3.4 percent thought that the use of financial infor-
mation was ùnimportant and very unimportant in the collec-
tive bargaining respect ively". 
CONCLUSION 
Although some of the évidence that emerged from 
issues such as on union involvement and disclosure of 
information reflected 'counter' indications ; the overall 
picture remained the same - that is, one of support for 
the hypothesis. 
THE MIDDLE MANAGERS HYPOTHESIS 
In summary, the middle managers hypothesis states: 
"Middle managers in the companies or 
industries under collective bargain-
ing arrangements have a greater sensé 
of belônging, achievement and self-
actualisation . " 
Essentially, to find support for this hypothesis , it would 
be necessary to demonstrate that more Lever Brothers Ltd 
middle managers have a feeling of self-fulfilment and 
achievement than the Nigérian Airways middle managers. 
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Table 19.3. Ach i e veinent, and Self-Fui filment Thinking 
of your présent job - the pay, responsibili-
t ies and opportunities (a dvancement) how rdo 
you perçoive it? Do you feel within yourself 
any sensé of" self-fulfilment? 
Company Very strong 
sensé of 
fulfil­
ment 
Strong 
self-ful-
f ilment 
Moderate 
self-ful-
filment 
> 
Little 
self-ful-
_f àlmen t 
No self 
fulfil--
ment 
LBN 66.7 16.7 10.0 3.3 3.3 1 
(20) (5) (3) (1) ( D 2 
Nigeria 
Airways 10 • 3.3 13.3 20.0 53.3 
(3) (1) (4) (6) (16) 
Explanàtory Notes: 
1. Percentages 
2. Actual numbers of workers 
464 
The main source of évidence was through the unstruc-
tured interviews. Middle and senior managers in both 
organisations as well as officiais from other institutions 
such as the trade unions and government departments were 
given unstructured interviews, hence the little statis-
tical information presented to support the hypothesis. 
Organisations motivate their managers through 
various ways. This could take the form of higher pay, and 
better conditions of service as well as other fringe 
benefits - long holidays etc' . It could be by giving the 
managers more challenging responsibilities - allowing 
them to take certain operational décisions within their 
units. In addition, the organisation could provide 
opportunities for advancement. Surely, in organisations 
where there are no opportunities for job advancement, 
higher responsibilities and good financial reward, managers 
are less likely to have feeling of self-fulfilment and 
àchievement. 
The middle managers in both organisations were asked 
how they felt about their jobs, if they had sensé of self-
fulfilment and àchievement and their replies recorded on 
a five point scale (Table 19.3). As can be seen from the 
table,^levels of feelings of self-fulfilment and àchieve­
ment is clearly higher among Lever Brothers middle managers 
than In Nigeria Airways. Over 66 percent of the middle 
managers at Lever Brothers indicated that they had a very 
strong sensé of self-fulfilment and àchievement, while 
only 10 percent indicated in the Nigeria Airways Ltd. 
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Again, during the interviews one-of the Lever Brothers 
middle managers named Hycinth Nwaogbo an electrical engin-
eer who has been in the LBN service for six years told the 
researcher: 
"To be candid insofar as my présent 
job is concerned I am satisfied 
both with the pay, the responsi-
bility attached and its challenges. 
I have a very strong feeling that 
ail my expectations were being 
met." 
When a similar question was put to (Mr. Uwalukehi assistant 
personnel officer in charge of (NSD) Non-Soapy Detergent 
workers he responded: 
"I have no illusions as far as my 
présent job is concerned; it has 
provided me with ali my immediate 
requirements as a young man - I 
have a nice car, on good wages, 
: live in a fiat, and happily married. 
Besides, very often than not I 
\ take operational décisions within 
my unit, and can leave the office at 
any time without queries from my 
immediate boss. So there you are, 
tell me if you were in my 'shoes' 
wouldn't you have that feeling of 
self-fulfilment in you." 
In contrast, a personnel officer in the Nigeria Airways, 
a young man in his late thirties responded when a similar 
questign was asked to him: 
"Old boy, forget about this 
concept of seif-fulfilment and 
achievement here in Nigeria 
Airways, because not even a 
manager of my rank can teil you 
that he or she is statisfied with 
his or her.job, let alone to talk 
of self-fulfilment and achievement. 
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Hbw can your job. be fulfiling 
when after paying your brothers 
school fees you find it diffi-
cult to buy a gallon of petrol 
for your car. How can a sensé 
of achievement corne across your 
mind when you have no opportu-
nities to test your perso.\nal 
initiatives. To be sincere, I 
have no such feeling of self-
fulfilment of achievement at the 
moment." 
Furthermore, when the same question was put to the 
Accountant in charge of ground personnel wages, he told 
the researcher: 
"Self-fulfilment and achievement 
you must be joking. You know 
too well as a manager, that there 
are certain expectations such as 
opportunities for advancement, 
higher responsibilities, good 
pay and good working conditions, 
and challenging opportunities 
to test ones judgement, which 
must be évident in a job before 
a manager can start talking of 
self-fulfilment and self-actuali-
zation. As far as I am concerned, 
my présent job does not offer 
such opportunities - the pay is 
poor, working conditions atracious 
and opportunities for self-
initiatives nil. Unless we 
middle managers in the airline are 
dece'iving; ourselves, I can assure 
you there is nothing like a 
feeling of self-fulfilment or 
achievement among us. Références 
of self-fulfil! ment and self-
actualisation would be appropriate 
when you are talking to managers 
in other airlines such as the 
British Caledonian and the Pan-
American Airlines (Pan-Am) not 
Nigeria Airways managers." 
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CONCLUSION 
Surely, the évidence from the study support the notion 
that middle managers in the companies or industries under 
collective bargaining arrangements have a greater sensé of 
belonging and achievement than managers in industries where 
wages and other conditions of service are centrally deter-
mined through government.appointed wage tribunals or 
commissions. It must be concluded therefore that thëre is 
a high degree of validity in the middle managers hypothesis. 
(B) THE HYPOTHESES REVIEWED 
Ali the four hypothèses tabled above supported the 
general hypothesis developed for this study which states that 
'in Nigeria industries or companies using'the collective 
bargaining process for the détermination of their workers 
rémunérations have a lower strike incidence, labour turnover, 
lower absentéeism rate and enjoy higner productivity. There 
is'no reason to believe that thèse organisations, Nigérian 
Airways and the Lever Brothers' workers are untypical. The 
ambiguous organisational position of middle managers is the 
main influence, though the différences between the levels of 
satisfaction is significant but probably relate to other 
aspects of the organisation. 
What brief conclusion can then be drawn from the 
above results. It can be concluded that the study 
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revealed support, actual and potential for a wage 
détermination System in which workers themselves have 
a say in décisions that affect their working lives in 
both organisations. The history of collective bar- : 
gaining at the XBN may indicate a greater "responsiveness 
of that organisation to its workers and managers, 
which may underlie their attitudes. But this does not 
contradict the significance of the worker attitudes 
and the actual and potential support for collective 
bargaining as revealed in the two organisations. 
REFERENCES 
The respondent was speaking in what we call 'Broken 
or Pidgin Language in Nigeria, which is commonly used 
in most offices and market places. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
WAGE POLICY AND ECQNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
8.17 A General Preview/objectives o£ Wage Policy 
During the course of the field work, the researcher 
became increasingly aware of the anomalies in terms of the 
"mismatch" between educational qualifications and job. 
Conséquently, a chapter drawing on the évidence of the 
research on the question of wage structure, income 
distribution and the allocation of labour has been 
included in this thesis. This gives a number of insights 
on the efficiency of the wage payment system in dealing 
with the question of labour allocation and économie 
development, and raises the question whether the wage 
payment system is the suitable vehicle for handling major 
problems in thèse areas in a developing Society. This 
chapter, therefore, sets out to examine the objectives of 
wage policy and to appraise the Nigeria wage structure in 
the light of the above issues - labour allocation effi-' 
ciency and équitable income distribution. 
In gênerai, the objectives of a wage policy vary 
from country to country and dépends also on the 
country's social System and économie structure. In 
Nigeria, for example, during the colonial administration, 
when the "family system" 1 made if difficult for rural worke 
"to accept wage ' employment, the object'of wage policy then 
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was the 'need' to establish appropriate gênerai level 
of wages to attract thèse rural workers to wage 
employment. Also during these periods, income levels 
were generally so low that there was an understandable 
préoccupation with fixing wages at least sufficient 
enough to sustain a minimum acceptable standard of ';. 
living. In essence, it was not a matter of giving due 
considération to the basic human needs of workers 
(that is providing the living"wage" as provided by 
the ILO's 1919 constitution), rather it was viewed as 
necessary from the point of view of 'industrial 
development'. That is, to ensur.e that workers were 
adequately motivated and physically fit to perform 
their jobs with reasonable efficiency. 
However, in récent years, concerns with achieving 
'integrated' employment opportunities have resulted in 
a shift in emphasis in policy discussions with regard to 
wage lëvels in gênerai. Attention now is being placed 
on the need to maintain a reasonable relationship 
between urban wage levels and the incomes earned in other 
sections of the community in particular the self-employed 
in agriculture and related activities. Also there 
has been a tendeney to lay greater emphasis on the 
economic conséquences of higher gênerai wage levels. 
472 
Thus, much attention has now been given to the 
capacity of the domestic economy to meet foreign 
compétition at home and export markets, and to provide 
productive employment opportunities for a growing 
labour force that is often dominated by unemployment 
and under-employment. 
Often, the practical problem confronting a 
government (,in particular , in developing countries 
with vulnérable économies) does not usually présent 
itself so much in the form of the question: "What would 
be optimum gênerai wage levels for the country? 
but rather "What room is there for wage increases in 
the situation which the country finds itself this 
2 
year? Particularly, if the -country is battling with 
high unemployment, low industrial output, balance of 
payment difficulties and galloping inflation which such 
wage increase if not linked to productivity 
would only help to aggravate. For a country under 
such économie pressure the question of contemplating 
wage increases become remote. 
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In any case, this does not imply that government 
necessarily favour equal rates of- increases for ail 
incomes. They usually do not. Because to a greater extent 
increases or réductions in 'income' dépend on the government's 
économie priorities within that period. For example, 
a government might décide that the average wage incomes 
be encouraged to increase faster than the average of ail 
other incomes because wages were too low for basic needs 
or because the share of national income being allocated 
to entrepreneurs and land owners was more than was necessary 
to call forth a sufficient supply of enterprise and capital 
investmènt. On the other hand, with Urban unemployment posing 
as the most serious social and économie problem (in most 
developing countries), it might be decided that in the 
national interest 'wage incomes should rise more slowly 
than the average of ail incomes for a given period of 
time. This measure, it is assummed would then help signi-
ficantly to reduce the Tural-urban incomes, and its atten-
dant urban migration, as well as to increase the rate of 
savings and employment generating investmènt. In other 
words, in this circumstances priority has been given to 
the provision of productive employment for the unemployed 
over the raising of the real incomes of those already 
employed. 
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Even where a policy of wage restraint is in force 
because of certain macro-economie difficulties, wage 
policies are usually designed in such a way to ensure that 
wage earners receive an appropriate share of the 'national 
cake'. At the very ieast they are designed to ensure that 
money wage increases keep pace with cost of living increases, 
so as to maintain real wage incomes particularly for 
the lowest paid workers. The exceptions to this pattern -
being when a country is facing severe economie problems 
such as galloping inflation and perhaps most importantly 
a declinihg national income resulting from a drop in 
export earnings. A situation which Nigeria found herself 
in the first quarter of 1982 - falling oil revenue; result-
ing in severe wage policy measures. But often when such 
exceptional circumstances arise wage policies are usually 
directed towards an even spread of the costs or sacrifices 
that have to be made. 
The objective of a wage policy with respect to 
changes in the structure of wageswhich is the focus of 
this discussion may be divided into two inter-related 
types: 
(a) Equity and; 
(b) allocative or economie efficiency. 
Concerns for greater equity are manifested by the wide-
spread support given to relatively large wage increases 
by most governments for the low paid workers. Thèse com-
paratively large increases have either been granted on 
sélective basis to certain groups of low paid workers 
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or have been given to ali unskilled or semi-skilled workers 
in order to bridge the earnings gap between high and iow 
paid workers, and most'importantly to enable the latter 
to maintain a certain minimum living standard. 
However, the use of wage policy as a general instru-
ment for redistributing income is limited by the fact that 
in the developing countries where it is often used, the • 
proprotion of wage earners relative to the working popula-
tion is usually very small. For example, in Nigeria only 
about 4-5 percent of the population are wage earners. 
Similarly, in Ghana below 15 percent of the workforce are 
reported to be wage earners This ::apparent drawback 
raises some doubts over the use of wage policy to achieve 
this distributive function in such économies." Moreover, 
theTe exists a wide gap between the living 
standards of the rural workers (farmers, self-employed 
persons) and the workers in the modem sector; and the 
former endures the lowest living. Normally wage.policy 
(even when armed with its potential instrument - minimum 
wage régulation) , is incapable of being used to raise the 
1iving standard of workers in the rural areas, because 
rural economie relationships are usually not often 
"monetised", and are often of the 'consumption1 kind. 
Even if the economie relationships were to have 
some measure of monetary value attached to them, the mere 
fact that thèse rural workers (farmers) are not organised 
in any meaningful manner means that they would not be 
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covered by the "minimum wage scheme" and this in no doubt 
renders the 'protective' objective ineffective. Aziz put 
this point as follows: 
"Even were rural labour incomes 
are received as money, the lack of 
organisation of rural workers 
means that they are often not 
covered by a minimum wage' scheme, 
and where they are, administrative 
weaknesses in rural areas limit 
the effectiveness of this p r o t e c t i o n . * • 
Consequently, it is argued that perhaps the best"instrument 
for raising the lowest living standards is the 'fiscal 
instrument' (even though its efficacy is often limited by 
administrative deficiencies which tend to make it basically 
regressive) rather than through the wage policy and its 
minimum wage instrument. One way of using fiscal instru­
ment to raise living standards is by granting 'food 
subsidies' to those in the poverty line and similar members 
of'the community. 
As regards allocative or economie efficiency, the 
objective is to adapt wage structure in such a way to provide 
adequate incentives for workers to acquire needed skills 
and be able to take jobs in areas where labour is in short 
supply; and to move away from those areas where unemployment 
and underemployment are concentrated. An example of a 
situation where wage structure can provide the necessary 
incentive for labour to move from one area to another is 
for instance where a country concentrated most of her 
capital investments in a particular area (ie in the capital 
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city), which>usually results in migration from other 
areas to that city in search of emplòyment. In order to 
move away from this capital city to other parts of the 
country where labour is in demand, special wage rates and 
allowances are offered by the government as an incentive 
to those wo'rkers who elect to move. It is important to 
note that more often than not thèse objectives conflict. 
For instance, most governments usually find themselves in 
quandry over dee is ions affec t ing wage increases and un-
employment problems. Should wages be ìncreased in order 
to act as an incentive for 'labour mobility' but at a 
cost to emplòyment prospects? Or should wages be moderated 
in order not to 'price oneself out of job' but at an expense 
to the allocative efficiency of labour? Thèse are some of 
the conflicting issues usually associated with thèse objec-
tives in an economy. 
However, since the equity objective relates to the 
degree to which the pay structure conforms to the task of 
équitable income distribution, and allocative efficiency 
with pay structure acting as ah incentive mechanism for 
labour allocation, it would be in place to appraise the 
Nigérian pay structure in the light of thèse objectives. 
Questions such as: is the pay structure efficient as an 
incentive mechanism for allocating labour between sectors 
of the economy for acquiring scarce skill vital for econo-
mie development? And is the pay structure geared 
towards achieving équitable income distribution to increase 
the living standards of the lowest paid workers would be 
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examined and reasons for successes or failures discussed. 
We shall also at the end make a set of proposais. 
->7 .18 AN ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIAN PERFORMANCE AND SUGGESTION 
'{&) pay. Structure and-'Labou'f Allocative Efficiericy. " "•' 
•In".ohaptèr ' one we noted- that dif f erent ials in 
Nigeria were very- wide. For example, we found "Permanent 
secretaries receiving 15 times as much as 'lift attendants/, 
skilled manual labourer receiving six times as much as 
the unskilled labourer and the gap between rural-urban 
incomes as wide as ever. Hence, it is plausible to regard 
thèse large differentials as being adequate incentives for 
the acquisition of skills in Nigeria. In "1 962 , the 
Federai Minister of Economie Development stated that one 
of the nations 1 objectives was to ensure that: 
"the right number of workers with 
the right qualifications and tech-
nical skills are available at the 
appropriate places to permit 
implementation of our development 
plan and to meet the needs of 
private industry." 
5 
It is tempting to assume on the basis of the 
Minister's statement that the prevailing large differential 
are part of a general strategy for achieving rapid 
economie development, since a country requires the services 
of 'skilled manpower very desperately a't the early stages 
of its development. However, such an assumption might be 
premature. In that, as can be inferred from the previous 
discussions, the use of wage structure as an incentive 
479 
for achieving efficient labour allocation has never been 
a major policy considération in the détermination of wages 
and salaries in Nigeria. Moreover, the apparent absence 
of job évaluation, work measurement, motion-time study and 
related vital tools for wage assessment, and the considér-
able relative influence of institutional vis-a-vis economie 
factors in major pay changes are évidence in support of 
this assertion. It is not surprising, therefore that 
the 'pay structure' is not entirely satisfactory as an 
incentive generating instrument. The system suffers 
from two defects. 
Firstly, the differentials are not sufficiently , 
discriminatory. This means that ail catégories of high 
level"manpower enjoy a high degree of pay premium over 
the low-level manpower even though there is a considérable 
variation in their searcity. There are some catégories 
of high-level manpower which are in surplus, supply in 
the labour market,^ but this relative over-capacity is 
hardly reflected in the levels of pay. For example, in 
the civil service the number of suitable applicants for 
the post of administrative officer has out-stripped 
ava il ab 1 c vacane ie s, wi th. the re sul t that greater emphasis 
is placed on the 'quality of the applicants to be sêlected 
than on the level of pay. The converse of this situation 
being that other high-level man power posts become very 
difficult to fili, because of the lack of incentives. 
Examples of such posts include: the post of technical 
college tutors , engineers, scientists , doctors - veterinarians 
and agronomists.^ '• Yet attempts have not been made to 
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solve this problem of 'criticai skill' shortage by the 
provision of incentives. 
The main role of 'differentials' is to ensure that 
the flow of skills are consistent with demands for them. 
This rôle assumes crucial importance where as in Nigeria 
few proper 'machinery' for controlling the supply of high-
level manpower right from its very source of supply exist; 
for example, by allocating students regardless of their 
ethnie or tribal backgrounds to particular courses or 
institutions. Surely, in só far as the system of 
'generalised' differentials in Nigeria encourages people 
to acquire skills already in abundant supply, and falls 
short of giving a distinct advantage to skills in short 
supply, it cannot be claimed to have fulfilled its allo­
cative function. 
\ A second defect of the existing wage structure in 
Nigeria which has had the effect of limiting its role as 
an incentive for acquiring needed skills, is the.large 
differentials existing between the middle and the high-
level manpower. Indeed, the Ashby Commission in 1960 
did not hesitate to point out this defect. The commission 
noted in the following comments: 
"In terms of their need and use-
fulness for society the differ-
entials in compensation and per-
quisites between university 
graduâtes and highly skilled 
non-university graduâtes (in 
the intermediate high-level 
manpower category) are much too 
great. As a conséquence relatively 
few young persons are satisfied 
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to become or remain engineering 
technicians , medicai te clinic ians , 
works foremen, junior agricultural 
officers and qualified (but not 
graduate) teachers." 
8 
The unwillingness to enter and remain as an intermediate 
level manpower by thèse young men seems to be founded. 
Since with a little more years of training (éducation) 
one can easily join those in the high-income bracket -
(high-level manpower). To illustrate the irrationality of 
the gap it may be worthwhile to consider the salary and 
educational requirements of two posts in the Federai 
Ministry of Agriculture - on the one hand, the agricultural 
officer on level 08, and on the other the agricultural 
assistant,'Faucity of h'à'.rd core évidence 1 have made this 
type of illustration inévitable. 
The years of éducation for the post of an agricultural 
officer on salary grade level 08 is usually 14 years, 
made up of à" years in secondary school, 6 years in 
elementary school and three years in the university. 
On the other hand, the agricultural assistant (AA) had 12 
years of éducation - 6 years in elementary school, 5 in 
secondary school and 1 year for the AA course at a farm 
settlement. Thus only 2 years of éducation séparâtes the 
two posts. However, while the agricultural officer is on 
salary grade level 08 that is about N3,264 Naira (in cash 
térms) per annum, the agricultural assistant is on salary 
grade level 04 or 05 or N1,164 Naira per annum. Since only2 
years of éducation seperates the two posts, the size of 
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the gap (almost 3:1) in their incomes can hardly be justi-
fied by foregone earnings of the additional 
•years of éducation by the agricultural officer. 
Nor can the gap be justified on the grounds of private 
costs of the latter'.'s additional éducation since in general, 
higher éducation is heavily subsidized in Nigeria. For 
example, in 19 76/77 and 1977/78, the average récurrent 
subsidy per student in the collèges of technology was 
N2873 and N2562 Naira respectively; while corresponding 
9 
levels in the universities were N4874 and N5130 Naira. 
No doubt, the effect of such marked differential 
(as stated above) is to discourage young people from 
entering or remaining in the lower cadre of the high-
level jobs. Go-ldway in his report put the point as 
follows: 
. - "Two reason for the low level of 
\ estèein for sub-professional 
éducation lies in the salary 
structure, and the gap between 
professional and sub-professional 
men". 
10 
Furthermore, it was stated that one of the main -
reasons why some of the targets projected in the first 
national development pian 1962-68 could not be implemented 
"was the lack or inadequacy of executive manpower", and 
it was mainly .the middle grade officers that were lacking. 
Also the third national development pian 1975-80 was at 
a certain stage thought to be in jeopardy because of the 
shortage of "executive manpower" in the civil service, and 
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ït turns ont to be the "middle grade executive" man-power that 
was mainly lacking.'^ A major factor in this inadequacy, as we 
have suggested is the lack o£ proper differentiation. For 
as Lins observed: 
"If wages are properly differentiated 
there will be a better balance 
between demand and supply of labour 
in occupations, industries and other 
sectors of the labour market."^ 
The inability of the Nigérian wage structure to per-
forili very satisfactorily the allocative objective stems 
from the fact that it was never designed for this purpose 
in the first place. In general, and as an alternative to 
an effective wage system over the years the emphasis has 
been on the provision of increased educational and training 
facilities. In fact, many of the commissions appointed 
immediately after politicai independence have had éducation 
and training programmes in their catalogue of recommen-
dations. For example, in 1960, the Asby Commission made 
a strong recomtnendation for the establishment of an inter-
régional manpower board for the purpose of assessing man-
power needs and to formulate programmes for effective 
manpower development throughout the country on a continuous 
basis. Realising that the assessment of manpower problems 
in the country would resuit in failure without due références 
to wage and salary levels and the incentive they would 
provide for productive employment the commission recommended 
that: 
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"a major task of the inter-regional 
manpower board should be to review 
wages and salary structure for 
high-level manpower and to make 
appropriâte recommendations to the 
govenrments for such revisions as 
are in the interests of accelerating 
the country's économie growth". 
14 
Although the main recommendations of the commission 
were accepted by the government and ' . . subsequently the 
National Manpower Board was set up,what the Ashby Commission 
regarded as a 'major-task' of the manpower - the review of 
wages and salaries on continuing basis - was not specifi-
cally included in the board's terms of référence, as 
reflected below. The board's terms of référence as approved 
by the National Economie Council and by both Fédéral and 
Regional governments were thus: 
"The détermination of the nations 
needs in ail occupations; formu-
\ lating for considération of the 
National Economie Council and the 
governments of the fédération pro­
grammes for manpower development 
through university expansion and 
training, scholarships, fellowships 
and other facilities and co-
ordinating the policies and acti-
vities of the fédéral and régional 
missionaries primarily concerned 
with employment and the optimum 
utilization of the nations 
manpower resources." 
15 
Educational expansion programmes embarked by the various 
governments in the fédération and manpower planning by the 
manpower board have ail been implemented without due consi­
dération of the need to harmonize them with an effective 
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wage structure. After ali, occupational demand projections, 
educational programmes and wage differentials policy are 
logically inter-dependent and should be treated as part of 
an integrated policy in order to be more effective. Just 
as Harison noted in his wòrk: 
"a primary condition for solution 
of.ìall manpower problems whether 
they be criticai skill bottlenecks 
in the modernising sector or mounting 
labour surpluse.s > throughout the 
nation is the building of appro-
priate incentives. Lacking this, 
massive expenditure on training and 
education will contribute little to 
accelerate development. n 
16 
Undoubtedly, this primary factor-incentive-as we argued 
earlier in the discussion has been conspicuously missing 
from the country's long-term manpower plans hence/ it is 
hardly surprising therefore that such wide gaps in skill 
supplies exist in the country. 
Much of the discussion has concentrated on the 
function of the wage structure as an instrument for man-
power allocation to various occupations. The need for a 
rational wage structure is even of greater importance from 
the point of view of allocating labour amcng the various 
sectors of the economy particularly between the rural-
urban sectors. There is a consensus, that the rural-
urban migration with its attendent urban unemployment 
poses the most serious social and economie problem in 
Nigeria today. This is a problem indicated earlier in 
section three, the unplanned rapid expansion of primary 
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éducation has done much to excercebate. It has been 
observed that there are two main causes of rural-urban 
drift particularly in the developing countries: 
(a) the level of disparity in incomes ; 
1 7 
(b) the opportunities for non-agricultural jobs. 
In Nigeria it is a combination of both reasons, although 
the latter appears to be the major reason for the drift. . 
For ih a recent study carried out by the Human Resources 
Unit of the university of Lagos, it was found that the 
dominant reason for migrating to Lagos, the capital 
city related to economie opportunity, at the forefront 
employment. Employment related reasons according to the 
study accounted for over hàlf of ali the reasons given, 
43.35 percent of the respondehts stated that they came to 
1 g 
Lagos to look for job. It is, thus possible to hypothe-
size that 'the immediate cause of 'migration1 from the 
rural areas lies mainly in the différent economie oppor­
tunities such as the large gap in the earnings of the rural 
and urban workers. 1. 
Although statistical évidence in support of this 
hypothesis might be very difficult to corne by because 
of paucity of refined data; nonetheless, tentative conclu­
sions can stili be drawn on the basis of few empirical 
studies carried out in Nigeria few years ago in addition 
to the study cited above. In a study of rural-urban 
migration in Western Nigeria, Olusanya found that the 
"possibility of earning more money than can ever be 
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earned in primitive agriculture was by far the most 
1 9 
important reason. In conclusion he argued that it 'is 
almost inescapable that the migration of rural dwellers 
to the towns is to be attributed largely to the response 
to 'pushes' and 'pulls' of economie adversity and 
' 2 0 
opportunity." 
In addition, the response which the researcher got 
from the newly employed luggage handlers, in the Nigeria 
Airways seems to support the hypothesis. In that, over 
75 percent of this category of workers claimed that they 
joined Nigeria Airways because the money income they were 
getting in the villages was not enough. Some claimed that 
their monthly 'money income' couldn't even buy them a pair 
of trousers. During the interviews one young Luggage 
Handler in his early twenties from 'OTTA' a village fifty 
kilometers fronn'.Lagos toldj the researcher . 
i 
\ 
"Boss the cash we make in the 
village in a month is not usually 
enough to cover the cost * of a 
pair of shoes and a khakì short. <\. " 
Whereas with the monthly wages 
of most of my colleagues in Lagos 
they can afford to buy 'suits' 
and even radios." 
Furthermore, the hypothesis is supported by some 
government statements òn the behaviour of certain primary 
produets made few years after politicai independence. 
For example, in 1964, the Eastern Nigeria Ministry of 
Finance and Economie Planning observed that: 
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"Palm oi1 production was below 
that of previous year. Buying 
prices for palm produce were 
lower, discouraging the farmers. 
It was noticeable that the move-
ment away from the land continued." 
21 
No doubt, the présent rural-urban migration in Nigeria is 
a rational economic reaction to the large differentials 
in potential earnings. The young school leaver can hardly 
be expected to enter into agriculture until the incomes 
and related issues of those in it compares favourably with 
those of other workers in the urban area. Surely, a sig-
nificant improvement in the 'lot 1 of farmers is crucial 
if farming is to attract young school leavers. Because 
as the ILO mission to Western Nigeria pointed out in 1967, 
"No young person, once having 
been to school and gained even 
a slight success in the changes 
induced by éducation will want 
to consider the low and uncertain 
income of peasant farming?2 
22 
The présent mounting urban unemployment in the 
country discussed in chapter one makes a multi-dimension 
attack on this issue - (migration) very necessary. Since 
the scale of the urban-uncmploymcnt is such that only a 
small fraction of the many thousands of job seekers can be 
absorbéd into urban wage-employment^tne only effective policy 
option would appear to lie in making agriculture; more compé-
titive and more rewarding. This can best be attained by 
skillful manipulât ion of rural-urban incarne differentiation, 
which among other things calls for the 
establishment of a diffèrential that can only be 
/ • 
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justified by the différences in the cost of living or 
other economie factors. However, as noted earlier in the 
discussion, in practice, efforts have not been geared 
to use the 'wage system' to effect labour mobility in 
Nigeria. It is understandable therefore, why the rural-
urban migration has remained unabated twenty years after 
politicai indèpendence in the country. Because, it is 
évident that 'when real wages are very much above the income 
of the traditional sector the search for wage employment 
may cause excessive migration from rural areas to the 
towns." 2 3 -
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it can be 
strongly argued that the Nigeria pay structure is 
'defective' as an instrument for allocating labour to 
various sectors of the economy for rapid economie develop-
ment. This does not mean that there is no scope for 
im'provement, no doubt with proper wage policy which will 
among other things re-assess; the issue of 'centralised 
system' of wage détermination, the pay structure"would 
perform its allocative rôle. This issue of 'ideal pay 
structure' would be treated in due course. In the meantime, 
attempts would be made to examine the pay structure in 
relation to income distribution; for since it is not so 
successful as an instrument for allocating labour, it 
might be successful as a vehicle for proper income dis-
tribution. 
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PAY STRUCTURE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION 
Inchapter-. one it was observed that in récent years 
skill and occupational differentials have tended to 
become compressed through séries of government wage policy 
instruments such as the national minimum wage and the 
annual incomes guidelines. Surely, on the basis of thèse 
developments in the 'wage differential scène', it can 
easily be assumed that the issue of 'income inequality' 
was no longer a problem in Nigeria. This kind of assump-
tion.might be highly prématuré. In the first place, a 
System which allows one wage earner to earn 15 times as 
much as fellow wage earner can hardly be sàid to possess 
any élément of equity. Secondly, one needs more than 
just the trend in differentials to disc'uss something 
tentative about changes in the distribution of income. 
Particularly, it is essential to have a good idea about 
the percentage of workers in each income group, as well 
as a sample which is représentative enough (usually for 
the whole country) for généralisations to be made. 
Unfortunately, this discussion is déficient of data along 
such lines (in particûlar représentative sample) to carry 
out the exercise for the whole country. Consequently, 
two 'states' in the country have been selected - Bendel 
and Western states where relevant statistical information 
are in acceptable proportions. 
491 
Table 20. Income Distribution Among Wage/Salary 
Earners in Benin City, Bendel State, 1975. 
Income Range 
K (Naira) Nümbe r 
Percentage 
Number 
Percentage 
Income 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
Under 400 72 1:4 . 7 4.8 • ,,4.8 
400-800 115 23.6 11.5 16.3 
801-1,200 145 29.7 24'ïOO 40.3 
1 ,201 -1 ,600 73 15.0 17.0 57.3 
1 ,601 -2 ,000 35 7.2 10.5 67.8 
2,001-4,000 29 5.9 14.5 82.3 
4,001-6,000 13 2.7 10.1 93.0 
6f,:001 and over 6 1 .2 7.0 100.00 
- . 488 100 100 
Source: Population, Employment and Living Conditions in 
in Benin July-October 1975 cited in the Political 
Economy of the Income Distribution in Nigeria, 
edited "by -piejomaoh , et al. , 1981. 
Explanatory Notes: 
A ^ i. ü I 1 U t, Q J. J U L f . I 
Average Income = N1361 
Modal Income = N1,000 
Median Income = N1,285, N = 488 
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The choice of thèse two states is arguable. It 
might be argued that since the exercise was based on two 
states only that the sample is not représentative enough. 
Another limitation might stem from the f.act that the 
sample covered people in wage income mainly. In addition, 
the relatively few number o£ years covered in particular 
for table 20 does not provide adéquate grounds for proper 
comparative analysis to be made it might be argued. 
But, as we noted earlier in the discussion,the choice is 
justified because of paucity of information covering the 
whole country. What'smore, we have reasonable grounds to 
believe that what obtained in Bendel and Western States 
would be replica of the position of things in the other-
remaining seventeen states in the Fédération as previous 
studies on the same issue have demonstrated. ^ 
However, inspitc of thèse, defects, something very 
illuminating about income distribution in Nigeria can be 
inferred from Table 20., The table shows the increasing 
disparity between the high and low paid employées" in the 
income range. It can be seen from the table that those 
earning less than N2,000 Naira who accounts for about 
90.2 percent of the wage and salary earners in Bénin 
city controls about 68 percent of the city rs total income. 
While at the other extrême, about 4 percent (3.9) of 
employ ces in the N4 ,000 and above income range earned 
17.1 percent of the total Income in Bénin in 1975. 
Furthermore, it can be noted from the same table that the 
modal income is N1,000 Naira, the médian N1285 Naira and 
the average income N1361 Naira. 
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Table -? O . t . Ru ra 1-urban Percentage Distribution of 
Earnings 1968-1977. 
Sector 1968 1969 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Rural 
Urban 
'23.04 
76.96 
24.85 
75.15 92.40 
18.28 
81.72 
14.93 
85.07 93.55 
20.77 
79.23 
37.29 
62.71 
Source : 0. Oladipo and A.A. Adesin - Income distribution in 
the rural sector cited in the political economy 
of income distribution in Nigeria by Henry Biener 
and V.O. Diejomaoh Holms & Meier N. York, 1981, 
Table 9.7, p. 306.' 
i 
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However, the extent to which a country's income 
distribution is equitable cannot be enquired by the dis-
tribution of income within the wage class alone. Moreso 
in a country like Nigeria where wage earners constitute 
a small proportion of the total workforce. Thus, a more 
objective approach for this nature of inference should 
be the sectoral or inter-class income distribution, for 
example, the income distribution between the wage and 
non-wage earning classes. In fact, much of the recent 
government statement on equitable income distribution 
relate not only to the income of the wage earners but 
also to the various classes in the community particularly 
the income distribution between the agriculturai (farmers) 
2 5 
community and the urban (wage earning) community. 
It. is therefore essential to look into the ihcome dis-
tribution between these two classes,- the wage and non-
wage earners. Table 20.1 shows the rural-urban percentage 
distribution of earnings between 1968-1977, in the Western 
States of Nigeria (now divided into three states Ondo, 
Oyo and Oqun. 
It is evident from the table that the urban sector 
(the wage-earners) received a disproportionate share of 
the earnings. Take for example, in 1974, the aggregate 
earnings for the rural sector /(non-wage earners) amounted 
to approxìmately 15 percent, while the urban sector 
share of the earnings was 85 percent; a ration of 5*7:1. 
No doubt, as can be seen ffom the table, 1974 was not an 
isolated case, for in the previous years the distribution 
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picture have been the same. The apparent changes in the 
'earnings gap' (the gap between the 'pay' of the two sectors) 
since 1977 were as a conséquence of the catalogue of local 
government reforms which were introduced in December 1976. 
They were purely temporary measures,for no sooner the 
civilian administration took over in 1979 with new 
national minimum wage 'package1 than the 'gap' was restored 
to its pre-1977 picture. This uneven distribution between 
thèse two classes has further highlighted the degree of 
inequâlity in the country's income distribution system 
noted earlier in the discussion. On the basis of thèse 
findings one may conclude that even the recent changes 
in wages and salaries (for example, the Udoji and Adebo 
Wage/Salary Awards) brought about by the sharp rise in oil 
revenue have not succeeded in creating a more équitable income _ 
distribution either within:;.the wage-earning class or 
between the various economie classes. As an instrument 
for achieving the è'galitarian goal, the wage system has 
at best been relatively ineffective and at worst been 
counter^product ive. 
In a country where employment-is insighificant in tenus of compositions
 f 
changes in einrjl.'oyment income might not "be the right" instrument for 
redistributing income equitably. Even if there exists 
a scope for using the pay structure to effect a significant 
change in income distribution, it is stili very doubtful 
whether the structure should be allocated this function. 
This is mainly because of the urgent need to encourage 
labour to acquire needed skill and move into strategie 
industries essential to rapid economie development. 
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Therefore, this might necessitate the use of 'incentive 
payment' even though such a skill might not be at the 
bottom of the occupational pay hierarchy and the industries 
not classified~among the low-wage industries. Again to 
assign 'pay structure' this income distributive function 
may diminish its efficacy as an instrument for allocating 
labour into various occupations and sectors of the 
economy, for promòting economie development. It is 
therefore essential that the goal of équitable ineorne 
distribution be hàndled and achieved through other policy 
instruments such as the 'fiscal' instrument, (taxation) 
and subsidy as we noted earliér. No doubt a skilful use 
of thèse instruments would go along way to redressing the 
existing imbalance between the urban labour aristocrasts 
(top wage-earners) and the^.bûlk^of-\the masses imbeded in 
subsistence agriculture in the villages. But in the 
words of a récent international symposium on wage policy 
issues in economie development -
" "the primary goal of wage policy 
in developing countries should 
be the promotion of economie 
development." 
26 
But the problem is that in Nigeria as well as most 
other developing countries wage policy is never geared to 
the needs of economie development. It was noted in the 
symposium referred to above that although more than twenty 
African countries including Nigeria have formulated deve-
lopment plâns'major surveys of them fail to contain a 
27 
single référence of wages or wage policies." 
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The danger to economie development of" the présent 
position in Nigeria is too obvious. The country ean hardly 
attain its state.d poliey objectives which among other 
things include achievement o£.sustained economie growth, 
if wage poliey issues were not accorded the importance 
they desire in the development strategy. After ali, the 
speed of economie development dépends not only on capital 
formation (addit ions to machin e ry, buildings e te . ) it 
involves also an adequate supply of human capital in 
occupations and sectors where they are urgently required. 
That there is an urgent need in Nigeria to incorporate 
wage poliey in the government's list of poliey instruments 
for achieving rapid economie development can hardly be 
denied. 
The urgency of the need becomes e-ven more apparent 
if one realises that economie development can only be 
achieved" in an atmosphère of social and politicai stability, 
Urban unemployment as noted already remains the most 
serious socio-economie problem facing Nigeria. It can 
be reasonably argued that it is one of the major casual 
factors for the sporadic politicai unrests in the country. 
Surely, it is a problem which if not solved within a 
reasonable period of time will continue to undermine the 
country's social and politicai stability and jeopardise 
the chances of achieving a fast rate of economie growth. 
The only way to get to grips with the problem requires 
among others a skilful use of the pay structure for the 
efficient reallocation of labour. However, the question 
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that arises is how can the Nigeria wage policy be geared 
v t'o achieve thèse allocative and income distribution objec-
tives necessary for economie development? 
. f i - . 
In Chapter. Four it was argued that since the présent 
prices and incomes policy machinery is so ineffective 
because of its advisory rôle that a new permanent machinery 
with "teeth" should be established. In this regard; . 
since wage policies cannot fully cope with inflation 
arising from external sources we specifically cali for an 
integrated national development policy which combines both 
wages and incomes policies under one 'roof, to form one 
powerful machinery asowe proposed imChapter " Four with ail 
theofunctions and responsibilities. The danger to economie 
development of the absence of such a machinery is reflected 
in the manner in which wages and incomes in the country 
have over the years been determined by politicai and 
other hon-economic factors without due considérations 
to their implication for economie development. It is in 
this light that a new 'machinery' much more powerful than 
the présent. (PPIB) Productivity Prices and Incomes Board 
which has been no more than a discussion forum is strongly 
advocated for. The composition and functiens cf such a 
body have already been treated in chapter Four. 
Surely, the machinery might not be a panacea for 
ali the ills of wage policy issues in the country, but 
there is no doubt that if the new machinery - Pay and Prices 
Commission - were to be faiTly and efficiently administered, 
it can ensure proper 'pay structure' which would be able 
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to fulfil both labour allocation and income distribution 
objectives necessary for economie development. 
In this section, we have examined the objectives 
of wage policy; we also tried to appraise the Nigérian 
wage structure as an instrument for équitable income1 
d istr ibution, and as an incentive for meeting the manpower 
requirement necessary for rapid economie development. 
Our surveys showed an immense personal significance 
of pay to the respondents. For example, in chapter six, 
a Nigérian Airways luggage loader indicated the 
willingness of his work-mates to join the local trade 
unions, if the union officiais could secure a better pay 
deal for them. Also see chapter 6, Section (A).. 
Further, our research shows that if the government décides 
to use wage policies aa instruments for planning, it 
should not forget workers attitudes and values. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
TOWARDS THE FUTURE 
9.19 Collective Bargaining in Nigeria -
A New Approach and Conclusions. 
In the preceding chapters we presented a picture 
of the main mechanisms of wage détermination process 
in Nigeria. We also examined the rôle of trade unions 
in the wage détermination process. Some hypothèses 
were developed and later tested to establish some 
aspects of employée behaviour and relate them to the 
differing wage détermination mechanisms operating in the 
two organisations. Our analysis reveals that workers 
in the companyvhere collective bargaining process is 
the basis of wage détermination were more satisfied with 
their jobs, and had feelings of a-sensé of achievement. 
In contrast, workers in the other company where other 
forms of wage de terminâtion mechan ism are used were 
found to be alienated. We also examined the structure 
and organisation of the Nigérian trade union movement 
as well as the rôle of wage policy in économie d.evelon-
ment. 
However, given that the question in the country is 
no longer how to institute collective bargaining process in 
the industrial relations system, but how to make it more 
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efficient and effective as a system; we shall consider 
what are the best means of encouraging the development 
of collective bargaining. Hence the purpose of this 
cbapter. 
In chapter three, we found that collective bar­
gaining- process ' in Nigeria was an ineffective and 
almost neglected mechanism of wage détermination inspite 
of the overwhelming support given to it by the social 
partners since its inception in the country. We also 
noted, how, both the first post-independence civilian 
government under the premiership of Tafawa Balewa and 
'••the military administration under General Yakubu Gowon 
did express their commitment to the process through a 
séries of officiai statements at both national and inter­
national levels.*" . One might ask then, why hasn't 
collective bargaining process taken its proper place in 
the Nigérian wage détermination system? 
Undoubtedly, a -number of reasons account for this 
practical neglect. The first and perhaps the most 
important factor is the controversy surrounding the use 
of the term "voluntary 1, in the collective bargaining process, 
in the country. Most government officiais are of the 
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opinion^-Èhat the word' 'voluntary' shoùld not be used 
to prefix the Nigérian collective bargaining process, 
arguing that it encourages 1differentials' in wages and 
conditions of employment in some industries, firms or 
geographical areas, since the term implies leaving the 
régulation o£ termsand conditions of employment. to indi-
vidual employers. The Morgan Commission while commenting 
on the importance of collective bargaining process re-
commended that the government should stress the word 
'collective1 rather than voluntary/ The commission was 
critical of the use of the term 'voluntary* because it 
believes that: 
"a System which leaves the régu-
lation of wages and conditions 
of service to the whims and 
\ discrétion of individual emp-
loyers institutionalises exploi-
tation of the worst kind," 3 
The second factor is common to ail developing 
couhtries which is the fear that "wage explosion" with 
its attendant inflationary tendencies would.resuit if 
wages and other conditions of employment were left to 
the whdms of union and management. The assumption being 
that with most modem trade unions' skill, tactics and 
shrewdness in wage negotiation, inexperienced employers 
can easily be forced .to concede wage payments over and 
above the government guidelines. 
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Thirdly, with the apparent higher strike incidence 
•4 -U' 
in the private sector (usually a consequence of govern-
ment wage commission awards) government officials are 
perhaps assuming that the use o£ collective bargaining 
process in the public sector might aggravate the general 
level of labour conflicts in the country which would 
resült in the further loss of output, discouragement 
to investors and perhaps damage permanently national 
development programmes, henee the use of wage tribunals. 
However, now that the government seems to have 
renewed its commitment to the collective bargaining pro-
cess manifested, for example, by its participation in 
activities which had hitherto been in private hands, 
the indigenisation policy and the growing need for an 
incomes policy, there is now a need for the development 
of a collective bargaining system which would promote the 
economic interests of all the social partners, as well 
as the whole nation. To this end, it is recommended 
that a "social management" system of collective bargaining 
(that is a sort of tripartite system) in which the acere-
dited representativos of the social partners - the workers, 
emp1oyers and the government would particípate be adopted. 
In the new arrangements, the social partners would possess 
equal powers. This would help to allay fears among the 
workers representatives - the trade unions ---'henee there 
would be no grounds for allegations of intimidation and 
victimisations to be made. 
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Before we set out to outline the advantages of 
the new proposai it would be in place to discuss very 
briefly the measures which are necessary if the 'system' 
is to be successful. This issue is important because 
ov-er the years in Nigeria, proposais which 7 look as 
plausible as the one under discussion have been aborfed 
because of lack of adéquate measures to safeguard their 
opérations. For example, in 1964, the Morgan Commission 
recommended a system along the lines of the présent 
proposai called the 'tripartite agreement 1 it got 
off the ground quite allright but was abandoned after 
few years mainly because of issues relating to its 
enforcement. As a conséquence, the application of sanc­
tions is of fundamental importance to the new proposai. 
This is not only because the application of sanctions by 
the parties to a negotiation is important per se, but 
because it is essential for the overall survival of the 
new system. Without sanctions the system cannot 
succeed, no matter how well-structured. 
To this end, it is strongly recommended that a 
spécial 'law' which would have the capacity of making 
ail the agreemeiits reached on every vital issue such as 
on wages and other conditions of employment by this 
body to be 'binding' should be enacted. The importance 
offthis 'légal enactment' to the new proposai is sum-
marized by the comment made by the former fédéral com-
missioner of labour on the use of sanctions. He noted 
that: 
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Sanctions are an essential feature 
of our system of labour administration. 
No law can be effective unless it is 
enf orceable . No law can be enf or.ceable 
unless there be a sanction for its 
breach ... the basis of the-sanctions is 
that the term of awards muSt be capable 
of being upheld at law''.^ 
Surely, without the 'system-' having a forcé of law backed 
up by effective sanctions for its breach by the social 
partners - government, unions.and employers - the new 
proposal will be shortlived. 
With regard to the advantages of the new approach; 
firstly, agreements reached under this platform would 
automat ically rece ive government approval and wouId no 
longer be subjected to either major alterations or 
rejection by any of the.'triáis' since their accredited 
representatives struck such a 'deal1 . Secondly, in 
chapter five.we nóted that one of the problems facing 
the collective bargaining process in the country 
was the impunity with which trade unions reject negotiated 
agreements because of trivial issues. This social manage­
ment system of collective bargaining would elimínate 
such practices, since sanctions would be enforceable 
for breach. 
i 
Thirdly, the problem of unión recognition which has 
remained as one of the most intractable problems facing 
the Nigerian trade unión movement until the later part of 
1978, would be taken care of by the new proposal, since 
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both employers and government récognition would be 
automatic. 
Moreover, apart from the fact that the parties are 
assured of a stable industrial relations during the life 
of'.'.the collective agreement the government is likely to 
be satisfied because it would be convinced that such an 
agreement had been reached with due considérations 
given to its incomes policy objectives. This would remove 
an important factor behind most developing countries 
objection to the use of collective bargaining as a mecha-, 
nism for wage détermination. The assumption being that 
collective bargaining agreements reached by unions and 
management alone often resuit in excessive pay awards over 
and above government projections which are often injurious 
to government macro-economic policies - rapid inflation, 
loss of competitive power for domestic products on world 
i n 
márkets and increase of under-employment and .unemployment. 
Finâlly, the" 'system' would help to reduce strike 
incidence in the country which has always been at the peak, 
whenever government appointed wages and salaries review 
commission makes an award. 
On the other hand, however, those who believe in 
•m 
the doctorine of 'voluntary principie' would argue that 
this arrangement is an infringement by government on 
industrial relations matters, which are sup'posed to be 
purely labour-management affairs . This argument 
looks plausible but the fact remains that in Nigeria, 
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bilateral agreements are usually sent to the government . 
for approval and it is up to government to decide upon its 
legality or the consistency of such agreements. Moreover, 
as a major employer it should not be kept in abeyance in 
industrial relations matters which the régulation of 
wages and o'ther conditions of employment is central. 
' Additionally, besides being involved in its capacity 
as an employer it should particípate under any other 
capacity, because government participation is essential 
if collective bargaining process is to have any credibi-
lity as a mechanism for wage détermination in Nigeria. 
Henee, our new collective bargaining proposai - "social 
management" - which would involve management, unions and 
the government. It is the only System capable of creating 
peaceful industrial relations atmosphère essential for 
rapid économie development which the country is embarking o 
on. 
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i\ CONCLUSION 
• "The method ... by which an end 
is obtained mayi be of.more . . 
conséquence "than the end itself". 
- Henry Maine 
In this thesis, we have been concerned with the 
examination of the various forms or mechanisms of wage 
détermination in Nigeria. The issue has in récent years 
generated considérable debate among académies, industriai-
ists,trade unionists and public administrators over the 
suitability of the periodic government appointed wage com­
missions/arbitrât ion. Since each ehapter in the analysis 
was concluded, this main conclusion would be brief. 
Our analysis of the wage détermination mechanisms 
in the country reveals government continued reliance on wage 
arbitration or --^commission mechanism inspäte of its 
avowed commitment to the principle of voluntary negotia-
tion and collective bargaining process for the détermina­
tion of wages. Government adhérence to the wage arbitration 
commission mechanism stems from its belief that it was the 
only mechanism capable of ensuring adequate protection for 
vulnerable employées particularly those engaged in the 
private sector. 
The collective bargaining process as-'a mechanism 
for wage détermination in the country was found to be 
confined mainly to the private sector and generally in-
effective. A number of factors account for the 
V 
c 
ineffectiveness, thèse include' 
a. Nigérian employers negative attitude towards the 
trade union movement. 
b. Trade union leadership rivalry. \ ^  •
 c • . 
c. Government wage commissions, conséquences for the collec-
tive bargaining process. 
d. Dearth of information. - i 
Firstly, with respect to the employers negative 
attitude, most Nigérian employers detest the idea of 
their firm having any form of trade union encroachment on 
their authority and prerogative powers. The few employers 
that accept the formation of trade unions in their firms 
prescribed the type of union structure and officiais they 
would be prepared to work with,- the weak unions and 
officiais. As a resuit of this negative attitudeflit was 
difficult for the unions to be recognise.d for collective 
bargaining purposes. 
Trade union leaders are often found competing among 
themselves over trade union posts such as the post of the 
President, General-secretary and the Treasurer. The -net 
effect of the leadership rivalry being that the union 
leaders hardly had the time to concentrate or perform 
their traditional unionfunctions which among other things 
include negotiating wage rates and related issues on 
behalf of their members. 
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The belief among most government appointed wage 
commissions about the process of collective bargaining is 
that it is inadequate and unsuitable to Nigeria, because 
it cannot assure economic growth, full-employment and the 
maintenance of equilibrium between prices and incomes. This 
lack of confidence in the effectiveness of collective bar­
gaining as a wage determination mechanism even by the 
authorities makes it more difficult for the workers to give 
hundred percent backing to it as a very strong alternative 
to the present mechanism in use - adhoc wage commissions. 
The dearth of information on vital factors such as on 
cost-of-living trends, labour market situation, wage corn-
par isons and economic cOnd it ion is a fur the r constra int on 
effective collective bargaining. As collective bargaining 
is in part an attempt to settle disputes by an appeal to 
reason than to force, paucity of data on these vital factors 
disrupt the normal process of negotiation based on facts. 
The national minimum wage 'mechanism' was found to be a 
recent development in the Nigeria wage setting scene. And 
the basic objectives include: providing protection for low-
paid workers considered to be in vulnerable position in the 
labour market, the elimination of unfair competition, the 
establishment of a basic floor for the wage structure and as 
a policy instrument to alter the general level and structure 
of wage in line with broad national economic and 
social goals. The national minimum wage fixing 
5 H 
machineries include: the industriai wages boards and the 
use of fair wages clause. While the following factors 
constitute the criteria for fixing it: 
coctcost of living index, 
nature of the work and 
the general level of wages in the country. 
Prices and incomes policy as a mechanism of wage 
détermination was similarly found to be relatively a very 
recent development in Nigeria. It started in 1976, and 
since it is a new introduction its impact on the wage 
détermination scene in the country could not be easily 
isolated. 
It is clearly évident from our analysis that the 
Nigérian trade unions have played a significant role in 
the wage détermination procèss in Nigeria, though they 
have not succeeded in bringing about such wage increases 
through direct negotiation as in the United Kingdora. 
Some of the major problems which have to a large extent 
affected both the trade unions bargaining role and organisa 
tiohal capacity are identif ied and classified into primary 
and secondary problems. The basic or primary problems 
being: 
abuse of office; 
lack of finance , poor éducation and leadership rivalry, 
While .the secondary problems include: 
employers negative attitudes; 
rank and file apathy; and 
prolifération of unions. 
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What are our main findings on the basis o£ our 
hypotheses? Our study reveáis firstly,that employees in 
the firm using the collective bargaining frame-work as a 
basis for determining its work'ers1 wages were more satis-
£ied with their job, pay and other working conditions than 
the employees in the firm under the centralised wage system 
Secondly, the study shows that strike incidence, labour 
turnover and absenteeism rates were lower in the firm 
using the collective bargaining mechanism for the settle-
ment of its employees wage rates. 
Thirdly, our study reveáis that a higher degree of 
mutual understanding, spirit of compromise and cordiality 
exist between labour and management in the firm using the 
collective bargaining mechanism for the determination of 
its employees wages. In addition, our study shows that 
the industry under the collective bargaining arrangement 
has a higher trade unión density " and more articúlate 
trade unión officials. Fourthly, the : study-reveáls that 
the .middle managérs - in the collective bargaining firm -
the Lever Brothers (Nig.) Ltd., have a more sense of 
achievement, self-fulfilment and actualisation than their 
counterparts in the firm under the centralised wage system 
the Nigeria Airways Ltd. The middle managers In the 
Nigeria Airways Ltd were found to be alienated and es-
tranged ,.with a significant proportion finding their. work 
unrewarding and meaninglessy thus prcviding a hard core 
underpinning for our hypotheses. 
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An appraisal of the wage policy shows that it is 
not geared to produce a 'pay structure' which can be used 
as an incentive for the allocation of manpower into desired 
occupations and sectors; for the mobilisation of resources 
for economic development and as an instrument making for 
more equitable income distribution. The inadequacy of the 
pay-structure in these respects stems from the defective 
wage determination system. 
The considerable and potential support for the 
principle of collective bargaining from our study shows 
that it is the only wage determination mechanism capable 
of providing basis for industrial peace if practised 
honestly. This is because it offers a feeling of trust, 
compromises and accomodation. It can change the cynical 
and suspicious attitudes of workers and management 
towards each other. Through effective communication and 
human relationships, labour and management can under­
stand and appreciate their problems more clearly and so 
arrive at agreement through dialogue and cooperation. 
For employees to co-operate, however, their participation 
through their representatives in matters affecting their 
working lives is essential. 
-To make collective bargaining an effective wage 
determination mechanism in the country in order to evolve 
industrial harmony or lessen industrial conflict, it is 
necessary to establish a 'social management' system of 
collective bargaining (a sort of tripartite system) - a 
system which would involve both government, labour and 
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employers. With government participating fully, less 
emphasis would be paid to the wage tribunals. For this 
machinery to be really effective, firstly, it is essential 
to have some sanctions to guide the parties. Thèse 
sanctions would help to ensure that agreements reached 
by the parties are implemented. Secondly, intense labour 
and management éducation tailored to stimulate awareness, 
critical évaluations of labour relations and other issues 
which affect the quality of life in a m o d e m Society is 
essential. The subject matter for this éducation would 
include ail aspects of industrial relations, leadership 
training, role of government in industrial relations 
human relations and indeed any other'subject matters which 
would créate a high level of understanding (between labour, 
management and the government) necessary for the successful 
functioning of collective bargaining process. This study 
has generated many questions which need to be researched 
into, issues such as the role of union in wage détermina-
tion and the question of wage policy and économie 
development. 
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F A C ï U A 1 
VVhat is your job _________ 
(a) How long have you been employed by thîs company 
íb) Have you worked else whcre before £ 
{If yes} 
(c) Which Company M 
For How long 
5Î9 
J NoYoar» 
( i N o 
(d) 
SEX 
(a) 
No. Yearj 
J MALE 
What is your Marital Status: 
1 i Marrísd 
r J Single 
1 ' 1 Widowcd 
Í ~l Divorced 
(bl What was your age last birthday I 
What is your Présent Educational Qualification 
I ~\ WASC 
[ j Primary Six 
FEMALE 
years 
j Higher Elementary 
1 GCE 'O' Level 
None. 
Do you pay any 'Dues' to your Union Yes 
No 
No 
No 
{a} Apart from your Educational qualification, have you had snother formai 
Training on your Présent Job Yes 
Are you a tnemebr of any Union Yesf 
(if yes) 
a What is the Name of your Union, 
tb) 
ïf yes 
(ci How much Is your monthly Dues' f^jalra 
(if not to) 
id) Why is THAT 
Are you a member of any Politicai Party 
íif yes) (a) which politicai party 
GENERAL OPINION QUESTIONS 
_Xobo 
Yes No 
To what extent are you satiffied wlth your i job 
Very sattsfied 
I 1 Satisfied 
S íV ( t S Ç-ï Gr 
Or 
Thinking of your job and the pay that you ^ ' ^ -t doai the pay actutìly 
reflect the effort you put in J Ytw | ~) No 
(rf yes) 
(a) To what degree 
[ 1 Very - V ^ U U 
i i HCT *J c M . 
| " _ 3 Not at all 
8. How would you Rate the Quality of your management in dealing wlth every 
aspect of work situation particulariy in {. R. Matteri e.g. employée probtems 
| J l Excellent 
f" | Very good 
J Good 
] Bad 
3 Very bad 
How "do you find your working conditions compared whh those in sîmilar 
industries or firms 
Are the Conditions 
Very SfvTii ^ H 
I I Average 
| 1 Çûort_ 
How important is it thot emplovee (worker s) should be given information about 
• - \ • the firms or Company's financtal activities/7 t 
I | Very important { [ O ^ ^ ) CUn j O ^ V ^ r . 
I 1 Important . , 
12. What type of the job would you llke to be doing in Jay 3 yoars time; 
13. Do,you think that the joint Indu striai CounciC^ Joinf negotiating CounciH are 
doing a good job in wsge issues; and how would you Rate this 
Very good 
good 
Averagc 
1 Bad 
Very Bad « „ ^ U . ^ 
14. Consldering your yearyrr Industrial maters which shoufd be the most important 
criterion for determing wages. 
J Number of hours worked 
] Working Conditions 
_[ profitabtlity basis 
J Comparability basis 
'J Job évaluation technique 
15. Thinking of your wages, again how far do you think that you are receivîng 
a f air-oays-pay for a fair-days-work? 
(_ j S T ä j ^ u ^ l - ^ ^svjla.. 
I l Agreed 
[ J Moderatcly f Y ^ y - M-A • 
| ~] Drsagreed 
[ | Strongly disagreed 
Name of Respondcnt:•_. 
Address:-: 
JIX tt FIRMSJOR) C O M PANI ES N O T C Q V E R Ë D BY COLLECTIVE BARGAtNl^n 5 2 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. FACTUAL ... 
1. What îs your jnh? 
(a) 
(b) 
(cî 
(dï 
2, sex: 
3. 
4. 
How long have you worked for thrs Company 
Have you worked for another company before 
lf Yes 
Which Company (s) , — 
For how long 
YesCZl 
Years 
NoL^J 
] No. Years 
Imale 
t__3F EMALE 
(a) What is your Marital Status 
I ! Married ' 
I 3 Single 
I I Widowed 
I IDivorced 
(bï What was your age last birthday? 
What is your Présent Educational Qualification 
I ^—1 WASC 
I I Primary Six 
I ] Higher Elementary 
. I ! GCE '0* Level ' 
! None. 
R F ì Years. 
(a) Apart from your Educational Qualification. Have you had anothar Training 
in your présent job Yen ( | 'No 1 
if yes 
Are you a member of any Union Yes.f \ J " 
îfyes • 
(a) What is the Name of your Union:—Li_—s—- — 
(b) Do you pay any Union Dues to your Union Yes 
if yes 
(c) How much is your rnonthly Dues *__r__Naira 
No 
(if No) {d) Why isTHAT 
5. Are you a memmber of any Politicai party? 
îa) Whicn Politicai Party 
Yes. 
No 
Ü_LKobo ' 
B. GENERAL OPINION QUESTIONS 
6. To what extent are you satisf ied with your Présent job 
7. 
J Very satisf ied. 
H S3tisfied 
[] Averagely Satîsfied 
"j Dissatîsfied. 
Very dissatîfied 
Thinkjof your job and the Pay that you get as a resuit, does the pay actually refìect the 
effort you put în . Yes, 
(rf yes) (a) To what degree. 
'No r 
J Very well ' 
1 €i^v"^ ^ 
I 1 A w Ä O c ^ ^ ^ e U 
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9. How do you find your;working condition compared with those in simitar industries. 
r. Are tha.Conditbns „. 
Very Satisfactory 
C~ ï. Satisfactory 
" 7erage 
| | Very Poor i 
10. Thinking of Promotion Prospects generally in the company do you consider you 
prospects to be 
Jfc ^ ^ Very good 
I *^vT j good 
_J Bad 
~~\ Very Bad. 
11. How important is it that Employées (Workers) shouîd be given information about 
the firms or Company's financial octivitie*. * 
[ 3 ^ 1 Very Important \ \ ^ ^ K y 
~~\< Important 
1 Averagely Important 
12. To what extent do you reckon that the Trade Unions should be invoîved in wag« 
détermination Process 
| xX\ Fui! y Commi tted 
l : \ Commltted 
•^Ç] Averagely Commltted 
Not Commltted 
Not at ail commltted. 
13. Do you think thaï the wago Commissions™ »ich es Udojl, A dabo, etc, do a good job? 
o 
how would you Rate such good job? 
j "] Very good 
[ ] flood 
L 3 Z Í ! B a d 
I J Very bad 
14. Consldering yotnV/ealth of expérience In Indurirla! mattarvwhteh should ba the most 
important c rit er Ion for determing wage.£ 
I ~ i No of houi*worked 
j "j Working Condition* 
1 I ProfltaDÍiHy of work 
I ] Comparabllrty oasis 
I / ' [ job évaluation technique 
15. Thinking of your wages, ©gain, how far do you think that you are recelvlng s fair 
days pay for a fair-days work. 
\ \ Totally egreed 
S. How would you Rate the Quality of yóur management in deating with every aspect of 
,-work situation particuiarly in-Employee problems 
" f , ) Excellent 
I j Very good 
j -r ì^ good 
f I Bad 
I 1 Very Bad 
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S U P P L E M E N T T O O F F I C I A L G A Z E T T E N O . 43, VOL. 63, 26TH A U G U S T , 1976— 
P A R T A 
T R A D E UNIONS (CENTRAL L A B O U R O R G A N I S A T I O N S ) 
(SPECIAL P R O V I S I O N S ) DECREE 1976 
DECREE N O . 44 
(18/A Augttst 1976) Commcnccmcot. 
The F E D E R A L M I L I T A R Y G O V E R N M E N T hereby decrecs as fôllows:-
1.—(1) The registration o f the bodics spccîfied in subsection (2) o f this section as central Canccllatton of r> 
labour organisations for the purposcs o f the Tradc Unions Decrce 1973 is hereby canccllcd. Eistratio» of exist-
ing central labour 
(2) The bodies referred to in subsection ( I ) o f this section arc:- organisations. 
(¿1) The Labour Unily Front, 
(6) The Nigérian Tradc Union Congress, 
(c) The Nigérian Workcrs Council, and 
(d) The United Labour Congress o f Nigeria. 
2.—(1) Thcre shall for the purposes o f this Dccrec bc an Admînistrator who shall bc Appointment of 
Administrator and 
of assistants for 
the Administralor. 
appointée! by the Commissioncr with the approval o f the Fédéral Executive Council 
of assistants for 
(2) The Administrator may, after consultation with the Commissioncr, appoint not 
more than six persons to perfonn, or assist in the performance of, such o f the functions o f 
the Administrator as t!ie Administrator may détermine. 
3.—(1) The Administrator is hereby charged with rcsponsibility — Functions of the 
Administrator. 
(a) for performing on behalf o f trade unions the saine dutics as are normally performed 
by a central labour organisation, including — 
( 0 representing the general interests o f trade unions on any advisory body set up 
by the Federai Military Government; 
( » ) promoting the éducation of members o f trade unions in the field o f labour 
relations and connected ftclds; 
(///) collecting and disseminating to members o f trade unions information and ad-
vice on economic and social matters; 
(iv) giving advîce, encouragement and financial assistance to trade unions in need 
thereof; 
(b) for taking ali steps necessary to effect the formation_gf a single central labour orya-
nisation to which shall be afÜIiated ail trade unionsln NigcrîiT ~ 
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(4) If the Inspector-General of Police is satisfied that any property to which this section 
relates continues to be held by any person after the expiration of the period specified in sub­
section (2) above the Inspector-General may direct any police officer to recover such property 
and the police officer so directed may use such force as may be necessary fo effect the recovery 
of the property. 
8. If any person other than the Administrator or any person acting under the authority .Offence in c o g -
of the Administrator — ooctioa with tte 
affairs of old or 
(a) acts or purports to act on behalf of any of the bodies mentioned in section 1 of this labour*** or^aniS-
Decree; ' tiom. 
(b) does anything preparatory to or concerning the formation of a central labour orga­
nisation, 
he shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding N2,000 or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. 
9.—(1) In this Decree — 
"Administrator" means the person appointed as such pursuant to section 2 of this Decree; 
"Commissioner" means the Federal Commissioner charged with responsibility for labour. 
(2) Expressions used in this Decree shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have 
h^e same meaning as in the Trade Unions Decree 1973. 1°73 No. 31 
(3) As from the commencement of this Decree sections 33 to 38 of the Trade Unions 
Decree 1973 shall cease to have effect. 
10. This Decree may be cited as the Trade Unions (Central Labour Organisations) {Spe- Citation. 
cial Provisions) Decree 1976. 
Made at Lagos this 18th day of August, 1976. 
Interpretation, etc 
L t . -Genera l O. Obasanjo 
Head of the Federal Military Government, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 
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APPENDIX D 
STRUCTURE OF NIGERIAN LABOUR MOVEMENT UNDER THE NEW 
ARRANGEMENT, DECEMBER 1978 
NAME OF UNION NUMBER OF ESTIMATED 
MERGING ìi MEMBER-
UNIONS SHIP 
1. National Union of Hotel and 
Provisions of Serv. wòrk 14 6127 
2. National Union of Shop & Dis 
tribut ive Employées 40 30,105 
3. National Union of Petro and 
Naturai Gas Workers 21 13,332 
4. National Union of Chemical & 
Non-metallic Product Workers 37 11,753 
5. Automobile, Boatyard, Trans 
port Equipment and Allied 
Workers' Union of Nigeria 
6. Nigérian Coal Miners Union 
17 6,778 
1 ,610 
7. Nigérian Union of Seamen and 
Water Transport Workers 
8. Nigérian Civil Service Union 
12 
22 
7,606 
37,233 
9. Civil Service Technical Workers' 30 81,316 
Union of Nigeria 
Dl 
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NAME OF UNION 
10. Nigérian Union of Civil Service 
Typists, Stenographic and 
Allied Staff 
NUMBER OF 
MERGING 
UNIONS 
ESTIMATED 
MEMBERSHIP 
10 ,236 
11. Non-academic Staff Union of 
Educational and Associated 
Institutions 33 28,288 
12. National Union of Public Cor­
poration Employées. 17 13,223 
13. Agricultural and Allied Workers 
Union :i: 17 61 ,045 
14. Radio, Television and Théâtre 
Workers' Union 12 1 ,974 
15. Printing and Publishing Workers' 
Union 13 2,963 
16. National Union of Paper and 
Paper Products Workers 10 3,557 
17. Metal Products Workers' Union 
of Nigeria 30 7,793 
18. National Union of Road Transport 
Workers 10 3,301 
19. National Union of Local Govern­
ment Employées 10 19,340 
20. Medical and Health Workers Union 
of Nigeria 17 9,120 
D2 
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NAME OF UNION NUMBER OF " ESTIMATED 
MERCING MEMBERSHIP 
UNIONS 
3 7,221 
22. Nigérian Union of Construction and 
Civil Engineering Workers 22 47,524 
23. National Union of Furniture Fixture 
and Wood Workers 36,474 
24. Footwear, Leather, Rubber Products, 
Workers' Union of Nigeria 
25. National Union of Textile, Garment 
and Tailoring Workers 
1 1 
37 
4,504 
40,908 
26. Iron and Steel Workers Union of 
Nigeria 
27. Metallic and Non-metallic Mines 
Workers 1 Union 
15 6,308 
14,733 
28. National Union of Air Transport 
Services Employées 3,157 
29, National Union of Electricity and 
Gas Workers 
30. Nigérian Union of Pensioners 
11,512 
9,648 
31. Precision Electrical and Related 
Equipments Workers' Union 
32. Dock Workers Union of Nigeria 
33. Nigeria Ports Authority Workers Union 
2,009 
12,591 
11 ,186 
21. National Association of Nigeria 
Nurses and Midwives 
D3 
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NAME OF UNION 
34. Nigerian Union of Teachers 
NUMBER OF 
MERGING 
UNIONS 
ESTIMATED 
MEMBERSHIP 
35. Nigerian Union of Railwaymen 27 352 
36. National Union of Banks, Insurance 
and Financial Institutions 15,401 
37. National Union of Food, Beverage 
and Tobacco Employees 26 14,883 
38. National Union of Postal and 
Telecommunications Employees 9,722 
39. Union of Shipping, Clearing and 
Forwarding Agencies Workers 13 2,845 
40. Recreational Services Employees' 
Union 747 
41. Customs & Excise And Immigration 
Staff Union 2,350 
42. Nigerian Union of Journalists N.A. 
SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATIONS 
43, Electricity and Gas Senior Staff 
Association 1 13 
44. Water Transport Senior Staff 
Association : 1 326 
45. Association of Senior Civil Servants 
of Nigeria N.A 
1,53,541 . 55 
D4 
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46. 
NAME OF UNION 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
Senior Staff Association 
NUMBER OF 
MERGING 
UNIONS 
ESTIMATED 
MEMBERSHIP 
257 
47. Footwear, Leather and Rubber 
Products Senior Staff Association 80 
48. Association of Senior Staff of 
Bank, Insurance and Financial 
Institution 13123 
49. Metallic and Non-metallic Mines 
Senior Staff ossociation 1 ,565 
50. Shop and Distributive Trade 
Senior Staff Association 890 
51. Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior 
Staff Association of Nigeria 991 
S2\ Chemical and Non-metallic Products 
Senior Staff Association 113 
53. Senior Staff Association of 
Shipping, Clearing and Forwarding 
Agencies 46 
54. Textile, Garment and Tailoring 
Senior Staff Association 284 
55. 
-Automobile, Boatyard, Transport 
Equipment and Allied Senior 
Staff Association 2 260 
D5 
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56. 
NAME 0F UNION 
Senior Staff Association of 
Statutory Corporations and 
Government-owned Companie s 
NUMBER OF 
MERGING 
UNIONS 
ESTIMATED 
MEMBERSHIP 
1 ,780 
57. Construction and Civil 
Engineering Senior Association 161 
"PROFESSIONAL UNIONS 
58. National Association of Aircraft 
Pilots and Engineers 
59. Nigérian Médical Association 
78 
N.A. 
60. Académie Staff Union of Nigérian 
Universities N.A. 
61/ Nigérian .Union of Professions 
\ Allied to Medicine 536 
EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION 
62. National Union of Agricultural and 
Allied Employers 
63. Nigérian Employers Association 
Bänlcs, Insurance & Allied 
Institutions 39 
64. National Association of Conversancy 
Employers 2 350 
65. Association of Food Beveragl 
and Tobacco Employers 6 932 
D6 531 
66. 
NAME OF UNION NUMBER OF 
MERGING 
UNIONS 
ESTIMATED 
MEMBERSHIP 
285 
67. Construction & Civil Engineering 
Employers' Association of Nigeria N.A. 
68. National Union of Dock 
Labour Employers N.A N.A 
69. R o a d r T r a n 5 p o r t Employers' 
Association of Nigeria 718 
70. Nigérian Mining Employers 
Association 50 
CENTRAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 
Nigeria Labour Congress 42 N.A 
TOTAL 946 837,375 
Hotel and Personal Service 
Employers' Association 
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LEVER BROTHERS NIGERIA LTD. 
PRICE LISTS 
SOAP AND DETERGENTS 
OUR SELLING MAXIMUM 
PRODUCT PACK PRICE PER CASE RETAIL PRICE 
Key Bar (Yellow & Green) 30 Bars N16, .80 63k 
Handprint Bar 30 " N13. .87 5 2k 
Sunlight Soap 72 Tablets N12, .08 19k 
Lux Toilet Soap Personal 144 N 8. .96 7k 
Lux Toilet Soap Popular 96 N11 . 95 14k 
Lux Toilet Soap Standard 
(White,Pink,Green & Blue) 72 N14, .72 23k 
Lux Toilet Soap Bath 
(White,Pink»Green & Blue) 36 N 9 .60 30k 
Rexona Toilet Soap Standard 72 H12 .80 20k 
Astral Soap Standard 72 N1 7 .92 '28k 
Astral Soap Bath 36 NÏ3 .83 44k 
Asepso Standard 7.2 N22 .94 37k 
Omo Sachet 144 Sachets N15 .30 12k 
Omo/Surf Medium 48 Packets N19 .48 4 5k 
Omo/Surf Large 24 N17 .47 80k 
Omo/Surf Giant 12 N18 .20 N2.50 
Omo/Surf Bulk 10-kg. Bag N13 .00 N13.00 
Vini Medium 24 Canisters N 9 ;64 45k 
Vim Large 24 N13 .88 65k 
Nobla L 4 Kegs N13 .00 N3.25 
Nobla L 200-kg. Drum Nil 5 .00 • N115.00 
Penetrax Ordinary 200-kg. Drum N120 .00 N120.00 
Penetrax Special 200-kg. Drum N195 .00 N195.00 
Hytox 4 kegs N1 S .00 N3.75 
Hytox 200-kg. Drum N145 .00 N145.0Û 
This Price List replaces ail previous Price Lists. 
EFFECTIVE : 24th December 1980 
GENERAL SALES MANAGER 
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LEVER BROTHERS NIGERIA LTD 
PRICE LISTS 
EDIBLES 
OUR SELLING ,f 
PRICE MAXIMUM 
PRODUCT PACK PER CASE RETAIL PRICE 
Tree Top Orange ' 12 : Botties N14 . 45 Nl .40 
Tree Top Lemon 12 . !! N14. ,45 N1 .40 
Tree Top Pineapple 12 I t N14. ,45 N1 .40 
Tree Top Lime 12 I t N16. .08 N1 .55; 
Tree Top Black Currant 12 N19. .63 Nl .90 
Tree Top Instant (Orange) 144 Sachets N14 , .93 12k 
Tree Top Instant (Pineapple) 144 t i M14, .93 12k 
Blue Band Margarine Medium 48 Tins N25. .12 58k 
Blue Band Margarine Large 24 i t N20. .50 95k 
Blue Band. Margarine Giant 8 i t N31 .00 N4.35 
Cookeen Small 36 t t N36 .05 N1 .15 
Cookeen Large 12 N31 .33 N3 .00 
Covo 1-Litre 12 Botties N35 . 56 N3.50 
Covo 4-Litre 4 Tins N37 .10 N11 .00 
Covo Industriai 18-Litre Tin K34 .00 N34.00 
Soft Planta Tub Small 24 Tub s N13 .15 68k 
Soft Planta Tub Large 12 Tub s N1 2 .68 N1 .32 
Planta Packet (225gm.) 48 Packets N21 .25 55k 
Holsum Bakery Fat Ordinary 16-kg. Tin N19 .00 . M19.00 
Special Holsum Bakery Fat 16-kg. Tin N19 .50 N19.50 
Holsum Bakery Fat Ordinary 190 -kg. Drum N215 .00 N215.00 
Special Holsum Bakery Fat 190 -kg. Drum N220 .00 N220.00 
Bi skin 190 -kg * Drum N2 5 5 .00 w ? 1 ^ no 
Solo 160 1 -kg. Drum N210 .00 N210.00 
Palmin 190 i-kg - Drum N230 .00 N230.00 
This price list replaces all previous price lists. 
Effective: 24th December 1980. 
General Sales Manaeer 
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LEVER BROTHERS NIGERIA LIMITED 
PRICE LIST 
TOILETTERIES 
OUR SELLING MAXIMUM 
PRODUCT -, PACK PRICE PER DOZEN RETAIL PRICE 
Pepsodent Standard 12 X 12 Tubes N4 .96 48k 
Pepsodent Large 12 x 12 N7 .2-2 70k 
Pepsodent Economy • 6 X 12 N10 .61 N1 .05k 
Pepsodent Family 4 X 12 N1 3 .61 N1.35k 
Close-Up Standard 12 X 12 N 5 .47 53k 
Close-Up Large 12 X 12 N 7 .72 75k 
Close-Up Economy 6 X 12 N11 .61 N1.15k 
Close-Up Family 4 X 12 NI 4 .61 N1.45k 
Astral Cream Popular 6 X 12 Pots N 7 .50 75k 
Astral Cream Large 4 X 12 t l NI 1 .54 N1 .20k 
Astral Cream Family 3 X 12 t l N18 .00 N1.80k 
This pirce list replaces ail previous price lists. 
Effective: 24th December, 1980 
GENERAL SALES MANAGER 
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LEVER BROTHERS NIGERIA LIMITED 
15 DOCKYARD ROAD, 
P.O. BOX 15, 
APAPA, 
Nigeria. 
TELEPHONE: APAPA 803300-9 
TELEGRAMS: NEPTUNE, APAPA 
TELEX: 21520 
24th December, 1980. 
PRICE LISTS . 
CONDITIONS OF SALE 
1. Conditions of sales and prices are liable to be amemded. 
2. Minimum order quantities will be as specified by the •'.'<>'.-
Company from time to time. 
3. Payments will be'made fuïly in cash before collection of 
goods ëxoept as specified by the Company. 
4. The price to be charged will be that price ruling at the 
date of collection. 
5. The buyer shall be responsible for the collection of the 
goods from the Company's premises unless otherwise agreed. 
6. The Company does not accept anyliability to supply any 
order in total or in part. 
7. Title to goods passes from the Company on collection from 
a duly authorised dépôt to the buyer. 
8. The Company will not be liable for any defect in the goods 
once they have left its premises. 
9. All accredited customers of the Company agree :.to seil only 
at those maximum prices that may be specified from time 
to time by the Company. 
10. Any sales above the fixed maximum prices will lead to 
immediate termination of supplies. 
DIRECTORS: 
Nigjerian: Dr. M.O. Omolayole (Chairman/Managing Director) 
British : J.H. Kempster (Vice-Chairman/Deputy Managing 
Director) 
Nigerian: A.A. Abidogun 
Brithsh:; B.K. Bezant 
Dutch : J. Derwig 
Nigerian: Alhaji S.O. Alatise 
Nigerian: J.A. Adediran 
British : M. I. Duns 
Nigerian: C O . Enuke 
Nigerian: Chief R.F. Giwa 
Nigerian: A.A. Ayida 
Nigerian: S.C. Ikenze 
I 
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O\RRIER/SECT0R BRITONS NIGERIANS OTHERS TOTAL 
BRITISH CALEDÖNIAN: 
KANO/LONDON 
LAGOS/LONDON 
NATIONALITY MIX % 
2640) 
20052) 2 2r 8 9 2 
29.1% 
3872 K 
34566) 3 8 4^ 8 
. 48.9% . 
2380). 
14840) 1 7 • 
22.0%^ 
9092) 
69458) 
100% 
LONDON/KANO 
LONDON/LAGOS 
NATIONALITY MIX % 
NIG/UK/NIGERIA 
NATIONALITY" MIX % 
3633)„ 
2 1 4 3 2 ) 2 5 0 6 5 
34.7% 
47957 
31.8% 
2953) 
29941) 33 8 9 4 
45.6% 
71332 
47.3% 
1856) 
12381) 
19.7% 
31457 
20.9% 
100% 
150746 
100% 
NIGERIA AIRWAYS: 
KANO/LONDON 
LAGOS/LONDON 
NATIONALITY MIX % 
7 5 1 > 3 1 9 1 
2 4 4 0 ) 3 i y i 
6.4% 
6 3 9 4 ) 3 9 8 5 3 3 3 4 5 9 ) J y ö ^ 
80.1% 
4 3 4 7 ) 6 7 0 4 
13.5% 
9 5 0 2 ) 4 9 7 4 8 
4 0 2 4 6 ) — " 
100% 
LONDON/KANO 
LONDON/LAGOS 
NATIONALITY MIX % 
NIG/UK/NIGERIA 
NATIONALITY MIX % 
6.9% 
7336 
6.7% 
8 1 3 1 ) 4 9 6 4 0 -4^509) / b < f c U 
82.0% ' 
89493 
81.1% 
1 7 7 7 W 
4 9 6 7 ) 0 / 4 4 
1 1.1% 
13448 
12.2% 
10789) 
49740) 6 (V 2 9 
100% 
110277 
100% 
TOTAL: NIG/UK(BR+WT) 
BR % CARRIED 
WT % CARRIED 
26083 
87.8% 
12.2% 
78291 
4?.T% 
50.9% 
23924 
75.0% 
28.0% 
128298 
6>2% 
38„8% 
TOTAL: UK/NIGCBR+WT) * 
BR % CARRIED 
WT % CARRIED 
29210 
85.8% 
14.5% 
82534 
39^9% 
^€0.1%\. 
20981 
67.9% 
132725 
54.4% 
^4576| > 
TOTAL: NIG/UK/NIGERIA 
(BR + WT) 
BR % SHARE 
WT % SHARE" 
NATIONALITY MIX % 
55293 
86.7% 
13.3% 
21.2%' 
160825 
44.. 4%. 
55.. 6% 
61.6% 
44905 
70.1% 
29.9% 
17,2% 
261023 
57.8% 
4^.2% 
100% 
YEAR 1 9 8 0 
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APPENDIX F NIGERIA AIRWAYS LIMITED „ . ...... . 
_ ..PASSENGER CARRIED BY C'iRKIER BY NATIONALTTY... 
ROUTE: EUROPEAN 
TABLE: 1 
NIGERIA/UK/NIGERIA 
F1 
- 7 -
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HOUTE; AMERICAN • I 
- T A B L E .1 NIGER I Ą/TJ5 A/NIGERI A 
carrier/sector AMERICANS NIGERIANS LIBERI AN OTHERS TOTAL • 
PAN AM 
LAGOS/ta YORK 
NATIONALITY MIX # 
3,099 
2-U4Í 
8,543 
58 •>• 
2,856 
19.7^ 
14,498 
IOO56 
NEW YORK/LaGOS 
NATIONALITY MIX $ 
NIGERlA/llS A/CICERI A 
NATIONAL ITY MIX $ 
2,982 
23.35$ 
6,08i . 
22.306 
8,081 
62.9SÊ-
16,624 
60.0?6 
-
1,775 
13.85& 
4,631 
16.955 
12,838 
1005$ 
27,336 
1005$ 
NIGERIA AIRW/YS LIMITED 
LAGOS/NEW YORK 
NATIONALITY MIX % 
1,333 
11.95$ 
8,800 
78,756 — 
1,056 11,197 
1005$ 
NEW YORK/Í.AGOS 
NATIONALITY MIX % 
NIGER iA/tJ S A/NIGERIA 
NATIONALITY MIX 5$ 
1,494 
12.2$ 
2,827 
12.1?6 
9,908 
8o.9# 
18,716 
ISM 
-
842 
1,898. 
8.15$ 
12,244 
23,441 
IOO36.. 
TOTAL: NIGERIANA (PArfWT) 4,432 17,351 - 3,912 25,695 
PA 5$ CARRIED 
m f0 CARRIED 
69.95$ 49^$ 
50.85$ 
tow 73iofo 
27.05$ 
56.45$ 
43«6j$ 
TOTAL: USA/NIGERIA (PA+WT) 4,476 17,989 2,617 25,082 
PA $ CARRIED 
. WT % CARRIED 
66.6?¿ 
33.45$ 
44.9?$ 
55.1# 
-
32.$ 
51.$ 
48.85$ 
TOTAL: NIGERIa/USaAhGERIA 
(PAł-WT) 
PA 5$ SHARE 
WT 5$ SHARE 
NATIONALITY MIX $ 
8,908 
68.3?o 
31.75$ 
17.55$ 
35 , 340 
47.056 
53.05$ 
69.6^ 
a w 
6,529 
70.95$ 
29.195 
12.95$ 
50,777 
53.85? 
46»?# 
1005$ 
TABLE 2 NIGERIĄ/BRĄZ IL/NIGERIA 
carrier/sector BRAZILIANS NIGERIANS OTHERS TOTAL 
VARIG 
lagos/brazil 931 1,199 1,239 3,369 
nationality mix % 27.6/1 35.6£ 36.85$ 100t$ 
brazil/laoos 1,390 1,006 963 3,359 
nationality mix 56 41.45? 29.9Í 1005$ 
NIGERlA/BRAZIL/falGERlA 
nationality mix 5$ 
2,321 2,205 2,202 6,728 
34-55$ 32.85$ 32.7£ 1005$ 
I^O u ' ï d : Ai-RÏCAN 
CARRIER/SECTOR GHANAIANS NIGERIANS FRENCH OTHERS TOTAL 
GHANA AIRWAYS LIMITED: 
LAGOS/WEST COAST 33 ,170 2 , 2 4 1 304 1 ,909 3 7 , 6 2 4 
NATIONALITY MIX % 88*2% 6.0% 0.8% 5.0% 100% 
WEST COAST/LAGOS 3 3 , 0 3 7 2 ,199 396 2 , 3 6 6 3 7 , 9 9 8 
NATIONALITY M I X % ; 86c9% 5.8% 1.0% 6 .3% 100% 
NIGERIA/WEST COAST/NIGERIA 6 6 , 2 0 7 4 , 4 4 0 700 4 , 2 7 5 7 5 , 6 2 2 
NATIONALITY M I X % 87 .5% 5.9% 0.9% 507% 100% 
NIGERIA AIRWAYS LIMITED: . 
LAGOS/WEST COAST 1 3 , 6 0 8 1 4 , 6 5 0 3 ,470 7 , 2 2 0 3 8 , 9 4 8 
NATIONALITY M I X % 34.9% 37.6% "8.9% 18 .6% 100% 
WEST COAST/LAGOS 5 , 3 2 9 11*729 2 , 8 7 3 6 , 4 2 9 2 6 , 3 6 0 
NATIONALITY M I X % 20.2% 44 .5% 10 .9% 24 .4% 100% 
NIGERIA/WEST COAST/NIGERIA 1 8 , 9 3 7 2 6 , 3 7 9 6 , 3 4 3 1 3 , 6 4 9 6 5 , 3 0 8 
NATIONALITY M I X % 29 .0% 40.4% 9.7% 20 = 9% 100% 
CAMEROUN AIRWAYS LIMITED: 
LAGOS/WEST COAST _ - 1 ,328 2 , 2 3 1 787 4 , 3 4 6 
NATIONALITY M I X % - 30.6% 51 .3% 1 8 . 1 % 100% 
WEST COAST/LAGOS 1 ,451 1,492 756 3 , 6 9 9 
NATIONALITY M I X % — 39.2% 4 0 . 3 % 2 0 . 5 % 100% 
NIGERIA/WEST COAST/NIGERIA — 2 , 7 7 9 3 , 7 2 3 1 ,543 8 , 0 4 5 
NATIONALITY M I X % 34 .5% 46 .3% 19 .2% • 100% 
AIR AFRIQUE: 
LAGOS/WEST COAST — 4 , 3 9 5 9 , 4 2 9 3 , 6 3 1 1 7 , 4 5 5 
NATIONALITY M I X % - 25 .2% 54 .0% 20 .8% 100% 
WEST COAST/LAGOS 3 , 5 0 1 5 , 2 4 2 3 ,416 1 2 , 1 5 9 
NATIONAL!TY M I X % — 28 .8% 4 3 . 1 % 2 8 . 1 % 100% 
NIGERIA/WEST COAST/NIGERIA — 7 , 8 9 6 1 4 , 6 7 1 7 , 0 4 7 2 9 , 6 1 4 
NATIONALITY MIX % - 26o7% 49 »5% 23 ,8% 100% 
AIR GABON:' 
LAGOS/WEST COAST — 976 1 ,561 836 3 , 3 7 3 
NATIONALITY MIX % - 28 c 9% 4 6 . 3 % 24 .8% 100% 
WEST COAST/LAGOS 1,151 1 ,176 921 3 ,248 
NATIONALITY MIX % - 35.4% 36 .2% 28 .4% 100% 
NIGERIA/WEST COAST/NIGERIA - 2 , 1 2 7 2 , 7 3 7 1 ,757 6 , 6 2 1 
NATIONALITY M I X % - 32.2% 4 1 . 3 % 26 .5% 100% 
UTA: 
KANOAJEST COAST 15 99 71 185 
NATIONALITY M I X % 
- 8 . 1 % 53-5% 38.4% 100% 
WEST COAST/KANO 11 128 74 213 
NATIONALITY MIX % _ 5,2% 6 0 . 1 % 34.7% 100% 
NIGERIAAJEST COAST/NIGERIA - 26 227 145 398 
NATIONALITY M I X % 
- 6 .5% 57c0% 36.5% 100% 
-
 5 3 Q 
TABLE: 1 NIGERIA/WEST COAST (AFRICA)/NIGERIA 
G : 539 
•¡¿1 
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